atlas-iac/scripts/ops/hermes_handoff_checks_delivery.py
jenkins b6ae6225f6 hermes: source handoff forge evidence through the scm broker
The acceptance harness pinned a forge client that has never existed in any
commit or pod (/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py, digest f0943db4..., GIT/POST
grammar, an askpass helper). Every Gitea-backed check was therefore
unrunnable as merged. Point the harness at the credential-isolated SCM
broker client that actually ships in the agent pod.

- policy: GITEA_CLIENT=/opt/scm/gitea_api.py; trust /opt/scm/ instead of
  the phantom /opt/coordinator/; admit the client's real grammar
  (`read <api-path>`, exactly one path) with the same atlas/titan-iac pin
  and dot-segment rejection; bare HTTP methods are refused in every mode.
  The armed POST/PATCH/DELETE windows remain but are documented as
  deferred: the deployed client cannot execute them.
- exec: pin the client digest to the sha256 of
  services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py — the exact file the
  hermes-scm-boundary-v2 ConfigMap mounts at /opt/scm/gitea_api.py — so
  the pin is derivable from merged source and equal to the deployed
  client. gitea_api.py gains a narrow /api/v1/user identity read in
  _authorize_read (see below), so the pin is the NEW source hash
  76efd16dedbeb74425b12fbbdbfaa391854771292077e0463bf22706855ae6dc.
  Drop the dangling GIT_ASKPASS (no helper exists; broker git needs
  none) and swap /opt/coordinator for /opt/scm in SAFE_PATH.
- checks: all forge/baseline/lineage probes use (client, "read", path).
  The SELF-vantage identity checks now truthfully assert the *broker's*
  forge identity (the only one the platform can exercise) is not an
  administrator and holds push-scoped, non-administrative repository
  authority; the administrative-route check asserts the broker read
  allowlist's live refusal of branch_protections. The remote-main step
  keeps `origin` (the broker remote exists only in pool workspaces and
  the broker origin is cluster-local); its rationale now tells the
  operator to ensure origin fetchability.
- gitea_api.py/_authorize_read: allow exactly `/api/v1/user` (no query,
  no sibling routes) as operation "identity" so the harness can prove
  the broker identity is not an administrator. The broker imports the
  same module, so one reviewed edit covers both sides of the boundary.
- rules: DENIAL_MARKERS now match the client's real refusal lines
  ("SCM broker request failed with HTTP 400/403" and the no-credential
  rejection) and drop "gitea api returned http 403", which the client
  never emits; a broker 404 is deliberately not denial evidence.
- ephemeral: index/verification reads use the real grammar; manual
  cleanup guidance now says close/delete require operator forge
  credentials (the client exposes no mutation besides create-draft);
  armed mode is documented as deferred until the probes are rebuilt on
  the broker's bounded mutation surface.
- docs: broker vantage/evidence section, operator prerequisites (broker
  healthy, no /vault/secrets/gitea-token anywhere on the harness path,
  current ConfigMap mount, operator-side client + origin fetchability),
  armed-mode deferral.
- tests: read-grammar accepted / GET refused in every mode, /opt/scm
  attestation pin proven equal to the merged source digest, real
  denial-marker matching, /api/v1/user identity route bounds; the
  repository-pin mutant probe speaks the new grammar. Full handoff +
  gitea + broker families pass (952 tests), mutation gate 13/13, per-file
  line+branch coverage >=95%, all touched sources within the 500-line cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 18:21:38 -03:00

385 lines
14 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Acceptance checks for forge authority, node accounts, images, and regressions.
What the platform is allowed to do outside its own namespace: which forge
authority a worker holds, what a node account is and is not, how an image is
built and pinned, and whether the fixes the release depends on are actually
running rather than merely merged.
Where a property has no side-effect-free live probe — a merge that must never be
attempted, a branch protection the harness identity cannot read — the entry says
so in its rationale and asserts the nearest fact that *is* observable, rather
than quietly asserting nothing.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from hermes_handoff_catalog import (
FORGE_CREDENTIAL_NAMES,
INIT_NAME_PROJECTION,
NODE_NAME_PROJECTION,
OPERATOR,
SELF,
Targets,
check,
step,
)
from hermes_handoff_model import ATTEMPT, CheckSpec
from hermes_handoff_policy import GITEA_CLIENT, projection, shell
def _forge(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
api = f"/api/v1/repos/{targets.repo}"
return [
check(
"forge.worker-holds-no-git-credential-variable",
"No forge credential is exported into the worker process",
"forge",
"names_absent",
[step("env", SELF, *shell("env_names"))],
{"step": "env", "names": FORGE_CREDENTIAL_NAMES},
rationale="The worker holds no forge credential at all: authenticated SCM traffic goes through the credential-isolated broker, never through the environment.",
),
check(
"forge.identity-is-not-an-administrator",
"The broker's forge identity holds no administrative rights",
"forge",
"json_field",
[step("user", SELF, GITEA_CLIENT, "read", "/api/v1/user")],
{"step": "user", "fields": {"is_admin": False}},
rationale="The broker holds the only forge credential the platform can use, so its identity is the one that must not be an administrator.",
),
check(
"forge.repository-authority-is-push-only",
"The broker's repository authority is push-scoped, never administrative",
"forge",
"json_field",
[step("repo", SELF, GITEA_CLIENT, "read", api)],
{
"step": "repo",
"fields": {
"permissions.admin": False,
"permissions.push": True,
"permissions.pull": True,
},
},
rationale="Merge, approve, close, and protection changes all require authority the broker identity is proven not to hold; the agent-side client additionally exposes no write besides draft creation.",
),
check(
"forge.administrative-route-is-refused",
"An administrative forge route is refused through the broker",
"forge",
"denied",
[
step(
"attempt",
SELF,
GITEA_CLIENT,
"read",
f"{api}/branch_protections",
kind=ATTEMPT,
)
],
rationale="A live refusal from the broker's read allowlist, not a configuration reading. Other mandatory broker reads in this run prove the broker is healthy, so an outage cannot masquerade as this refusal across the catalog.",
),
]
def _nodes(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
return [
check(
"nodes.hardening-covers-every-node",
"The node account audit runs on every node in the cluster",
"nodes",
"distinct_count",
[
step(
"coverage",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
targets.namespace,
"get",
"pods",
"--selector",
f"app={targets.node_daemonset}",
"-o",
NODE_NAME_PROJECTION,
)
],
{
"step": "coverage",
"minimum": targets.node_count,
"total_equals": targets.node_count,
},
rationale="A hardened fleet with one unenrolled node is an unhardened fleet.",
),
]
def _build(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
pipeline = f"{targets.remote}/main:{targets.builder_pipeline}"
return [
check(
"build.builder-service-account-is-tokenless",
"The image builder service account mounts no API token",
"build",
"stdout_matches",
[
step(
"serviceaccount",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
targets.builder_namespace,
"get",
"serviceaccount",
targets.builder_serviceaccount,
"-o",
projection("jsonpath={.automountServiceAccountToken}"),
)
],
{"step": "serviceaccount", "equals": "false"},
),
check(
"build.builder-runs-unprivileged-with-exact-capabilities",
"The build pod is unprivileged and adds only the expected capabilities",
"build",
"names_present",
[step("pipeline", OPERATOR, "git", "show", pipeline, record=False)],
{
"step": "pipeline",
"names": (
targets.builder_capabilities,
"privileged: false",
"allowPrivilegeEscalation: false",
"automountServiceAccountToken: false",
'drop: ["ALL"]',
),
},
rationale="Exact lines, not a substring sweep: a widened capability set has to change one of these lines to take effect.",
),
check(
"build.harbor-immutability-rule-is-applied",
"The Harbor immutable-tag rule for the agent image has been applied",
"build",
"lines_match",
[
step(
"job",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
targets.harbor_namespace,
"get",
"job",
targets.harbor_immutability_job,
"-o",
projection("jsonpath={.status.succeeded}"),
)
],
{"step": "job", "pattern": r"^[1-9][0-9]*$", "minimum": 1},
rationale="The job verifies the rule it creates, so a completed run is evidence the rule matched the expected contract.",
),
_release_lineage(targets),
]
def _release_lineage(targets: Targets) -> CheckSpec:
"""Bind the exact reviewed release from Git through the Ready pods."""
container = targets.agent_container
namespace = targets.namespace
deployment = f"deploy/{targets.agent_deployment}"
deployment_projection = projection(
(
"jsonpath={.metadata.generation}{'\\t'}{.status.observedGeneration}{'\\t'}"
"{.spec.replicas}{'\\t'}{.status.readyReplicas}{'\\t'}"
"{.metadata.annotations.deployment\\.kubernetes\\.io/revision}{'\\t'}"
f'{{.spec.template.spec.containers[?(@.name=="{container}")].image}}'
).replace("'", '"')
)
pod_projection = projection(
(
"jsonpath={range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{'\\t'}{.status.phase}{'\\t'}"
"{range .status.conditions[?(@.type==\"Ready\")]}{.status}{end}{'\\t'}"
f'{{.spec.containers[?(@.name=="{container}")].image}}{{"\\t"}}'
f'{{.status.containerStatuses[?(@.name=="{container}")].imageID}}{{"\\t"}}'
"{.metadata.labels.pod-template-hash}{'\\n'}{end}"
).replace("'", '"')
)
replicaset_projection = projection(
(
"jsonpath={range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{'\\t'}"
"{.metadata.annotations.deployment\\.kubernetes\\.io/revision}{'\\t'}"
"{.status.readyReplicas}{'\\t'}{.status.availableReplicas}{'\\t'}"
f'{{.spec.template.spec.containers[?(@.name=="{container}")].image}}{{"\\t"}}'
"{.metadata.labels.pod-template-hash}{'\\n'}{end}"
).replace("'", '"')
)
flux_projection = projection(
(
"jsonpath={.metadata.name}{'\\t'}{.metadata.generation}{'\\t'}"
"{.status.observedGeneration}{'\\t'}{.spec.suspend}{'\\t'}"
"{range .status.conditions[?(@.type==\"Ready\")]}{.status}{end}{'\\t'}"
"{.status.lastAppliedRevision}"
).replace("'", '"')
)
return check(
"release.exact-lineage-is-running",
"Remote main, merged reviewed PR, image, build, Flux, and running revision agree",
"release",
"release_lineage",
[
step(
"remote-main",
OPERATOR,
"git",
"ls-remote",
targets.remote,
"refs/heads/main",
),
step(
"reviewed-pr",
OPERATOR,
GITEA_CLIENT,
"read",
f"/api/v1/repos/{targets.repo}/pulls/{targets.reviewed_pr_number}",
),
step(
"build-source",
OPERATOR,
"git",
"rev-parse",
f"{targets.remote}/main",
),
step(
"merge-ancestry",
OPERATOR,
"git",
"merge-base",
"--is-ancestor",
targets.reviewed_head_sha,
f"{targets.remote}/main",
),
step(
"deployment",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
namespace,
"get",
deployment,
"-o",
deployment_projection,
),
step(
"pods",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
namespace,
"get",
"pods",
"--selector",
f"app={targets.agent_deployment}",
"-o",
pod_projection,
),
step(
"replicasets",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
namespace,
"get",
"replicasets",
"--selector",
f"app={targets.agent_deployment}",
"-o",
replicaset_projection,
),
step(
"flux",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
"flux-system",
"get",
"kustomization/hermes",
"-o",
flux_projection,
),
],
{
"main_sha": targets.remote_main_sha,
"head_sha": targets.reviewed_head_sha,
"head_ref": targets.reviewed_head_ref,
"pr_number": targets.reviewed_pr_number,
"image": targets.agent_image,
"build_sha": targets.build_sha,
"deployment_revision": targets.deployment_revision,
},
rationale="A PASS requires one exact release identity across every source and running object. The remote-main step needs a fetchable origin from the operator checkout: ensure `git ls-remote origin refs/heads/main` works with the operator's own forge access before the run, or this check is NOT_RUN.",
)
def _reliability(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
return [
check(
"reliability.finalization-and-replay-patches-are-deployed",
"The agent workload runs the finalization, replay, and session patches",
"reliability",
"names_present",
[
step(
"init",
OPERATOR,
"kubectl",
"--namespace",
targets.namespace,
"get",
f"deploy/{targets.agent_deployment}",
"-o",
INIT_NAME_PROJECTION,
)
],
{"step": "init", "names": targets.agent_init_containers},
rationale="The regression suites live in the repository; this asserts the fixes they cover are actually running.",
),
check(
"reliability.regression-suites-are-present-on-main",
"The decomposition and worker-recovery regression suites are on main",
"reliability",
"names_present",
[
step(
"suites",
OPERATOR,
"git",
"ls-tree",
"--name-only",
f"{targets.remote}/main",
"testing/tests/",
)
],
{
"step": "suites",
"names": (
"testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes.py",
"testing/tests/test_hermes_coordinator.py",
"testing/tests/test_hermes_worker_recovery.py",
),
},
),
]
def delivery_checks(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
"""Return the forge, node, build, and reliability checks."""
return [
*_forge(targets),
*_nodes(targets),
*_build(targets),
*_reliability(targets),
]