atlas-iac/testing/tests/test_hermes_handoff_acceptance.py
jenkins b6ae6225f6 hermes: source handoff forge evidence through the scm broker
The acceptance harness pinned a forge client that has never existed in any
commit or pod (/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py, digest f0943db4..., GIT/POST
grammar, an askpass helper). Every Gitea-backed check was therefore
unrunnable as merged. Point the harness at the credential-isolated SCM
broker client that actually ships in the agent pod.

- policy: GITEA_CLIENT=/opt/scm/gitea_api.py; trust /opt/scm/ instead of
  the phantom /opt/coordinator/; admit the client's real grammar
  (`read <api-path>`, exactly one path) with the same atlas/titan-iac pin
  and dot-segment rejection; bare HTTP methods are refused in every mode.
  The armed POST/PATCH/DELETE windows remain but are documented as
  deferred: the deployed client cannot execute them.
- exec: pin the client digest to the sha256 of
  services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py — the exact file the
  hermes-scm-boundary-v2 ConfigMap mounts at /opt/scm/gitea_api.py — so
  the pin is derivable from merged source and equal to the deployed
  client. gitea_api.py gains a narrow /api/v1/user identity read in
  _authorize_read (see below), so the pin is the NEW source hash
  76efd16dedbeb74425b12fbbdbfaa391854771292077e0463bf22706855ae6dc.
  Drop the dangling GIT_ASKPASS (no helper exists; broker git needs
  none) and swap /opt/coordinator for /opt/scm in SAFE_PATH.
- checks: all forge/baseline/lineage probes use (client, "read", path).
  The SELF-vantage identity checks now truthfully assert the *broker's*
  forge identity (the only one the platform can exercise) is not an
  administrator and holds push-scoped, non-administrative repository
  authority; the administrative-route check asserts the broker read
  allowlist's live refusal of branch_protections. The remote-main step
  keeps `origin` (the broker remote exists only in pool workspaces and
  the broker origin is cluster-local); its rationale now tells the
  operator to ensure origin fetchability.
- gitea_api.py/_authorize_read: allow exactly `/api/v1/user` (no query,
  no sibling routes) as operation "identity" so the harness can prove
  the broker identity is not an administrator. The broker imports the
  same module, so one reviewed edit covers both sides of the boundary.
- rules: DENIAL_MARKERS now match the client's real refusal lines
  ("SCM broker request failed with HTTP 400/403" and the no-credential
  rejection) and drop "gitea api returned http 403", which the client
  never emits; a broker 404 is deliberately not denial evidence.
- ephemeral: index/verification reads use the real grammar; manual
  cleanup guidance now says close/delete require operator forge
  credentials (the client exposes no mutation besides create-draft);
  armed mode is documented as deferred until the probes are rebuilt on
  the broker's bounded mutation surface.
- docs: broker vantage/evidence section, operator prerequisites (broker
  healthy, no /vault/secrets/gitea-token anywhere on the harness path,
  current ConfigMap mount, operator-side client + origin fetchability),
  armed-mode deferral.
- tests: read-grammar accepted / GET refused in every mode, /opt/scm
  attestation pin proven equal to the merged source digest, real
  denial-marker matching, /api/v1/user identity route bounds; the
  repository-pin mutant probe speaks the new grammar. Full handoff +
  gitea + broker families pass (952 tests), mutation gate 13/13, per-file
  line+branch coverage >=95%, all touched sources within the 500-line cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 18:21:38 -03:00

461 lines
14 KiB
Python

"""End-to-end contracts for the Hermes full-handoff acceptance harness CLI."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import subprocess
import pytest
from testing.tests.test_hermes_handoff_support import FakeClock, load_handoff_module
acceptance = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_acceptance")
catalog = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_catalog")
exec_module = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_exec")
model = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_model")
policy = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_policy")
harness_run = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_run")
def completed(stdout: str = "", stderr: str = "", returncode: int = 0):
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args=[], returncode=returncode, stdout=stdout, stderr=stderr
)
class ScriptedCluster:
"""A ``subprocess.run`` stand-in that answers by command shape.
Real runs issue a couple of hundred commands; scripting them positionally
would make every test a brittle ordering puzzle. Matching on the command
line keeps each test about the behaviour it is checking.
"""
def __init__(self, rules: list[tuple[str, object]], default=None) -> None:
self.rules = rules
self.default = default or completed(stderr="not found", returncode=1)
self.calls: list[list[str]] = []
def __call__(self, argv, **_kwargs):
self.calls.append(list(argv))
line = " ".join(argv)
for fragment, response in self.rules:
if fragment in line:
return response
return self.default
def whoami(username: str):
return completed(stdout=username)
REVIEWED = "8f005458282269ba5c07941814e4237f5d4cf3ac"
SHA = "1" * 40
VALID_ARGS = [
"--remote-main-sha",
SHA,
"--reviewed-head-sha",
REVIEWED,
"--agent-image",
f"registry.example/hermes:git-{'1' * 40}-build-7@sha256:{'2' * 64}",
"--build-sha",
SHA,
"--deployment-revision",
"1",
"--chat-config-revision",
"chat-rev",
*[
item
for number in catalog.Targets().dependency_pull_requests
for item in ("--dependency-head", f"{number}={SHA}")
],
]
HEALTHY_CLUSTER = [
(
"exec --namespace hermes hermes-agent-1",
whoami("system:serviceaccount:hermes:hermes-agent"),
),
("auth whoami", whoami("kubernetes-admin")),
("get pods --selector app=hermes-agent", completed(stdout="pod/hermes-agent-1\n")),
("get pods --selector", completed(stdout="pod/other-1\n")),
("get pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0", completed(stdout="pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0\n")),
]
def run_cli(monkeypatch, argv, rules):
cluster = ScriptedCluster(rules)
clock = FakeClock()
def build_runner(**kwargs):
return exec_module.Runner(
clock=clock,
spawn=cluster,
environ={},
attestor=lambda command, _environment: exec_module.Attestation(
command, "a" * 64
),
**kwargs,
)
monkeypatch.setattr(acceptance, "Runner", build_runner)
return (acceptance.main([*VALID_ARGS, *argv]), cluster)
def read_report(path):
return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
def test_the_parser_exposes_the_documented_controls() -> None:
arguments = acceptance.build_parser().parse_args(
[
"--namespace",
"hermes",
"--context",
"atlas-operator",
"--dependency-pr",
"14",
"--dependency-pr",
"15",
"--expected-suspension",
"flux-system/parked",
"--node-count",
"21",
"--pool-worker-env",
"HERMES_POOL_LEASE_SECONDS",
]
)
targets = acceptance.targets_from_args(arguments, None)
assert targets.dependency_pull_requests == (14, 15)
assert targets.expected_suspensions == ("flux-system/parked",)
assert targets.node_count == 21
assert targets.pool_worker_env == ("HERMES_POOL_LEASE_SECONDS",)
assert not hasattr(arguments, "concurrency")
assert not hasattr(arguments, "expect_telegram_sessions")
def test_defaults_fall_back_to_the_shipped_targets() -> None:
arguments = acceptance.build_parser().parse_args([])
targets = acceptance.targets_from_args(arguments, None)
assert targets.dependency_pull_requests == catalog.Targets.dependency_pull_requests
assert targets.expected_suspensions == ()
assert targets.repo == catalog.Targets.repo
@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["bad", "x=" + "1" * 40, "0=" + "1" * 40, "1=BAD"])
def test_dependency_heads_require_a_positive_pr_and_lowercase_sha(value: str) -> None:
with pytest.raises(Exception):
acceptance.dependency_head(value)
def test_a_default_run_is_read_only_and_never_pushes_or_posts(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
status, cluster = run_cli(
monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER
)
report = read_report(output)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert report["mode"] == policy.READ_ONLY
assert not any("push" in call for call in cluster.calls)
assert not any("POST" in call for call in cluster.calls)
assert not any("DELETE" in call for call in cluster.calls)
writes = [
call
for call in cluster.calls
if {"patch", "create", "delete", "apply", "replace"} & set(call)
and "can-i" not in call
]
assert writes == []
def test_mutating_checks_report_not_run_until_the_mode_is_armed(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER)
ephemeral = {
check["id"]: check
for check in read_report(output)["checks"]
if check["group"] == "ephemeral"
}
assert len(ephemeral) == 4
for check in ephemeral.values():
assert check["status"] == model.NOT_RUN
assert check["mandatory"] is False
assert check["scope"] == model.EPHEMERAL
def test_a_zero_state_cluster_is_no_go_with_every_check_accounted_for(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
"""Nothing observed must never read as nothing wrong."""
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
status, _ = run_cli(
monkeypatch,
["--output", str(output), "--json-only"],
[("auth whoami", whoami("kubernetes-admin"))],
)
report = read_report(output)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert report["decision"] == model.NO_GO
assert report["counts"][model.PASS] == 0
assert sum(report["counts"].values()) == len(report["checks"])
assert any(
"in-pod Hermes vantage is unavailable" in error
for error in report["harness_errors"]
)
def test_partial_failure_is_reported_per_check_rather_than_aborting(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
rules = [
*HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
("auth can-i", completed(stdout="no\n", returncode=1)),
("get namespaces", completed(stdout="namespace/hermes\n")),
("merge-base", completed()),
]
status, _ = run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], rules)
report = read_report(output)
statuses = {check["status"] for check in report["checks"]}
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert model.PASS in statuses and model.NOT_RUN in statuses
assert report["blocking"]
def test_a_vantage_collision_is_a_no_go_even_with_clean_checks(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
rules = [
(
"exec --namespace hermes hermes-agent-1",
whoami("system:serviceaccount:hermes:hermes-agent"),
),
("auth whoami", whoami("system:serviceaccount:hermes:hermes-agent")),
(
"get pods --selector app=hermes-agent",
completed(stdout="pod/hermes-agent-1\n"),
),
("get pods --selector", completed(stdout="pod/other-1\n")),
(
"get pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0",
completed(stdout="pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0\n"),
),
]
status, _ = run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], rules)
report = read_report(output)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert any("same principal" in error for error in report["harness_errors"])
def test_an_invalid_deadline_stops_before_any_subprocess(monkeypatch, tmp_path) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
status, _ = run_cli(
monkeypatch,
["--output", str(output), "--json-only", "--deadline", "0"],
HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
)
report = read_report(output)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_USAGE
assert report["counts"][model.NOT_RUN] > 0
assert any("invalid execution bound" in error for error in report["harness_errors"])
def test_arming_with_a_wrong_confirmation_stops_before_anything_runs(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
status, cluster = run_cli(
monkeypatch,
[
"--output",
str(output),
"--json-only",
"--arm-ephemeral-push",
"--confirm",
"please",
"--ephemeral-token",
"acceptance-20260817a",
],
HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
)
report = read_report(output)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert "arming refused" in report["harness_errors"][0]
assert not any("push" in call for call in cluster.calls)
def test_arming_against_a_protected_push_target_is_refused(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
status, cluster = run_cli(
monkeypatch,
[
"--output",
str(output),
"--json-only",
"--arm-ephemeral-push",
"--confirm",
acceptance.CONFIRMATION,
"--ephemeral-token",
"main",
],
HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert "arming refused" in read_report(output)["harness_errors"][0]
assert not any("push" in call for call in cluster.calls)
def test_an_armed_run_does_not_mutate_until_read_only_acceptance_is_go(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
monkeypatch.setattr(acceptance, "preflight", lambda *_args: None)
rules = [
("git ls-remote origin refs/heads/ephemeral", completed(stdout="")),
("git push", completed()),
(
"POST /api/v1/repos/atlas/titan-iac/pulls",
completed(stdout=json.dumps({"number": 9})),
),
("PATCH", completed()),
("DELETE", completed()),
(
"read /api/v1/repos/atlas/titan-iac/pulls/9",
completed(stdout='{"state": "closed"}'),
),
*HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
]
status, cluster = run_cli(
monkeypatch,
[
"--output",
str(output),
"--json-only",
"--arm-ephemeral-push",
"--confirm",
acceptance.CONFIRMATION,
"--ephemeral-token",
"acceptance-20260817a",
],
rules,
)
report = read_report(output)
assert report["mode"] == policy.ARMED
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert any(
"read-only acceptance did not GO" in error for error in report["harness_errors"]
)
pushes = [call for call in cluster.calls if "push" in call]
assert pushes == []
assert not any("DELETE" in call for call in cluster.calls)
def test_the_report_is_written_to_stdout_when_no_output_path_is_given(
monkeypatch, capsys
) -> None:
status, _ = run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER)
payload = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert payload["harness"] == model.HARNESS
def test_the_human_summary_accompanies_the_json_unless_suppressed(
monkeypatch, capsys, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output)], HEALTHY_CLUSTER)
captured = capsys.readouterr()
assert model.HARNESS in captured.err
assert "vantage operator" in captured.err
assert captured.out == ""
def test_a_report_that_fails_its_own_screening_is_replaced_not_published(
tmp_path,
) -> None:
"""The last barrier: never write an artifact nobody re-read."""
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
arguments = acceptance.build_parser().parse_args(
["--output", str(output), "--json-only"]
)
report = model.Report(mode="read-only", started_at="2026-08-17T00:00:00Z")
report.harness_errors = ["leaked ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV1234"]
monkey = report.as_dict
report.as_dict = lambda *_args, **_kwargs: { # type: ignore[method-assign]
**monkey(),
"leak": "token: ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV1234",
}
offenders = acceptance.emit(report, arguments)
payload = read_report(output)
assert offenders == ["$.leak"]
assert payload["decision"] == model.NO_GO
assert "leak" not in payload
assert "failed its own credential screening" in payload["harness_errors"][0]
def test_a_screening_failure_forces_no_go_from_the_entry_point(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
"""The exit status must follow the refusal to publish, not the check tally."""
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
monkeypatch.setattr(
acceptance, "unscreened_fields", lambda _payload: ["$.checks[0].stdout"]
)
monkeypatch.setattr(acceptance, "build_catalog", lambda _targets: [])
monkeypatch.setattr(harness_run, "vantage_problems", lambda _records: [])
status, _ = run_cli(
monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER
)
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
assert read_report(output)["decision"] == model.NO_GO
def test_no_recorded_command_output_carries_a_credential_shape(
monkeypatch, tmp_path
) -> None:
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
leaky = completed(stdout="ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz\n")
run_cli(
monkeypatch,
["--output", str(output), "--json-only"],
[*HEALTHY_CLUSTER, ("exec", leaky)],
)
assert model.unscreened_fields(read_report(output)) == []
assert "sk-ant-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" not in output.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("flag", ["--help"])
def test_the_help_text_describes_the_read_only_default(flag: str, capsys) -> None:
with pytest.raises(SystemExit):
acceptance.main([flag])
assert "Read-only by default" in capsys.readouterr().out