Adds modes, multimodal, releases, release_security, retention_scheduler,
suggestions and the vendored hux-runtime plugin modules to lint, LOC and
coverage enforcement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BvMSXH8VH2tMWXanb8SJdf
The Flux release renderer now accepts an expected-consumer set per
workload (chat may carry the HUX sidecar as a second consumer of the
exact same WebUI image) and binds HUX_IMAGE_TAG/HUX_IMAGE_DIGEST env
metadata to the released tag and digest when those fields are present.
Rendering fails when the binding fields are incomplete, keeping the
image identity single-sourced. Tests adapt to both topologies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BvMSXH8VH2tMWXanb8SJdf
Defense in depth: the tenant router deletes every browser-supplied
X-Hux-* header before asserting its own HUX identity headers, so no
client can forge subject, trust class, or relay key. Regression covers
X-Hux-Subject, X-Hux-Trust and X-Hux-Relay-Key forgeries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BvMSXH8VH2tMWXanb8SJdf
Standalone per-card browser model/security/view modules for HUX-01..10
plus node+pytest suites that read the hux.v1 contract schemas directly.
Reconciled drift found on integration: the activity model now accepts
all 32 hux.event.v1 kinds (delegation.*, memory.suppressed,
memory.retrieval_removed, budget.exhausted, side_effect.*), the
autonomy model carries the external_side_effect capability, and the
foundation boundary test now asserts the shipped static HUX surface
exists on disk and that images never bake activated HUX_FLAGS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BvMSXH8VH2tMWXanb8SJdf
GET /hux/v1/conversations/{id}/privacy reports forgotten, memory_disabled,
topics, mode and memory_writes_allowed; the worker hook's memory gate reads it
and fails closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
User artifacts are never rewritten, but a secret pattern in a version marks
the artifact restricted and audits the reason (review a2-C, SO-12).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
F3 memory edits go through the same privacy shaping as proposals; F5 seq is
derived from the ledger tail so a crash between append and checkpoint never
duplicates; F7 transitions re-read under the lock and always write with the
loaded revision; F9 secret scrub on titles, passages, claims and notebooks
and forget blanks the conversation document; F13 no ghost conversations
from notices, idempotency under the lock, artifact titles searchable,
normalised paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
F1 policy writes and allow grants are human-surface only; F2 worker trust is
confined to the hook allowlist and unexpected exceptions become audited 500
error records; F4 external side effects release only for the same run and
argument hash; F6 the gate honours budget exhaustion; F8 only the gateway
can vouch for an empty process registry and failed receipts can be
superseded; F11/F12 receipt revision and unshipped card routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
Stdlib client the agent runtime calls around its tool loop; fails closed for
side effects, fails open for telemetry, never carries raw arguments or outputs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
Per-conversation monotonic event ledger with idempotent emit, SSE replay from
Last-Event-ID, per-kind detail allowlists and secret scrubbing, surface-aware
serve-time redaction; memory as an append-only ledger with no-store,
supersede, forget and retrieval tombstones so 'do not remember' blocks both
persistence and retrieval; sensitive-topic scoping, notices, conversation
forget and a retention job that never touches audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
Scoped policies resolved through the single capability matrix, grants with
server-set expiry, approval queue with once/session/always/deny, pre-side-effect
gate that releases a once approval exactly once against the argument hash,
run budgets with exhaustion events, honest cancellation receipts; projects,
conversations, branch lineage and search over the indexed fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
Immutable content-addressed artifact versions with If-Match, lineage that must
resolve under the caller, unified diffs, promotion; sources/passages/citations
with server-side hashing and dedupe, citation integrity checks and revisioned
research notebooks. Cross-tenant access is 404 and audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
Stdlib per-tenant service: trusted-header identity (router/relay/worker,
constant-time keys, slot pinned to the pod), fail-closed card flags with
capability negotiation, tenant-scoped store (atomic writes, revisions,
append-only ledgers, content-addressed blobs, manifest), audit outcome for
every request, and the /hux/v1 pipeline that maps errors to hux.error.v1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
