atlas-iac/scripts/ops/hermes_handoff_exec.py
Hermes Agent 8f00545828 hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.

The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.

Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.

Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.

Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.

The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.

docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.

Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00

253 lines
8.4 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Bounded, screened command execution for the handoff acceptance harness.
Every probe runs through :class:`Runner`, which owns the three budgets a
long-running acceptance sweep needs: a per-command timeout, a whole-run
deadline, and a per-capture byte budget. Exhausting the deadline does not
silently shorten the sweep — the remaining probes report ``NOT_RUN``, which is a
NO_GO, so a slow cluster can never be mistaken for a clean one.
Subprocesses never inherit the caller's environment. A probe that echoed
`$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` would otherwise be one typo away from a leak, so the child
environment is rebuilt from an allowlist of names whose values the harness
already needs to reach the cluster and the forge.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shlex
import subprocess
import time
from collections.abc import Callable, Mapping, Sequence
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from hermes_handoff_policy import READ_ONLY, PolicyError, check_argv
from hermes_handoff_redaction import DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES, redact, safe_text
DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 25.0
DEFAULT_RUN_DEADLINE = 900.0
# Names whose values the harness needs to reach the cluster and the forge. The
# values are handed to the child process and are never recorded.
ENV_PASSTHROUGH = (
"GIT_ASKPASS",
"GITEA_BASE_URL",
"HERMES_HOME",
"HOME",
"JENKINS_BASE_URL",
"KUBECONFIG",
"LANG",
"PATH",
"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE",
"SSL_CERT_FILE",
"VAULT_ADDR",
)
DEADLINE_ERROR = "deadline-exceeded"
TIMEOUT_ERROR = "timeout"
OPERATOR = "operator"
SELF = "self"
# Tools that accept a `--context` flag directly after the binary name.
CONTEXT_AWARE_BINARIES = ("kubectl", "flux", "helm")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Outcome:
"""The screened, bounded result of one probe command."""
argv: tuple[str, ...]
vantage: str
returncode: int | None = None
stdout: str = ""
stderr: str = ""
truncated: bool = False
duration_ms: int = 0
error: str | None = None
@property
def ok(self) -> bool:
"""Report whether the command ran to completion and succeeded."""
return self.error is None and self.returncode == 0
@property
def ran(self) -> bool:
"""Report whether the command reached the target at all."""
return self.error is None
@property
def combined(self) -> str:
"""Return stdout and stderr joined, for message matching."""
return "\n".join(part for part in (self.stdout, self.stderr) if part)
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Return a JSON-serialisable view of the outcome."""
return {
"command": redact(shlex.join(self.argv)),
"vantage": self.vantage,
"returncode": self.returncode,
"stdout": self.stdout,
"stderr": self.stderr,
"truncated": self.truncated,
"duration_ms": self.duration_ms,
"error": self.error,
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Vantage:
"""A named identity and transport a probe can be observed from.
``prefix`` is how the in-pod vantage is reached: a ``kubectl exec`` into the
target container, so the inner command authenticates as the pod's own
service account instead of as the operator. ``inserts`` carries per-binary
flags — the operator's `--context`, which must not follow the command into
the pod.
"""
name: str
prefix: tuple[str, ...] = ()
inserts: Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]] = field(default_factory=dict)
env: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
description: str = ""
def wrap(self, argv: Sequence[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Return ``argv`` addressed to this vantage."""
command = tuple(argv)
if command:
extra = self.inserts.get(command[0].rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
if extra:
command = (command[0], *extra, *command[1:])
return (*self.prefix, *command)
def build_environment(vantage: Vantage, source: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Return the child environment: allow-listed names plus vantage overrides."""
origin = os.environ if source is None else source
environment = {name: origin[name] for name in ENV_PASSTHROUGH if name in origin}
environment.setdefault("LC_ALL", "C")
environment.update(vantage.env)
return environment
def operator_vantage(kubeconfig: str | None = None, context: str | None = None) -> Vantage:
"""Return the external read-only operator vantage."""
inserts = (
{binary: ("--context", context) for binary in CONTEXT_AWARE_BINARIES} if context else {}
)
detail = " ".join(
part for part in (f"context={context}" if context else "", "kubeconfig-pinned" if kubeconfig else "") if part
)
return Vantage(
name=OPERATOR,
inserts=inserts,
env={"KUBECONFIG": kubeconfig} if kubeconfig else {},
description=f"operator {detail}".strip(),
)
def pod_vantage(
namespace: str,
pod: str,
container: str,
operator: Vantage | None = None,
) -> Vantage:
"""Return the in-pod vantage: the inner command authenticates as the pod."""
reach = operator.inserts.get("kubectl", ()) if operator else ()
return Vantage(
name=SELF,
prefix=(
"kubectl",
*reach,
"exec",
"--namespace",
namespace,
pod,
"--container",
container,
"--",
),
env=dict(operator.env) if operator else {},
description=f"in-pod {namespace}/{pod}[{container}]",
)
class Runner:
"""Run probe commands under policy, timeout, deadline, and byte budgets."""
def __init__(
self,
mode: str = READ_ONLY,
command_timeout: float = DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT,
deadline_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RUN_DEADLINE,
max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES,
clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
spawn: Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess] = subprocess.run,
environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> None:
self.mode = mode
self.command_timeout = command_timeout
self.max_bytes = max_bytes
self._clock = clock
self._spawn = spawn
self._environ = environ
self._deadline_at = clock() + deadline_seconds
self.commands_run = 0
@property
def remaining_seconds(self) -> float:
"""Return the seconds left before the whole-run deadline."""
return self._deadline_at - self._clock()
def run(
self, argv: Sequence[str], vantage: Vantage, max_bytes: int | None = None
) -> Outcome:
"""Run one command, returning a screened outcome and never raising."""
budget_bytes = self.max_bytes if max_bytes is None else max_bytes
addressed = vantage.wrap(argv)
try:
check_argv(addressed, self.mode)
except PolicyError as exc:
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"policy: {exc}")
budget = min(self.command_timeout, self.remaining_seconds)
if budget <= 0:
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=DEADLINE_ERROR)
started = self._clock()
self.commands_run += 1
try:
completed = self._spawn(
list(addressed),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=budget,
check=False,
env=build_environment(vantage, self._environ),
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return Outcome(
argv=addressed,
vantage=vantage.name,
error=TIMEOUT_ERROR,
duration_ms=int((self._clock() - started) * 1000),
)
except OSError as exc:
return Outcome(
argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"spawn: {exc.strerror or exc}"
)
stdout, cut_out = safe_text(completed.stdout or "", budget_bytes)
stderr, cut_err = safe_text(completed.stderr or "", budget_bytes)
return Outcome(
argv=addressed,
vantage=vantage.name,
returncode=completed.returncode,
stdout=stdout,
stderr=stderr,
truncated=cut_out or cut_err,
duration_ms=int((self._clock() - started) * 1000),
)