The acceptance harness pinned a forge client that has never existed in any
commit or pod (/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py, digest f0943db4..., GIT/POST
grammar, an askpass helper). Every Gitea-backed check was therefore
unrunnable as merged. Point the harness at the credential-isolated SCM
broker client that actually ships in the agent pod.
- policy: GITEA_CLIENT=/opt/scm/gitea_api.py; trust /opt/scm/ instead of
the phantom /opt/coordinator/; admit the client's real grammar
(`read <api-path>`, exactly one path) with the same atlas/titan-iac pin
and dot-segment rejection; bare HTTP methods are refused in every mode.
The armed POST/PATCH/DELETE windows remain but are documented as
deferred: the deployed client cannot execute them.
- exec: pin the client digest to the sha256 of
services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py — the exact file the
hermes-scm-boundary-v2 ConfigMap mounts at /opt/scm/gitea_api.py — so
the pin is derivable from merged source and equal to the deployed
client. gitea_api.py gains a narrow /api/v1/user identity read in
_authorize_read (see below), so the pin is the NEW source hash
76efd16dedbeb74425b12fbbdbfaa391854771292077e0463bf22706855ae6dc.
Drop the dangling GIT_ASKPASS (no helper exists; broker git needs
none) and swap /opt/coordinator for /opt/scm in SAFE_PATH.
- checks: all forge/baseline/lineage probes use (client, "read", path).
The SELF-vantage identity checks now truthfully assert the *broker's*
forge identity (the only one the platform can exercise) is not an
administrator and holds push-scoped, non-administrative repository
authority; the administrative-route check asserts the broker read
allowlist's live refusal of branch_protections. The remote-main step
keeps `origin` (the broker remote exists only in pool workspaces and
the broker origin is cluster-local); its rationale now tells the
operator to ensure origin fetchability.
- gitea_api.py/_authorize_read: allow exactly `/api/v1/user` (no query,
no sibling routes) as operation "identity" so the harness can prove
the broker identity is not an administrator. The broker imports the
same module, so one reviewed edit covers both sides of the boundary.
- rules: DENIAL_MARKERS now match the client's real refusal lines
("SCM broker request failed with HTTP 400/403" and the no-credential
rejection) and drop "gitea api returned http 403", which the client
never emits; a broker 404 is deliberately not denial evidence.
- ephemeral: index/verification reads use the real grammar; manual
cleanup guidance now says close/delete require operator forge
credentials (the client exposes no mutation besides create-draft);
armed mode is documented as deferred until the probes are rebuilt on
the broker's bounded mutation surface.
- docs: broker vantage/evidence section, operator prerequisites (broker
healthy, no /vault/secrets/gitea-token anywhere on the harness path,
current ConfigMap mount, operator-side client + origin fetchability),
armed-mode deferral.
- tests: read-grammar accepted / GET refused in every mode, /opt/scm
attestation pin proven equal to the merged source digest, real
denial-marker matching, /api/v1/user identity route bounds; the
repository-pin mutant probe speaks the new grammar. Full handoff +
gitea + broker families pass (952 tests), mutation gate 13/13, per-file
line+branch coverage >=95%, all touched sources within the 500-line cap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
488 lines
18 KiB
Python
488 lines
18 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Bounded, screened, provenance-attested command execution.
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It bounds pipes, times out and reaps the process group, and discards truncated output.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import math
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import os
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import selectors
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import shlex
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import shutil
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import signal
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import stat
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import subprocess
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import time
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from collections.abc import Callable, Mapping, Sequence
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from contextlib import suppress
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any
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from hermes_handoff_policy import GITEA_CLIENT, READ_ONLY, PolicyError, check_argv
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from hermes_handoff_redaction import (
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DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES,
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TRUNCATION_NOTE,
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redact,
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safe_text,
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scrub,
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)
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DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 25.0
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DEFAULT_RUN_DEADLINE = 900.0
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DEFAULT_CLEANUP_RESERVE = 90.0
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MAX_COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 600.0
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MAX_RUN_DEADLINE = 7200.0
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MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
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READ_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
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PIPE_DRAIN_SECONDS = 0.25
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SAFE_PATH = (
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"/opt/data/tools/bin:/opt/hermes/.venv/bin:/opt/scm:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"
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)
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# These exact allowlists are intentionally dense: reviewers compare them as a
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# single provenance boundary rather than as extensible application config.
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# fmt: off
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ENV_PASSTHROUGH = ("KUBECONFIG", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE", "SSL_CERT_FILE")
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# No GIT_ASKPASS: no askpass helper ships in the pod, and none is needed —
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# authenticated SCM traffic goes through the credential-isolated broker.
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FIXED_ENVIRONMENT = {"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": "/dev/null", "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": "1",
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"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0", "GITEA_BASE_URL": "https://scm.bstein.dev",
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"LC_ALL": "C", "PATH": SAFE_PATH}
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EXPECTED_PATHS = {
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"kubectl": {"/opt/data/tools/bin/kubectl", "/usr/local/bin/kubectl", "/usr/bin/kubectl"},
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"git": {"/usr/bin/git", "/bin/git"},
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"hermes": {"/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes"},
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"sh": {"/usr/bin/sh", "/bin/sh"},
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GITEA_CLIENT: {GITEA_CLIENT},
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}
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EXPECTED_SHA256 = {
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"kubectl": {"3d514dbae5dc8c09f773df0ef0f5d449dfad05b3aca5c96b13565f886df345fd"},
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"git": {"a0e562e4bd3c4c79379e91d8c07a10104b2cefe8fac966dc6bd4874a57a807f3"},
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"sh": {"367967c823a0c391e5049b15a67c6a0a629c88b9b6dcdca75ef13ac9d65334b1"},
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"hermes": {"c8419290ef7f1a95f59eadcea9f58f446b1e6535a7f4ffee9f1c0cb1172335e4"},
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# sha256 of services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py: the ConfigMap
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# hermes-scm-boundary-v2 mounts that exact file at /opt/scm/gitea_api.py,
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# so this pin is derivable from merged source and equal to the deployed one.
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GITEA_CLIENT: {"76efd16dedbeb74425b12fbbdbfaa391854771292077e0463bf22706855ae6dc"},
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}
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DEADLINE_ERROR = "deadline-exceeded"
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TIMEOUT_ERROR = "timeout"
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OPERATOR = "operator"
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SELF = "self"
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CONTEXT_AWARE_BINARIES = ("kubectl",)
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POD_COMMAND_PATHS = {"kubectl": "/usr/local/bin/kubectl", "hermes": "/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes",
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"git": "/usr/bin/git", "sh": "/bin/sh", GITEA_CLIENT: GITEA_CLIENT}
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# fmt: on
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Attestation:
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"""The exact outer executable used for a probe."""
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path: str
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sha256: str
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Capture:
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"""Raw bounded process result returned by an executor implementation."""
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returncode: int
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stdout: bytes = b""
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stderr: bytes = b""
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stdout_truncated: bool = False
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stderr_truncated: bool = False
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timed_out: bool = False
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Outcome:
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"""The screened, bounded result of one probe command."""
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argv: tuple[str, ...]
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vantage: str
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returncode: int | None = None
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stdout: str = ""
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stderr: str = ""
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truncated: bool = False
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duration_ms: int = 0
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error: str | None = None
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executable_path: str = ""
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executable_sha256: str = ""
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@property
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def ok(self) -> bool:
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return self.error is None and self.returncode == 0 and not self.truncated
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@property
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def ran(self) -> bool:
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return self.error is None
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@property
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def combined(self) -> str:
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return "\n".join(part for part in (self.stdout, self.stderr) if part)
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def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
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return scrub(
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{
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"command": redact(shlex.join(self.argv)),
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"vantage": self.vantage,
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"returncode": self.returncode,
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"stdout": self.stdout,
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"stderr": self.stderr,
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"truncated": self.truncated,
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"duration_ms": self.duration_ms,
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"error": self.error,
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"executable_path": self.executable_path,
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"executable_sha256": self.executable_sha256,
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}
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)
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Vantage:
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"""A named identity and transport used to observe a probe."""
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name: str
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prefix: tuple[str, ...] = ()
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inserts: Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]] = field(default_factory=dict)
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env: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
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command_paths: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
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description: str = ""
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def wrap(self, argv: Sequence[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
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command = tuple(argv)
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if command:
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replacement = self.command_paths.get(command[0])
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if replacement:
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command = (replacement, *command[1:])
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extra = self.inserts.get(command[0].rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
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if extra:
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command = (command[0], *extra, *command[1:])
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return (*self.prefix, *command)
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def _finite_number(name: str, value: Any, minimum: float, maximum: float) -> float:
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if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float)):
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raise ValueError(f"{name} must be numeric")
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converted = float(value)
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if not math.isfinite(converted) or not minimum <= converted <= maximum:
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raise ValueError(
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f"{name} must be finite and between {minimum:g} and {maximum:g}"
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)
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return converted
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def _byte_budget(value: Any) -> int:
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if (
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isinstance(value, bool)
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or not isinstance(value, int)
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or not 1 <= value <= MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES
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):
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raise ValueError(
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f"max_bytes must be an integer between 1 and {MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES}"
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)
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return value
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def build_environment(
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vantage: Vantage, source: Mapping[str, str] | None = None
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) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Build a deterministic child environment without caller-controlled PATH."""
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origin = os.environ if source is None else source
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environment = {name: origin[name] for name in ENV_PASSTHROUGH if name in origin}
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environment.update(FIXED_ENVIRONMENT)
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environment.update(vantage.env)
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environment["PATH"] = SAFE_PATH
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environment["GITEA_BASE_URL"] = FIXED_ENVIRONMENT["GITEA_BASE_URL"]
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return environment
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# fmt: off
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def operator_vantage(kubeconfig: str | None = None, context: str | None = None) -> Vantage:
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inserts = dict.fromkeys(CONTEXT_AWARE_BINARIES, ("--context", context)) if context else {}
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detail = " ".join(part for part in (f"context={context}" if context else "",
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"kubeconfig-pinned" if kubeconfig else "") if part)
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return Vantage(name=OPERATOR, inserts=inserts,
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env={"KUBECONFIG": kubeconfig} if kubeconfig else {},
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description=f"operator {detail}".strip())
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def pod_vantage(namespace: str, pod: str, container: str, operator: Vantage | None = None) -> Vantage:
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reach = operator.inserts.get("kubectl", ()) if operator else ()
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return Vantage(name=SELF, prefix=("kubectl", *reach, "exec", "--namespace", namespace,
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pod, "--container", container, "--"),
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env=dict(operator.env) if operator else {}, command_paths=POD_COMMAND_PATHS,
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description=f"in-pod {namespace}/{pod}[{container}]")
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# fmt: on
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def attest_executable(command: str, environment: Mapping[str, str]) -> Attestation:
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"""Resolve and hash an executable from a fixed, trusted path set."""
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name = command if command == GITEA_CLIENT else command.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
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candidate = (
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command if "/" in command else shutil.which(command, path=environment["PATH"])
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)
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if not candidate:
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raise OSError(f"trusted executable is unavailable: {name}")
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resolved = str(Path(candidate).resolve(strict=True))
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allowed = {
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str(Path(item).resolve(strict=False))
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for item in EXPECTED_PATHS.get(name, set())
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}
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if resolved not in allowed:
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raise OSError(f"executable resolved outside its trusted paths: {name}")
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details = os.stat(resolved)
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if (
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not stat.S_ISREG(details.st_mode)
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or details.st_mode & 0o022
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or not details.st_mode & 0o111
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):
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raise OSError(f"trusted executable has unsafe ownership mode: {name}")
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digest = hashlib.sha256()
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with open(resolved, "rb") as handle:
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for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
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digest.update(chunk)
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observed = digest.hexdigest()
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expected = EXPECTED_SHA256.get(name)
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if not expected or observed not in expected:
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raise OSError(f"executable digest is not release-attested: {name}")
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return Attestation(resolved, observed)
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def _append_bounded(buffer: bytearray, chunk: bytes, limit: int) -> bool:
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remaining = limit + 1 - len(buffer)
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if remaining > 0:
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buffer.extend(chunk[:remaining])
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return len(buffer) > limit or len(chunk) > remaining
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def _signal_group(process: subprocess.Popen[bytes], signum: int) -> None:
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with suppress(ProcessLookupError):
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os.killpg(process.pid, signum)
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def execute_bounded(
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argv: Sequence[str],
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environment: Mapping[str, str],
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timeout: float,
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max_bytes: int,
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clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
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popen: Callable[..., subprocess.Popen[bytes]] = subprocess.Popen,
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) -> Capture:
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"""Execute one process with bounded live pipe capture and group cleanup."""
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process = popen(
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list(argv),
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stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
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stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
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env=dict(environment),
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text=False,
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close_fds=True,
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start_new_session=True,
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)
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streams = {"stdout": process.stdout, "stderr": process.stderr}
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buffers = {"stdout": bytearray(), "stderr": bytearray()}
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truncated = {"stdout": False, "stderr": False}
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selector = selectors.DefaultSelector()
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for name, stream in streams.items():
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if (
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stream is not None
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): # pragma: no branch - PIPE was requested for both streams
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os.set_blocking(stream.fileno(), False)
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selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name)
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expires = clock() + timeout
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timed_out = False
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try:
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while process.poll() is None:
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remaining = expires - clock()
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if remaining <= 0:
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timed_out = True
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break
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for key, _ in selector.select(min(remaining, 0.1)):
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try:
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chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), READ_CHUNK)
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except BlockingIOError: # pragma: no cover - readiness race, retry only
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continue
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if not chunk:
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selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
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continue
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name = key.data
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truncated[name] |= _append_bounded(buffers[name], chunk, max_bytes)
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_signal_group(process, signal.SIGKILL if timed_out else signal.SIGTERM)
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drain_until = clock() + PIPE_DRAIN_SECONDS
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while selector.get_map() and clock() < drain_until:
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for key, _ in selector.select(max(0.0, drain_until - clock())):
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try:
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chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), READ_CHUNK)
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except BlockingIOError: # pragma: no cover - readiness race, retry only
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continue
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if not chunk:
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selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
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continue
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name = key.data
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truncated[name] |= _append_bounded(buffers[name], chunk, max_bytes)
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_signal_group(process, signal.SIGKILL)
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returncode = process.wait(timeout=PIPE_DRAIN_SECONDS)
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finally:
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selector.close()
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for stream in streams.values():
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if (
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stream is not None
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): # pragma: no branch - PIPE was requested for both streams
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stream.close()
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if (
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process.poll() is None
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): # pragma: no branch - fail-safe for wait/selector exceptions
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_signal_group(process, signal.SIGKILL)
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process.wait()
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return Capture(
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returncode=returncode,
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stdout=bytes(buffers["stdout"][:max_bytes]),
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stderr=bytes(buffers["stderr"][:max_bytes]),
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stdout_truncated=truncated["stdout"],
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stderr_truncated=truncated["stderr"],
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timed_out=timed_out,
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)
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def _injected_executor(
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spawn: Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[Any]],
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) -> Callable[..., Capture]:
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"""Adapt deterministic test doubles without weakening the production path."""
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def execute(
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argv: Sequence[str],
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environment: Mapping[str, str],
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timeout: float,
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max_bytes: int,
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) -> Capture:
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completed = spawn(
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list(argv),
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capture_output=True,
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text=True,
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timeout=timeout,
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check=False,
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env=dict(environment),
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)
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stdout = str(completed.stdout or "").encode()
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stderr = str(completed.stderr or "").encode()
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return Capture(
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completed.returncode,
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stdout[:max_bytes],
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stderr[:max_bytes],
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len(stdout) > max_bytes,
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len(stderr) > max_bytes,
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)
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return execute
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def _screen_capture(data: bytes, truncated: bool, budget: int) -> str:
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if truncated:
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return TRUNCATION_NOTE.encode()[:budget].decode()
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return safe_text(data.decode("utf-8", "replace"), budget)[0]
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class Runner:
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"""Run probes under policy, provenance, timeout, deadline, and byte budgets."""
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def __init__(
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self,
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mode: str = READ_ONLY,
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command_timeout: float = DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT,
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deadline_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RUN_DEADLINE,
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max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES,
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clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
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executor: Callable[..., Capture] | None = None,
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spawn: Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[Any]] | None = None,
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environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
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attestor: Callable[[str, Mapping[str, str]], Attestation] = attest_executable,
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) -> None:
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self.mode = mode
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self.command_timeout = _finite_number(
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"command_timeout", command_timeout, 0.05, MAX_COMMAND_TIMEOUT
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)
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deadline = _finite_number(
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"deadline_seconds", deadline_seconds, 0.05, MAX_RUN_DEADLINE
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)
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self.max_bytes = _byte_budget(max_bytes)
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self._clock = clock
|
|
self._executor = executor or (
|
|
_injected_executor(spawn) if spawn else execute_bounded
|
|
)
|
|
self._environ = environ
|
|
self._attestor = attestor
|
|
self._deadline_at = clock() + deadline
|
|
self.commands_run = 0
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def remaining_seconds(self) -> float:
|
|
return self._deadline_at - self._clock()
|
|
|
|
def run(
|
|
self,
|
|
argv: Sequence[str],
|
|
vantage: Vantage,
|
|
max_bytes: int | None = None,
|
|
reserve_seconds: float = 0.0,
|
|
) -> Outcome:
|
|
budget_bytes = self.max_bytes if max_bytes is None else _byte_budget(max_bytes)
|
|
reserve = _finite_number(
|
|
"reserve_seconds", reserve_seconds, 0.0, MAX_RUN_DEADLINE
|
|
)
|
|
addressed = vantage.wrap(argv)
|
|
try:
|
|
check_argv(addressed, self.mode)
|
|
except PolicyError as exc:
|
|
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"policy: {exc}")
|
|
budget = min(self.command_timeout, self.remaining_seconds - reserve)
|
|
if budget <= 0:
|
|
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=DEADLINE_ERROR)
|
|
environment = build_environment(vantage, self._environ)
|
|
try:
|
|
attestation = self._attestor(addressed[0], environment)
|
|
except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
|
|
return Outcome(
|
|
argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"attestation: {exc}"
|
|
)
|
|
executed = (attestation.path, *addressed[1:])
|
|
try:
|
|
check_argv(executed, self.mode)
|
|
except PolicyError as exc:
|
|
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"policy: {exc}")
|
|
started = self._clock()
|
|
self.commands_run += 1
|
|
try:
|
|
capture = self._executor(executed, environment, budget, budget_bytes)
|
|
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
|
capture = Capture(-signal.SIGKILL, timed_out=True)
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
return Outcome(
|
|
argv=addressed,
|
|
vantage=vantage.name,
|
|
error=f"spawn: {exc.strerror or type(exc).__name__}",
|
|
executable_path=attestation.path,
|
|
executable_sha256=attestation.sha256,
|
|
)
|
|
was_truncated = capture.stdout_truncated or capture.stderr_truncated
|
|
stdout = _screen_capture(capture.stdout, capture.stdout_truncated, budget_bytes)
|
|
stderr = _screen_capture(capture.stderr, capture.stderr_truncated, budget_bytes)
|
|
return Outcome(
|
|
argv=addressed,
|
|
vantage=vantage.name,
|
|
returncode=capture.returncode,
|
|
stdout=stdout,
|
|
stderr=stderr,
|
|
truncated=was_truncated,
|
|
duration_ms=int((self._clock() - started) * 1000),
|
|
error=TIMEOUT_ERROR if capture.timed_out else None,
|
|
executable_path=attestation.path,
|
|
executable_sha256=attestation.sha256,
|
|
)
|