atlas-iac/scripts/ops/hermes_handoff_exec.py
jenkins b6ae6225f6 hermes: source handoff forge evidence through the scm broker
The acceptance harness pinned a forge client that has never existed in any
commit or pod (/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py, digest f0943db4..., GIT/POST
grammar, an askpass helper). Every Gitea-backed check was therefore
unrunnable as merged. Point the harness at the credential-isolated SCM
broker client that actually ships in the agent pod.

- policy: GITEA_CLIENT=/opt/scm/gitea_api.py; trust /opt/scm/ instead of
  the phantom /opt/coordinator/; admit the client's real grammar
  (`read <api-path>`, exactly one path) with the same atlas/titan-iac pin
  and dot-segment rejection; bare HTTP methods are refused in every mode.
  The armed POST/PATCH/DELETE windows remain but are documented as
  deferred: the deployed client cannot execute them.
- exec: pin the client digest to the sha256 of
  services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py — the exact file the
  hermes-scm-boundary-v2 ConfigMap mounts at /opt/scm/gitea_api.py — so
  the pin is derivable from merged source and equal to the deployed
  client. gitea_api.py gains a narrow /api/v1/user identity read in
  _authorize_read (see below), so the pin is the NEW source hash
  76efd16dedbeb74425b12fbbdbfaa391854771292077e0463bf22706855ae6dc.
  Drop the dangling GIT_ASKPASS (no helper exists; broker git needs
  none) and swap /opt/coordinator for /opt/scm in SAFE_PATH.
- checks: all forge/baseline/lineage probes use (client, "read", path).
  The SELF-vantage identity checks now truthfully assert the *broker's*
  forge identity (the only one the platform can exercise) is not an
  administrator and holds push-scoped, non-administrative repository
  authority; the administrative-route check asserts the broker read
  allowlist's live refusal of branch_protections. The remote-main step
  keeps `origin` (the broker remote exists only in pool workspaces and
  the broker origin is cluster-local); its rationale now tells the
  operator to ensure origin fetchability.
- gitea_api.py/_authorize_read: allow exactly `/api/v1/user` (no query,
  no sibling routes) as operation "identity" so the harness can prove
  the broker identity is not an administrator. The broker imports the
  same module, so one reviewed edit covers both sides of the boundary.
- rules: DENIAL_MARKERS now match the client's real refusal lines
  ("SCM broker request failed with HTTP 400/403" and the no-credential
  rejection) and drop "gitea api returned http 403", which the client
  never emits; a broker 404 is deliberately not denial evidence.
- ephemeral: index/verification reads use the real grammar; manual
  cleanup guidance now says close/delete require operator forge
  credentials (the client exposes no mutation besides create-draft);
  armed mode is documented as deferred until the probes are rebuilt on
  the broker's bounded mutation surface.
- docs: broker vantage/evidence section, operator prerequisites (broker
  healthy, no /vault/secrets/gitea-token anywhere on the harness path,
  current ConfigMap mount, operator-side client + origin fetchability),
  armed-mode deferral.
- tests: read-grammar accepted / GET refused in every mode, /opt/scm
  attestation pin proven equal to the merged source digest, real
  denial-marker matching, /api/v1/user identity route bounds; the
  repository-pin mutant probe speaks the new grammar. Full handoff +
  gitea + broker families pass (952 tests), mutation gate 13/13, per-file
  line+branch coverage >=95%, all touched sources within the 500-line cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 18:21:38 -03:00

488 lines
18 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Bounded, screened, provenance-attested command execution.
It bounds pipes, times out and reaps the process group, and discards truncated output.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import math
import os
import selectors
import shlex
import shutil
import signal
import stat
import subprocess
import time
from collections.abc import Callable, Mapping, Sequence
from contextlib import suppress
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from hermes_handoff_policy import GITEA_CLIENT, READ_ONLY, PolicyError, check_argv
from hermes_handoff_redaction import (
DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES,
TRUNCATION_NOTE,
redact,
safe_text,
scrub,
)
DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 25.0
DEFAULT_RUN_DEADLINE = 900.0
DEFAULT_CLEANUP_RESERVE = 90.0
MAX_COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 600.0
MAX_RUN_DEADLINE = 7200.0
MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
READ_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
PIPE_DRAIN_SECONDS = 0.25
SAFE_PATH = (
"/opt/data/tools/bin:/opt/hermes/.venv/bin:/opt/scm:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"
)
# These exact allowlists are intentionally dense: reviewers compare them as a
# single provenance boundary rather than as extensible application config.
# fmt: off
ENV_PASSTHROUGH = ("KUBECONFIG", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE", "SSL_CERT_FILE")
# No GIT_ASKPASS: no askpass helper ships in the pod, and none is needed —
# authenticated SCM traffic goes through the credential-isolated broker.
FIXED_ENVIRONMENT = {"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": "/dev/null", "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": "1",
"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0", "GITEA_BASE_URL": "https://scm.bstein.dev",
"LC_ALL": "C", "PATH": SAFE_PATH}
EXPECTED_PATHS = {
"kubectl": {"/opt/data/tools/bin/kubectl", "/usr/local/bin/kubectl", "/usr/bin/kubectl"},
"git": {"/usr/bin/git", "/bin/git"},
"hermes": {"/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes"},
"sh": {"/usr/bin/sh", "/bin/sh"},
GITEA_CLIENT: {GITEA_CLIENT},
}
EXPECTED_SHA256 = {
"kubectl": {"3d514dbae5dc8c09f773df0ef0f5d449dfad05b3aca5c96b13565f886df345fd"},
"git": {"a0e562e4bd3c4c79379e91d8c07a10104b2cefe8fac966dc6bd4874a57a807f3"},
"sh": {"367967c823a0c391e5049b15a67c6a0a629c88b9b6dcdca75ef13ac9d65334b1"},
"hermes": {"c8419290ef7f1a95f59eadcea9f58f446b1e6535a7f4ffee9f1c0cb1172335e4"},
# sha256 of services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py: the ConfigMap
# hermes-scm-boundary-v2 mounts that exact file at /opt/scm/gitea_api.py,
# so this pin is derivable from merged source and equal to the deployed one.
GITEA_CLIENT: {"76efd16dedbeb74425b12fbbdbfaa391854771292077e0463bf22706855ae6dc"},
}
DEADLINE_ERROR = "deadline-exceeded"
TIMEOUT_ERROR = "timeout"
OPERATOR = "operator"
SELF = "self"
CONTEXT_AWARE_BINARIES = ("kubectl",)
POD_COMMAND_PATHS = {"kubectl": "/usr/local/bin/kubectl", "hermes": "/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes",
"git": "/usr/bin/git", "sh": "/bin/sh", GITEA_CLIENT: GITEA_CLIENT}
# fmt: on
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Attestation:
"""The exact outer executable used for a probe."""
path: str
sha256: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Capture:
"""Raw bounded process result returned by an executor implementation."""
returncode: int
stdout: bytes = b""
stderr: bytes = b""
stdout_truncated: bool = False
stderr_truncated: bool = False
timed_out: bool = False
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Outcome:
"""The screened, bounded result of one probe command."""
argv: tuple[str, ...]
vantage: str
returncode: int | None = None
stdout: str = ""
stderr: str = ""
truncated: bool = False
duration_ms: int = 0
error: str | None = None
executable_path: str = ""
executable_sha256: str = ""
@property
def ok(self) -> bool:
return self.error is None and self.returncode == 0 and not self.truncated
@property
def ran(self) -> bool:
return self.error is None
@property
def combined(self) -> str:
return "\n".join(part for part in (self.stdout, self.stderr) if part)
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
return scrub(
{
"command": redact(shlex.join(self.argv)),
"vantage": self.vantage,
"returncode": self.returncode,
"stdout": self.stdout,
"stderr": self.stderr,
"truncated": self.truncated,
"duration_ms": self.duration_ms,
"error": self.error,
"executable_path": self.executable_path,
"executable_sha256": self.executable_sha256,
}
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Vantage:
"""A named identity and transport used to observe a probe."""
name: str
prefix: tuple[str, ...] = ()
inserts: Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]] = field(default_factory=dict)
env: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
command_paths: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
description: str = ""
def wrap(self, argv: Sequence[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
command = tuple(argv)
if command:
replacement = self.command_paths.get(command[0])
if replacement:
command = (replacement, *command[1:])
extra = self.inserts.get(command[0].rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
if extra:
command = (command[0], *extra, *command[1:])
return (*self.prefix, *command)
def _finite_number(name: str, value: Any, minimum: float, maximum: float) -> float:
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float)):
raise ValueError(f"{name} must be numeric")
converted = float(value)
if not math.isfinite(converted) or not minimum <= converted <= maximum:
raise ValueError(
f"{name} must be finite and between {minimum:g} and {maximum:g}"
)
return converted
def _byte_budget(value: Any) -> int:
if (
isinstance(value, bool)
or not isinstance(value, int)
or not 1 <= value <= MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES
):
raise ValueError(
f"max_bytes must be an integer between 1 and {MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES}"
)
return value
def build_environment(
vantage: Vantage, source: Mapping[str, str] | None = None
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Build a deterministic child environment without caller-controlled PATH."""
origin = os.environ if source is None else source
environment = {name: origin[name] for name in ENV_PASSTHROUGH if name in origin}
environment.update(FIXED_ENVIRONMENT)
environment.update(vantage.env)
environment["PATH"] = SAFE_PATH
environment["GITEA_BASE_URL"] = FIXED_ENVIRONMENT["GITEA_BASE_URL"]
return environment
# fmt: off
def operator_vantage(kubeconfig: str | None = None, context: str | None = None) -> Vantage:
inserts = dict.fromkeys(CONTEXT_AWARE_BINARIES, ("--context", context)) if context else {}
detail = " ".join(part for part in (f"context={context}" if context else "",
"kubeconfig-pinned" if kubeconfig else "") if part)
return Vantage(name=OPERATOR, inserts=inserts,
env={"KUBECONFIG": kubeconfig} if kubeconfig else {},
description=f"operator {detail}".strip())
def pod_vantage(namespace: str, pod: str, container: str, operator: Vantage | None = None) -> Vantage:
reach = operator.inserts.get("kubectl", ()) if operator else ()
return Vantage(name=SELF, prefix=("kubectl", *reach, "exec", "--namespace", namespace,
pod, "--container", container, "--"),
env=dict(operator.env) if operator else {}, command_paths=POD_COMMAND_PATHS,
description=f"in-pod {namespace}/{pod}[{container}]")
# fmt: on
def attest_executable(command: str, environment: Mapping[str, str]) -> Attestation:
"""Resolve and hash an executable from a fixed, trusted path set."""
name = command if command == GITEA_CLIENT else command.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
candidate = (
command if "/" in command else shutil.which(command, path=environment["PATH"])
)
if not candidate:
raise OSError(f"trusted executable is unavailable: {name}")
resolved = str(Path(candidate).resolve(strict=True))
allowed = {
str(Path(item).resolve(strict=False))
for item in EXPECTED_PATHS.get(name, set())
}
if resolved not in allowed:
raise OSError(f"executable resolved outside its trusted paths: {name}")
details = os.stat(resolved)
if (
not stat.S_ISREG(details.st_mode)
or details.st_mode & 0o022
or not details.st_mode & 0o111
):
raise OSError(f"trusted executable has unsafe ownership mode: {name}")
digest = hashlib.sha256()
with open(resolved, "rb") as handle:
for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
digest.update(chunk)
observed = digest.hexdigest()
expected = EXPECTED_SHA256.get(name)
if not expected or observed not in expected:
raise OSError(f"executable digest is not release-attested: {name}")
return Attestation(resolved, observed)
def _append_bounded(buffer: bytearray, chunk: bytes, limit: int) -> bool:
remaining = limit + 1 - len(buffer)
if remaining > 0:
buffer.extend(chunk[:remaining])
return len(buffer) > limit or len(chunk) > remaining
def _signal_group(process: subprocess.Popen[bytes], signum: int) -> None:
with suppress(ProcessLookupError):
os.killpg(process.pid, signum)
def execute_bounded(
argv: Sequence[str],
environment: Mapping[str, str],
timeout: float,
max_bytes: int,
clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
popen: Callable[..., subprocess.Popen[bytes]] = subprocess.Popen,
) -> Capture:
"""Execute one process with bounded live pipe capture and group cleanup."""
process = popen(
list(argv),
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
env=dict(environment),
text=False,
close_fds=True,
start_new_session=True,
)
streams = {"stdout": process.stdout, "stderr": process.stderr}
buffers = {"stdout": bytearray(), "stderr": bytearray()}
truncated = {"stdout": False, "stderr": False}
selector = selectors.DefaultSelector()
for name, stream in streams.items():
if (
stream is not None
): # pragma: no branch - PIPE was requested for both streams
os.set_blocking(stream.fileno(), False)
selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name)
expires = clock() + timeout
timed_out = False
try:
while process.poll() is None:
remaining = expires - clock()
if remaining <= 0:
timed_out = True
break
for key, _ in selector.select(min(remaining, 0.1)):
try:
chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), READ_CHUNK)
except BlockingIOError: # pragma: no cover - readiness race, retry only
continue
if not chunk:
selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
continue
name = key.data
truncated[name] |= _append_bounded(buffers[name], chunk, max_bytes)
_signal_group(process, signal.SIGKILL if timed_out else signal.SIGTERM)
drain_until = clock() + PIPE_DRAIN_SECONDS
while selector.get_map() and clock() < drain_until:
for key, _ in selector.select(max(0.0, drain_until - clock())):
try:
chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), READ_CHUNK)
except BlockingIOError: # pragma: no cover - readiness race, retry only
continue
if not chunk:
selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
continue
name = key.data
truncated[name] |= _append_bounded(buffers[name], chunk, max_bytes)
_signal_group(process, signal.SIGKILL)
returncode = process.wait(timeout=PIPE_DRAIN_SECONDS)
finally:
selector.close()
for stream in streams.values():
if (
stream is not None
): # pragma: no branch - PIPE was requested for both streams
stream.close()
if (
process.poll() is None
): # pragma: no branch - fail-safe for wait/selector exceptions
_signal_group(process, signal.SIGKILL)
process.wait()
return Capture(
returncode=returncode,
stdout=bytes(buffers["stdout"][:max_bytes]),
stderr=bytes(buffers["stderr"][:max_bytes]),
stdout_truncated=truncated["stdout"],
stderr_truncated=truncated["stderr"],
timed_out=timed_out,
)
def _injected_executor(
spawn: Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[Any]],
) -> Callable[..., Capture]:
"""Adapt deterministic test doubles without weakening the production path."""
def execute(
argv: Sequence[str],
environment: Mapping[str, str],
timeout: float,
max_bytes: int,
) -> Capture:
completed = spawn(
list(argv),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout,
check=False,
env=dict(environment),
)
stdout = str(completed.stdout or "").encode()
stderr = str(completed.stderr or "").encode()
return Capture(
completed.returncode,
stdout[:max_bytes],
stderr[:max_bytes],
len(stdout) > max_bytes,
len(stderr) > max_bytes,
)
return execute
def _screen_capture(data: bytes, truncated: bool, budget: int) -> str:
if truncated:
return TRUNCATION_NOTE.encode()[:budget].decode()
return safe_text(data.decode("utf-8", "replace"), budget)[0]
class Runner:
"""Run probes under policy, provenance, timeout, deadline, and byte budgets."""
def __init__(
self,
mode: str = READ_ONLY,
command_timeout: float = DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT,
deadline_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RUN_DEADLINE,
max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES,
clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
executor: Callable[..., Capture] | None = None,
spawn: Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[Any]] | None = None,
environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
attestor: Callable[[str, Mapping[str, str]], Attestation] = attest_executable,
) -> None:
self.mode = mode
self.command_timeout = _finite_number(
"command_timeout", command_timeout, 0.05, MAX_COMMAND_TIMEOUT
)
deadline = _finite_number(
"deadline_seconds", deadline_seconds, 0.05, MAX_RUN_DEADLINE
)
self.max_bytes = _byte_budget(max_bytes)
self._clock = clock
self._executor = executor or (
_injected_executor(spawn) if spawn else execute_bounded
)
self._environ = environ
self._attestor = attestor
self._deadline_at = clock() + deadline
self.commands_run = 0
@property
def remaining_seconds(self) -> float:
return self._deadline_at - self._clock()
def run(
self,
argv: Sequence[str],
vantage: Vantage,
max_bytes: int | None = None,
reserve_seconds: float = 0.0,
) -> Outcome:
budget_bytes = self.max_bytes if max_bytes is None else _byte_budget(max_bytes)
reserve = _finite_number(
"reserve_seconds", reserve_seconds, 0.0, MAX_RUN_DEADLINE
)
addressed = vantage.wrap(argv)
try:
check_argv(addressed, self.mode)
except PolicyError as exc:
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"policy: {exc}")
budget = min(self.command_timeout, self.remaining_seconds - reserve)
if budget <= 0:
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=DEADLINE_ERROR)
environment = build_environment(vantage, self._environ)
try:
attestation = self._attestor(addressed[0], environment)
except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
return Outcome(
argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"attestation: {exc}"
)
executed = (attestation.path, *addressed[1:])
try:
check_argv(executed, self.mode)
except PolicyError as exc:
return Outcome(argv=addressed, vantage=vantage.name, error=f"policy: {exc}")
started = self._clock()
self.commands_run += 1
try:
capture = self._executor(executed, environment, budget, budget_bytes)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
capture = Capture(-signal.SIGKILL, timed_out=True)
except OSError as exc:
return Outcome(
argv=addressed,
vantage=vantage.name,
error=f"spawn: {exc.strerror or type(exc).__name__}",
executable_path=attestation.path,
executable_sha256=attestation.sha256,
)
was_truncated = capture.stdout_truncated or capture.stderr_truncated
stdout = _screen_capture(capture.stdout, capture.stdout_truncated, budget_bytes)
stderr = _screen_capture(capture.stderr, capture.stderr_truncated, budget_bytes)
return Outcome(
argv=addressed,
vantage=vantage.name,
returncode=capture.returncode,
stdout=stdout,
stderr=stderr,
truncated=was_truncated,
duration_ms=int((self._clock() - started) * 1000),
error=TIMEOUT_ERROR if capture.timed_out else None,
executable_path=attestation.path,
executable_sha256=attestation.sha256,
)