Merge pull request 'Bound Hermes Atlas pull request authority' (#14) from feature/hermes-safe-gitea-pr-client into main

Reviewed-on: atlas/titan-iac#14

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-observer-bindings
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-observer-bindings
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: hermes
+    - name: hermes-observer-rbac

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-observer-rbac
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-observer-rbac
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker-code
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes/scm-common
+  targetNamespace: hermes-scm
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: hermes-scm-namespace

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-scm-broker
+  targetNamespace: hermes-scm
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 10m
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: apps/v1
+      kind: Deployment
+      name: hermes-scm-broker
+      namespace: hermes-scm
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: vault
+    - name: gitea
+    - name: hermes-scm-namespace
+    - name: hermes-scm-broker-code

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-namespace
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-scm-namespace
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes/kustomization.yaml

@@ -61,3 +61,5 @@ spec:
     - name: longhorn
     - name: vault
     - name: jenkins
+    - name: hermes-scm-broker
+    - name: hermes-observer-rbac

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/kustomization.yaml

@@ -28,7 +28,12 @@ resources:
   - jenkins/kustomization.yaml
   - ai-llm/kustomization.yaml
   - openclaw/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes-chat/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes-triage-demo/kustomization.yaml
   - game-stream/kustomization.yaml

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/vault/kustomization.yaml

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ spec:
   healthChecks:
     - apiVersion: batch/v1
       kind: Job
-      name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-9
+      name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-10
       namespace: vault
   dependsOn:
     - name: longhorn

scripts/tests/test_dashboards_render_atlas.py

@@ -416,101 +416,3 @@ def test_jobs_dashboard_bar_gauges_use_solid_threshold_colors():
 
     assert {"color": "dark-yellow", "value": 93} in threshold_steps
     assert {"color": "dark-blue", "value": 100} in threshold_steps
-
-
-def test_jobs_dashboard_collapses_heavy_drilldowns_for_light_first_paint():
-    mod = load_module()
-    dashboard = mod.build_jobs_dashboard()
-    panels = dashboard["panels"]
-    rows = [panel for panel in panels if panel["type"] == "row"]
-    visible_query_panels = [panel for panel in panels if panel["type"] != "row"]
-    nested_panels_by_title = {
-        child["title"]: child
-        for row in rows
-        for child in row.get("panels", [])
-    }
-
-    assert len(panels) == 18
-    assert len(visible_query_panels) == 12
-    assert sum(len(panel.get("targets", [])) for panel in visible_query_panels) == 12
-    assert all(
-        panel["title"] != "Coverage Gap to 95% by Suite"
-        for panel in visible_query_panels
-    )
-    assert [row["title"] for row in rows] == [
-        "CI Runs And Test Result History",
-        "Check Failure Rates By Suite",
-        "Check Healthy Rates By Suite",
-        "Test Drilldowns And Problem Tests",
-        "Telemetry Completeness And Branches",
-        "SonarQube Project Health",
-    ]
-    assert all(row["collapsed"] for row in rows)
-
-    assert "Coverage Failure Rate" in nested_panels_by_title
-    assert "Supply Chain Healthy Rate" in nested_panels_by_title
-    assert "Test Category Health History" in nested_panels_by_title
-    assert "Selected Test Pass Rate History" in nested_panels_by_title
-    assert "Coverage Metrics Present by Suite" in nested_panels_by_title
-    assert "SonarQube API Up" in nested_panels_by_title
-
-    failure_rate_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Coverage Failure Rate"]
-    assert failure_rate_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
-    assert failure_rate_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["unit"] == "percent"
-    assert failure_rate_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["max"] == 100
-    assert failure_rate_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["thresholds"]["steps"][0]["color"] == "dark-blue"
-    assert "increase(" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "platform_quality:check_failed_flag:present_1h" in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "platform_quality:check_seen_flag:present_1h" in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "platform_quality:check_status:present_1h" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert '.*_quality_gate_checks_total' not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "last_over_time" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert 'label_replace' not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "0 *" in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "and on(suite)" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-
-    pass_rate_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Selected Test Pass Rate History"]
-    assert pass_rate_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
-    assert "platform_quality:test_case_pass_rate:percent_1h" in pass_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "platform_quality_gate_test_case_result" not in pass_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-
-    pass_fail_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Selected Test Pass/Fail History"]
-    assert pass_fail_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["custom"]["drawStyle"] == "bars"
-    assert all(
-        "platform_quality:test_case_status:count_1h" in target["expr"]
-        for target in pass_fail_panel["targets"]
-    )
-
-    problematic_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Problematic Tests Over Time (Top failures)"]
-    assert problematic_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
-    assert problematic_panel["gridPos"]["w"] == 24
-    assert 'test!=""' in problematic_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "vector(0)" not in problematic_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert problematic_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["thresholds"]["steps"] == [
-        {"color": "dark-blue", "value": None},
-        {"color": "dark-green", "value": 2},
-        {"color": "dark-yellow", "value": 3},
-        {"color": "dark-orange", "value": 5},
-        {"color": "dark-red", "value": 8},
-    ]
-    assert "rolling 24h failure count" in problematic_panel["description"]
-    assert "at least two recent failures" in problematic_panel["description"]
-
-    sonar_mix_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Sonar Gate Status Mix (Selected)"]
-    sonar_health_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Sonar Gate Health by Project"]
-    assert sonar_mix_panel["gridPos"]["w"] == 4
-    assert sonar_health_panel["gridPos"]["w"] == 8
-    assert sonar_health_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
-    assert "platform_quality:sonar_gate_health_percent:latest_1h" in sonar_health_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "sonarqube_project_quality_gate_pass" not in sonar_health_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-
-    branch_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Primary Branch Clean by Suite (7d)"]
-    recent_branch_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Recent Branch Evidence by Suite (7d)"]
-    assert branch_panel["gridPos"]["x"] == 12
-    assert recent_branch_panel["gridPos"]["x"] == 18
-    assert "[7d:1h]" in recent_branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "[7d:1h]" in branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert branch_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["unit"] == "percent"
-    assert "unless on(suite)" in branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert "> bool 0" in branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
-    assert branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"].startswith("sort(")

scripts/tests/test_dashboards_render_atlas_drilldowns.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"""Detailed Atlas Jobs dashboard collapse and drilldown contracts."""
+
+from scripts.tests.test_dashboards_render_atlas import load_module
+
+
+def test_jobs_dashboard_collapses_heavy_drilldowns_for_light_first_paint():
+    mod = load_module()
+    dashboard = mod.build_jobs_dashboard()
+    panels = dashboard["panels"]
+    rows = [panel for panel in panels if panel["type"] == "row"]
+    visible_query_panels = [panel for panel in panels if panel["type"] != "row"]
+    nested_panels_by_title = {
+        child["title"]: child for row in rows for child in row.get("panels", [])
+    }
+
+    assert len(panels) == 18
+    assert len(visible_query_panels) == 12
+    assert sum(len(panel.get("targets", [])) for panel in visible_query_panels) == 12
+    assert all(
+        panel["title"] != "Coverage Gap to 95% by Suite"
+        for panel in visible_query_panels
+    )
+    assert [row["title"] for row in rows] == [
+        "CI Runs And Test Result History",
+        "Check Failure Rates By Suite",
+        "Check Healthy Rates By Suite",
+        "Test Drilldowns And Problem Tests",
+        "Telemetry Completeness And Branches",
+        "SonarQube Project Health",
+    ]
+    assert all(row["collapsed"] for row in rows)
+
+    assert "Coverage Failure Rate" in nested_panels_by_title
+    assert "Supply Chain Healthy Rate" in nested_panels_by_title
+    assert "Test Category Health History" in nested_panels_by_title
+    assert "Selected Test Pass Rate History" in nested_panels_by_title
+    assert "Coverage Metrics Present by Suite" in nested_panels_by_title
+    assert "SonarQube API Up" in nested_panels_by_title
+
+    failure_rate_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Coverage Failure Rate"]
+    assert failure_rate_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
+    assert failure_rate_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["unit"] == "percent"
+    assert failure_rate_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["max"] == 100
+    assert (
+        failure_rate_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["thresholds"]["steps"][0]["color"]
+        == "dark-blue"
+    )
+    assert "increase(" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert (
+        "platform_quality:check_failed_flag:present_1h"
+        in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+    assert (
+        "platform_quality:check_seen_flag:present_1h"
+        in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+    assert (
+        "platform_quality:check_status:present_1h"
+        not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+    assert (
+        ".*_quality_gate_checks_total" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+    assert "last_over_time" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert "label_replace" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert "0 *" in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert "and on(suite)" not in failure_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+
+    pass_rate_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Selected Test Pass Rate History"]
+    assert pass_rate_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
+    assert (
+        "platform_quality:test_case_pass_rate:percent_1h"
+        in pass_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+    assert (
+        "platform_quality_gate_test_case_result"
+        not in pass_rate_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+
+    pass_fail_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Selected Test Pass/Fail History"]
+    assert pass_fail_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["custom"]["drawStyle"] == "bars"
+    assert all(
+        "platform_quality:test_case_status:count_1h" in target["expr"]
+        for target in pass_fail_panel["targets"]
+    )
+
+    problematic_panel = nested_panels_by_title[
+        "Problematic Tests Over Time (Top failures)"
+    ]
+    assert problematic_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
+    assert problematic_panel["gridPos"]["w"] == 24
+    assert 'test!=""' in problematic_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert "vector(0)" not in problematic_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert problematic_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["thresholds"]["steps"] == [
+        {"color": "dark-blue", "value": None},
+        {"color": "dark-green", "value": 2},
+        {"color": "dark-yellow", "value": 3},
+        {"color": "dark-orange", "value": 5},
+        {"color": "dark-red", "value": 8},
+    ]
+    assert "rolling 24h failure count" in problematic_panel["description"]
+    assert "at least two recent failures" in problematic_panel["description"]
+
+    sonar_mix_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Sonar Gate Status Mix (Selected)"]
+    sonar_health_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Sonar Gate Health by Project"]
+    assert sonar_mix_panel["gridPos"]["w"] == 4
+    assert sonar_health_panel["gridPos"]["w"] == 8
+    assert sonar_health_panel["type"] == "state-timeline"
+    assert (
+        "platform_quality:sonar_gate_health_percent:latest_1h"
+        in sonar_health_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+    assert (
+        "sonarqube_project_quality_gate_pass"
+        not in sonar_health_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    )
+
+    branch_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Primary Branch Clean by Suite (7d)"]
+    recent_branch_panel = nested_panels_by_title["Recent Branch Evidence by Suite (7d)"]
+    assert branch_panel["gridPos"]["x"] == 12
+    assert recent_branch_panel["gridPos"]["x"] == 18
+    assert "[7d:1h]" in recent_branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert "[7d:1h]" in branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert branch_panel["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["unit"] == "percent"
+    assert "unless on(suite)" in branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert "> bool 0" in branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"]
+    assert branch_panel["targets"][0]["expr"].startswith("sort(")

services/gitea/atlas-identity-bootstrap-job.yaml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 apiVersion: batch/v1
 kind: Job
 metadata:
-  name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap-3
+  name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap-5
   namespace: gitea
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
@@ -34,6 +34,20 @@ spec:
       nodeSelector:
         node-role.kubernetes.io/worker: "true"
         hardware: rpi5
+      initContainers:
+        - name: python-runtime
+          image: python@sha256:6d43704baacd1bfbe7c295d7f13079d5d8104ed33568873133f8fc69980419df
+          command: [/bin/sh, -ec]
+          args: ["cp -R /usr/local/. /python/"]
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities: {drop: [ALL]}
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 1000
+            runAsGroup: 1000
+          volumeMounts:
+            - {name: python-runtime, mountPath: /python}
       containers:
         - name: bootstrap
           image: gitea/gitea:1.23
@@ -80,6 +94,7 @@ spec:
             - name: bootstrap
               mountPath: /opt/bootstrap
               readOnly: true
+            - {name: python-runtime, mountPath: /opt/python, readOnly: true}
       volumes:
         - name: data
           persistentVolumeClaim:
@@ -88,3 +103,6 @@ spec:
           configMap:
             name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap
             defaultMode: 0555
+        - name: python-runtime
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 128Mi

services/gitea/kustomization.yaml

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ configMapGenerator:
   - name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap
     files:
       - gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh=scripts/gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh
+      - gitea_branch_protection_check.py=scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py
 
 generatorOptions:
   disableNameSuffixHash: true

services/gitea/scripts/gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ source_owner="${GITEA_SOURCE_OWNER:-bstein}"
 managed_repositories="${GITEA_MANAGED_REPOSITORIES:-hermes-code-demo cassandra soteria pegasus metis ananke ariadne typhon titan-iac}"
 contributor_team=Contributors
 contributor_units='["repo.actions","repo.packages","repo.code","repo.issues","repo.wiki","repo.pulls","repo.releases","repo.projects"]'
+protected_reviewer=bstein
 
 die() {
   echo "Gitea Atlas identity bootstrap failed: $*" >&2
@@ -272,6 +273,46 @@ transfer_managed_repositories() {
   trap - EXIT HUP INT TERM
 }
 
+ensure_default_branch_protection() {
+  repository=$1
+  repo_file=$(mktemp)
+  protections_file=$(mktemp)
+  response_file=$(mktemp)
+
+  status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}" '' "${repo_file}")
+  expect_status "${status}" 200 "read ${repository} metadata for branch protection"
+  default_branch=$(sed -n 's/.*"default_branch":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "${repo_file}")
+  case "${default_branch}" in
+    main|master) ;;
+    *) die "${repository} has unsupported default branch ${default_branch:-missing}" ;;
+  esac
+
+  status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" '' "${protections_file}")
+  expect_status "${status}" 200 "list ${repository} branch protections"
+  if ! protection_state=$(
+    /opt/python/bin/python3 /opt/bootstrap/gitea_branch_protection_check.py \
+      "${protections_file}" "${default_branch}" "${protected_reviewer}"
+  ); then
+    die "${repository} ${default_branch} protection differs from the human-review policy"
+  fi
+
+  if [ "${protection_state}" = ABSENT ]; then
+    payload="{\"rule_name\":\"${default_branch}\",\"enable_push\":true,\"enable_push_whitelist\":true,\"push_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"push_whitelist_teams\":[],\"push_whitelist_deploy_keys\":false,\"enable_force_push\":false,\"enable_force_push_allowlist\":false,\"force_push_allowlist_usernames\":[],\"force_push_allowlist_teams\":[],\"force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys\":false,\"enable_merge_whitelist\":true,\"merge_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"merge_whitelist_teams\":[],\"enable_approvals_whitelist\":true,\"approvals_whitelist_username\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"approvals_whitelist_teams\":[],\"required_approvals\":1,\"block_on_rejected_reviews\":true,\"block_on_outdated_branch\":true,\"dismiss_stale_approvals\":true,\"block_admin_merge_override\":true}"
+    status=$(api_request POST "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" "${payload}" "${response_file}")
+    expect_status "${status}" 201 "protect ${repository} ${default_branch}"
+    status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" '' "${protections_file}")
+    expect_status "${status}" 200 "read back ${repository} branch protections"
+    protection_state=$(
+      /opt/python/bin/python3 /opt/bootstrap/gitea_branch_protection_check.py \
+        "${protections_file}" "${default_branch}" "${protected_reviewer}"
+    ) || die "${repository} ${default_branch} protection differs from the human-review policy"
+  fi
+  [ "${protection_state}" = PRESENT ] || \
+    die "${repository} ${default_branch} protection did not become effective"
+
+  rm -f "${repo_file}" "${protections_file}" "${response_file}"
+}
+
 wait_for_gitea
 ensure_user "${reconciler_user}" "${reconciler_email}" true
 ensure_user "${hermes_user}" "${hermes_email}" false
@@ -318,6 +359,10 @@ expect_status "${status}" 204 "add Hermes to Atlas contributors"
 
 transfer_managed_repositories
 
+for repository in ${managed_repositories}; do
+  ensure_default_branch_protection "${repository}"
+done
+
 vault_write gitea/atlas-reconciler "{\"data\":{\"username\":\"${reconciler_user}\",\"token\":\"${reconciler_token}\",\"base_url\":\"${public_url}\"}}"
 vault_write hermes/developer-gitea "{\"data\":{\"username\":\"${hermes_user}\",\"email\":\"${hermes_email}\",\"token\":\"${hermes_token}\",\"base_url\":\"${public_url}\"}}"
 

services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Validate the first effective Gitea protection for an Atlas primary branch."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import stat
+from pathlib import Path
+
+MAX_INPUT = 1024 * 1024
+MAX_RULES = 100
+MAX_RULE_NAME = 255
+SPECIAL = frozenset("*?\\[]{}")
+
+
+class PolicyError(RuntimeError):
+    """The protection response is ambiguous or violates human review policy."""
+
+
+def _read_bounded(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    descriptor = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0))
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) or metadata.st_size > MAX_INPUT:
+            raise PolicyError("branch protection response exceeds the safe limit")
+        value = os.read(descriptor, MAX_INPUT + 1)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    if len(value) != metadata.st_size:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection response changed while reading")
+    return value
+
+
+def _is_plain(pattern: str) -> bool:
+    return not any(character in SPECIAL for character in pattern)
+
+
+def _literal_rule(pattern: str) -> str:
+    """Return one exact rule name or reject Gitea glob interpretation.
+
+    Gitea 1.23.8 delegates matching to gobwas/glob.  Reimplementing that
+    grammar and its error quoting rules here would create a second policy
+    engine.  The reconciler instead accepts only plain ASCII literals.  This
+    deliberately rejects braces, ranges, escapes, malformed globs, and even
+    special rules that appear unrelated: an operator must remove ambiguity
+    before this job may attest the primary-branch boundary.
+    """
+    if not pattern.isascii() or not 1 <= len(pattern) <= MAX_RULE_NAME:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection rule name is invalid")
+    if not _is_plain(pattern):
+        raise PolicyError("glob branch protection rules require human review")
+    return pattern
+
+
+def _created(value: object) -> datetime.datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) > 64:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection creation time is invalid")
+    try:
+        result = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection creation time is invalid") from exc
+    if result.tzinfo is None:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection creation time is invalid")
+    return result
+
+
+def _required(reviewer: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return {
+        "enable_push": True,
+        "enable_push_whitelist": True,
+        "push_whitelist_usernames": [reviewer],
+        "push_whitelist_deploy_keys": False,
+        "enable_force_push": False,
+        "enable_merge_whitelist": True,
+        "merge_whitelist_usernames": [reviewer],
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist": True,
+        "approvals_whitelist_username": [reviewer],
+        "required_approvals": 1,
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews": True,
+        "block_on_outdated_branch": True,
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals": True,
+        "block_admin_merge_override": True,
+    }
+
+
+def evaluate(value: bytes, branch: str, reviewer: str) -> str:
+    """Return PRESENT/ABSENT or fail on ambiguous/effective policy drift."""
+    if len(value) > MAX_INPUT or branch not in {"main", "master"}:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection input is invalid")
+    data = json.loads(value)
+    if not isinstance(data, list) or len(data) > MAX_RULES:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection response is invalid")
+    ordered: list[tuple[int, datetime.datetime, int, dict[str, object]]] = []
+    for index, raw in enumerate(data):
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise PolicyError("branch protection entry is invalid")
+        priority = raw.get("priority")
+        rule_name = raw.get("rule_name")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(priority, int)
+            or isinstance(priority, bool)
+            or not 0 <= priority <= 1_000_000
+            or not isinstance(rule_name, str)
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError("branch protection priority is ambiguous")
+        created = _created(raw.get("created_at"))
+        literal = _literal_rule(rule_name)
+        if literal == branch:
+            # With every rule constrained to a plain literal, Gitea's glob
+            # comparator cannot affect this result.  Preserve API ordering:
+            # priority first (including legacy zero), creation time, then the
+            # stable response order for an otherwise exact tie.
+            ordered.append((priority, created, index, raw))
+    if not ordered:
+        return "ABSENT"
+    if len(ordered) != 1:
+        raise PolicyError("duplicate primary-branch protections are ambiguous")
+    effective = ordered[0][3]
+    for key, expected in _required(reviewer).items():
+        if effective.get(key) != expected:
+            raise PolicyError(
+                f"effective {branch} protection differs from human-review policy"
+            )
+    return "PRESENT"
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("response", type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("branch", choices=("main", "master"))
+    parser.add_argument("reviewer")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        value = _read_bounded(args.response)
+        print(evaluate(value, args.branch, args.reviewer))
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, PolicyError) as exc:
+        print(f"branch protection check failed: {exc}", file=__import__("sys").stderr)
+        return 1
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - rolebindings.yaml

services/hermes-observer-bindings/rolebindings.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-bindings/rolebindings.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: List
+items:
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: ai}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: bstein-dev-home}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: cassandra}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: cert-manager}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: climate}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: comms}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: crypto}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: default}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: finance}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: flux-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: game-stream}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: gitea}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: harbor}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: health}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes-chat}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes-triage-demo}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: jellyfin}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: jenkins}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-node-lease}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-public}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: logging}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: longhorn-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: mailu-mailserver}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: maintenance}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: metallb-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: monitoring}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: nextcloud}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: openclaw}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: outline}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: planka}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: postgres}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: quality}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: sso}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: sui-metrics}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: traefik}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: vault}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: vaultwarden}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: veles}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}

services/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - rbac.yaml

services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources:
+      - namespaces
+      - nodes
+      - persistentvolumes
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["ingressclasses"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["storage.k8s.io"]
+    resources:
+      - csidrivers
+      - csinodes
+      - storageclasses
+      - volumeattachments
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["metrics.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["nodes"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources:
+      - configmaps
+      - endpoints
+      - events
+      - persistentvolumeclaims
+      - pods
+      - pods/log
+      - replicationcontrollers
+      - resourcequotas
+      - services
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["apps"]
+    resources:
+      - controllerrevisions
+      - daemonsets
+      - deployments
+      - replicasets
+      - statefulsets
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["batch"]
+    resources: ["cronjobs", "jobs"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["autoscaling"]
+    resources: ["horizontalpodautoscalers"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["ingresses", "networkpolicies"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["discovery.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["endpointslices"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["policy"]
+    resources: ["poddisruptionbudgets"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["storage.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["csistoragecapacities"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["metrics.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["pods"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list"]
+  - apiGroups:
+      - helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - image.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - notification.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - source.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+    resources: ["*"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["longhorn.io"]
+    resources:
+      - backingimages
+      - engines
+      - instancemanagers
+      - nodes
+      - replicas
+      - settings
+      - volumes
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: hermes-agent
+    namespace: hermes
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2

services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+  labels:
+    app: hermes-scm-broker
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  revisionHistoryLimit: 2
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-scm-broker
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: hermes-scm-broker
+      annotations:
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/role: hermes-scm-broker
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-token: |
+          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
+          {{ .Data.data.token }}
+          {{- end }}
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-pre-populate-only: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-init-first: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-requests-cpu: 10m
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-requests-mem: 32Mi
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-limits-cpu: 50m
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-limits-mem: 64Mi
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: hermes-scm-broker
+      automountServiceAccountToken: true
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 10000
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      affinity:
+        nodeAffinity:
+          requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            nodeSelectorTerms:
+              - matchExpressions:
+                  - key: kubernetes.io/arch
+                    operator: In
+                    values: [arm64]
+                  - key: node-role.kubernetes.io/worker
+                    operator: In
+                    values: ["true"]
+          preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            - weight: 100
+              preference:
+                matchExpressions:
+                  - key: hardware
+                    operator: In
+                    values: [rpi5]
+      containers:
+        - name: broker
+          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command:
+            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python
+            - /opt/broker/scm_broker.py
+          ports:
+            - {name: http, containerPort: 9081, protocol: TCP}
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet: {path: /healthz, port: http}
+            initialDelaySeconds: 3
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet: {path: /healthz, port: http}
+            initialDelaySeconds: 15
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            failureThreshold: 10
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: [ALL]
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 10000
+            runAsGroup: 10000
+          volumeMounts:
+            - {name: broker-code, mountPath: /opt/broker, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
+          resources:
+            requests: {cpu: 50m, memory: 128Mi}
+            limits: {cpu: "1", memory: 768Mi}
+      volumes:
+        - name: broker-code
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-scm-boundary
+            defaultMode: 0555
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 1Gi

services/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: hermes-scm
+resources:
+  - service.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - networkpolicy.yaml
+images:
+  - name: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent
+    digest: sha256:37ebf720c783ae908a602916ffccf88d43d205a157957f5dc4b487867aee45e7

services/hermes-scm-broker/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/networkpolicy.yaml
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker-isolation
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-scm-broker
+  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
+  ingress:
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: hermes
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: hermes-agent
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 9081}
+  egress:
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              k8s-app: kube-dns
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: vault
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: vault
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 8200}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 192.168.22.9/32
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 443}

services/hermes-scm-broker/service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/service.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app: hermes-scm-broker
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 9081
+      targetPort: http

services/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml

services/hermes-scm-namespace/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-namespace/namespace.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-scm-broker
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+automountServiceAccountToken: true

services/hermes/agent-configmap.yaml

@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ data:
     not replace these coordinator-wide rules. Never call `kanban_show` without
     a known, non-empty task ID. Ad-hoc inspection and acceptance checks do not
     need a synthetic Kanban lookup, and must load a skill only when its workflow
-    materially applies. Atlas HTTPS Git authentication is already supplied by
-    the runtime-only `GIT_ASKPASS`; use it without reading or exposing the
-    credential. Coordinator guidance lives at
+    materially applies. Atlas Git access is supplied by the isolated SCM
+    broker; no repository token is present in this pod. Use only configured
+    broker remotes and clients. Coordinator guidance lives at
     `/opt/data/workspace/AGENTS.md` when more detail is needed.
 
     The Jetson classifier is mandatory for AUTO selection. Switchyard may use
@@ -295,70 +295,75 @@ data:
     objective's difficulty warrants it; otherwise synthesize at the original
     effort.
 
-    This owner-only pod has cluster-admin access across Atlas, including logs,
-    Secrets, exec, port-forwarding, rollout operations, and Flux reconciliation.
-    Prefer the titan-iac Git/Flux workflow for every durable cluster change;
-    direct operations are available for explicit operator requests, incident
-    recovery, and verification, and must be followed by a matching source-of-
-    truth change when they alter desired state. Never expose credentials in
-    chat or logs. Triage belongs at triage.hermes.bstein.dev.
+    This owner-only pod has scoped read-only Kubernetes diagnostics across
+    Atlas, including resource status, events, logs, and Flux/Helm evidence. It
+    cannot read Secrets, exec or attach to pods, create service-account tokens,
+    mutate workloads or RBAC, or reconcile Flux. Put every durable cluster
+    change on a reviewed titan-iac branch. Never expose credentials in chat or
+    logs. Triage belongs at triage.hermes.bstein.dev.
 
     ## Atlas engineering access
 
     The Atlas organization has private visibility. Repository visibility is
     preserved per project and may be public or private; do not infer a
     repository's visibility from the organization setting. Repositories are
-    canonical at `https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/<repo>.git`. HTTPS Git
-    authentication is already supplied through `GIT_ASKPASS`. Verify the remote
+    canonical at `https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/<repo>.git`; worker Git traffic
+    uses `http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081/git/atlas/<repo>.git`.
+    Verify the broker remote
     and cleanly separate pre-existing changes, create a task branch, run the
     repository's tests, use `git push --dry-run` when proving access, and push a
     real branch only when the requested implementation is review-ready. Never
     force-push.
 
-    `scm.bstein.dev` is Gitea, not GitHub. Never load or follow a GitHub/`gh`
-    skill for an Atlas remote, and do not interpret an unauthenticated Gitea
-    HTTP 404 as a missing private repository. Use authenticated Git for clone,
-    fetch, and push. For pull-request metadata, comments, and merges, call
-    `/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py METHOD /api/v1/...`; it injects the runtime
-    Vault token without exposing it to the command line, environment, output,
-    or transcript. Before a consequential merge, independently verify the
-    exact base/head ancestry and diff, run the relevant tests, and confirm the
-    candidate Jenkins result. Prefer the internal endpoint in
-    `JENKINS_BASE_URL`; when Jenkins API authorization prevents a read, use the
-    existing cluster access to inspect the controller's job/build files and
-    logs rather than guessing a public hostname. The preferred read-only path
-    is `/opt/coordinator/jenkins_build_evidence.py JOB [--branch BRANCH]
-    [--commit SHA] --wait`; it distinguishes a genuinely terminal build from
-    nested Jenkins execution metadata and returns bounded JSON/log evidence.
-    With a branch, the helper also tries the conventional `JOB-branches`
-    multibranch name. For JSON Gitea mutations, prefer repeatable shell-safe
-    `--field KEY=VALUE` arguments over hand-quoted JSON.
-    After merging, observe the default-branch build to a terminal result and
-    report exact commit, build, and test evidence.
+    `scm.bstein.dev` is Forgejo/Gitea, not GitHub. Never load or follow a
+    GitHub/`gh` skill for an Atlas remote, and do not interpret an
+    unauthenticated Gitea HTTP 404 as a missing private repository. Use
+    brokered Git for clone, fetch, and creation of a new namespaced feature
+    branch. Existing-ref updates, protected refs, deletion, and force-push are
+    rejected. The broker inflates and scans every pushed object, so thin
+    packs are rejected; always push with `git push --no-thin` so the pack
+    is self-contained. For bounded
+    repository/pull-request evidence or to create a review-ready draft PR, load
+    `$manage-atlas-pull-requests` and use `/opt/scm/gitea_api.py`. The
+    client carries no repository credential; a separate least-authority
+    workload performs the allowed operation. It permits only Atlas-scoped
+    metadata reads and verified same-repository draft creation. Updates, merge,
+    approve, close, delete, comments, repository administration, and force-push
+    are unavailable; never bypass the client with raw HTTP. Leave every PR
+    unmerged for Brad's review. Independently
+    verify the exact base/head ancestry and diff, run the relevant tests, and
+    confirm the candidate Jenkins result before presenting a handoff. Prefer
+    the internal endpoint in
+    `JENKINS_BASE_URL`; when Jenkins API authorization prevents a read, use
+    Kubernetes pod logs and status evidence without exec or secret access.
+    Do not bypass the boundary to inspect controller files. If Brad separately
+    reports that he merged the PR, observe
+    the default-branch build to a terminal result and report exact commit,
+    build, and test evidence.
 
     The workspace already has a non-secret Hermes Git author identity. Do not
     use `git reset --hard`, even in a fresh clone; use a detached worktree or a
     clean branch switch when comparing revisions, and preserve any unexpected
-    file as user state. Use the Gitea pull-request merge endpoint for an open
-    PR so both Git history and PR state remain auditable. If an authorized
-    manual merge already reached the base branch, reconcile the open PR with
-    `Do=manually-merged` and its exact merge commit instead of leaving stale
-    review state.
+    file as user state. PR publication ends at the verified open draft; Brad
+    owns review and merge authority.
 
     The terminal PATH contains the pinned operator tools. Start cluster work
     with `kubectl config current-context`, read-only status/events/logs, and the
-    relevant `titan-iac` manifests. Put durable desired-state changes on a
-    reviewable `titan-iac` branch, validate Kustomize and client dry-run, then
-    use Flux reconciliation after the tracked change is published. Direct
-    `kubectl` mutations are for explicit incident recovery or ephemeral
-    verification, not ordinary delivery.
+    relevant `titan-iac` manifests. The broker namespace is deliberately
+    excluded from agent RBAC. Kubernetes cannot express a deny on one namespace
+    inside an all-namespace list, so enumerate namespaces and run namespaced
+    diagnostics instead of relying on `kubectl ... --all-namespaces`. Put
+    durable desired-state changes on a
+    reviewable `titan-iac` branch and validate Kustomize and client dry-run.
+    Brad owns merge and Flux reconciliation. Direct `kubectl` mutation is not
+    available to the agent; hand an explicit incident mutation back to Brad.
 
-    Node SSH uses a dedicated audited Hermes identity: `ssh titan-04` (or any
-    current Kubernetes node name). Host keys are pinned and password fallback
-    is disabled. Use SSH only for host-level evidence or repairs that cannot be
-    performed through Kubernetes. Read first, identify the exact node and
-    impact, avoid fleet-wide destructive commands, and reflect persistent host
-    configuration in the appropriate tracked provisioning source.
+    Node SSH uses the dedicated locked-password `hermes-agent` OS account:
+    `ssh titan-04` (or any current Kubernetes node name). Host keys are pinned,
+    password fallback is disabled, and the account has no sudo, disk, runtime,
+    or Kubernetes-storage authority. Use it for unprivileged host evidence;
+    hand privileged host repair back to Brad and reflect persistent changes in
+    the tracked provisioning source.
 
     Treat every credential, SSH identity, host-trust record, and
     credential-bearing access-client state as runtime-only Vault data. Keep
@@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ data:
     <low|medium|high|xhigh> [model]` for a persistent override. The first native
     Codex worker requires one device-code login; refreshed provider credentials
     persist through Vault while client caches remain disposable. The owner
-    workspace includes cluster-admin Kubernetes
-    access plus `kubectl`, `flux`, `helm`, `kustomize`, `vault`, `sops`, `age`,
+    workspace includes scoped read-only Kubernetes diagnostics plus `kubectl`,
+    `flux`, `helm`, `kustomize`, `vault`, `sops`, `age`,
     `terraform`, `k9s`, `jq`, `yq`, `gh`, Git, SSH, Python, Node, the
     browser/computer tools, and the native provider CLIs.

services/hermes/agent-deployment.yaml

@@ -46,16 +46,6 @@ spec:
           {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/agent-tokens" -}}
           {{ .Data.data.codex_auth_json }}
           {{- end }}
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-token: |
-          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
-          {{ .Data.data.token }}
-          {{- end }}
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-username: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-username: |
-          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
-          {{ .Data.data.username }}
-          {{- end }}
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-jenkins-image-build-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-jenkins-image-build-token: |
           {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins" -}}
@@ -191,9 +181,8 @@ spec:
                 chmod 0600 "${profile_env}"
                 chown 10000:10000 "${profile_env}"
               done
-              upsert_env GIT_ASKPASS /opt/coordinator/gitea_askpass.sh
               upsert_env GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT 0
-              upsert_env GITEA_BASE_URL https://scm.bstein.dev
+              upsert_env HERMES_SCM_BROKER_URL http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081
               upsert_env JENKINS_BASE_URL http://jenkins.jenkins.svc.cluster.local:8080
               upsert_env ARIADNE_BASE_URL http://ariadne.maintenance.svc.cluster.local
               upsert_env VICTORIA_METRICS_URL http://victoria-metrics-single-server.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:8428
@@ -668,6 +657,8 @@ spec:
             - {name: subprocess-secret-patch, mountPath: /opt/hermes/tools/process_registry.py, subPath: process_registry.py}
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: routing-catalog, mountPath: /routing-catalog, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
           startupProbe:
@@ -831,6 +822,8 @@ spec:
             - {name: subprocess-secret-patch, mountPath: /opt/hermes/tools/process_registry.py, subPath: process_registry.py}
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: routing-catalog, mountPath: /routing-catalog, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
             - {name: ttyd-index, mountPath: /ttyd-index, readOnly: true}
@@ -899,6 +892,8 @@ spec:
             - {name: auth-patch, mountPath: /opt/hermes/hermes_cli/auth.py, subPath: auth.py}
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
           resources:
             requests: {cpu: 100m, memory: 256Mi}
@@ -1193,6 +1188,16 @@ spec:
               - {key: dashboard-api.py, path: dashboard/plugin_api.py}
               - {key: dashboard-index.js, path: dashboard/dist/index.js}
               - {key: dashboard-style.css, path: dashboard/dist/style.css}
+        - name: atlas-pr-skill
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-atlas-pr-skill
+            items:
+              - {key: SKILL.md, path: SKILL.md}
+              - {key: openai.yaml, path: agents/openai.yaml}
+        - name: scm-boundary
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-scm-boundary
+            defaultMode: 0555
         - name: image-policy
           configMap:
             name: hermes-image-policy

services/hermes/agent-kubeconfig.yaml

@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ users:
     user:
       tokenFile: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
 contexts:
-  - name: atlas-owner
+  - name: atlas-observer
     context:
       cluster: atlas
       user: hermes-agent
       namespace: default
-current-context: atlas-owner
+current-context: atlas-observer

services/hermes/agent-rbac.yaml

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# services/hermes/agent-rbac.yaml
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: ClusterRoleBinding
-metadata:
-  name: hermes-agent-cluster-admin
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
-subjects:
-  - kind: ServiceAccount
-    name: hermes-agent
-    namespace: hermes
-roleRef:
-  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-  kind: ClusterRole
-  name: cluster-admin

services/hermes/kustomization.yaml

@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ images:
     digest: sha256:37ebf720c783ae908a602916ffccf88d43d205a157957f5dc4b487867aee45e7
 resources:
   - namespace.yaml
+  - scm-common
   - vault-serviceaccount.yaml
   - configmap.yaml
   - agent-configmap.yaml
   - chat-configmap.yaml
   - switchyard-configmap.yaml
   - rbac.yaml
-  - agent-rbac.yaml
   - node-ssh-access.yaml
   - pvc.yaml
   - switchyard-pvc.yaml
@@ -69,8 +69,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - classifier_broker.py=scripts/classifier_broker.py
       - claude_oauth_broker.py=scripts/claude_oauth_broker.py
       - worker_route_broker.py=scripts/worker_route_broker.py
-      - gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
-      - gitea_askpass.sh=scripts/gitea_askpass.sh
       - hermes_coordinator.py=scripts/hermes_coordinator.py
       - hermes_model_routing.py=scripts/hermes_model_routing.py
       - hermes_stt_client.py=scripts/hermes_stt_client.py
@@ -105,6 +103,15 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - config=agent-kubeconfig.yaml
     options:
       disableNameSuffixHash: true
+  - name: hermes-node-account-hardener
+    namespace: hermes
+    files:
+      - node_account_hardening.py=scripts/node_account_hardening.py
+      - node_account_audit.py=scripts/node_account_audit.py
+      - node_account_io.py=scripts/node_account_io.py
+      - node_polkit_audit.py=scripts/node_polkit_audit.py
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true
   - name: hermes-auto-router-plugin
     namespace: hermes
     files:
@@ -159,3 +166,10 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - alert-review.md=skills/tune-atlas-alerts/references/alert-review.md
     options:
       disableNameSuffixHash: true
+  - name: hermes-atlas-pr-skill
+    namespace: hermes
+    files:
+      - SKILL.md=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/SKILL.md
+      - openai.yaml=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/agents/openai.yaml
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true

services/hermes/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -119,11 +119,65 @@ spec:
               app: server
       ports:
         - {protocol: TCP, port: 9010}
-  # agent.hermes.bstein.dev is an owner-only engineering workstation. The
-  # browser boundary remains OAuth-protected, while its workers need to reach
-  # every cluster namespace, Atlas LAN service, and hosted provider endpoint.
   egress:
-    - {}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              k8s-app: kube-dns
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchExpressions:
+              - key: kubernetes.io/metadata.name
+                operator: NotIn
+                values: [gitea, hermes-scm]
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: hermes-scm
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: hermes-scm-broker
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 9081}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 10.43.0.1/32
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 443}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 192.168.0.0/16
+            except:
+              - 192.168.22.9/32
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
+            except:
+              - 10.0.0.0/8
+              - 100.64.0.0/10
+              - 127.0.0.0/8
+              - 169.254.0.0/16
+              - 172.16.0.0/12
+              - 192.168.0.0/16
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-node-ssh-access-isolation
+  namespace: hermes
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-node-ssh-access
+  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
+  ingress: []
+  egress: []
 ---
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: NetworkPolicy

services/hermes/node-ssh-access.yaml

@@ -45,32 +45,16 @@ spec:
         - operator: Exists
       containers:
         - name: key-reconciler
-          image: busybox:1.37
+          # The pinned index supports the cluster's amd64 and arm64 nodes.
+          image: python@sha256:6d43704baacd1bfbe7c295d7f13079d5d8104ed33568873133f8fc69980419df
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           command: [/bin/sh, -ec]
           args:
             - |
-              reconcile() {
-                key="$(cat /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key)"
-                found=0
-                for user in atlas oceanus; do
-                  home="/host-home/${user}"
-                  [ -d "${home}" ] || continue
-                  found=1
-                  identity="$(awk -F: -v name="${user}" '$1 == name {print $3 ":" $4; exit}' /host-etc/passwd)"
-                  [ -n "${identity}" ] || identity="$(stat -c %u:%g "${home}")"
-                  uid="${identity%%:*}"
-                  gid="${identity##*:}"
-                  install -d -m 0700 -o "${uid}" -g "${gid}" "${home}/.ssh"
-                  touch "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  grep -qxF "${key}" "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys" || printf '%s\n' "${key}" >> "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  chown "${uid}:${gid}" "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  chmod 0600 "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                done
-                [ "${found}" = 1 ] || { echo "no supported node SSH account found" >&2; return 1; }
-              }
               while true; do
-                reconcile
+                /usr/local/bin/python \
+                  /opt/node-hardener/node_account_hardening.py \
+                  --public-key-file /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key
                 sleep 300
               done
           securityContext:
@@ -83,8 +67,21 @@ spec:
           volumeMounts:
             - name: host-home
               mountPath: /host-home
-            - name: host-passwd
-              mountPath: /host-etc/passwd
+            - name: host-etc
+              mountPath: /host-etc
+            - name: host-polkit-share
+              mountPath: /host-polkit-share
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: host-k3s
+              mountPath: /host-k3s
+            - name: host-kubelet
+              mountPath: /host-kubelet
+            - name: host-run-k3s
+              mountPath: /host-run-k3s
+            - name: host-run-containerd
+              mountPath: /host-run-containerd
+            - name: coordinator
+              mountPath: /opt/node-hardener
               readOnly: true
             - name: vault-secrets
               mountPath: /vault/secrets
@@ -94,19 +91,43 @@ spec:
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 5m
-              memory: 8Mi
+              memory: 32Mi
             limits:
               cpu: 50m
-              memory: 32Mi
+              memory: 128Mi
       volumes:
         - name: host-home
           hostPath:
             path: /home
             type: Directory
-        - name: host-passwd
+        - name: host-etc
           hostPath:
-            path: /etc/passwd
-            type: File
+            path: /etc
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-polkit-share
+          hostPath:
+            path: /usr/share/polkit-1
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-k3s
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/rancher/k3s
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-kubelet
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/kubelet
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-run-k3s
+          hostPath:
+            path: /run/k3s
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-run-containerd
+          hostPath:
+            path: /run/containerd
+            type: Directory
+        - name: coordinator
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-node-account-hardener
+            defaultMode: 0555
         - name: vault-secrets
           csi:
             driver: secrets-store.csi.k8s.io

services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+configMapGenerator:
+  - name: hermes-scm-boundary
+    files:
+      - deadline_http.py=scripts/deadline_http.py
+      - git_pack_objects.py=scripts/git_pack_objects.py
+      - gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
+      - gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
+      - receive_pack_scan.py=scripts/receive_pack_scan.py
+      - scm_broker.py=scripts/scm_broker.py
+      - scm_broker_io.py=scripts/scm_broker_io.py
+      - scm_broker_server.py=scripts/scm_broker_server.py
+      - scm_broker_client.py=scripts/scm_broker_client.py
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/deadline_http.py

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Absolute wall-clock deadlines for every outbound Hermes HTTP exchange.
+
+Small control exchanges run inside a killable helper process, so connect,
+send, read, and DNS all share one hard bound that no blocking socket state
+can outlive.  Large streaming Git exchanges cannot cross a process boundary;
+they instead register their connection with a watchdog that force-closes the
+socket when the same kind of absolute deadline expires.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import email.message
+import http.client
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import signal
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+MAX_CONTROL_BYTES = 128 * 1024
+MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_STREAM_SECONDS = 900.0
+READ_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
+
+
+class _RejectRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        raise urllib.error.URLError("redirect rejected")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Result:
+    """Minimal HTTP evidence returned across the process boundary."""
+
+    status: int
+    content_type: str
+    body: bytes
+
+
+def _read_response(response, maximum: int, deadline: float) -> bytes:
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    total = 0
+    while True:
+        remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if remaining <= 0:
+            raise TimeoutError
+        raw = getattr(getattr(response, "fp", None), "raw", None)
+        sock = getattr(raw, "_sock", raw)
+        if hasattr(sock, "settimeout"):
+            sock.settimeout(remaining)
+        chunk = response.read(min(READ_CHUNK, maximum + 1 - total))
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        chunks.append(chunk)
+        total += len(chunk)
+        if total > maximum:
+            raise ValueError("response too large")
+    return b"".join(chunks)
+
+
+def _child_exchange(control: dict[str, object]) -> Result:
+    url = control.get("url")
+    method = control.get("method")
+    headers = control.get("headers")
+    encoded = control.get("body")
+    maximum = control.get("maximum")
+    timeout = control.get("timeout")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(url, str)
+        or not isinstance(method, str)
+        or not isinstance(headers, dict)
+        or not all(isinstance(key, str) and isinstance(value, str) for key, value in headers.items())
+        or not isinstance(encoded, str)
+        or not isinstance(maximum, int)
+        or not 0 <= maximum <= 2 * 1024 * 1024
+        or not isinstance(timeout, (int, float))
+        or not 0 < timeout <= 120
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("invalid control")
+    body = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True) if encoded else None
+    if body is not None and len(body) > MAX_CONTROL_BYTES:
+        raise ValueError("request too large")
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + float(timeout)
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        url, data=body, method=method, headers=headers  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_RejectRedirect())
+    try:
+        response = opener.open(request, timeout=max(deadline - time.monotonic(), 0.001))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+        response = error
+    with response:
+        status = getattr(response, "status", response.getcode())
+        content_type = response.headers.get_content_type()
+        value = _read_response(response, maximum, deadline)
+    return Result(int(status), str(content_type), value)
+
+
+def _child_main() -> int:
+    try:
+        raw = sys.stdin.buffer.read(MAX_CONTROL_BYTES + 1)
+        if len(raw) > MAX_CONTROL_BYTES:
+            raise ValueError("control too large")
+        control = json.loads(raw)
+        if not isinstance(control, dict):
+            raise ValueError("invalid control")
+        result = _child_exchange(control)
+        output = {
+            "ok": True,
+            "status": result.status,
+            "content_type": result.content_type,
+            "body": base64.b64encode(result.body).decode("ascii"),
+        }
+    except Exception:
+        output = {"ok": False}
+    sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(output, separators=(",", ":")))
+    return 0 if output["ok"] else 1
+
+
+def _terminate(process: subprocess.Popen[bytes]) -> None:
+    with contextlib.suppress(ProcessLookupError):
+        os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+    process.communicate()
+
+
+def exchange(
+    request: urllib.request.Request,
+    *,
+    maximum: int,
+    timeout: float,
+    popen=subprocess.Popen,
+) -> Result:
+    """Execute a whole request under one monotonic deadline and size limit."""
+    if not 0 < timeout <= 120 or not 0 <= maximum <= 2 * 1024 * 1024:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request bounds are invalid")
+    body = request.data or b""
+    if not isinstance(body, bytes) or len(body) > MAX_CONTROL_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    control = json.dumps(
+        {
+            "url": request.full_url,
+            "method": request.get_method(),
+            "headers": dict(request.header_items()),
+            "body": base64.b64encode(body).decode("ascii"),
+            "maximum": maximum,
+            "timeout": timeout,
+        },
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode()
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    process = popen(
+        [sys.executable, os.path.realpath(__file__), "--child"],
+        stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        start_new_session=True,
+        env={"LANG": "C.UTF-8", "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"},
+    )
+    try:
+        remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if remaining <= 0:
+            raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(process.args, timeout)
+        output, _error = process.communicate(control, timeout=remaining)
+    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
+        _terminate(process)
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request deadline exceeded") from exc
+    if process.returncode != 0 or len(output) > MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request failed")
+    try:
+        result = json.loads(output)
+        if not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("ok") is not True:
+            raise ValueError
+        status = result["status"]
+        content_type = result["content_type"]
+        encoded = result["body"]
+        if not isinstance(status, int) or not isinstance(content_type, str) or not isinstance(encoded, str):
+            raise ValueError
+        value = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
+    except (KeyError, ValueError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control helper returned invalid evidence") from exc
+    if len(value) > maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    return Result(status, content_type, value)
+
+
+class _AdaptedResponse:
+    """Present one finished exchange through the urlopen reader interface."""
+
+    def __init__(self, result: Result):
+        self.status = result.status
+        self.headers = email.message.Message()
+        self.headers["Content-Type"] = result.content_type
+        self._stream = io.BytesIO(result.body)
+
+    def read(self, limit: int = -1) -> bytes:
+        return self._stream.read(limit)
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, *_excinfo: object) -> bool:
+        return False
+
+
+def open_bounded(
+    request: urllib.request.Request,
+    *,
+    maximum: int,
+    timeout: float,
+    popen=subprocess.Popen,
+) -> _AdaptedResponse:
+    """Open one control exchange whose whole lifetime shares one deadline."""
+    return _AdaptedResponse(
+        exchange(request, maximum=maximum, timeout=timeout, popen=popen)
+    )
+
+
+def _resolve_within(host: str, port: int, timeout: float) -> None:
+    """Resolve one host under a hard timeout the socket layer never covers.
+
+    ``getaddrinfo`` ignores socket timeouts and runs before any socket
+    exists, so a slow or hostile resolver would otherwise outlive the whole
+    stream deadline.  Running it in a joinable worker bounds resolution by the
+    same wall clock; a stuck lookup leaks only one daemon thread.
+    """
+    outcome: dict[str, object] = {}
+
+    def run() -> None:
+        try:
+            outcome["value"] = socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, type=socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            outcome["error"] = exc
+
+    worker = threading.Thread(target=run, daemon=True)
+    worker.start()
+    worker.join(timeout)
+    if worker.is_alive():
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP stream DNS resolution deadline exceeded")
+    if "error" in outcome:
+        raise outcome["error"]  # type: ignore[misc]
+
+
+class StreamDeadline:
+    """Force-close tracked connections once an absolute deadline passes."""
+
+    def __init__(self, timeout: float, *, timer=threading.Timer):
+        if not 0 < timeout <= MAX_STREAM_SECONDS:
+            raise PolicyError("HTTP stream deadline bounds are invalid")
+        self._deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._connections: list[http.client.HTTPConnection] = []
+        self.expired = False
+        self._timer = timer(timeout, self._expire)
+        self._timer.daemon = True
+        self._timer.start()
+
+    def remaining(self) -> float:
+        value = self._deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if value <= 0 or self.expired:
+            raise PolicyError("HTTP stream deadline exceeded")
+        return value
+
+    def _expire(self) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.expired = True
+            connections = list(self._connections)
+        for connection in connections:
+            # Shut the raw socket down first so a blocked send or recv wakes
+            # immediately; close alone leaves peers waiting on the old fd.
+            sock = getattr(connection, "sock", None)
+            if sock is not None:
+                with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
+                    sock.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
+            connection.close()
+
+    def _track(self, connection: http.client.HTTPConnection):
+        with self._lock:
+            expired = self.expired
+            if not expired:
+                self._connections.append(connection)
+        if expired:
+            connection.close()
+            raise PolicyError("HTTP stream deadline exceeded")
+        return connection
+
+    def _bounded_connection(self, connection: http.client.HTTPConnection):
+        """Register one connection and bound its DNS phase by the deadline.
+
+        The watchdog can only close a live socket, but ``connect`` resolves
+        the host before any socket exists.  Wrapping ``connect`` runs that
+        resolution under the same absolute deadline first, then hands off to
+        the real connect for the socket phases the watchdog already covers.
+        """
+        original_connect = connection.connect
+
+        def connect() -> None:
+            _resolve_within(connection.host, connection.port, self.remaining())
+            original_connect()
+
+        connection.connect = connect  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        return self._track(connection)
+
+    def cancel(self) -> None:
+        self._timer.cancel()
+
+    def handlers(self) -> tuple[urllib.request.BaseHandler, ...]:
+        """Build urllib handlers whose connections obey this deadline."""
+        deadline = self
+
+        class GuardedHTTPHandler(urllib.request.HTTPHandler):
+            def http_open(self, req):
+                return self.do_open(
+                    lambda host, **kwargs: deadline._bounded_connection(
+                        http.client.HTTPConnection(host, **kwargs)
+                    ),
+                    req,
+                )
+
+        class GuardedHTTPSHandler(urllib.request.HTTPSHandler):
+            def https_open(self, req):
+                return self.do_open(
+                    lambda host, **kwargs: deadline._bounded_connection(
+                        http.client.HTTPSConnection(host, **kwargs)
+                    ),
+                    req,
+                )
+
+        return (GuardedHTTPHandler(), GuardedHTTPSHandler())
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(_child_main() if sys.argv[1:] == ["--child"] else 2)

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/git_pack_objects.py

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Bounded Git pack inflation and delta resolution for quarantine scanning.
+
+Pushed objects arrive zlib-compressed inside a packfile, so any content
+screening must inflate the real payloads first.  This module unpacks one
+self-contained pack under explicit object, size, and checksum bounds and
+resolves every delta against bases inside the same pack.  Thin packs are
+rejected outright: a delta against a base the broker cannot see would leave
+part of the pushed content unscanned.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import tempfile
+import zlib
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES = {1: b"commit", 2: b"tree", 3: b"blob", 4: b"tag"}
+OFS_DELTA = 6
+REF_DELTA = 7
+MAX_PACK_OBJECTS = 50_000
+MAX_OBJECT_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 256 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_RESOLVE_PASSES = 64
+SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT = 256 * 1024
+READ_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
+
+
+def _read_exact(stream: BinaryIO, size: int) -> bytes:
+    value = stream.read(size)
+    if len(value) != size:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack data ended early")
+    return value
+
+
+def _object_header(stream: BinaryIO) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    """Parse one object's type and declared inflated size."""
+    byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+    type_code = (byte >> 4) & 0x7
+    size = byte & 0x0F
+    shift = 4
+    while byte & 0x80:
+        if shift > 60:
+            raise PolicyError("Git object header is invalid")
+        byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+        size |= (byte & 0x7F) << shift
+        shift += 7
+    return type_code, size
+
+
+def _delta_distance(stream: BinaryIO) -> int:
+    """Parse one ofs-delta base distance."""
+    byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+    value = byte & 0x7F
+    while byte & 0x80:
+        byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+        value = ((value + 1) << 7) | (byte & 0x7F)
+        if value > 1 << 48:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta base distance is invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _inflate(stream: BinaryIO, declared: int) -> BinaryIO:
+    """Inflate one object into a quarantine spool, bounded by its header."""
+    spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - caller owns returned spool
+        max_size=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT, dir="/tmp"
+    )
+    decompressor = zlib.decompressobj()
+    produced = 0
+    try:
+        while not decompressor.eof:
+            data = stream.read(READ_CHUNK)
+            if not data:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack object data ended early")
+            while True:
+                value = decompressor.decompress(data, READ_CHUNK)
+                produced += len(value)
+                if produced > declared:
+                    raise PolicyError("Git object size does not match its header")
+                spool.write(value)
+                data = decompressor.unconsumed_tail
+                if decompressor.eof or not data:
+                    break
+        if decompressor.unused_data:
+            stream.seek(-len(decompressor.unused_data), 1)
+        if produced != declared:
+            raise PolicyError("Git object size does not match its header")
+        spool.seek(0)
+        return spool
+    except zlib.error as exc:
+        spool.close()
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack object data is corrupt") from exc
+    except Exception:
+        spool.close()
+        raise
+
+
+def _delta_size(delta: bytes, position: int) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    size = 0
+    shift = 0
+    while True:
+        if position >= len(delta) or shift > 60:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta header is invalid")
+        byte = delta[position]
+        position += 1
+        size |= (byte & 0x7F) << shift
+        shift += 7
+        if not byte & 0x80:
+            return size, position
+
+
+def _apply_delta(base: bytes, delta: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """Apply one Git delta and require exact declared sizes throughout."""
+    source_size, position = _delta_size(delta, 0)
+    target_size, position = _delta_size(delta, position)
+    if source_size != len(base) or target_size > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Git delta sizes are invalid")
+    parts: list[bytes] = []
+    produced = 0
+    while position < len(delta):
+        opcode = delta[position]
+        position += 1
+        if opcode & 0x80:
+            operands = [bit for bit in (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64) if opcode & bit]
+            if position + len(operands) > len(delta):
+                raise PolicyError("Git delta copy is truncated")
+            offset = 0
+            size = 0
+            for shift, bit in enumerate((1, 2, 4, 8)):
+                if opcode & bit:
+                    offset |= delta[position] << (8 * shift)
+                    position += 1
+            for shift, bit in enumerate((16, 32, 64)):
+                if opcode & bit:
+                    size |= delta[position] << (8 * shift)
+                    position += 1
+            size = size or 0x10000
+            if offset + size > len(base):
+                raise PolicyError("Git delta copy is out of bounds")
+            parts.append(base[offset : offset + size])
+            produced += size
+        elif opcode:
+            if position + opcode > len(delta):
+                raise PolicyError("Git delta insert is truncated")
+            parts.append(delta[position : position + opcode])
+            position += opcode
+            produced += opcode
+        else:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta instruction is invalid")
+        if produced > target_size:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta result exceeds its declared size")
+    if produced != target_size:
+        raise PolicyError("Git delta result size is invalid")
+    return b"".join(parts)
+
+
+def _payload_sha(type_code: int, payload: BinaryIO, size: int) -> bytes:
+    digest = hashlib.sha1(OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES[type_code] + b" %d\x00" % size)
+    payload.seek(0)
+    while True:
+        chunk = payload.read(READ_CHUNK)
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        digest.update(chunk)
+    payload.seek(0)
+    return digest.digest()
+
+
+def _verify_checksum(stream: BinaryIO, start: int, end: int) -> None:
+    trailer = _read_exact(stream, 20)
+    stream.seek(start)
+    digest = hashlib.sha1()
+    remaining = end - start
+    while remaining:
+        chunk = stream.read(min(READ_CHUNK, remaining))
+        digest.update(chunk)
+        remaining -= len(chunk)
+    if digest.digest() != trailer:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack checksum is invalid")
+    stream.seek(end + 20)
+
+
+class _Entry:
+    """One pack entry: either resolved content or an unresolved delta."""
+
+    def __init__(self, type_code: int, payload: BinaryIO, size: int, base):
+        self.type_code = type_code
+        self.payload = payload
+        self.size = size
+        self.base = base
+
+
+def _resolve(entries: dict[int, _Entry], total: list[int]) -> None:
+    """Resolve every delta against in-pack bases only, to a fixed point."""
+    by_sha: dict[bytes, int] = {}
+    for offset, entry in entries.items():
+        if entry.base is None:
+            by_sha.setdefault(
+                _payload_sha(entry.type_code, entry.payload, entry.size), offset
+            )
+    for _ in range(MAX_RESOLVE_PASSES):
+        pending = [item for item in entries.items() if item[1].base is not None]
+        if not pending:
+            return
+        progressed = False
+        for offset, entry in pending:
+            base_key = entry.base
+            base_offset = base_key if isinstance(base_key, int) else by_sha.get(base_key)
+            base = entries.get(base_offset) if base_offset is not None else None
+            if base is None or base.base is not None:
+                if isinstance(base_key, int) and base is None:
+                    raise PolicyError("Git delta base offset is invalid")
+                continue
+            base.payload.seek(0)
+            entry.payload.seek(0)
+            value = _apply_delta(base.payload.read(), entry.payload.read())
+            total[0] += len(value)
+            if total[0] > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack contents exceed the safe size limit")
+            entry.payload.close()
+            spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - entry owns spool
+                max_size=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT, dir="/tmp"
+            )
+            spool.write(value)
+            spool.seek(0)
+            entry.type_code = base.type_code
+            entry.payload = spool
+            entry.size = len(value)
+            entry.base = None
+            by_sha.setdefault(_payload_sha(entry.type_code, spool, entry.size), offset)
+            progressed = True
+        if not progressed:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta base is outside the pack; push full packs")
+    raise PolicyError("Git delta chains exceed the safe resolution limit")
+
+
+def unpack_objects(stream: BinaryIO) -> list[tuple[int, BinaryIO]]:
+    """Inflate one self-contained pack and return every resolved payload."""
+    start = stream.tell()
+    header = _read_exact(stream, 12)
+    version = int.from_bytes(header[4:8], "big")
+    count = int.from_bytes(header[8:12], "big")
+    if header[:4] != b"PACK" or version not in {2, 3}:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack header is invalid")
+    if count > MAX_PACK_OBJECTS:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack contains too many objects")
+    entries: dict[int, _Entry] = {}
+    total = [0]
+    try:
+        for _ in range(count):
+            offset = stream.tell() - start
+            type_code, declared = _object_header(stream)
+            if declared > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git object exceeds the safe size limit")
+            total[0] += declared
+            if total[0] > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack contents exceed the safe size limit")
+            base: int | bytes | None = None
+            if type_code == OFS_DELTA:
+                distance = _delta_distance(stream)
+                base = offset - distance
+                if base < 0:
+                    raise PolicyError("Git delta base offset is invalid")
+            elif type_code == REF_DELTA:
+                base = _read_exact(stream, 20)
+            elif type_code not in OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack object type is invalid")
+            entries[offset] = _Entry(type_code, _inflate(stream, declared), declared, base)
+        _verify_checksum(stream, start, stream.tell())
+        _resolve(entries, total)
+    except Exception:
+        for entry in entries.values():
+            entry.payload.close()
+        raise
+    for entry in entries.values():
+        entry.payload.seek(0)
+    return [
+        (entries[offset].type_code, entries[offset].payload)
+        for offset in sorted(entries)
+    ]
+
+
+def parse_loose_object(value: bytes) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
+    """Inflate one quarantined loose object and return its typed payload."""
+    if len(value) > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Git object exceeds the safe size limit")
+    decompressor = zlib.decompressobj()
+    try:
+        inflated = decompressor.decompress(value, MAX_OBJECT_BYTES + 1)
+    except zlib.error as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("Git loose object data is corrupt") from exc
+    if not decompressor.eof or decompressor.unused_data or len(inflated) > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Git loose object framing is invalid")
+    kind, separator, remainder = inflated.partition(b"\x00")
+    name, space, size = kind.partition(b" ")
+    types = {label: code for code, label in OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES.items()}
+    if (
+        not separator
+        or not space
+        or name not in types
+        or not size.isdigit()
+        or int(size) != len(remainder)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Git loose object header is invalid")
+    return types[name], remainder

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Use the private Atlas Forgejo API through a least-authority PR boundary."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import deadline_http
+from gitea_api_policy import (
+    PolicyError,
+    _draft_title,
+    _reject_forbidden,
+    _validate_body,
+    _validate_pr_number,
+    _validate_pr_number_segment,
+    _validate_query,
+    _validate_ref,
+    _validate_ref_bounds,
+    _validate_repo,
+    _validate_sha,
+)
+
+CANONICAL_BASE_URL = "https://scm.bstein.dev"
+ALLOWED_OWNER = "atlas"
+DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/vault/secrets/gitea-token")
+CREATE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/api/v1/repos/atlas/([^/]+)/pulls\Z")
+MAX_ERROR_BYTES = 8192
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH = 768
+MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH = 512
+RAW_API_TARGET_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9/_.?&=-]+\Z")
+
+
+def _safe_urlopen(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int):
+    """Open one exchange under a killable absolute wall-clock deadline.
+
+    The helper process rejects redirects before urllib can copy
+    authentication headers, and its whole connect/send/read lifetime
+    shares one hard deadline.
+    """
+    return deadline_http.open_bounded(
+        request, maximum=MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, timeout=timeout
+    )
+
+
+def read_token(path: Path = DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE) -> str:
+    """Read the token from the pod-lifetime Vault projection."""
+    token = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if not token:
+        raise ValueError(f"runtime credential is empty: {path}")
+    return token
+
+
+def configured_base_url() -> str:
+    """Reject attempts to redirect credentials away from the canonical origin."""
+    configured = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", CANONICAL_BASE_URL)
+    if configured != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
+    return configured
+
+
+def _split_api_path(path: str) -> urllib.parse.SplitResult:
+    if not isinstance(path, str) or len(path) > MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH:
+        raise PolicyError("API target exceeds the safe size limit")
+    if (
+        not path.isascii()
+        or any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in path)
+        or "\\" in path
+        or not RAW_API_TARGET_RE.fullmatch(path)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API target contains non-canonical raw characters")
+    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)
+    canonical = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(("", "", target.path, target.query, ""))
+    if canonical != path:
+        raise PolicyError("API target is not in exact canonical form")
+    if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
+        raise PolicyError("API path must be relative to the Atlas SCM origin")
+    if not target.path.startswith("/api/v1/"):
+        raise PolicyError("API path must start with /api/v1/")
+    if len(target.path) > MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH:
+        raise PolicyError("API path exceeds the safe size limit")
+    segments = target.path.split("/")
+    if "//" in target.path or any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in segments):
+        raise PolicyError("encoded or non-canonical API paths are not allowed")
+    return target
+
+
+def _authorize_read(
+    target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Allow only repository, PR, branch, commit, and status metadata reads."""
+    prefix = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/"
+    remainder = target.path.removeprefix(prefix)
+    if remainder == target.path:
+        raise PolicyError("reads are limited to explicit Atlas repository metadata")
+    repo, separator, suffix = remainder.partition("/")
+    _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", forbidden)
+    _validate_repo(repo)
+
+    if not separator:
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "repository"
+    if suffix == "pulls":
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit", "state"})
+        return "pull-list"
+    content_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)\.(?:patch|diff)", suffix)
+    if content_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(content_match.group(1))
+        raise PolicyError("repository API route is outside the metadata read allowlist")
+    pull_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)", suffix)
+    if pull_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(pull_match.group(1))
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "pull"
+    evidence_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)/(?:commits|files)", suffix)
+    if evidence_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(evidence_match.group(1))
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "pull-evidence"
+    if suffix == "branches":
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "branch-list"
+    branch_match = re.fullmatch(r"branches/([^/]+)", suffix)
+    if branch_match:
+        _validate_ref(branch_match.group(1), "branch")
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "branch"
+    if suffix == "commits":
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "commit-list"
+    if re.fullmatch(r"git/commits/[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", suffix):
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "commit"
+    if re.fullmatch(
+        r"(?:commits/[0-9a-fA-F]{40}/status|commits/[0-9a-fA-F]{40}/statuses|statuses/[0-9a-fA-F]{40})",
+        suffix,
+    ):
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "status"
+    raise PolicyError("repository API route is outside the metadata read allowlist")
+
+
+def api_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
+    """Return a canonical same-origin URL without forwarding credentials."""
+    if base_url != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
+    target = _split_api_path(path)
+    return urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
+        ("https", "scm.bstein.dev", target.path, target.query, "")
+    )
+
+
+def authorize_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    data: object | None,
+    *,
+    forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+) -> str:
+    """Validate one request and return its bounded operation name."""
+    normalized_method = method.upper()
+    target = _split_api_path(path)
+    if normalized_method == "GET":
+        if data is not None:
+            raise PolicyError("read operations cannot include a request body")
+        return _authorize_read(target, forbidden=forbidden)
+    if target.query:
+        raise PolicyError("mutating operations cannot include query parameters")
+    if normalized_method != "POST":
+        raise PolicyError("only read and create-draft operations are available")
+    match = CREATE_PATH_RE.fullmatch(target.path)
+    if not match:
+        raise PolicyError("POST is limited to creating an Atlas draft pull request")
+    _reject_forbidden(match.group(1), "repository", forbidden)
+    _validate_repo(match.group(1))
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) != {"base", "body", "head", "title"}:
+        raise PolicyError("draft creation accepts only base, body, head, and title")
+    if data["title"] != _draft_title(data["title"], forbidden=forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError("new pull requests must use the Gitea draft-title prefix")
+    _validate_body(data["body"], forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(data["base"], "base", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(data["head"], "head", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref(data["base"], "base", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref(data["head"], "head", forbidden=forbidden)
+    return "create-draft"
+
+
+def build_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    base_url: str,
+    token: str,
+    data: object | None = None,
+) -> urllib.request.Request:
+    """Build an authorized request without putting the token in its URL or body."""
+    authorize_request(method, path, data, forbidden=(token,))
+    return _build_request(method, path, base_url=base_url, token=token, data=data)
+
+
+def _build_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    base_url: str,
+    token: str,
+    data: object | None = None,
+) -> urllib.request.Request:
+    """Build one already-authorized upstream request."""
+    payload = None
+    if data is not None:
+        payload = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    return urllib.request.Request(
+        api_url(base_url, path),
+        data=payload,
+        method=method.upper(),
+        headers={
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "Authorization": f"token {token}",
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": "hermes-atlas-pr-client/2",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def redact_bytes(value: bytes, token: str) -> bytes:
+    """Remove exact runtime-token and authorization-header values from output."""
+    redacted = value.replace(token.encode("utf-8"), b"[REDACTED]")
+    return re.sub(
+        rb"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:token|bearer)?\s*[^\s,;\"}]+",
+        rb"\1[REDACTED]",
+        redacted,
+    )
+
+
+def _reject_response_credential(value: bytes, token: str) -> None:
+    """Fail closed if an upstream body reflects any ordinary token encoding."""
+    raw = token.encode("utf-8")
+    forms = {
+        raw,
+        base64.b64encode(raw),
+        base64.b64encode(b"hermes-automation:" + raw),
+        urllib.parse.quote(token, safe="").encode("ascii"),
+    }
+    if any(form and form in value for form in forms):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo response contains runtime credential material")
+
+
+def _request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    data: object | None,
+    *,
+    token: str,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen,
+    authorized: bool = False,
+    expected_status: int,
+) -> bytes:
+    builder = _build_request if authorized else build_request
+    request = builder(method, path, base_url=configured_base_url(), token=token, data=data)
+    with opener(request, timeout=30) as response:  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        status = getattr(response, "status", None)
+        if status is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+            status = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if status != expected_status:
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+        if response.headers.get_content_type() != "application/json":  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned an unexpected response type")
+        body = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if len(body) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    _reject_response_credential(body, token)
+    return redact_bytes(body, token)
+
+
+def read(
+    path: str, *, token: str, opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen
+) -> bytes:
+    """Read one explicitly allowed Atlas repository metadata resource."""
+    return _request(
+        "GET", path, None, token=token, opener=opener, expected_status=200
+    )
+
+
+def _nested(document: dict[str, object], *keys: str) -> object:
+    value: object = document
+    for key in keys:
+        if not isinstance(value, dict) or key not in value:
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted required pull-request evidence")
+        value = value[key]
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_create_response(
+    value: bytes,
+    *,
+    repo: str,
+    base: str,
+    head: str,
+    head_sha: str,
+    title: str,
+    body: str,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Require exact server evidence for the intended open draft handoff."""
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(value)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata") from exc
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata")
+    number = _validate_pr_number(document.get("number"))
+    full_name = f"{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}"
+    expected_html = f"{CANONICAL_BASE_URL}/{full_name}/pulls/{number}"
+    checks = (
+        document.get("state") == "open",
+        document.get("draft") is True,
+        document.get("merged") is False,
+        document.get("html_url") == expected_html,
+        document.get("url") == expected_html,
+        document.get("title") == title,
+        document.get("body") == body,
+        _nested(document, "base", "ref") == base,
+        _nested(document, "base", "repo", "full_name") == full_name,
+        _nested(document, "head", "ref") == head,
+        _nested(document, "head", "sha") == head_sha,
+        _nested(document, "head", "repo", "full_name") == full_name,
+    )
+    if not all(checks):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo did not confirm the exact draft pull-request state")
+    return document
+
+
+def create_draft(
+    repo: str,
+    *,
+    base: str,
+    head: str,
+    head_sha: str,
+    title: str,
+    body: str,
+    token: str,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Create and verify a same-repository draft pull request for human review."""
+    _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+    repo = _validate_repo(repo)
+    title = _draft_title(title, forbidden=(token,))
+    body = _validate_body(body, forbidden=(token,))
+    head_sha = _validate_sha(head_sha)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(base, "base", forbidden=(token,))
+    _validate_ref_bounds(head, "head", forbidden=(token,))
+    base = _validate_ref(base, "base", forbidden=(token,))
+    head = _validate_ref(head, "head", forbidden=(token,))
+    data = {"base": base, "body": body, "head": head, "title": title}
+    result = _request(
+        "POST",
+        f"/api/v1/repos/{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}/pulls",
+        data,
+        token=token,
+        opener=opener,
+        authorized=True,
+        expected_status=201,
+    )
+    _require_create_response(
+        result,
+        repo=repo,
+        base=base,
+        head=head,
+        head_sha=head_sha,
+        title=title,
+        body=body,
+    )
+    return result
+
+
+def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
+    """Parse the intentionally narrow read and create-draft operations."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--dry-run",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="validate and describe the request without reading a token or using the network",
+    )
+    subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="operation", required=True)
+    read_parser = subparsers.add_parser("read", help="read allowed Atlas metadata")
+    read_parser.add_argument("path")
+    create_parser = subparsers.add_parser(
+        "create-draft", help="create a same-repository draft pull request"
+    )
+    create_parser.add_argument("repo")
+    create_parser.add_argument("--base", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--head", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--head-sha", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--title", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--body", default="")
+    return parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+
+def _operation(
+    args: argparse.Namespace, *, validate_refs: bool = True
+) -> tuple[str, str, object | None]:
+    if args.operation == "read":
+        return "GET", args.path, None
+    repo = _validate_repo(args.repo)
+    _validate_sha(args.head_sha)
+    body = _validate_body(args.body)
+    title = _draft_title(args.title)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(args.base, "base")
+    _validate_ref_bounds(args.head, "head")
+    base = _validate_ref(args.base, "base") if validate_refs else args.base
+    head = _validate_ref(args.head, "head") if validate_refs else args.head
+    data = {
+        "base": base,
+        "body": body,
+        "head": head,
+        "title": title,
+    }
+    return "POST", f"/api/v1/repos/{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}/pulls", data
+
+
+def _write_body(body: bytes) -> None:
+    if body:
+        sys.stdout.buffer.write(body)
+        if not body.endswith(b"\n"):
+            sys.stdout.buffer.write(b"\n")
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    """Validate, optionally describe, and execute one safe Forgejo operation."""
+    try:
+        args = parse_args(argv)
+        if args.dry_run:
+            method, path, data = _operation(args, validate_refs=False)
+            operation = authorize_request(method, path, data)
+            print(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {
+                        "dry_run": True,
+                        "host": "scm.bstein.dev",
+                        "operation": operation,
+                        "owner": ALLOWED_OWNER,
+                        "path": path,
+                        "request_fields": sorted(data)
+                        if isinstance(data, dict)
+                        else [],
+                    },
+                    sort_keys=True,
+                )
+            )
+            return 0
+        method, path, data = _operation(args, validate_refs=False)
+        from scm_broker_client import create_draft as broker_create_draft
+        from scm_broker_client import read as broker_read
+
+        if args.operation == "read":
+            body = broker_read(path)
+        else:
+            assert isinstance(data, dict)
+            body = broker_create_draft(
+                args.repo,
+                base=str(data["base"]),
+                head=str(data["head"]),
+                head_sha=args.head_sha,
+                title=str(data["title"]),
+                body=str(data["body"]),
+            )
+        _write_body(body)
+        return 0
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        exc.read(MAX_ERROR_BYTES)
+        print(f"SCM broker request failed with HTTP {exc.code}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    except (OSError, PolicyError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        print(
+            "Forgejo request rejected or unavailable; no credential was disclosed",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+"""Validation policy for Hermes' least-authority Atlas Forgejo client.
+
+The screening catches structured credential assignments, known token formats,
+and long high-entropy values. It is a fail-closed accident barrier, not proof
+that text is secret-free: a short or multiword secret under an innocuous key is
+not reliably distinguishable from prose and must never be supplied by callers.
+JSON depth/nodes/documents and multiline gaps are deliberately bounded; large
+or unusual configuration blobs are not a supported pull-request field format.
+"""
+
+# ruff: noqa: SIM905
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+import subprocess
+import urllib.parse
+from collections import Counter
+from math import log2
+
+REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
+DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
+GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
+MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 128
+MAX_QUERY_ITEMS = 3
+MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH = 16
+MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH = 16
+MAX_PAGE = 10_000
+MAX_LIMIT = 50
+MAX_PR_NUMBER = 2_147_483_647
+MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS = 10
+MAX_REF_CHARACTERS = 200
+MAX_REF_UTF8_BYTES = 255
+MAX_TITLE_UTF8_BYTES = 512
+MAX_BODY_UTF8_BYTES = 32_768
+MAX_JSON_DOCUMENTS = 32
+MAX_JSON_NODES = 2_048
+MAX_JSON_DEPTH = 32
+CANONICAL_QUERY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_=&-]*\Z")
+ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(
+    r"""(?mx)
+    (?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])
+    (?P<key_quote>[\"']?)
+    (?P<key>\.?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127})
+    (?P=key_quote)
+    [ \t]*(?P<separator>[:=])[ \t]*
+    (?P<value>
+      \"(?:\\.|[^\"\\\r\n])*\" |
+      '(?:\\.|[^'\\\r\n])*' |
+      [^\r\n,;}&]{0,2048}
+    )
+    """
+)
+JSON_KEY_RE = re.compile(r'"(?P<key>[^"]{1,512})"(?P<spacing>[\x00-\x20\x7f]{0,256}):')
+MULTILINE_ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(
+    r"""(?mx)
+    (?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])
+    (?P<key_quote>["']?)
+    (?P<key>\.?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127})
+    (?P=key_quote)
+    [ \t]{0,64}(?:\r?\n[ \t]{0,64}){0,4}
+    (?P<separator>[:=])
+    [ \t]{0,64}(?:\r?\n[ \t]{0,64}){1,4}
+    (?P<value>[^\r\n,;}&]{1,2048})
+    """
+)
+CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE = re.compile(r"(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])|(?<=[A-Z])(?=[A-Z][a-z])")
+CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic|token)\s+"
+    r"(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}\b)(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]*[0-9+/_=.-])"
+    r"[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}"
+)
+STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE)
+    for pattern in (
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])sk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])[rs]k_(?:test|live)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])whsec_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:gta|gto|gitea|forgejo)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])ya29\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])oy2[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])SK[0-9a-f]{32}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"-----BEGIN\s+[A-Z0-9 ][A-Z0-9 -]{1,62}-----",
+        r"\bssh-(?:rsa|ed25519|dss|ecdsa-[A-Za-z0-9-]+)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}",
+        r"https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Za-z0-9/_-]{20,}",
+        r"https://(?:discord(?:app)?\.com)/api/webhooks/[0-9]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,}",
+        r"https://[^\s/]*webhook\.office\.com/[^\s]{20,}",
+    )
+)
+HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])[A-Za-z0-9+/_=-]{48,16384}(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"
+)
+PROSE_LEAD_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "add allow change check describe document ensure explain fix handle keep preserve "
+    "prevent reject remove review support test validate".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "auth authentication authorization auths basic bearer credential credentials "
+    "passwd password pat private sas secret secrets sig signature signing token tokens "
+    "webhook".split()
+)
+KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "access account api auth client encryption identity private registry secret service "
+    "session signing ssh".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS = frozenset(
+    "accessid accesskeyid accountkey clientemail clientid connectionstring "
+    "dockerconfigjson privatekeyid serviceaccountkey sharedaccesssignature".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES = tuple(
+    "accesskey accesskeyid accountkey apikey authkey clientemail clientid clientkey "
+    "connectionstring credential credentials encryptionkey identitykey password passwd "
+    "privatekeyid privatekey secret secretkey servicekey sessionkey signature signingkey "
+    "sshkey token webhook".split()
+)
+
+
+class PolicyError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
+
+
+def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
+    if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
+        raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
+    return repo
+
+
+def _reject_forbidden(value: object, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    """Reject exact runtime credentials before invoking helpers or the network."""
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} contains runtime credential material")
+
+
+def _validate_ref_bounds(
+    value: object, name: str, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Reject oversized or non-encodable refs before invoking Git."""
+    _reject_forbidden(value, name, forbidden)
+    if not value or len(value) > MAX_REF_CHARACTERS:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe branch-name limit")
+    try:
+        encoded = value.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} is not valid UTF-8 text") from exc
+    if len(encoded) > MAX_REF_UTF8_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe UTF-8 branch-name limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_ref(
+    value: object, name: str, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
+    value = _validate_ref_bounds(value, name, forbidden=forbidden)
+    if value.startswith("-"):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
+    if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
+        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
+    return value.lower()
+
+
+def _validate_pr_number_segment(value: object) -> int:
+    """Validate a canonical bounded pull-request number from an API path."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, str)
+        or len(value) > MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS
+        or not re.fullmatch(r"[1-9][0-9]*", value)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request number must use bounded canonical ASCII digits")
+    number = int(value)
+    if number > MAX_PR_NUMBER:
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request number is outside its allowed range")
+    return number
+
+
+def _validate_pr_number(value: object) -> int:
+    """Validate a bounded pull-request number returned by Forgejo."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, int)
+        or isinstance(value, bool)
+        or not 1 <= value <= MAX_PR_NUMBER
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted a valid pull-request number")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_text(
+    value: object,
+    name: str,
+    maximum: int,
+    maximum_bytes: int,
+    *,
+    required: bool,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
+    if required and not value.strip():
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
+    try:
+        encoded = value.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} is not valid UTF-8 text") from exc
+    if len(value) > maximum or len(encoded) > maximum_bytes or "\x00" in value:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _normalized_key(value: str) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], str]:
+    """Split camelCase and separator-based assignment keys into semantics."""
+    separated = CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE.sub(" ", value.strip(".\"'"))
+    words = tuple(re.findall(r"[A-Za-z0-9]+", separated.lower()))
+    return words, "".join(words)
+
+
+def _is_sensitive_key(value: str) -> bool:
+    words, compact = _normalized_key(value)
+    word_set = set(words)
+    if word_set & SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS:
+        return True
+    if compact in SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS:
+        return True
+    if compact.endswith(SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES):
+        return True
+    if "key" in word_set and word_set & KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS:
+        return True
+    if {"client", "email"} <= word_set or {"client", "id"} <= word_set:
+        return True
+    if {"access", "id"} <= word_set or {"connection", "string"} <= word_set:
+        return True
+    return compact.endswith("configjson")
+
+
+def _strip_assignment_value(value: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    stripped = value.strip()
+    quoted = (
+        len(stripped) >= 2 and stripped[0] in {'"', "'"} and stripped[-1] == stripped[0]
+    )
+    if quoted:
+        stripped = stripped[1:-1].strip()
+    return stripped, quoted
+
+
+def _looks_like_prose(value: str) -> bool:
+    words = re.findall(r"[A-Za-z]+(?:[-'][A-Za-z]+)?", value)
+    if len(words) < 2:
+        return False
+    if re.search(r"[$`{}\[\]\\@/:=+_]", value):
+        return False
+    return words[0].lower() in PROSE_LEAD_WORDS
+
+
+def _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(value: str) -> bool:
+    stripped, quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
+    if not stripped:
+        return False
+    if quoted or stripped.startswith(("{", "[", "|", ">", "!!", "&", "*")):
+        return True
+    if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(stripped):
+        return True
+    if any(pattern.search(stripped) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+        return True
+    if re.search(r"(?:https?://|[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+)", stripped):
+        return True
+    if re.search(r"(?:\$\{|\$\(|\\[nrt]|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}\Z)", stripped):
+        return True
+    return not _looks_like_prose(stripped)
+
+
+def _is_structural_credential_assignment(key: str, value: str) -> bool:
+    words, compact_key = _normalized_key(key)
+    stripped, _quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
+    _value_words, compact_value = _normalized_key(stripped)
+    return (
+        compact_key == "type" and compact_value in {"serviceaccount", "credential"}
+    ) or ("service" in words and "account" in words and bool(stripped))
+
+
+def _decode_json_key(raw: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    """Decode one bounded JSON key without silently accepting bad escapes."""
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(f'"{raw}"')
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeError):
+        approximate = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+", "_", raw.replace("\\", ""))
+        return approximate, False
+    return decoded if isinstance(decoded, str) else "", True
+
+
+def _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(
+    value: object, *, depth: int = 0, nodes: list[int] | None = None
+) -> bool:
+    """Walk one decoded JSON value with explicit depth and node ceilings."""
+    if nodes is None:
+        nodes = [0]
+    nodes[0] += 1
+    if nodes[0] > MAX_JSON_NODES or depth > MAX_JSON_DEPTH:
+        raise PolicyError("structured pull-request text exceeds the scan limit")
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        for key, assigned in value.items():
+            if not isinstance(key, str):
+                continue
+            if _is_sensitive_key(key):
+                return True
+            assigned_text = assigned if isinstance(assigned, str) else ""
+            if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned_text):
+                return True
+            if _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(
+                assigned, depth=depth + 1, nodes=nodes
+            ):
+                return True
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        return any(
+            _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(item, depth=depth + 1, nodes=nodes)
+            for item in value
+        )
+    return False
+
+
+def _decoded_json_documents(value: str):
+    """Yield bounded embedded JSON object or array fragments."""
+    decoder = json.JSONDecoder()
+    index = 0
+    attempts = 0
+    while attempts < MAX_JSON_DOCUMENTS:
+        positions = [
+            position for token in "{[" if (position := value.find(token, index)) >= 0
+        ]
+        if not positions:
+            return
+        start = min(positions)
+        attempts += 1
+        try:
+            document, end = decoder.raw_decode(value, start)
+        except (json.JSONDecodeError, RecursionError, ValueError):
+            index = start + 1
+            continue
+        yield document
+        index = max(end, start + 1)
+    if "{" in value[index:] or "[" in value[index:]:
+        raise PolicyError("structured pull-request text exceeds the scan limit")
+
+
+def _has_structured_sensitive_assignment(value: str) -> bool:
+    """Detect bounded JSON and multiline YAML/env credential assignments."""
+    for candidate in JSON_KEY_RE.finditer(value):
+        decoded, valid = _decode_json_key(candidate.group("key"))
+        if _is_sensitive_key(decoded):
+            return True
+        if not valid and _is_sensitive_key(candidate.group("key").replace("\\", "")):
+            return True
+    for candidate in MULTILINE_ASSIGNMENT_RE.finditer(value):
+        key = candidate.group("key")
+        assigned = candidate.group("value")
+        if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned) or (
+            _is_sensitive_key(key) and _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(assigned)
+        ):
+            return True
+    return any(
+        _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(item)
+        for item in _decoded_json_documents(value)
+    )
+
+
+def _has_high_entropy_token(value: str) -> bool:
+    for match in HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE.finditer(value):
+        token = match.group(0)
+        if len(token) > 256:
+            return True
+        groups = sum(
+            bool(re.search(pattern, token))
+            for pattern in (r"[a-z]", r"[A-Z]", r"[0-9]", r"[+/_=-]")
+        )
+        counts = Counter(token)
+        entropy = -sum(
+            (count / len(token)) * log2(count / len(token)) for count in counts.values()
+        )
+        if groups >= 3 and entropy >= 4.0:
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def _reject_sensitive(value: str, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    if any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} contains runtime credential material")
+    if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if _has_structured_sensitive_assignment(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    for candidate in ASSIGNMENT_RE.finditer(value):
+        key = candidate.group("key")
+        assigned = candidate.group("value")
+        if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned) or (
+            _is_sensitive_key(key) and _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(assigned)
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if _has_high_entropy_token(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+
+
+def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
+    body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, MAX_BODY_UTF8_BYTES, required=False)
+    _reject_sensitive(body, "body", forbidden)
+    return body
+
+
+def _draft_title(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
+    """Return a bounded, secret-screened Gitea draft title."""
+    title = _validate_text(
+        value, "title", 251, MAX_TITLE_UTF8_BYTES, required=True
+    ).strip()
+    _reject_sensitive(title, "title", forbidden)
+    for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
+        if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
+            title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
+            break
+    if not title:
+        raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
+    return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
+
+
+def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
+    """Accept only short canonical ASCII query strings with bounded pagination."""
+    raw = target.query
+    if (
+        len(raw) > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH
+        or not raw.isascii()
+        or not CANONICAL_QUERY_RE.fullmatch(raw)
+        or "%" in raw
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API query must use short canonical ASCII form")
+    try:
+        pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(raw, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
+    if len(pairs) > MAX_QUERY_ITEMS:
+        raise PolicyError("too many API query parameters")
+    if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
+        raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
+    if any(
+        not key
+        or len(key) > MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH
+        or len(value) > MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH
+        for key, value in pairs
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API query key or value exceeds its safe limit")
+    if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
+        raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
+    values = dict(pairs)
+    for name in ("page", "limit"):
+        if name not in values:
+            continue
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", values[name]):
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use ASCII decimal digits")
+        number = int(values[name])
+        if values[name] != str(number):
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use canonical ASCII decimal form")
+        ceiling = MAX_PAGE if name == "page" else MAX_LIMIT
+        if not 1 <= number <= ceiling:
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} is outside its allowed range")
+    if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/receive_pack_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Validate Git receive-pack requests and scan pushed object content.
+
+Ref commands may only create new namespaced feature branches.  Every pushed
+object is then inflated in quarantine and its decompressed payload scanned,
+so credentials cannot ride through the broker inside compressed pack data.
+The screening is a fail-closed accident barrier for credential-shaped
+content: exact runtime-token forms, private keys, SSH key material, and
+known provider token formats.  Entropy heuristics are deliberately excluded
+so SOPS ciphertext, pinned digests, and lock files remain pushable; a short
+secret disguised as prose is not reliably detectable and must never be
+supplied by callers.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import re
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+import git_pack_objects
+from gitea_api_policy import (
+    STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS,
+    PolicyError,
+    _validate_ref,
+)
+
+ZERO_SHA = b"0" * 40
+MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS = 16
+SCAN_CHUNK = 256 * 1024
+SCAN_CARRY = 8 * 1024
+FEATURE_REF_RE = re.compile(
+    r"refs/heads/(?:(?:feature|fix|hermes|handoff)/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,190})\Z"
+)
+PKT_HEADER_RE = re.compile(rb"[0-9a-f]{4}\Z")
+CONTENT_SECRET_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(pattern.pattern.encode("ascii"), re.IGNORECASE)
+    for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS
+) + (
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AGE-SECRET-KEY-1[A-Z0-9]{20,}"),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)PuTTY-User-Key-File"),
+    re.compile(
+        rb"(?im)^[ \t]*authorization[ \t]*:[ \t]*(?:basic|bearer|token)[ \t]+"
+        rb"(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]*[0-9+/=.-])[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}"
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def _read_pkt_line(stream: BinaryIO) -> bytes | None:
+    """Read one pkt-line; None marks the flush packet before the pack."""
+    header = stream.read(4)
+    if not header:
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack request omitted its command terminator")
+    if not PKT_HEADER_RE.fullmatch(header):
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+    size = int(header, 16)
+    if size == 0:
+        return None
+    if size < 4:
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+    value = stream.read(size - 4)
+    if len(value) != size - 4:
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_command(line: bytes, token: str, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> None:
+    """Permit only creation of one new, namespaced feature branch."""
+    if any(form in line for form in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError("Git request contains runtime credential material")
+    command = line.rstrip(b"\n").split(b"\x00", 1)[0]
+    fields = command.split(b" ")
+    if len(fields) != 3 or not all(
+        re.fullmatch(rb"[0-9a-f]{40}", item) for item in fields[:2]
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack ref command is invalid")
+    old_sha, new_sha, raw_ref = fields
+    if old_sha != ZERO_SHA or new_sha == ZERO_SHA:
+        raise PolicyError("Git broker permits only new feature-branch creation")
+    try:
+        ref = raw_ref.decode("ascii")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("Git ref must be canonical ASCII") from exc
+    if not FEATURE_REF_RE.fullmatch(ref):
+        raise PolicyError("Git push is limited to namespaced feature branches")
+    _validate_ref(ref.removeprefix("refs/heads/"), "head", forbidden=(token,))
+
+
+def _scan_payload(payload: BinaryIO, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> None:
+    """Scan one decompressed object payload across chunk boundaries."""
+    carry = b""
+    while True:
+        chunk = payload.read(SCAN_CHUNK)
+        if not chunk:
+            return
+        window = carry + chunk
+        if any(form in window for form in forbidden):
+            raise PolicyError("Git push contains runtime credential material")
+        if any(pattern.search(window) for pattern in CONTENT_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+            raise PolicyError("Git push contains credential-shaped content")
+        carry = window[-SCAN_CARRY:]
+
+
+def _scan_pack(stream: BinaryIO, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> None:
+    objects = git_pack_objects.unpack_objects(stream)
+    try:
+        if stream.read(1):
+            raise PolicyError("Git request has bytes after its pack")
+        for _type_code, payload in objects:
+            _scan_payload(payload, forbidden)
+    finally:
+        for _type_code, payload in objects:
+            payload.close()
+
+
+def validate_receive_pack(
+    body: bytes | BinaryIO, token: str, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]
+) -> None:
+    """Validate one whole receive-pack request: commands, pack, and content."""
+    stream = io.BytesIO(body) if isinstance(body, bytes) else body
+    stream.seek(0)
+    try:
+        commands = 0
+        while True:
+            line = _read_pkt_line(stream)
+            if line is None:
+                break
+            _validate_command(line, token, forbidden)
+            commands += 1
+            if commands > MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS:
+                raise PolicyError("Git push contains too many ref commands")
+        if commands == 0:
+            raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack request has no ref command")
+        _scan_pack(stream, forbidden)
+    finally:
+        stream.seek(0)
+
+
+def scan_loose_object(value: bytes, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> int:
+    """Scan one quarantined loose object and return its parsed type code."""
+    type_code, payload = git_pack_objects.parse_loose_object(value)
+    _scan_payload(io.BytesIO(payload), forbidden)
+    return type_code

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Serve the credential-isolated Atlas API and Git smart-HTTP boundary."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import json
+import re
+import socket
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+import deadline_http
+from gitea_api import (
+    CANONICAL_BASE_URL,
+    PolicyError,
+    create_draft,
+    read,
+    read_token,
+)
+from gitea_api_policy import _reject_forbidden, _validate_repo
+from receive_pack_scan import validate_receive_pack
+from scm_broker_io import RejectRedirect, response_status as _status, spool_response
+from scm_broker_server import AbsoluteHeaderDeadlineMixin, BoundedThreadingHTTPServer
+
+BROKER_PORT = 9081
+GIT_USER = "hermes-automation"
+MAX_CONTROL_BODY = 64 * 1024
+MAX_GIT_REQUEST = 128 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_GIT_RESPONSE = 128 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_HEADERS = 32
+MAX_HEADER_BYTES = 16 * 1024
+SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT = 1024 * 1024
+STREAM_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
+INBOUND_HEADER_TIMEOUT = 10.0
+INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT = 120.0
+UPSTREAM_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 300.0
+GIT_PATH_RE = re.compile(
+    r"/git/atlas/(?P<repo>[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99})\.git/"
+    r"(?P<operation>info/refs|git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack)\Z"
+)
+
+
+def _read_bounded(
+    stream,
+    maximum: int,
+    length: int | None = None,
+    *,
+    deadline: float | None = None,
+    set_timeout=None,
+) -> bytes:
+    if length is not None and not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    wanted = maximum + 1 if length is None else length
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    total = 0
+    while total < wanted:
+        if deadline is not None:
+            remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request body deadline exceeded")
+            if set_timeout is not None:
+                set_timeout(remaining)
+        chunk = stream.read(min(STREAM_CHUNK, wanted - total))
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        chunks.append(chunk)
+        total += len(chunk)
+    value = b"".join(chunks)
+    if len(value) > maximum or (length is not None and len(value) != length):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _spool_bounded(
+    stream,
+    maximum: int,
+    length: int,
+    *,
+    token: str,
+    context: str,
+    deadline: float,
+    set_timeout=None,
+) -> tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    """Copy a fixed-length exchange through a bounded-memory disk spool."""
+    if not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - caller owns returned spool
+        max_size=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT, dir="/tmp"
+    )
+    remaining = length
+    forms = _credential_forms(token)
+    carry = b""
+    try:
+        while remaining:
+            remaining_time = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining_time <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request body deadline exceeded")
+            if set_timeout is not None:
+                set_timeout(remaining_time)
+            chunk = stream.read(min(STREAM_CHUNK, remaining))
+            if not chunk:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request body ended early")
+            candidate = carry + chunk
+            if any(form in candidate for form in forms):
+                raise PolicyError(f"{context} contains runtime credential material")
+            width = max(len(form) for form in forms) - 1
+            carry = candidate[-width:] if width else b""
+            spool.write(chunk)
+            remaining -= len(chunk)
+        spool.seek(0)
+        return spool, length
+    except Exception:
+        spool.close()
+        raise
+
+
+def _spool_response(
+    response, maximum: int, token: str, deadline_seconds: float
+) -> tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    return spool_response(
+        response,
+        maximum,
+        _credential_forms(token),
+        memory_limit=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT,
+        chunk_size=STREAM_CHUNK,
+        deadline_seconds=deadline_seconds,
+    )
+
+
+def _load_json(handler: BaseHTTPRequestHandler) -> dict[str, object]:
+    if handler.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding"):
+        raise PolicyError("chunked broker control requests are not allowed")
+    if handler.headers.get_content_type() != "application/json":
+        raise PolicyError("broker control request must be JSON")
+    length = _content_length(handler.headers, MAX_CONTROL_BODY)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT
+    value = json.loads(
+        _read_bounded(
+            handler.rfile,
+            MAX_CONTROL_BODY,
+            length,
+            deadline=deadline,
+            set_timeout=handler.connection.settimeout,
+        )
+    )
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise PolicyError("broker control request must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def _git_target(raw: str) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
+    if (
+        not raw.isascii()
+        or any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in raw)
+        or "%" in raw
+        or "\\" in raw
+        or len(raw) > 512
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is not canonical ASCII")
+    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(raw)
+    canonical = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(("", "", target.path, target.query, ""))
+    if canonical != raw:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is not in exact canonical form")
+    if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target must be relative")
+    match = GIT_PATH_RE.fullmatch(target.path)
+    if not match:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is outside the Atlas allowlist")
+    repo = _validate_repo(match.group("repo"))
+    operation = match.group("operation")
+    query = target.query
+    if operation == "info/refs":
+        if query not in {"service=git-upload-pack", "service=git-receive-pack"}:
+            raise PolicyError("Git discovery service is outside the allowlist")
+        service = query.removeprefix("service=")
+    elif query:
+        raise PolicyError("Git RPC query parameters are not allowed")
+    else:
+        service = operation
+    return repo, operation, service
+
+
+def _content_length(headers: object, maximum: int) -> int:
+    """Parse one short canonical bounded Content-Length header."""
+    raw = headers.get("Content-Length", "")  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw, str)
+        or not raw.isascii()
+        or len(raw) > 10
+        or not raw.isdigit()
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request length is invalid")
+    length = int(raw)
+    if raw != str(length) or not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request length is invalid")
+    return length
+
+
+def _credential_forms(token: str) -> tuple[bytes, ...]:
+    basic = base64.b64encode(f"{GIT_USER}:{token}".encode())
+    return token.encode("utf-8"), basic, b"Basic " + basic
+
+
+def _validate_receive_pack(body: bytes | BinaryIO, token: str) -> None:
+    """Permit only vetted new-feature-branch pushes with scanned contents."""
+    validate_receive_pack(body, token, _credential_forms(token))
+
+
+def _guarded_opener(guard: deadline_http.StreamDeadline):
+    """Build an opener whose connection obeys one absolute stream deadline."""
+    return urllib.request.build_opener(RejectRedirect(), *guard.handlers()).open
+
+
+def _upstream_git_request(
+    target: str,
+    *,
+    method: str,
+    body: bytes | BinaryIO | None,
+    content_type: str | None,
+    expected_type: str,
+    token: str,
+    body_length: int | None = None,
+    stream_result: bool = False,
+    opener=None,
+) -> bytes | tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    credentials = base64.b64encode(f"{GIT_USER}:{token}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+    headers = {"Accept": expected_type, "Authorization": f"Basic {credentials}"}
+    if content_type:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = content_type
+    if body is not None:
+        if body_length is None:
+            if not isinstance(body, bytes):
+                raise PolicyError("Git upstream request length is missing")
+            body_length = len(body)
+        headers["Content-Length"] = str(body_length)
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        CANONICAL_BASE_URL + target,
+        data=body,
+        method=method,
+        headers=headers,
+    )
+    # One wall-clock budget covers connect, send, headers, and body read; the
+    # watchdog closes the upstream socket if any phase overstays it.
+    guard = deadline_http.StreamDeadline(UPSTREAM_DEADLINE_SECONDS)
+    try:
+        open_upstream = opener if opener is not None else _guarded_opener(guard)
+        with open_upstream(request, timeout=guard.remaining()) as response:
+            if _status(response) != 200:
+                raise PolicyError("Git upstream returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+            if response.headers.get_content_type() != expected_type:
+                raise PolicyError("Git upstream returned an unexpected response type")
+            result, result_length = _spool_response(
+                response, MAX_GIT_RESPONSE, token, guard.remaining()
+            )
+    finally:
+        guard.cancel()
+    if stream_result:
+        return result, result_length
+    try:
+        return result.read()
+    finally:
+        result.close()
+
+
+class BrokerHandler(AbsoluteHeaderDeadlineMixin, BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Expose only bounded metadata, draft creation, and smart-HTTP Git."""
+
+    server_version = "HermesSCMBroker/1"
+    sys_version = ""
+    header_deadline_seconds = INBOUND_HEADER_TIMEOUT
+
+    def _validate_headers(self) -> None:
+        items = list(self.headers.items())
+        if len(items) > MAX_HEADERS:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM request has too many headers")
+        total = 0
+        for name, value in items:
+            if not name.isascii() or not value.isascii():
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request headers must be ASCII")
+            total += len(name) + len(value) + 4
+            if any(ord(character) < 32 and character != "\t" for character in value):
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request header contains controls")
+        if total > MAX_HEADER_BYTES:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM request headers exceed the safe limit")
+        if len(self.headers.get_all("Content-Length", [])) > 1:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM request has duplicate Content-Length")
+
+    def _stream(
+        self, status: int, content_type: str, body: BinaryIO, length: int
+    ) -> None:
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", content_type)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(length))
+        self.end_headers()
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT
+        while True:
+            chunk = body.read(STREAM_CHUNK)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM response write deadline exceeded")
+            self.connection.settimeout(remaining)
+            self.wfile.write(chunk)
+
+    def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: object) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, status: int, body: bytes) -> None:
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def _reject(self, status: int = 400) -> None:
+        self._json(status, b'{"error":"request rejected"}')
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._validate_headers()
+            if self.path == "/healthz":
+                self._json(200, b'{"status":"ok"}')
+                return
+            repo, operation, service = _git_target(self.path)
+            if operation != "info/refs":
+                raise PolicyError("Git RPC requires POST")
+            token = read_token()
+            _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+            expected = f"application/x-{service}-advertisement"
+            streamed = _upstream_git_request(
+                f"/atlas/{repo}.git/info/refs?service={service}",
+                method="GET",
+                body=None,
+                content_type=None,
+                expected_type=expected,
+                token=token,
+                stream_result=True,
+            )
+            body, length = streamed
+            try:
+                self._stream(200, expected, body, length)
+            finally:
+                body.close()
+        except (
+            OSError,
+            PolicyError,
+            socket.timeout,
+            urllib.error.URLError,
+            ValueError,
+        ):
+            self._reject()
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._validate_headers()
+            self.connection.settimeout(INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT)
+            if self.path in {"/v1/metadata", "/v1/drafts"}:
+                self._control()
+            else:
+                self._git_rpc()
+        except (
+            OSError,
+            PolicyError,
+            socket.timeout,
+            urllib.error.URLError,
+            ValueError,
+            json.JSONDecodeError,
+        ):
+            self._reject()
+
+    def _control(self) -> None:
+        data = _load_json(self)
+        token = read_token()
+        if self.path == "/v1/metadata":
+            if set(data) != {"path"} or not isinstance(data["path"], str):
+                raise PolicyError("metadata request fields are invalid")
+            result = read(data["path"], token=token)
+        else:
+            expected = {"base", "body", "head", "head_sha", "repo", "title"}
+            if set(data) != expected or not all(
+                isinstance(data[key], str) for key in expected
+            ):
+                raise PolicyError("draft request fields are invalid")
+            result = create_draft(token=token, **data)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        if token.encode("utf-8") in result:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM upstream reflected credential material")
+        self._json(200, result)
+
+    def _git_rpc(self) -> None:
+        repo, operation, service = _git_target(self.path)
+        if (
+            operation not in {"git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"}
+            or service != operation
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError("Git RPC operation is outside the allowlist")
+        expected_request = f"application/x-{service}-request"
+        if self.headers.get_content_type() != expected_request or self.headers.get(
+            "Transfer-Encoding"
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError("Git RPC request type is invalid")
+        length = _content_length(self.headers, MAX_GIT_REQUEST)
+        token = read_token()
+        _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+        body, body_length = _spool_bounded(
+            self.rfile,
+            MAX_GIT_REQUEST,
+            length,
+            token=token,
+            context="Git request",
+            deadline=time.monotonic() + INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT,
+            set_timeout=self.connection.settimeout,
+        )
+        try:
+            if service == "git-receive-pack":
+                _validate_receive_pack(body, token)
+            expected = f"application/x-{service}-result"
+            streamed = _upstream_git_request(
+                f"/atlas/{repo}.git/{service}",
+                method="POST",
+                body=body,
+                body_length=body_length,
+                content_type=expected_request,
+                expected_type=expected,
+                token=token,
+                stream_result=True,
+            )
+            result, result_length = streamed
+            try:
+                self._stream(200, expected, result, result_length)
+            finally:
+                result.close()
+        finally:
+            body.close()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--listen", default="0.0.0.0")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=BROKER_PORT)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    BoundedThreadingHTTPServer((args.listen, args.port), BrokerHandler).serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Call the credential-isolated Hermes SCM broker over its fixed cluster origin."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import urllib.request
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+import deadline_http
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+BROKER_ORIGIN = "http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081"
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+
+def _open(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int):
+    """Open one broker exchange under a killable absolute deadline.
+
+    The helper process keeps every request on its fixed in-cluster origin by
+    rejecting redirects before they are followed.
+    """
+    return deadline_http.open_bounded(
+        request, maximum=MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, timeout=timeout
+    )
+
+
+def request(
+    endpoint: str,
+    payload: dict[str, object],
+    *,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _open,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Send one bounded broker operation without any repository credential."""
+    if endpoint not in {"/v1/metadata", "/v1/drafts"}:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker operation is outside the client allowlist")
+    body = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    if len(body) > 64 * 1024:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    outgoing = urllib.request.Request(
+        BROKER_ORIGIN + endpoint,
+        data=body,
+        method="POST",
+        headers={
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": "hermes-scm-broker-client/1",
+        },
+    )
+    with opener(outgoing, timeout=30) as response:  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        status = getattr(response, "status", None)
+        if status is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+            status = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if status != 200:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM broker returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+        content_type = response.headers.get_content_type()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise PolicyError("SCM broker returned an unexpected response type")
+        result = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if len(result) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    json.loads(result)
+    return result
+
+
+def read(path: str, *, opener: Callable[..., object] = _open) -> bytes:
+    """Read explicitly allowed Atlas metadata through the broker."""
+    return request("/v1/metadata", {"path": path}, opener=opener)
+
+
+def create_draft(
+    repo: str,
+    *,
+    base: str,
+    head: str,
+    head_sha: str,
+    title: str,
+    body: str,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _open,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Create one verified draft through the broker for human review."""
+    return request(
+        "/v1/drafts",
+        {
+            "base": base,
+            "body": body,
+            "head": head,
+            "head_sha": head_sha,
+            "repo": repo,
+            "title": title,
+        },
+        opener=opener,
+    )

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_io.py

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Bounded-memory stream helpers for the Hermes SCM broker."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.request
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+
+class RejectRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Reject every upstream redirect before credentials can be forwarded."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM upstream redirects are not allowed")
+
+
+def response_status(response: object) -> int | None:
+    """Read an HTTP status from either urllib response interface."""
+    value = getattr(response, "status", None)
+    if value is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+        value = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    return value
+
+
+def spool_response(
+    response,
+    maximum: int,
+    forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...],
+    *,
+    memory_limit: int,
+    chunk_size: int,
+    deadline_seconds: float,
+) -> tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    """Spool an upstream response to disk while scanning chunk boundaries."""
+    spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - caller owns returned spool
+        max_size=memory_limit, dir="/tmp"
+    )
+    carry = b""
+    total = 0
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + deadline_seconds
+    try:
+        while True:
+            remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM upstream response deadline exceeded")
+            raw = getattr(getattr(response, "fp", None), "raw", None)
+            sock = getattr(raw, "_sock", raw)
+            if hasattr(sock, "settimeout"):
+                sock.settimeout(remaining)
+            chunk = response.read(chunk_size)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            total += len(chunk)
+            if total > maximum:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM upstream response exceeds the safe size limit")
+            candidate = carry + chunk
+            if any(value in candidate for value in forbidden):
+                raise PolicyError(
+                    "Git upstream response contains runtime credential material"
+                )
+            width = max(len(value) for value in forbidden) - 1
+            carry = candidate[-width:] if width else b""
+            spool.write(chunk)
+        spool.seek(0)
+        return spool, total
+    except Exception:
+        spool.close()
+        raise

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Concurrency-bounded threaded HTTP server for the Hermes SCM broker."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+import time
+from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS = 3
+
+
+class _AbsoluteDeadlineReader:
+    """Read header lines against one wall-clock deadline, not idle timeouts."""
+
+    def __init__(self, stream, connection):
+        self._stream = stream
+        self._connection = connection
+        self._deadline: float | None = None
+
+    def begin(self, timeout: float) -> None:
+        self._deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+
+    def end(self) -> None:
+        self._deadline = None
+
+    def readline(self, limit: int = -1) -> bytes:
+        if self._deadline is None:
+            return self._stream.readline(limit)
+        value = bytearray()
+        while limit < 0 or len(value) < limit:
+            remaining = self._deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise TimeoutError("absolute SCM header deadline exceeded")
+            self._connection.settimeout(remaining)
+            character = self._stream.read(1)
+            if not character:
+                break
+            value.extend(character)
+            if character == b"\n":
+                break
+        return bytes(value)
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name: str):
+        return getattr(self._stream, name)
+
+
+class AbsoluteHeaderDeadlineMixin:
+    """Apply an absolute request-line plus header deadline to HTTP handlers."""
+
+    header_deadline_seconds = 10.0
+
+    def setup(self) -> None:
+        super().setup()
+        self._header_reader = _AbsoluteDeadlineReader(self.rfile, self.connection)
+        self.rfile = self._header_reader
+
+    def handle_one_request(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._header_reader.begin(self.header_deadline_seconds)
+            try:
+                self.raw_requestline = self.rfile.readline(65537)
+                if len(self.raw_requestline) > 65536:
+                    self.requestline = ""
+                    self.request_version = ""
+                    self.command = ""
+                    self.send_error(414)
+                    return
+                if not self.raw_requestline:
+                    self.close_connection = True
+                    return
+                if not self.parse_request():
+                    return
+            finally:
+                self._header_reader.end()
+            method_name = "do_" + self.command
+            if not hasattr(self, method_name):
+                self.send_error(501, "Unsupported method")
+                return
+            getattr(self, method_name)()
+            self.wfile.flush()
+        except TimeoutError:
+            self.close_connection = True
+
+
+class BoundedThreadingHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    """Cap active handlers so large Git exchanges cannot exhaust memory."""
+
+    daemon_threads = True
+    block_on_close = True
+    request_queue_size = 16
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        self._slots = threading.BoundedSemaphore(MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def process_request(self, request, client_address) -> None:
+        if not self._slots.acquire(blocking=False):
+            try:
+                request.sendall(
+                    b"HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\n"
+                    b"Connection: close\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n"
+                )
+            finally:
+                self.shutdown_request(request)
+            return
+        try:
+            super().process_request(request, client_address)
+        except Exception:
+            self._slots.release()
+            self.shutdown_request(request)
+            raise
+
+    def process_request_thread(self, request, client_address) -> None:
+        try:
+            super().process_request_thread(request, client_address)
+        finally:
+            self._slots.release()

services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py

@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Call the private Atlas Gitea API through a runtime-only token boundary."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://scm.bstein.dev"
-DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
-ALLOWED_METHODS = ("GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE")
-
-
-def read_token(path: Path = DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE) -> str:
-    """Read and validate the token from its in-memory Vault projection."""
-    token = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-    if not token:
-        raise ValueError(f"runtime credential is empty: {path}")
-    return token
-
-
-def api_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
-    """Return a same-origin Gitea API URL for a validated API path."""
-    base = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url.rstrip("/"))
-    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)
-    if base.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not base.netloc:
-        raise ValueError("GITEA_BASE_URL must be an absolute HTTP(S) URL")
-    if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
-        raise ValueError("API path must be relative to the configured Gitea origin")
-    if not target.path.startswith("/api/v1/"):
-        raise ValueError("API path must start with /api/v1/")
-    return urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
-        (base.scheme, base.netloc, target.path, target.query, "")
-    )
-
-
-def build_request(
-    method: str,
-    path: str,
-    *,
-    base_url: str,
-    token: str,
-    data: object | None = None,
-) -> urllib.request.Request:
-    """Build one authenticated request without placing the token in its URL."""
-    payload = None
-    if data is not None:
-        payload = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    return urllib.request.Request(
-        api_url(base_url, path),
-        data=payload,
-        method=method,
-        headers={
-            "Accept": "application/json",
-            "Authorization": f"token {token}",
-            "Content-Type": "application/json",
-            "User-Agent": "hermes-atlas-operator/1",
-        },
-    )
-
-
-def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
-    """Parse a bounded method, API path, and optional JSON request body."""
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
-        description="Call the Atlas Gitea API using the runtime Vault token."
-    )
-    parser.add_argument("method", choices=ALLOWED_METHODS)
-    parser.add_argument("path", help="Gitea path beginning with /api/v1/")
-    data_group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
-    data_group.add_argument("--data-json", help="JSON object/array request body")
-    data_group.add_argument(
-        "--data-file", type=Path, help="path to a JSON request body"
-    )
-    data_group.add_argument(
-        "--field",
-        action="append",
-        metavar="KEY=VALUE",
-        help=(
-            "repeatable JSON field; bare text remains a string while true, false, "
-            "null, numbers, objects, and arrays are decoded as JSON"
-        ),
-    )
-    return parser.parse_args(argv)
-
-
-def parse_fields(values: list[str]) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Build a JSON object from shell-safe, repeatable key/value arguments."""
-    result: dict[str, object] = {}
-    for value in values:
-        key, separator, raw = value.partition("=")
-        if not separator or not key or any(char.isspace() for char in key):
-            raise ValueError("each --field must be KEY=VALUE with a non-space key")
-        try:
-            result[key] = json.loads(raw)
-        except json.JSONDecodeError:
-            result[key] = raw
-    return result
-
-
-def load_data(args: argparse.Namespace) -> object | None:
-    """Decode the optional JSON body without involving a shell expansion."""
-    if args.data_json is not None:
-        return json.loads(args.data_json)
-    if args.data_file is not None:
-        return json.loads(args.data_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if args.field is not None:
-        return parse_fields(args.field)
-    return None
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    """Execute the request, print only its response body, and return HTTP status."""
-    args = parse_args(argv)
-    try:
-        request = build_request(
-            args.method,
-            args.path,
-            base_url=os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", DEFAULT_BASE_URL),
-            token=read_token(),
-            data=load_data(args),
-        )
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
-            body = response.read()
-            if body:
-                sys.stdout.buffer.write(body)
-                if not body.endswith(b"\n"):
-                    sys.stdout.buffer.write(b"\n")
-        return 0
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        body = exc.read(65536)
-        print(f"Gitea API returned HTTP {exc.code}", file=sys.stderr)
-        if body:
-            sys.stderr.buffer.write(body)
-            if not body.endswith(b"\n"):
-                sys.stderr.buffer.write(b"\n")
-        return 1
-    except (OSError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        print(f"Gitea API request failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
-        return 1
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scripts/gitea_askpass.sh

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env sh
-set -eu
-
-case "${1:-}" in
-  *Username*)
-    if [ -s /runtime-access/gitea-username ]; then
-      tr -d '\r\n' </runtime-access/gitea-username
-    else
-      printf '%s' hermes-automation
-    fi
-    printf '\n'
-    ;;
-  *Password*)
-    test -s /runtime-access/gitea-token
-    tr -d '\r\n' </runtime-access/gitea-token
-    printf '\n'
-    ;;
-  *) exit 1 ;;
-esac

services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py

@@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ from hermes_model_routing import (
 
 
 CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH = Path("/opt/data/workspace/projects/cassandra")
-CASSANDRA_REMOTE = "https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/cassandra.git"
-DEFAULT_GITEA_TOKEN_PATH = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
+CASSANDRA_REMOTE = (
+    "http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081/"
+    "git/atlas/cassandra.git"
+)
 
 
 def cassandra_workspace() -> Path:
@@ -139,24 +141,8 @@ def bootstrap_cassandra_state(root: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
     return {"state": "ready"}
 
 
-def _gitea_token_path() -> Path:
-    """Return the runtime-only Gitea credential path without reading it."""
-    configured = os.environ.get("HERMES_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", "").strip()
-    return Path(configured) if configured else DEFAULT_GITEA_TOKEN_PATH
-
-
-def _gitea_token_available() -> bool:
-    """Check credential readiness without loading it into process memory."""
-    try:
-        path = _gitea_token_path()
-        return path.is_file() and path.stat().st_size > 0
-    except OSError:
-        return False
-
-
 def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
-    """Clone or fetch Cassandra through the runtime-only askpass credential."""
-    token_available = _gitea_token_available()
+    """Clone or fetch Cassandra through the credential-isolated SCM broker."""
     if shutil.which("git") is None:
         return "git-unavailable"
     child_env = os.environ.copy()
@@ -173,9 +159,7 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
             }
         }
     )
-    child_env["GIT_ASKPASS"] = env_values.get(
-        "GIT_ASKPASS", "/opt/coordinator/gitea_askpass.sh"
-    )
+    child_env.pop("GIT_ASKPASS", None)
     child_env["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"] = "0"
     if (CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH / ".git").exists():
         try:
@@ -232,8 +216,6 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
                     return f"remote-repair-failed-{repaired.returncode}"
         except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
             return "remote-repair-failed"
-        if not token_available:
-            return "ready; fetch skipped until Gitea token is configured"
         command = [
             "git",
             "-C",
@@ -247,8 +229,6 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
         CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         if any(CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH.iterdir()):
             return "unmanaged-nonempty-directory"
-        if not token_available:
-            return "awaiting-gitea-token"
         command = [
             "git",
             "clone",

services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed supplementary-group and host privilege-policy audits."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import stat
+import struct
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from node_account_io import HardeningError, read_regular
+from node_polkit_audit import audit_polkit_policy
+
+
+def _members(field: str, context: str) -> set[str]:
+    if not field:
+        return set()
+    values = field.split(",")
+    if any(not value or value.strip() != value for value in values):
+        raise HardeningError(f"{context} has a malformed member list")
+    if len(values) != len(set(values)):
+        raise HardeningError(f"{context} has duplicate members")
+    return set(values)
+
+
+def audit_membership(
+    account: str, groups: list[list[str]], gshadow: list[list[str]]
+) -> None:
+    """Reject the dedicated account in any supplementary group/admin list."""
+    for record in groups:
+        if account in _members(record[3], f"group {record[0]}"):
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has supplementary group access")
+    for record in gshadow:
+        principals = _members(record[2], f"gshadow {record[0]} admins")
+        principals |= _members(record[3], f"gshadow {record[0]} members")
+        if account in principals:
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has gshadow group access")
+
+
+def _policy_files(host_etc: Path, polkit_share: Path, root_uid: int) -> list[Path]:
+    files: list[Path] = []
+    sudoers = host_etc / "sudoers"
+    if sudoers.exists():
+        files.append(sudoers)
+    roots = (
+        host_etc / "sudoers.d",
+        host_etc / "polkit-1/rules.d",
+        host_etc / "polkit-1/localauthority",
+        polkit_share / "rules.d",
+        polkit_share / "localauthority",
+    )
+    for root in roots:
+        if not root.exists():
+            continue
+        metadata = root.lstat()
+        if (
+            not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode)
+            or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode)
+            or metadata.st_uid != root_uid
+            or stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) & 0o022
+        ):
+            raise HardeningError("unsafe sudo/polkit policy directory")
+        files.extend(path for path in root.rglob("*") if path.is_file())
+    if len(files) > 256:
+        raise HardeningError("too many sudo/polkit policy files")
+    return sorted(files)
+
+
+def _audit_policy_metadata(snapshot, root_uid: int, account_uid: int) -> None:
+    if snapshot.uid != root_uid or snapshot.mode & 0o022:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy metadata permits unsafe mutation")
+    acl = dict(snapshot.xattrs).get("system.posix_acl_access", b"")
+    if not acl:
+        return
+    header = struct.Struct("<I")
+    entry = struct.Struct("<HHI")
+    if len(acl) < header.size or (len(acl) - header.size) % entry.size:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy ACL is malformed")
+    for offset in range(header.size, len(acl), entry.size):
+        tag, permissions, identifier = entry.unpack_from(acl, offset)
+        if tag == 0x02 and identifier == account_uid and permissions & 0o2:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy ACL grants Hermes write access")
+
+
+def _active_sudo_policy(text: str) -> str:
+    """Remove comments without discarding sudoers' numeric-UID principals."""
+    active: list[str] = []
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        stripped = line.lstrip()
+        if not stripped:
+            continue
+        # Detect any include spelling before the comment rule below.  sudo
+        # honours both #include and @include; a quoted or space-bearing path
+        # must never fall through the "#" comment branch and leave a second
+        # authority file unaudited.  Only the exact bare includedir into the
+        # audited /etc/sudoers.d passes; everything else fails closed.
+        if re.match(r"(?i)[#@]include(?:dir)?(?=\s|$)", stripped):
+            include = re.fullmatch(
+                r"(?i)([#@]include(?:dir)?)\s+([^\s\"'\\]+)", stripped
+            )
+            if include:
+                directive, target = include.groups()
+                if (
+                    directive.lower().endswith("includedir")
+                    and target == "/etc/sudoers.d"
+                ):
+                    continue
+            raise HardeningError("sudo policy includes an unaudited authority source")
+        if stripped.startswith("#") and not re.match(r"#\d+(?:\s|$)", stripped):
+            continue
+        active.append(line)
+    return "\n".join(active)
+
+
+def _mentions_dedicated_identity(text: str, account: str, account_uid: int) -> bool:
+    account_pattern = rf"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])%?{re.escape(account)}(?![A-Za-z0-9_.-])"
+    numeric_pattern = rf"(?<![0-9])#?{account_uid}(?![0-9])"
+    return bool(re.search(account_pattern, text) or re.search(numeric_pattern, text))
+
+
+SUDO_ALIAS_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*\Z")
+
+
+def _joined_sudo_lines(active: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Merge sudoers backslash continuations into whole logical lines."""
+    lines: list[str] = []
+    pending = ""
+    for line in active.splitlines():
+        if line.endswith("\\"):
+            pending += line[:-1] + " "
+            continue
+        lines.append(pending + line)
+        pending = ""
+    if pending:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo policy ends inside a line continuation")
+    return lines
+
+
+def _sudo_user_aliases(lines: list[str]) -> dict[str, list[str]]:
+    """Collect User_Alias definitions so grant principals can be expanded."""
+    aliases: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+    for line in lines:
+        stripped = line.strip()
+        if not stripped.startswith("User_Alias"):
+            continue
+        for definition in stripped.removeprefix("User_Alias").split(":"):
+            name, separator, members = definition.partition("=")
+            name = name.strip()
+            values = [item.strip() for item in members.split(",")]
+            if (
+                not separator
+                or not SUDO_ALIAS_NAME_RE.fullmatch(name)
+                or name in aliases
+                or not all(values)
+            ):
+                raise HardeningError("sudo alias definition is not auditable")
+            aliases[name] = values
+    return aliases
+
+
+def _expand_sudo_principal(
+    principal: str, aliases: dict[str, list[str]], seen: frozenset[str]
+) -> None:
+    """Reject grant principals that reach Hermes through aliases or wildcards."""
+    value = principal.strip()
+    while value.startswith("!"):
+        value = value[1:].strip()
+    value = value.strip('"')
+    if not value:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo grant principal is malformed")
+    if value in aliases:
+        if value in seen:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo alias expansion is cyclic")
+        for member in aliases[value]:
+            _expand_sudo_principal(member, aliases, seen | {value})
+        return
+    if value in {"ALL", "%ALL"}:
+        raise HardeningError("broad sudo authority includes Hermes")
+    if value.startswith("+") or value.startswith("%:"):
+        raise HardeningError("sudo netgroup authority cannot be audited")
+    if SUDO_ALIAS_NAME_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise HardeningError("sudo alias is undefined")
+
+
+def _audit_sudo_grants(active: str) -> None:
+    """Expand every grant's user list; only literal non-Hermes principals pass."""
+    lines = _joined_sudo_lines(active)
+    aliases = _sudo_user_aliases(lines)
+    skip = ("Defaults", "User_Alias", "Runas_Alias", "Host_Alias", "Cmnd_Alias")
+    for line in lines:
+        stripped = line.strip()
+        if not stripped or stripped.startswith(skip):
+            continue
+        head, separator, _rest = stripped.partition("=")
+        fields = head.split()
+        if not separator or len(fields) < 2:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo grant line is not auditable")
+        for principal in " ".join(fields[:-1]).split(","):
+            _expand_sudo_principal(principal, aliases, frozenset())
+
+
+def audit_privilege_policies(
+    account: str,
+    account_uid: int,
+    root_uid: int,
+    host_etc: Path,
+    polkit_share: Path,
+) -> None:
+    """Reject direct, group, wildcard sudo, or root-equivalent polkit grants."""
+    dangerous_polkit = (
+        "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec",
+        "org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-unit",
+        "org.freedesktop.udisks2.modify-device",
+        "org.freedesktop.packagekit",
+    )
+    nsswitch = host_etc / "nsswitch.conf"
+    if nsswitch.exists():
+        try:
+            nss_snapshot = read_regular(nsswitch, 64 * 1024)
+            _audit_policy_metadata(nss_snapshot, root_uid, account_uid)
+            text = nss_snapshot.value.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise HardeningError("nsswitch policy is not UTF-8") from exc
+        for line in text.splitlines():
+            name, separator, sources = line.partition(":")
+            if name.strip() in {
+                "passwd",
+                "group",
+                "initgroups",
+                "shadow",
+                "sudoers",
+            } and separator:
+                active_sources = [item for item in sources.split() if not item.startswith("[")]
+                if not active_sources or any(
+                    item not in {"files", "systemd"} for item in active_sources
+                ):
+                    raise HardeningError("external group/account/sudo authority source is unsafe")
+    total = 0
+    for path in _policy_files(host_etc, polkit_share, root_uid):
+        snapshot = read_regular(path, 256 * 1024)
+        _audit_policy_metadata(snapshot, root_uid, account_uid)
+        value = snapshot.value
+        total += len(value)
+        if total > 2 * 1024 * 1024:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy input exceeds safe limit")
+        try:
+            text = value.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy is not UTF-8") from exc
+        if path.name == "sudoers" or "sudoers.d" in path.parts:
+            active = _active_sudo_policy(text)
+            if _mentions_dedicated_identity(active, account, account_uid):
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has sudo authority")
+            _audit_sudo_grants(active)
+            continue
+        active = "\n".join(
+            line for line in text.splitlines() if not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
+        )
+        grants = "polkit.Result.YES" in active or re.search(
+            r"(?im)^\s*Result(?:Any|Inactive|Active)\s*=\s*yes\s*$", active
+        )
+        if grants and _mentions_dedicated_identity(active, account, account_uid):
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has polkit authority")
+        broad = "unix-user:*" in active or "Identity=unix-user:*" in active
+        if broad and grants and any(item in active for item in dangerous_polkit):
+            raise HardeningError("root-equivalent broad polkit authority includes Hermes")
+        audit_polkit_policy(path, text)

services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,496 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Reconcile a dedicated unprivileged Hermes SSH account on one Atlas node."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import errno
+import os
+import re
+import shlex
+import stat
+import struct
+from contextlib import suppress
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from node_account_audit import audit_membership, audit_privilege_policies
+from node_account_io import (
+    FileSnapshot,
+    HardeningError,
+    account_lock,
+    assert_unchanged,
+    atomic_write,
+    backup_once,
+    read_regular,
+)
+
+HOST_ETC = Path("/host-etc")
+HOST_HOME = Path("/host-home")
+HOST_K3S = Path("/host-k3s")
+HOST_KUBELET = Path("/host-kubelet")
+HOST_RUN_K3S = Path("/host-run-k3s")
+HOST_RUN_CONTAINERD = Path("/host-run-containerd")
+HOST_POLKIT_SHARE = Path("/host-polkit-share")
+ACCOUNT = "hermes-agent"
+ACCOUNT_UID = 1200
+ACCOUNT_GID = 1200
+ACCOUNT_HOME = "/home/hermes-agent"
+ACCOUNT_SHELL = "/bin/bash"
+HOST_ROOT_UID = 0
+HOST_ROOT_GID = 0
+LEGACY_ACCOUNTS = ("atlas", "oceanus")
+MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS = 1024 * 1024
+ACL_VERSION = 2
+ACL_UNDEFINED_ID = 0xFFFFFFFF
+ACL_USER_OBJ = 0x01
+ACL_USER = 0x02
+ACL_GROUP_OBJ = 0x04
+ACL_GROUP = 0x08
+ACL_MASK = 0x10
+ACL_OTHER = 0x20
+ACL_HEADER = struct.Struct("<I")
+ACL_ENTRY = struct.Struct("<HHI")
+ACL_XATTR = "system.posix_acl_access"
+
+
+def _read_regular(
+    path: Path, maximum: int = MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE
+) -> tuple[bytes, os.stat_result]:
+    snapshot = read_regular(path, maximum)
+    return snapshot.value, path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+
+
+def _records(value: bytes, fields: int, name: str) -> list[list[str]]:
+    try:
+        text = value.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise HardeningError(f"{name} is not UTF-8") from exc
+    if not text.endswith("\n"):
+        raise HardeningError(f"{name} is missing its final newline")
+    records = []
+    names = set()
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        parts = line.split(":")
+        if len(parts) != fields or not parts[0] or parts[0] in names:
+            raise HardeningError(f"{name} has an invalid record")
+        names.add(parts[0])
+        records.append(parts)
+    return records
+
+
+def _encode(records: list[list[str]]) -> bytes:
+    return ("\n".join(":".join(record) for record in records) + "\n").encode()
+
+
+def _expected_records() -> dict[str, list[str]]:
+    return {
+        "passwd": [
+            ACCOUNT,
+            "x",
+            str(ACCOUNT_UID),
+            str(ACCOUNT_GID),
+            "Hermes Agent",
+            ACCOUNT_HOME,
+            ACCOUNT_SHELL,
+        ],
+        "group": [ACCOUNT, "x", str(ACCOUNT_GID), ""],
+        "shadow": [ACCOUNT, "!", "1", "0", "99999", "7", "", "", ""],
+        "gshadow": [ACCOUNT, "!", "", ""],
+    }
+
+
+def _reconcile_record(
+    records: list[list[str]], expected: list[str], *, identity_index: int
+) -> list[list[str]]:
+    for record in records:
+        same_name = record[0] == expected[0]
+        same_identity = record[identity_index] == expected[identity_index]
+        if same_name or same_identity:
+            if record != expected:
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account identity conflicts")
+            return records
+    return [*records, expected]
+
+
+def _reconcile_databases() -> None:
+    expected = _expected_records()
+    definitions = (
+        ("passwd", 7, 2),
+        ("group", 4, 2),
+        ("shadow", 9, 0),
+        ("gshadow", 4, 0),
+    )
+    planned: list[tuple[Path, FileSnapshot, bytes]] = []
+    account_present = False
+    parsed: dict[str, list[list[str]]] = {}
+    for name, fields, identity_index in definitions:
+        path = HOST_ETC / name
+        snapshot = read_regular(path, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+        records = _records(snapshot.value, fields, name)
+        parsed[name] = records
+        updated = _reconcile_record(
+            records, expected[name], identity_index=identity_index
+        )
+        if name == "passwd":
+            account_present = expected[name] in records
+        planned.append((path, snapshot, _encode(updated)))
+    audit_membership(ACCOUNT, parsed["group"], parsed["gshadow"])
+    audit_privilege_policies(
+        ACCOUNT, ACCOUNT_UID, HOST_ROOT_UID, HOST_ETC, HOST_POLKIT_SHARE
+    )
+    try:
+        (HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT).lstat()
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        if not account_present:
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account home already exists")
+    for path, snapshot, _updated in planned:
+        assert_unchanged(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+    for path, snapshot, _updated in planned:
+        backup_once(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+    for path, snapshot, _updated in planned:
+        assert_unchanged(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+    written: list[tuple[Path, FileSnapshot, bytes]] = []
+    try:
+        for path, snapshot, updated in planned:
+            assert_unchanged(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+            atomic_write(path, updated, snapshot)
+            written.append((path, snapshot, updated))
+        for path, _snapshot, _updated in planned:
+            name = path.name
+            fields = next(item[1] for item in definitions if item[0] == name)
+            records = _records(_read_regular(path)[0], fields, name)
+            if expected[name] not in records:
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account validation failed")
+    except Exception as error:
+        for path, snapshot, updated in reversed(written):
+            current = read_regular(path, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+            if (
+                current.value != updated
+                or current.mode != snapshot.mode
+                or current.uid != snapshot.uid
+                or current.gid != snapshot.gid
+                or current.xattrs != snapshot.xattrs
+            ):
+                raise HardeningError(
+                    f"concurrent host account change prevents rollback: {path.name}"
+                ) from error
+            atomic_write(path, snapshot.value, snapshot)
+        raise
+
+
+SUPPORTED_KEY_TYPES = {"ssh-ed25519", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ssh-rsa"}
+KEY_TYPE_RE = re.compile(r"(?:sk-)?(?:ssh|ecdsa)-[A-Za-z0-9@._+-]+\Z")
+
+
+def _key_identity(line: bytes) -> tuple[str, bytes] | None:
+    """Return OpenSSH key type/blob, ignoring options and comments."""
+    stripped = line.strip(b"\r\n")
+    if not stripped or stripped.lstrip().startswith(b"#"):
+        return None
+    try:
+        fields = shlex.split(stripped.decode("ascii"), posix=True)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key line is malformed") from exc
+    indexes = [
+        index for index, field in enumerate(fields) if KEY_TYPE_RE.fullmatch(field)
+    ]
+    if len(indexes) != 1 or indexes[0] + 1 >= len(fields):
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key line has ambiguous key material")
+    key_type = fields[indexes[0]]
+    try:
+        blob = base64.b64decode(fields[indexes[0] + 1], validate=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key payload is invalid") from exc
+    encoded_type = key_type.encode("ascii")
+    if len(blob) < 4 or int.from_bytes(blob[:4], "big") != len(encoded_type):
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key blob is malformed")
+    if blob[4 : 4 + len(encoded_type)] != encoded_type:
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key type does not match its blob")
+    return key_type, blob
+
+
+def _validated_public_key(path: Path) -> tuple[bytes, tuple[str, bytes]]:
+    value, _ = _read_regular(path, 16 * 1024)
+    line = value.strip()
+    if b"\n" in line or b"\r" in line:
+        raise HardeningError("Hermes public key must contain one line")
+    identity = _key_identity(line)
+    fields = line.split()
+    if (
+        identity is None
+        or identity[0] not in SUPPORTED_KEY_TYPES
+        or len(fields) not in {2, 3}
+        or fields[0].decode("ascii") != identity[0]
+    ):
+        raise HardeningError("Hermes public key format is unsupported")
+    return line, identity
+
+
+def _directory(path: Path, *, mode: int, uid: int, gid: int) -> None:
+    with suppress(FileExistsError):
+        path.mkdir(mode=mode)
+    metadata = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise HardeningError(f"unsafe account directory: {path.name}")
+    if metadata.st_uid not in {0, uid} or metadata.st_gid not in {0, gid}:
+        raise HardeningError(f"account directory ownership conflicts: {path.name}")
+    os.chown(path, uid, gid)
+    path.chmod(mode)
+
+
+def _without_key(value: bytes, identity: tuple[str, bytes]) -> bytes:
+    kept = []
+    for line in value.splitlines(keepends=True):
+        if _key_identity(line) != identity:
+            kept.append(line)
+    return b"".join(kept)
+
+
+def _move_key(public_key: Path) -> None:
+    key, identity = _validated_public_key(public_key)
+    target = HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT / ".ssh" / "authorized_keys"
+    legacy_plan: list[tuple[Path, FileSnapshot, bytes]] = []
+    for legacy in LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        authorized = HOST_HOME / legacy / ".ssh" / "authorized_keys"
+        try:
+            snapshot = read_regular(authorized, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            continue
+        updated = _without_key(snapshot.value, identity)
+        if updated != snapshot.value:
+            legacy_plan.append((authorized, snapshot, updated))
+    if legacy_plan and target.exists():
+        target_snapshot = read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        target_without_key = _without_key(target_snapshot.value, identity)
+        if target_without_key != target_snapshot.value:
+            backup_once(target, target_snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+            assert_unchanged(target, target_snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+            atomic_write(target, target_without_key, target_snapshot)
+            verified_target = read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS).value
+            if _without_key(verified_target, identity) != verified_target:
+                raise HardeningError("preexisting Hermes authorization removal failed")
+    for authorized, snapshot, _updated in legacy_plan:
+        assert_unchanged(authorized, snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        backup_once(authorized, snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+    for authorized, snapshot, updated in legacy_plan:
+        assert_unchanged(authorized, snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        atomic_write(authorized, updated, snapshot)
+    for legacy in LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        authorized = HOST_HOME / legacy / ".ssh" / "authorized_keys"
+        try:
+            value = read_regular(authorized, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS).value
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            continue
+        if _without_key(value, identity) != value:
+            raise HardeningError("legacy Hermes authorization key removal failed")
+
+    # Installation happens only after every legacy authorization is absent. A
+    # crash can therefore remove access temporarily, but can never duplicate
+    # the machine credential across privileged and unprivileged accounts.
+    home = HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT
+    ssh = home / ".ssh"
+    _directory(home, mode=0o700, uid=ACCOUNT_UID, gid=ACCOUNT_GID)
+    _directory(ssh, mode=0o700, uid=ACCOUNT_UID, gid=ACCOUNT_GID)
+    target = ssh / "authorized_keys"
+    if target.exists():
+        current = read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        if current.value != key + b"\n":
+            backup_once(target, current, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+    else:
+        current = FileSnapshot(
+            value=b"",
+            device=0,
+            inode=0,
+            mode=0o600,
+            uid=ACCOUNT_UID,
+            gid=ACCOUNT_GID,
+            size=0,
+            mtime_ns=0,
+            ctime_ns=0,
+            xattrs=(),
+        )
+    atomic_write(target, key + b"\n", current)
+    if _read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)[0] != key + b"\n":
+        raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes authorized key validation failed")
+
+
+def _decode_acl(value: bytes, mode: int) -> list[tuple[int, int, int]]:
+    """Decode a bounded POSIX ACL or derive one from ordinary mode bits."""
+    if not value:
+        group = (mode >> 3) & 0o7
+        return [
+            (ACL_USER_OBJ, (mode >> 6) & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_GROUP_OBJ, group, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_MASK, group, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_OTHER, mode & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+        ]
+    if len(value) < ACL_HEADER.size or (len(value) - ACL_HEADER.size) % ACL_ENTRY.size:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL is malformed")
+    if ACL_HEADER.unpack_from(value)[0] != ACL_VERSION:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL version is unsupported")
+    entries = [
+        ACL_ENTRY.unpack_from(value, offset)
+        for offset in range(ACL_HEADER.size, len(value), ACL_ENTRY.size)
+    ]
+    if any(permission > 0o7 for _tag, permission, _identifier in entries):
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL permission is malformed")
+    required = {ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, ACL_OTHER}
+    if not required <= {tag for tag, _permission, _identifier in entries}:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL is incomplete")
+    return entries
+
+
+def _encode_acl(entries: list[tuple[int, int, int]]) -> bytes:
+    return ACL_HEADER.pack(ACL_VERSION) + b"".join(
+        ACL_ENTRY.pack(*entry) for entry in entries
+    )
+
+
+def _acl_with_deny(value: bytes, mode: int) -> bytes:
+    entries = _decode_acl(value, mode)
+    entries = [
+        entry
+        for entry in entries
+        if not (entry[0] == ACL_USER and entry[2] == ACCOUNT_UID)
+    ]
+    entries.append((ACL_USER, 0, ACCOUNT_UID))
+    if not any(tag == ACL_MASK for tag, _permission, _identifier in entries):
+        entries.append((ACL_MASK, (mode >> 3) & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID))
+    order = {
+        ACL_USER_OBJ: 0,
+        ACL_USER: 1,
+        ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 2,
+        ACL_GROUP: 3,
+        ACL_MASK: 4,
+        ACL_OTHER: 5,
+    }
+    entries.sort(key=lambda entry: (order.get(entry[0], 99), entry[2]))
+    return _encode_acl(entries)
+
+
+def _read_acl(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return os.getxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, follow_symlinks=False)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno in {errno.ENODATA, getattr(errno, "ENOATTR", errno.ENODATA)}:
+            return b""
+        raise
+
+
+def _validate_acl_backup(value: bytes) -> None:
+    if value[:1] not in {b"A", b"N"}:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+    if value[:1] == b"A":
+        if len(value) == 1:
+            raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+        _decode_acl(value[1:], 0)
+    elif value != b"N":
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+
+
+def _acl_backup_once(path: Path, value: bytes, backup_name: str | None = None) -> None:
+    """Persist the original ACL as a private, durable host recovery file."""
+    root = HOST_ETC / "hermes-node-boundary"
+    _directory(root, mode=0o700, uid=HOST_ROOT_UID, gid=HOST_ROOT_GID)
+    backup = root / f"{backup_name or path.name}.acl"
+    encoded = b"A" + value if value else b"N"
+    try:
+        existing, _metadata = _read_regular(backup, 64 * 1024)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        _validate_acl_backup(existing)
+        return
+
+    temporary = root / f".{path.name}.acl.hermes-{os.getpid()}"
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(temporary, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, encoded) != len(encoded):
+            raise HardeningError("short sensitive directory ACL backup write")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, HOST_ROOT_UID, HOST_ROOT_GID)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    try:
+        os.link(temporary, backup, follow_symlinks=False)
+    except FileExistsError:
+        # Another reconciler won the race; never overwrite the first backup.
+        pass
+    finally:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    stored, _metadata = _read_regular(backup, 64 * 1024)
+    _validate_acl_backup(stored)
+    directory = os.open(root, os.O_RDONLY)
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+
+
+def _deny_sensitive_root(path: Path, backup_name: str | None = None) -> None:
+    metadata = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise HardeningError(f"unsafe sensitive directory: {path.name}")
+    if metadata.st_uid != HOST_ROOT_UID:
+        raise HardeningError(f"sensitive directory is not root-owned: {path.name}")
+    current = _read_acl(path)
+    _acl_backup_once(path, current, backup_name)
+    updated = _acl_with_deny(current, stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode))
+    try:
+        os.setxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, updated, follow_symlinks=False)
+        verified = _decode_acl(_read_acl(path), stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode))
+        if (ACL_USER, 0, ACCOUNT_UID) not in verified:
+            raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL validation failed")
+    except Exception:
+        if current:
+            os.setxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, current, follow_symlinks=False)
+        else:
+            try:
+                os.removexattr(path, ACL_XATTR, follow_symlinks=False)
+            except OSError as exc:
+                if exc.errno not in {
+                    errno.ENODATA,
+                    getattr(errno, "ENOATTR", errno.ENODATA),
+                }:
+                    raise
+        raise
+
+
+def _deny_sensitive_roots() -> None:
+    for path, backup_name in (
+        (HOST_K3S, "var-lib-rancher-k3s"),
+        (HOST_KUBELET, "var-lib-kubelet"),
+        (HOST_RUN_K3S, "run-k3s"),
+        (HOST_RUN_CONTAINERD, "run-containerd"),
+    ):
+        _deny_sensitive_root(path, backup_name)
+
+
+def reconcile(public_key: Path) -> None:
+    """Create the locked account and move only the Hermes authorization key."""
+    with account_lock(HOST_ETC, expected_uid=HOST_ROOT_UID):
+        _reconcile_databases()
+        _deny_sensitive_roots()
+        _move_key(public_key)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--public-key-file", type=Path, required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    reconcile(args.public_key_file)
+    print("Dedicated Hermes node account reconciled.", flush=True)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Crash-safe, metadata-preserving host account database I/O."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import os
+import stat
+import time
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Iterator
+
+MAX_XATTRS = 64
+MAX_XATTR_NAME = 255
+MAX_XATTR_VALUE = 256 * 1024
+MAX_XATTR_TOTAL = 1024 * 1024
+LOCK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15.0
+
+
+class HardeningError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised before an unsafe or ambiguous host-account change."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FileSnapshot:
+    """Bounded file contents and all security-relevant inode metadata."""
+
+    value: bytes
+    device: int
+    inode: int
+    mode: int
+    uid: int
+    gid: int
+    size: int
+    mtime_ns: int
+    ctime_ns: int
+    xattrs: tuple[tuple[str, bytes], ...]
+
+
+def _stat_identity(item: os.stat_result) -> tuple[int, ...]:
+    return (
+        item.st_dev,
+        item.st_ino,
+        item.st_mode,
+        item.st_uid,
+        item.st_gid,
+        item.st_size,
+        item.st_mtime_ns,
+        item.st_ctime_ns,
+    )
+
+
+def _xattrs(path_or_fd: Path | int) -> tuple[tuple[str, bytes], ...]:
+    try:
+        names = sorted(os.listxattr(path_or_fd, follow_symlinks=False))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        names = sorted(os.listxattr(path_or_fd))
+    if len(names) > MAX_XATTRS:
+        raise HardeningError("host account file has too many extended attributes")
+    values: list[tuple[str, bytes]] = []
+    total = 0
+    for name in names:
+        if len(name.encode("utf-8")) > MAX_XATTR_NAME:
+            raise HardeningError("host account file xattr name is too long")
+        try:
+            value = os.getxattr(path_or_fd, name, follow_symlinks=False)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            value = os.getxattr(path_or_fd, name)
+        total += len(value)
+        if len(value) > MAX_XATTR_VALUE or total > MAX_XATTR_TOTAL:
+            raise HardeningError("host account file xattrs exceed the safe limit")
+        values.append((name, value))
+    return tuple(values)
+
+
+def _restore_xattrs(descriptor: int, expected: tuple[tuple[str, bytes], ...]) -> None:
+    expected_names = {name for name, _value in expected}
+    for name, _value in _xattrs(descriptor):
+        if name not in expected_names:
+            os.removexattr(descriptor, name)
+    for name, value in expected:
+        os.setxattr(descriptor, name, value)
+
+
+def read_regular(path: Path, maximum: int) -> FileSnapshot:
+    """Read one bounded, non-symlink regular file and capture its metadata."""
+    flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags)
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) or metadata.st_size > maximum:
+            raise HardeningError(f"unsafe regular file: {path.name}")
+        value = os.read(descriptor, maximum + 1)
+        attrs = _xattrs(descriptor)
+        after = os.fstat(descriptor)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    if len(value) != metadata.st_size or _stat_identity(metadata) != _stat_identity(after):
+        raise HardeningError(f"short file read: {path.name}")
+    return FileSnapshot(
+        value=value,
+        device=metadata.st_dev,
+        inode=metadata.st_ino,
+        mode=stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode),
+        uid=metadata.st_uid,
+        gid=metadata.st_gid,
+        size=metadata.st_size,
+        mtime_ns=metadata.st_mtime_ns,
+        ctime_ns=metadata.st_ctime_ns,
+        xattrs=attrs,
+    )
+
+
+def assert_unchanged(path: Path, expected: FileSnapshot, maximum: int) -> None:
+    """Fail if an account file changed since planning began."""
+    current = read_regular(path, maximum)
+    if current != expected:
+        raise HardeningError(f"concurrent host account change detected: {path.name}")
+
+
+def atomic_write(path: Path, value: bytes, metadata: FileSnapshot) -> None:
+    """Atomically replace a file while retaining ACLs, labels, and xattrs."""
+    temporary = path.with_name(f".{path.name}.hermes-{os.getpid()}")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(temporary, flags, metadata.mode)
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, value) != len(value):
+            raise HardeningError(f"short atomic write: {path.name}")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, metadata.mode)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, metadata.uid, metadata.gid)
+        _restore_xattrs(descriptor, metadata.xattrs)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+    directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+
+
+def backup_once(path: Path, snapshot: FileSnapshot, maximum: int) -> Path:
+    """Create the first durable recovery copy without replacing an older one."""
+    backup = path.with_name(path.name + ".hermes-boundary-backup")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    try:
+        descriptor = os.open(backup, flags, snapshot.mode)
+    except FileExistsError:
+        read_regular(backup, maximum)
+        return backup
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, snapshot.value) != len(snapshot.value):
+            raise HardeningError(f"short backup write: {path.name}")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, snapshot.mode)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, snapshot.uid, snapshot.gid)
+        _restore_xattrs(descriptor, snapshot.xattrs)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        backup.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+    return backup
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def account_lock(host_etc: Path, *, expected_uid: int = 0) -> Iterator[None]:
+    """Hold the standard shadow-utils account lock for the full transaction."""
+    path = host_etc / ".pwd.lock"
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0) | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if (
+            not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode)
+            or metadata.st_uid != expected_uid
+            or stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) != 0o600
+        ):
+            raise HardeningError("unsafe standard account lock")
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + LOCK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+        while True:
+            try:
+                fcntl.lockf(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+                break
+            except BlockingIOError as exc:
+                if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
+                    raise HardeningError("standard account lock is busy") from exc
+                time.sleep(0.05)
+        yield
+    finally:
+        try:
+            fcntl.lockf(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+        finally:
+            os.close(descriptor)

services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Literal-identity proof for polkit policies on hardened Atlas nodes.
+
+Polkit rules are JavaScript, so a grant can name its subject indirectly:
+concatenated strings, escape sequences, bracket lookups, or arithmetic can
+compute an identity that plain text matching never sees.  Rather than model
+the language, every grant must scope itself through exact literal identity
+comparisons.  Anything the audit cannot prove literal fails closed.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from node_account_io import HardeningError
+
+_ALLOWED_ESCAPES = {'"', "'", "\\", "/", "n", "r", "t"}
+_STRING_MARK = r"\x00[0-9]+\x00"
+_GRANT_RE = re.compile(r"\bResult\s*\.\s*YES\b")
+_PKLA_GRANT_RE = re.compile(r"(?im)^\s*Result(?:Any|Inactive|Active)\s*=\s*yes\s*$")
+_PKLA_IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"unix-(?:user|group):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
+_IDENTITY_USE_RE = re.compile(r"subject\s*(\[|\.\s*(?:user|uid|isInGroup)\b)")
+_COMPUTED_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
+    r"\b(?:eval|Function|arguments|fromCharCode|fromCodePoint|atob|btoa|unescape"
+    r"|escape|decodeURI[A-Za-z]*|encodeURI[A-Za-z]*|charCodeAt|codePointAt"
+    r"|normalize|constructor|prototype|globalThis|Reflect|Proxy)\b"
+)
+# Logical && and || stay legal; every value-building operator next to a
+# string or number literal is rejected so comparisons stay whole literals.
+_OPERATOR_ADJACENT_RE = re.compile(
+    rf"(?:{_STRING_MARK}|[0-9])\s*[+\-*/%<>^~](?![&|=])"
+    rf"|(?<![&|=!<>])[+\-*/%<>^~]\s*(?:{_STRING_MARK}|[0-9])"
+)
+_USER_BEFORE_RE = re.compile(rf"{_STRING_MARK}\s*[=!]==?\s*\Z")
+_USER_AFTER_RE = re.compile(rf"\s*[=!]==?\s*{_STRING_MARK}")
+_UID_BEFORE_RE = re.compile(r"(?<![0-9A-Za-z_.$])[0-9]{1,10}\s*[=!]==?\s*\Z")
+_UID_AFTER_RE = re.compile(r"\s*[=!]==?\s*[0-9]{1,10}(?![0-9A-Za-z_.$])")
+_GROUP_AFTER_RE = re.compile(rf"\s*\(\s*{_STRING_MARK}\s*\)")
+_BARE_SUBJECT_RE = re.compile(r"\bsubject\b(?!\s*[.\[])")
+_PARAMETER_BEFORE_RE = re.compile(r"function\s*\(\s*[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*\s*,\s*\Z")
+_RESULT_USE_RE = re.compile(r"\bResult\b(?!\s*\.\s*[A-Z_]{2,32}\b)")
+
+
+def _split_strings(text: str) -> tuple[str, list[str]]:
+    """Replace string literals with markers and drop JavaScript comments."""
+    code: list[str] = []
+    strings: list[str] = []
+    index = 0
+    length = len(text)
+    while index < length:
+        character = text[index]
+        if character == "`":
+            raise HardeningError("polkit rule uses computed template strings")
+        if character in {'"', "'"}:
+            quote = character
+            index += 1
+            value: list[str] = []
+            while True:
+                if index >= length or text[index] in "\r\n":
+                    raise HardeningError("polkit rule string is unterminated")
+                character = text[index]
+                if character == "\\":
+                    if index + 1 >= length or text[index + 1] not in _ALLOWED_ESCAPES:
+                        raise HardeningError("polkit rule string uses computed escapes")
+                    escaped = text[index + 1]
+                    value.append({"n": "\n", "r": "\r", "t": "\t"}.get(escaped, escaped))
+                    index += 2
+                    continue
+                index += 1
+                if character == quote:
+                    break
+                value.append(character)
+            strings.append("".join(value))
+            code.append(f"\x00{len(strings) - 1}\x00")
+            continue
+        if text.startswith("//", index):
+            newline = text.find("\n", index)
+            index = length if newline < 0 else newline
+            continue
+        if text.startswith("/*", index):
+            closing = text.find("*/", index + 2)
+            if closing < 0:
+                raise HardeningError("polkit rule comment is unterminated")
+            code.append(" ")
+            index = closing + 2
+            continue
+        if character == "/":
+            # Any remaining slash is a regex literal or a division operator.
+            # A regex literal may embed a quote character, which would desync
+            # the string scanner and swallow an unconditional grant.  Neither
+            # regex nor division has a place in an identity-scoped grant, so
+            # both fail closed before they can hide a Result.YES.
+            raise HardeningError("polkit rule uses a regex or division operator")
+        code.append(character)
+        index += 1
+    return "".join(code), strings
+
+
+def _require_literal_identity_use(code: str, match: re.Match[str]) -> None:
+    """Reject one identity reference unless it is an exact literal comparison."""
+    form = match.group(1)
+    if form.startswith("["):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule reads identity through a computed lookup")
+    member = form.removeprefix(".").strip()
+    before = code[max(match.start() - 48, 0) : match.start()]
+    after = code[match.end() : match.end() + 48]
+    if member == "user":
+        literal = _USER_BEFORE_RE.search(before) or _USER_AFTER_RE.match(after)
+    elif member == "uid":
+        literal = _UID_BEFORE_RE.search(before) or _UID_AFTER_RE.match(after)
+    else:
+        literal = _GROUP_AFTER_RE.match(after)
+    if not literal:
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule identity test is not an exact literal")
+
+
+def _audit_rules_javascript(text: str) -> None:
+    """Require granting rules to gate on exact literal subject identities.
+
+    With computed tokens, bracket lookups, and subject aliasing rejected in
+    every rule file, a YES decision can only be written as the literal grant
+    token, so the grant test below cannot be evaded by construction.
+    """
+    code, _strings = _split_strings(text)
+    if _COMPUTED_TOKEN_RE.search(code):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule computes values the audit cannot prove")
+    if _RESULT_USE_RE.search(code):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule reads results through a computed lookup")
+    for bare in _BARE_SUBJECT_RE.finditer(code):
+        if not _PARAMETER_BEFORE_RE.search(code[: bare.start()]):
+            raise HardeningError("polkit rule passes the subject to computed code")
+    if not _GRANT_RE.search(code):
+        return
+    if _OPERATOR_ADJACENT_RE.search(code):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit grant builds values with operators")
+    uses = 0
+    for match in _IDENTITY_USE_RE.finditer(code):
+        uses += 1
+        _require_literal_identity_use(code, match)
+    if not uses:
+        raise HardeningError("polkit grant is not scoped to an explicit identity")
+
+
+def _audit_pkla(text: str) -> None:
+    """Require granting localauthority entries to name exact literal identities."""
+    if not _PKLA_GRANT_RE.search(text):
+        return
+    identities: list[str] = []
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        name, separator, value = line.strip().partition("=")
+        if name.strip() != "Identity" or not separator:
+            continue
+        entries = [entry.strip() for entry in value.split(";") if entry.strip()]
+        identities.extend(entries)
+    if not identities:
+        raise HardeningError("polkit authority grant lacks an identity scope")
+    for entry in identities:
+        if not _PKLA_IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(entry):
+            raise HardeningError("polkit authority identity is not an exact literal")
+
+
+def audit_polkit_policy(path: Path, text: str) -> None:
+    """Prove one polkit policy file cannot grant through a computed identity."""
+    if "localauthority" in path.parts or path.suffix == ".pkla":
+        _audit_pkla(text)
+    else:
+        _audit_rules_javascript(text)

services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py

@@ -86,6 +86,21 @@ def _write_empty_auth_store() -> None:
     os.chown(path, OWNER_UID, OWNER_GID)
 
 
+def _stage_node_ssh_config() -> None:
+    """Force every Atlas node alias onto the dedicated Hermes OS account."""
+    destination = RUNTIME_ROOT / "node-ssh-config"
+    source = _copy_secret("node-ssh-config", destination)
+    if "\x00" in source:
+        destination.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise RuntimeError("node SSH config contains invalid control data")
+    destination.write_text(
+        "Host titan-*\n  User hermes-agent\n" + source.rstrip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    destination.chmod(0o600)
+    os.chown(destination, OWNER_UID, OWNER_GID)
+
+
 def stage_agent() -> None:
     """Stage the owner agent's complete runtime access set."""
     for path in (RUNTIME_ROOT, RUNTIME_ROOT / "claude", RUNTIME_ROOT / "codex"):
@@ -93,14 +108,12 @@ def stage_agent() -> None:
     for name in (
         "agent-api-key",
         "chat-relay-key",
-        "gitea-token",
-        "gitea-username",
         "jenkins-image-build-token",
         "node-ssh-private-key",
-        "node-ssh-config",
         "node-ssh-known-hosts",
     ):
         _copy_secret(name, RUNTIME_ROOT / name)
+    _stage_node_ssh_config()
     _validated_json(
         "claude-credentials",
         RUNTIME_ROOT / "claude" / ".credentials.json",

services/hermes/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+name: manage-atlas-pull-requests
+description: Read bounded private Atlas repository and pull-request metadata or create a verified draft pull request after a tested branch is pushed through Hermes' least-authority Forgejo client. Use for PR handoff in scm.bstein.dev/atlas repositories. Never use it to update, merge, approve, close, delete, or force-push.
+---
+
+# Manage Atlas pull requests
+
+Use `/opt/scm/gitea_api.py` for Forgejo API access. The agent pod has no
+repository credential. The client calls a separate least-authority broker;
+never bypass it with `curl` or direct Gitea HTTP.
+
+Use the configured broker Git remote for clone, fetch, and creation of a new
+namespaced feature branch. Existing-ref updates, protected refs, deletion,
+and force-push are rejected by the broker. Never replace that remote with a
+credential-bearing URL.
+
+## Read repository or PR state
+
+Pass one allowed Atlas metadata API path to the read operation:
+
+```sh
+/opt/scm/gitea_api.py read /api/v1/repos/atlas/REPO/pulls/NUMBER
+```
+
+The client exposes only repository metadata, PRs and PR evidence, branches,
+commits, and commit status. Hooks, Actions secrets/variables, collaborators,
+protections, reviews, merge endpoints, releases, and administration are
+rejected even as reads. Responses are size-bounded. Treat returned state as
+evidence, not authorization to change it.
+
+## Create a review handoff
+
+Before opening a PR, verify the remote, branch, clean worktree, diff, tests, and
+exact pushed commit. Never force-push. Pass that full 40-character pushed head
+SHA explicitly. Keep the short body free of credentials and credential-like
+text. The client screens structured assignments, known token formats, and long
+high-entropy values as an accidental-disclosure barrier. It cannot prove text
+is secret-free: short or multiword secrets under innocuous names may resemble
+ordinary prose, so never place credential material in either field. Structured
+inspection is deliberately bounded; large, deeply nested, or unusual config
+blobs do not belong in these fields and may be rejected. Validate without
+reading a credential or using the network:
+
+```sh
+/opt/scm/gitea_api.py --dry-run create-draft REPO \
+  --base main --head hermes/TASK --head-sha FULL_PUSHED_SHA \
+  --title "Focused change" --body "Tests and review evidence"
+```
+
+Run the same command without `--dry-run` only when the branch is review-ready.
+The client accepts success only when Forgejo returns the exact requested
+repository, base/head refs, head SHA, title/body, canonical URLs, positive PR
+number, and open/unmerged/draft state. Report its URL and exact head commit to
+Brad. Leave it unmerged for human review. PR updates are intentionally absent;
+publish a corrected tested commit and ask Brad how to proceed if metadata must
+change.
+
+## Stop at the authority boundary
+
+Update, merge, approve, close, delete, branch mutation, comments, releases,
+repository administration, and force-push are intentionally unavailable. Do
+not bypass the client with a raw HTTP request. If one of those actions is
+needed, present the tested commit and evidence to Brad and stop for human
+review.

services/hermes/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/agents/openai.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+interface:
+  display_name: "Manage Atlas Pull Requests"
+  short_description: "Create safe draft PR handoffs for human review"
+  default_prompt: "Use $manage-atlas-pull-requests to inspect the requested Atlas repository or prepare a tested branch as an unmerged draft pull request. Preserve the human review boundary."

services/vault/hermes-auth-role-bootstrap-job.yaml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 apiVersion: batch/v1
 kind: Job
 metadata:
-  name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-9
+  name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-10
   namespace: vault
 spec:
   backoffLimit: 2

services/vault/scripts/vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh

@@ -269,8 +269,11 @@ write_policy_and_role "game-stream" "game-stream" "game-stream-vault" \
   "game-stream/*" ""
 write_policy_and_role "hermes" "hermes" "hermes-vault,hermes-triage" \
   "hermes/triage-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/triage-api" ""
+# The agent keeps its own credentials but no longer holds developer-gitea:
+# the least-authority hermes-scm-broker role (below) carries the Gitea token
+# so a compromised agent cannot reach the SCM write path directly.
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent" "hermes" "hermes-agent" \
-  "hermes/agent-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/chat-telegram hermes/developer-keycloak hermes/developer-gitea hermes/developer-harbor hermes/developer-jenkins hermes/developer-ssh" ""
+  "hermes/agent-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/chat-telegram hermes/developer-keycloak hermes/developer-harbor hermes/developer-jenkins hermes/developer-ssh" ""
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-switchyard" "hermes" "hermes-switchyard" \
   "hermes/chat-telegram" ""
 hermes_jenkins_token_seed_policy='
@@ -288,6 +291,8 @@ vault_cmd write "auth/kubernetes/role/hermes-jenkins-token-seed" \
   bound_service_account_namespaces="vault" \
   policies="hermes-jenkins-token-seed" \
   ttl="${role_ttl}"
+write_policy_and_role "hermes-scm-broker" "hermes-scm" "hermes-scm-broker" \
+  "hermes/developer-gitea" ""
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-credential-sync" "hermes" "hermes-agent" \
   "" "hermes/agent-tokens"
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-node-ssh" "hermes" "hermes-node-ssh-access" \

testing/quality_contract.json

@@ -32,11 +32,27 @@
     "testing/quality_gate.py",
     "ci/tests/glue/test_ariadne_schedules.py",
     "ci/tests/glue/test_glue_metrics.py",
-      "testing/tests/test_publish_test_metrics.py",
-      "testing/tests/test_supply_chain_report.py",
-      "testing/tests/test_semgrep_report.py",
-      "testing/tests/test_quality_contract.py",
-    "testing/tests/test_quality_gate.py"
+    "testing/tests/test_publish_test_metrics.py",
+    "testing/tests/test_supply_chain_report.py",
+    "testing/tests/test_semgrep_report.py",
+    "testing/tests/test_quality_contract.py",
+    "testing/tests/test_quality_gate.py",
+    "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_client.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_io.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_server.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/deadline_http.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/git_pack_objects.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/receive_pack_scan.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
   ],
   "lint_paths": [
     "ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py",
@@ -52,7 +68,15 @@
     "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync.py",
     "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync_listener.py",
     "testing/tests",
-    "testing"
+    "testing",
+    "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
   ],
   "pytest_suites": {
     "unit": {
@@ -70,7 +94,9 @@
         "services/harbor/scripts",
         "services/hermes/scripts",
         "services/mailu/scripts",
-        "testing"
+        "testing",
+        "services/gitea/scripts",
+        "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts"
       ],
       "coverage_xml": "build/coverage-unit.xml"
     },
@@ -136,7 +162,15 @@
       "scripts/tests/**/*.py",
       "services/*/scripts/tests/**/*.py",
       "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync.py",
-      "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync_listener.py"
+      "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync_listener.py",
+      "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/*.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
     ],
     "naming_rules": [
       {
@@ -193,7 +227,23 @@
       "testing/quality_docs.py",
       "testing/quality_hygiene.py",
       "testing/quality_coverage.py",
-      "testing/quality_gate.py"
+      "testing/quality_gate.py",
+      "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_client.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_io.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_server.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/deadline_http.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/git_pack_objects.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/receive_pack_scan.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
     ]
   }
 }

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_images.py

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+"""Image generation and sandbox-boundary contracts for Hermes chat."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+import time
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
+    HERMES,
+    VAULT,
+    _documents,
+)
+
+
+def test_chat_image_generation_uses_private_owner_broker():
+    """Family pods get image bytes without receiving the owner's OAuth file."""
+    configmap = _documents(HERMES / "chat-configmap.yaml")[0]
+    assert "shared desktop/Wolf lane" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "local FLUX waits" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "Use `image_generate_local`" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "Use `image_generate_hosted`" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "ComfyUI endpoint" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "`MEDIA:` path" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "`image_edit_latest`" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert (
+        "Preserve the most recently selected image lane" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    )
+    config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["config.yaml"])
+    assert config["image_gen"] == {
+        "provider": "atlas-broker",
+        "model": "atlas-image-auto-high",
+    }
+    assert config["plugins"]["enabled"] == ["atlas-broker", "auto-router"]
+
+    statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
+    pod = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    hermes = next(item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == "hermes")
+    mounts = {item["name"]: item for item in hermes["volumeMounts"]}
+    assert mounts["image-plugin"]["mountPath"] == (
+        "/opt/hermes/plugins/image_gen/atlas-broker"
+    )
+    assert mounts["runtime-access"]["mountPath"] == "/runtime-access"
+    assert "provider-auth" not in mounts
+    assert not any(
+        mount["name"] == "home" and "agent" in str(mount)
+        for mount in hermes["volumeMounts"]
+    )
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in hermes["env"]}
+    assert env["HERMES_IMAGE_BROKER_URL"].startswith("http://hermes-image-broker.")
+
+    plugin = (HERMES / "plugins" / "image-gen-broker" / "__init__.py").read_text()
+    assert '"local": "flux-2-klein-4b-local"' in plugin
+    assert '"hosted": "gpt-image-2-high"' in plugin
+    assert 'name="image_generate_local"' in plugin
+    assert 'name="image_generate_hosted"' in plugin
+    assert '"name": "image_edit_latest"' in plugin
+    assert '"name": "image_edit_latest_local"' in plugin
+    assert '"name": "image_edit_latest_hosted"' in plugin
+    assert "def _latest_generated_image" in plugin
+    assert "newest MEDIA: path from the conversation" in plugin
+    assert 'candidate.upper().startswith("MEDIA:")' in plugin
+    assert "override=True" not in plugin
+
+    agent = _documents(HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    containers = agent["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    broker = next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == "image-broker")
+    assert broker["ports"] == [
+        {"name": "image-broker", "containerPort": 9002, "protocol": "TCP"}
+    ]
+    assert broker["securityContext"]["readOnlyRootFilesystem"] is True
+    assert broker["securityContext"]["runAsNonRoot"] is True
+
+    services = _documents(HERMES / "service.yaml")
+    service = next(
+        item for item in services if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-image-broker"
+    )
+    assert service["spec"]["selector"] == {"app": "hermes-agent"}
+
+    oauth_store = _documents(HERMES / "oauth-session-store.yaml")
+    redis = next(item for item in oauth_store if item["kind"] == "Deployment")
+    assert redis["spec"]["strategy"]["type"] == "Recreate"
+    assert "--appendonly" in redis["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"][0]["args"]
+
+    policies = _documents(HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml")
+    agent_policy = next(
+        item
+        for item in policies
+        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-agent-isolation"
+    )
+    broker_ingress = next(
+        rule
+        for rule in agent_policy["spec"]["ingress"]
+        if {port["port"] for port in rule["ports"]} == {9002, 9003}
+    )
+    assert broker_ingress["from"][0]["podSelector"]["matchLabels"] == {
+        "app": "hermes-chat-tenant"
+    }
+    vault_policy = (VAULT / "scripts" / "vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh").read_text()
+    agent_role = vault_policy[
+        vault_policy.index('write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent"') : vault_policy.index(
+            "write_policy_and_role",
+            vault_policy.index('write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent"') + 1,
+        )
+    ]
+    assert "hermes/developer-gitea" not in agent_role
+    assert 'write_policy_and_role "hermes-scm-broker" "hermes-scm"' in vault_policy
+    assert (
+        'write_policy_and_role "hermes-node-ssh" "hermes" '
+        '"hermes-node-ssh-access"' in vault_policy
+    )
+
+
+def test_compact_image_edit_resolves_latest_tenant_artifact(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Follow-up edits resolve the source server-side and keep tool JSON small."""
+    provider_module = SimpleNamespace(
+        DEFAULT_ASPECT_RATIO="square",
+        ImageGenProvider=object,
+        error_response=lambda **value: value,
+        normalize_reference_images=lambda value: value,
+        resolve_aspect_ratio=lambda value: value,
+        save_b64_image=lambda *_args, **_kwargs: tmp_path / "saved.png",
+        success_response=lambda **value: value,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "agent", SimpleNamespace())
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "agent.image_gen_provider", provider_module)
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "hermes_image_plugin",
+        HERMES / "plugins" / "image-gen-broker" / "__init__.py",
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+
+    image_dir = tmp_path / "cache" / "images"
+    image_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+    older = image_dir / "atlas_flux-old.png"
+    newest = image_dir / "atlas_gpt-image-new.png"
+    older.write_bytes(b"older")
+    newest.write_bytes(b"newest")
+    older.touch()
+    time.sleep(0.001)
+    newest.touch()
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path))
+
+    calls = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "_handle_image_generate",
+        lambda args, route: calls.append((args, route)) or "ok",
+    )
+    assert module._handle_hosted_edit({"prompt": "make it a clown"}) == "ok"
+    assert calls == [
+        (
+            {
+                "prompt": "make it a clown",
+                "image_url": str(newest.resolve()),
+            },
+            "hosted",
+        )
+    ]
+
+
+def test_chat_reasoning_uses_switchyard_without_owner_credentials():
+    """Family pods use AUTO/manual routes without mounting owner credentials."""
+    configmap = _documents(HERMES / "chat-configmap.yaml")[0]
+    config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["config.yaml"])
+    assert config["model"] == {
+        "provider": "atlas-switchyard",
+        "default": "atlas/auto/fast",
+        "model": "atlas/auto/fast",
+    }
+    assert config["providers"]["atlas-switchyard"] == {
+        "name": "Automatic Router",
+        "api": "http://hermes-switchyard.hermes.svc.cluster.local:9005/v1",
+        "api_key": "atlas-switchyard",
+        "default_model": "atlas/auto/fast",
+        "transport": "chat_completions",
+    }
+    assert config["platforms"]["api_server"]["extra"]["model_routes"] == {
+        route: {"provider": "atlas-switchyard", "model": route}
+        for route in [
+            "atlas/auto/fast",
+            "atlas/auto/balanced",
+            "atlas/auto/deep",
+            "atlas/auto/maximum",
+            "atlas/manual/codex/luna",
+            "atlas/manual/codex/terra",
+            "atlas/manual/codex/sol",
+            "atlas/manual/claude/haiku",
+            "atlas/manual/claude/fable",
+            "atlas/manual/claude/sonnet",
+            "atlas/manual/claude/opus",
+            "atlas/manual/local/qwen-14b",
+        ]
+    }
+
+    agent = _documents(HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    containers = agent["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    broker = next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == "codex-broker")
+    assert broker["ports"] == [
+        {"name": "codex-broker", "containerPort": 9003, "protocol": "TCP"}
+    ]
+    assert broker["securityContext"]["readOnlyRootFilesystem"] is True
+    assert broker["securityContext"]["runAsNonRoot"] is True
+    assert {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in broker["env"]}.items() >= {
+        "PYTHONPATH": "/opt/hermes",
+        "HERMES_CODEX_BROKER_LISTEN_PORT": "9003",
+        "HERMES_ROUTING_CATALOG_PATH": "/routing-catalog/catalog.json",
+    }.items()
+
+    services = _documents(HERMES / "service.yaml")
+    service = next(
+        item for item in services if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-codex-broker"
+    )
+    assert service["spec"]["selector"] == {"app": "hermes-agent"}
+    assert service["spec"]["ports"] == [
+        {
+            "name": "http",
+            "port": 9003,
+            "targetPort": "codex-broker",
+            "protocol": "TCP",
+        }
+    ]
+
+    statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
+    assert (
+        statefulset["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"][
+            "ai.bstein.dev/config-rev"
+        ]
+        == "20260816-telegram-topics"
+    )
+    pod_spec = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    patch_init = next(
+        item
+        for item in pod_spec["initContainers"]
+        if item["name"] == "patch-stream-recovery"
+    )
+    assert patch_init["command"][-2:] == [
+        "/opt/hermes/agent/conversation_loop.py",
+        "/patched/conversation_loop.py",
+    ]
+    hermes = next(item for item in pod_spec["containers"] if item["name"] == "hermes")
+    assert {
+        "name": "stream-recovery-patch",
+        "mountPath": "/opt/hermes/agent/conversation_loop.py",
+        "subPath": "conversation_loop.py",
+    } in hermes["volumeMounts"]
+    api_session_init = next(
+        item
+        for item in pod_spec["initContainers"]
+        if item["name"] == "patch-api-server-sessions"
+    )
+    assert "patch_api_server_sessions.py" in api_session_init["args"][0]
+    assert "migrate_telegram_api_sessions.py" in api_session_init["args"][0]
+    assert {
+        "name": "api-server-patch",
+        "mountPath": "/opt/hermes/gateway/platforms/api_server.py",
+        "subPath": "api_server.py",
+    } in hermes["volumeMounts"]
+    assert any(volume["name"] == "api-server-patch" for volume in pod_spec["volumes"])
+    assert not any(
+        mount["mountPath"].endswith("/.codex") for mount in hermes["volumeMounts"]
+    )
+
+    policies = _documents(HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml")
+    agent_policy = next(
+        item
+        for item in policies
+        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-agent-isolation"
+    )
+    broker_ingress = next(
+        rule
+        for rule in agent_policy["spec"]["ingress"]
+        if {port["port"] for port in rule["ports"]} == {9002, 9003}
+    )
+    assert broker_ingress["from"][0]["podSelector"]["matchLabels"] == {
+        "app": "hermes-chat-tenant"
+    }

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_local_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+"""Local inference and sandbox execution contracts for Hermes chat."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
+    HERMES,
+    ROOT,
+    _documents,
+)
+
+
+def test_titan20_serializes_classifier_and_local_chat_model_residency():
+    """Classifier and local chat share one serialized resident Qwen weight."""
+    deployment = _documents(
+        Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/ai-llm/deployment.yaml"
+    )[0]
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    required = pod["affinity"]["nodeAffinity"][
+        "requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution"
+    ]["nodeSelectorTerms"][0]["matchExpressions"][0]
+    assert required["values"] == ["titan-20"]
+    container = pod["containers"][0]
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
+    assert env["OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS"] == "1"
+    assert env["OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL"] == "1"
+    assert env["OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE"] == "-1"
+    assert env["OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH"] == "8192"
+    warm_command = " ".join(container["command"])
+    assert "--keepalive=-1" not in warm_command
+    models = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "models")
+    assert models["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == ("ollama-models-titan20")
+
+
+def test_local_image_gpu_guard_distinguishes_background_and_saturated_gpu(monkeypatch):
+    """Lease-idle desktop spikes may coexist, but saturation still blocks FLUX."""
+    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_local_image_server", source)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_ACTIVITY_NODE", "titan-24")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_ACTIVE_SM_PERCENT", 80.0)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_MAX_EXTERNAL_MEMORY_BYTES", 3 << 30)
+
+    idle = module._parse_gpu_activity(
+        "\n".join(
+            [
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="Xorg"} 0',
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_memory_used_bytes{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="Xorg"} 1900000000',
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="game-stream",process="wolf"} 3',
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_memory_used_bytes{node="titan-24",namespace="hermes",process="python"} 9000000000',
+            ]
+        )
+    )
+    assert idle["interactive_active"] is False
+    assert idle["external_gpu_memory_bytes"] == 1900000000
+    assert idle["external_gpu_sm_percent"] == 3
+
+    background_spike = module._parse_gpu_activity(
+        'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="sway"} 41\n'
+    )
+    assert background_spike["interactive_active"] is False
+
+    active = module._parse_gpu_activity(
+        'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="steam"} 91\n'
+    )
+    assert active["interactive_active"] is True
+    assert "91%" in active["gpu_guard_reason"]
+
+
+def test_local_flux_renderer_uses_a_disposable_cuda_worker(monkeypatch):
+    """A completed render must not leave its CUDA context in the API process."""
+    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_local_image_worker", source)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    calls = []
+
+    def run(command, **kwargs):
+        calls.append((command, kwargs))
+        return SimpleNamespace(
+            returncode=0,
+            stdout=b'{"success":true,"route":"local","image_b64":"cG5n"}',
+            stderr=b"",
+        )
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.subprocess, "run", run)
+    result = module._render({"prompt": "black cat", "aspect_ratio": "square"})
+
+    assert result["route"] == "local"
+    command, options = calls[0]
+    assert command[-1] == "--render-worker"
+    assert json.loads(options["input"]) == {
+        "prompt": "black cat",
+        "aspect_ratio": "square",
+    }
+    assert options["timeout"] == module.RENDER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+    assert options["check"] is False
+
+
+def test_local_flux_uses_low_vram_offload_without_reducing_resolution():
+    """The shared 3080 lane must trade time, not image size, for headroom."""
+    source = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py").read_text()
+    assert "OFFLOAD_MODE = os.environ.get(" in source
+    assert '"HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_OFFLOAD_MODE", "sequential"' in source
+    assert "pipe.enable_sequential_cpu_offload()" in source
+    assert '"square": (1024, 1024)' in source
+
+
+def test_chat_auth_and_relay_are_pod_lifetime_only():
+    statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
+    pod = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    containers = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+
+    for name in ("hermes", "webui"):
+        container = next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == name)
+        env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
+        assert env["HERMES_AUTH_FILE"] == "/runtime-access/hermes-auth.json"
+        mount = next(
+            item
+            for item in container["volumeMounts"]
+            if item["name"] == "runtime-access"
+        )
+        assert mount["mountPath"] == "/runtime-access"
+        assert "subPath" not in mount
+
+    hermes_env = {
+        item["name"]: item["value"]
+        for item in next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == "hermes")["env"]
+    }
+    runtime = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "runtime-access")
+    assert runtime["emptyDir"] == {"medium": "Memory", "sizeLimit": "2Mi"}
+    assert not any(item["name"] == "provider-auth" for item in pod["volumes"])
+    init_command = next(
+        item for item in pod["initContainers"] if item["name"] == "init-config"
+    )["command"][2]
+    for key in (
+        "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+        "API_SERVER_KEY",
+        "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
+        "GITEA_TOKEN",
+        "HERMES_IMAGE_BROKER_KEY",
+        "OPENAI_API_KEY",
+    ):
+        assert key in init_command
+    assert "printf 'API_SERVER_KEY=%s" not in init_command
+    assert hermes_env["AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH"].endswith(
+        "/chrome-linux/headless_shell"
+    )
+    assert "--no-sandbox" in hermes_env["AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS"]
+
+
+def test_sandbox_executes_python_with_bounded_output(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-chat-sandbox-server.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_chat_sandbox_server", source)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "WORKSPACE", tmp_path)
+
+    result = module._execute("import math\nprint(math.comb(10, 3))")
+
+    assert result["success"] is True
+    assert result["stdout"] == "120\n"
+    assert result["stderr"] == ""

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_provider_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+"""Provider subscription and OAuth contracts for Hermes chat."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import sys
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import ModuleType
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
+    _load_broker_module,
+)
+
+
+def test_codex_broker_auth_and_request_contract(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    """The relay is bounded, stateless, and rejects unapproved models."""
+    module = _load_broker_module("hermes_codex_broker", "codex_broker.py", monkeypatch)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "TOKEN", "relay-secret")
+
+    assert module._authorized("Bearer relay-secret") is True
+    assert module._authorized("Bearer wrong") is False
+    assert module._real_model("route/codex/gpt-5.6-sol/xhigh") == "gpt-5.6-sol"
+    payload = module._validate_payload(
+        {
+            "model": "gpt-5.6-terra",
+            "input": "route this chat turn",
+            "store": True,
+            "stream": False,
+            "max_output_tokens": 96,
+            "max_completion_tokens": 96,
+            "max_tokens": 96,
+            "temperature": 0.7,
+            "top_p": 0.9,
+        }
+    )
+    assert payload["store"] is False
+    assert payload["stream"] is True
+    assert "max_output_tokens" not in payload
+    assert "max_completion_tokens" not in payload
+    assert "max_tokens" not in payload
+    assert "temperature" not in payload
+    assert "top_p" not in payload
+    assert payload["input"] == [
+        {
+            "type": "message",
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "route this chat turn"}],
+        }
+    ]
+    response_item = {
+        "type": "message",
+        "role": "user",
+        "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "keep this item"}],
+    }
+    assert module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": response_item})[
+        "input"
+    ] == [response_item]
+    response_items = [response_item]
+    assert (
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": response_items})[
+            "input"
+        ]
+        is response_items
+    )
+    image_items = [
+        {
+            "type": "message",
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {"type": "input_text", "text": "What color is this?"},
+                {
+                    "type": "image_url",
+                    "image_url": {
+                        "url": "",
+                        "detail": "high",
+                    },
+                },
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    assert module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": image_items})[
+        "input"
+    ][0]["content"][1] == {
+        "type": "input_image",
+        "image_url": "",
+        "detail": "high",
+    }
+    switchyard_image_items = [
+        {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {"type": "input_text", "text": "What color is this?"},
+                {
+                    "type": "image_url",
+                    "image_url": {
+                        "url": "",
+                        "detail": "auto",
+                    },
+                },
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    assert module._validate_payload(
+        {"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": switchyard_image_items}
+    )["input"][0]["content"][1] == {
+        "type": "input_image",
+        "image_url": "",
+        "detail": "auto",
+    }
+    switchyard_base64_items = [
+        {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {"type": "input_text", "text": "What color is this?"},
+                {
+                    "type": "image",
+                    "source": {
+                        "type": "base64",
+                        "media_type": "image/png",
+                        "data": "cHJpdmF0ZQ==",
+                    },
+                },
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    normalized_base64 = module._validate_payload(
+        {"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": switchyard_base64_items}
+    )["input"][0]["content"][1]
+    assert normalized_base64 == {
+        "type": "input_image",
+        "image_url": "",
+    }
+    switchyard_enum_items = [
+        {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {
+                    "type": "input_image",
+                    "image_url": {
+                        "type": "url",
+                        "data": {
+                            "url": "",
+                            "detail": "high",
+                        },
+                    },
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    nested_image = module._validate_payload(
+        {"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": switchyard_enum_items}
+    )["input"][0]["content"][0]
+    assert nested_image["image_url"] == ""
+    assert nested_image["detail"] == "high"
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=r"non-empty Responses image URL.*str\[4\]"):
+        module._validate_payload(
+            {
+                "model": "gpt-5.6-terra",
+                "input": [
+                    {
+                        "type": "message",
+                        "role": "user",
+                        "content": [
+                            {
+                                "type": "input_image",
+                                "image_url": {"detail": "high"},
+                            }
+                        ],
+                    }
+                ],
+            }
+        )
+    routed = module._validate_payload(
+        {
+            "model": "route/codex/gpt-5.6-luna/low",
+            "input": "use the low route",
+            "stream": False,
+        }
+    )
+    assert routed["model"] == "gpt-5.6-luna"
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported Codex model"):
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "unapproved-model", "input": "hello"})
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-empty Responses input"):
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": ""})
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-empty Responses input list"):
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": []})
+
+    completed = {
+        "id": "resp_test",
+        "object": "response",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "output": [],
+    }
+    completed_item = {
+        "type": "message",
+        "role": "assistant",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "content": [{"type": "output_text", "text": "done"}],
+    }
+    assert module._completed_response(
+        [
+            "event: response.created",
+            'data: {"type":"response.created","response":{}}',
+            "event: response.output_item.done",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps(
+                {
+                    "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                    "output_index": 0,
+                    "item": completed_item,
+                }
+            ),
+            "event: response.completed",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+            "data: [DONE]",
+        ]
+    )["output"] == [completed_item]
+    raw_stream = (
+        "event: response.output_item.done\n"
+        "data: "
+        + json.dumps(
+            {
+                "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                "output_index": 0,
+                "item": completed_item,
+            }
+        )
+        + "\n\nevent: response.completed\ndata: "
+        + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed})
+        + "\n\n"
+    ).encode()
+    normalized = module._normalized_stream(
+        raw_stream, {**completed, "output": [completed_item]}
+    ).decode()
+    terminal_data = next(
+        line for line in normalized.splitlines() if '"response.completed"' in line
+    )
+    assert json.loads(terminal_data.removeprefix("data: "))["response"]["output"] == [
+        completed_item
+    ]
+    assert normalized.endswith("\n\n")
+    streamed_function_item = {
+        "type": "function_call",
+        "name": "read_file",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "arguments": '{"path":"/tmp"}',
+    }
+    streamed_function_body = (
+        "event: response.function_call_arguments.delta\n"
+        'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.delta",'
+        '"item_id":"call_1","delta":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\"}"}\n\n'
+        "event: response.function_call_arguments.done\n"
+        'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.done",'
+        '"item_id":"call_1","arguments":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\"}"}\n\n'
+        "event: response.output_item.done\n"
+        'data: {"type":"response.output_item.done","output_index":0,'
+        '"item":{"type":"function_call","name":"read_file",'
+        '"arguments":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\"}"}}\n\n'
+        "event: response.completed\n"
+        "data: "
+        + json.dumps(
+            {
+                "type": "response.completed",
+                "response": {**completed, "output": [streamed_function_item]},
+            }
+        )
+        + "\n\n"
+    ).encode()
+    normalized_function_stream = module._normalized_stream(
+        streamed_function_body, {**completed, "output": [streamed_function_item]}
+    ).decode()
+    assert "response.function_call_arguments.delta" in normalized_function_stream
+    assert "response.function_call_arguments.done" not in normalized_function_stream
+    assert "response.output_item.done" not in normalized_function_stream
+    normalized_terminal = next(
+        line
+        for line in normalized_function_stream.splitlines()
+        if '"response.completed"' in line
+    )
+    assert (
+        json.loads(normalized_terminal.removeprefix("data: "))["response"]["output"]
+        == []
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="retryable incomplete response"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: response.incomplete",
+                'data: {"type":"response.incomplete","response":'
+                '{"status":"incomplete","incomplete_details":'
+                '{"reason":"max_output_tokens"}}}',
+            ]
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="provider unavailable"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: error",
+                'data: {"type":"error","error":{"message":"provider unavailable"}}',
+            ]
+        )
+    malformed_tool_item = {
+        "type": "function_call",
+        "name": "search_files",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "arguments": '{"path":"","offset":',
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="malformed function arguments"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: response.output_item.done",
+                "data: "
+                + json.dumps(
+                    {
+                        "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                        "output_index": 0,
+                        "item": malformed_tool_item,
+                    }
+                ),
+                "event: response.completed",
+                "data: "
+                + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+            ]
+        )
+    valid_tool_item = {
+        **malformed_tool_item,
+        "arguments": '{"path":"","offset":0}',
+    }
+    assert module._completed_response(
+        [
+            "event: response.output_item.done",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps(
+                {
+                    "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                    "output_index": 0,
+                    "item": valid_tool_item,
+                }
+            ),
+            "event: response.completed",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+        ]
+    )["output"] == [valid_tool_item]
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="malformed function arguments"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: response.function_call_arguments.delta",
+                'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.delta",'
+                '"item_id":"call_1","output_index":0,'
+                '"delta":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\",\\"offset\\":"}',
+                "event: response.completed",
+                "data: "
+                + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+            ]
+        )
+    streamed_tool = module._completed_response(
+        [
+            "event: response.function_call_arguments.delta",
+            'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.delta",'
+            '"item_id":"call_2","output_index":0,'
+            '"delta":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\",\\"offset\\":"}',
+            "event: response.function_call_arguments.done",
+            'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.done",'
+            '"item_id":"call_2","output_index":0,'
+            '"arguments":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\",\\"offset\\":0}"}',
+            "event: response.completed",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+        ]
+    )
+    assert streamed_tool["status"] == "completed"
+
+    auth_dir = tmp_path / ".codex"
+    auth_dir.mkdir()
+    # The token payload need only prove the broker reads CODEX_HOME directly.
+    encoded = (
+        base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp": time.time() + 3600}).encode())
+        .decode()
+        .rstrip("=")
+    )
+    (auth_dir / "auth.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps({"tokens": {"access_token": f"header.{encoded}.signature"}})
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CODEX_HOME", str(auth_dir))
+    assert module._access_token().startswith("header.")
+
+
+def test_codex_broker_refreshes_and_persists_first_party_oauth(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Expired ChatGPT OAuth refreshes in the canonical Codex CLI store."""
+    module = _load_broker_module(
+        "hermes_codex_refresh_broker", "codex_broker.py", monkeypatch
+    )
+    auth_dir = tmp_path / ".codex"
+    auth_dir.mkdir()
+
+    def jwt(expires_at: float) -> str:
+        payload = (
+            base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp": expires_at}).encode())
+            .decode()
+            .rstrip("=")
+        )
+        return f"header.{payload}.signature"
+
+    expired = jwt(time.time() - 60)
+    live = jwt(time.time() + 3600)
+    auth_path = auth_dir / "auth.json"
+    auth_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+                "tokens": {
+                    "access_token": expired,
+                    "refresh_token": "refresh-old",
+                },
+            }
+        )
+    )
+    calls = []
+    auth_module = ModuleType("hermes_cli.auth")
+
+    def refresh(access_token, refresh_token, *, timeout_seconds):
+        calls.append((access_token, refresh_token, timeout_seconds))
+        return {
+            "access_token": live,
+            "refresh_token": "refresh-new",
+            "last_refresh": "2026-08-12T20:00:00Z",
+        }
+
+    auth_module.refresh_codex_oauth_pure = refresh
+    package = ModuleType("hermes_cli")
+    package.auth = auth_module
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", package)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli.auth", auth_module)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CODEX_HOME", str(auth_dir))
+
+    assert module._access_token() == live
+    persisted = json.loads(auth_path.read_text())
+    assert persisted["tokens"]["access_token"] == live
+    assert persisted["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "refresh-new"
+    assert persisted["last_refresh"] == "2026-08-12T20:00:00Z"
+    assert calls == [(expired, "refresh-old", 30.0)]
+    assert auth_path.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
+
+    # A healthy token is reused, so repeated routed turns do not spend a
+    # refresh token or create a second billing/authentication path.
+    assert module._access_token() == live
+    assert len(calls) == 1
+
+
+def test_claude_broker_uses_native_subscription_without_api_billing(monkeypatch):
+    """Claude traffic must use the native first-party CLI subscription lane."""
+    module = _load_broker_module(
+        "hermes_claude_broker", "claude_oauth_broker.py", monkeypatch
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "must-not-leak")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CLAUDE_API_KEY", "must-not-leak")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "resolve_route",
+        lambda route: "claude-fable-5" if "/fable/" in route else route,
+    )
+
+    model, effort = module._route(
+        "route/claude/fable/xhigh", {"output_config": {"effort": "xhigh"}}
+    )
+
+    assert (model, effort) == ("claude-fable-5", "xhigh")
+    assert "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" not in module._claude_environment()
+    assert "CLAUDE_API_KEY" not in module._claude_environment()
+    assert module.CAPACITY_PATTERN.search("weekly usage limit exhausted")

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_routing_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+"""Routing and runtime workload contracts for Hermes chat."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tomllib
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
+    HERMES,
+    ROOT,
+    _documents,
+)
+
+
+def test_stale_parent_linked_api_workers_close_on_startup(tmp_path: Path):
+    """A previous gateway lifetime cannot leave phantom active workers."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "migrate_api_session_lineage.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "close_stale_api_workers", module_path
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    database = tmp_path / "state.db"
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE sessions (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, source TEXT, "
+            "parent_session_id TEXT, title TEXT, started_at REAL, ended_at REAL, "
+            "end_reason TEXT, archived INTEGER DEFAULT 0)"
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO sessions "
+            "(id, source, parent_session_id, started_at, ended_at, end_reason) "
+            "VALUES (?, ?, ?, 1, ?, ?)",
+            (
+                ("stale", "api_server", "parent", None, None),
+                ("root", "api_server", None, None, None),
+                ("finished", "api_server", "parent", 2.0, "api_run_completed"),
+                ("interactive", "tui", "parent", None, None),
+            ),
+        )
+
+    assert module.migrate(database) == 1
+    assert module.migrate(database) == 0
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        rows = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT id, ended_at, end_reason FROM sessions ORDER BY id"
+        ).fetchall()
+    by_id = {row[0]: row[1:] for row in rows}
+    assert by_id["stale"][0] is not None
+    assert by_id["stale"][1] == "api_run_recovered_stale"
+    assert by_id["root"] == (None, None)
+    assert by_id["finished"] == (2.0, "api_run_completed")
+    assert by_id["interactive"] == (None, None)
+
+
+def test_switchyard_brokers_and_native_claude_lane_use_the_right_images():
+    """Thin brokers stay small while native Claude runs beside owner auth."""
+    dockerfile = (
+        ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-switchyard-brokers"
+    ).read_text()
+    assert "httpx==0.28.1" in dockerfile
+    assert "worker_route_broker.py" in dockerfile
+    assert "routing_catalog.py" in dockerfile
+
+    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    containers = {
+        container["name"]: container
+        for container in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    expected = (
+        "registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-switchyard-brokers@"
+        "sha256:ee7e95e060ef8083da505162d7e9030daba15fdd828cc047bbcbe6aa409d2083"
+    )
+    assert containers["worker-route-broker"]["image"] == expected
+    assert containers["classifier-broker"]["image"] == expected
+    assert "claude-oauth-broker" not in containers
+
+    agent = _documents(HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    agent_containers = {
+        container["name"]: container
+        for container in agent["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    for container_name in ("hermes", "terminal"):
+        container = agent_containers[container_name]
+        environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
+        mounts = {item["name"]: item for item in container["volumeMounts"]}
+        assert (
+            environment["HERMES_ROUTING_CATALOG_PATH"]
+            == "/routing-catalog/catalog.json"
+        )
+        assert (
+            environment["HERMES_CODEX_HEALTH_PATH"]
+            == "/opt/data/provider-health/codex.json"
+        )
+        assert (
+            environment["HERMES_CLAUDE_HEALTH_PATH"]
+            == "/opt/data/provider-health/claude.json"
+        )
+        assert mounts["routing-catalog"]["mountPath"] == "/routing-catalog"
+        assert mounts["routing-catalog"]["readOnly"] is True
+    codex = agent_containers["codex-broker"]
+    codex_environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in codex["env"]}
+    assert (
+        codex_environment["HERMES_CODEX_HEALTH_PATH"]
+        == "/opt/data/provider-health/codex.json"
+    )
+    claude = agent_containers["claude-broker"]
+    assert claude["image"].startswith("registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent@")
+    assert "unset ANTHROPIC_API_KEY CLAUDE_API_KEY" in claude["args"][0]
+    assert any(
+        mount["name"] == "home" and mount["mountPath"] == "/opt/data"
+        for mount in claude["volumeMounts"]
+    )
+
+
+def test_classifier_broker_bounds_history_without_losing_routing_intent(monkeypatch):
+    """AUTO classification must fit the Jetson context without losing intent."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "classifier_broker.py"
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "httpx", SimpleNamespace())
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "hermes_classifier_broker", broker_path
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+
+    payload = {
+        "model": "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0",
+        "messages": [
+            {
+                "role": "system",
+                "content": "routing contract\n" + ("candidate policy " * 1000),
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "user",
+                "content": "Build and verify the Cassandra release safely.",
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": None,
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "call_large",
+                        "type": "function",
+                        "function": {
+                            "name": "large_tool",
+                            "arguments": '{"command":"' + ("x" * 5000) + '"}',
+                        },
+                    }
+                ],
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "tool",
+                "content": "unbounded test output " * 10000,
+                "tool_call_id": "call_large",
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "user",
+                "content": [
+                    {
+                        "type": "image_url",
+                        "image_url": {"url": ""},
+                    },
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "Turn this cat into a cute clown."},
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        "tools": [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "large_tool"}}],
+        "tool_choice": "auto",
+        "parallel_tool_calls": True,
+        "response_format": {"type": "json_object"},
+    }
+
+    compacted = module.compact_payload(payload)
+    encoded = json.dumps(compacted)
+
+    assert compacted["model"] == payload["model"]
+    assert compacted["response_format"] == payload["response_format"]
+    assert "tools" not in compacted
+    assert "tool_choice" not in compacted
+    assert "parallel_tool_calls" not in compacted
+    assert all(message.get("role") != "tool" for message in compacted["messages"])
+    assert all("tool_call_id" not in message for message in compacted["messages"])
+    assert all("tool_calls" not in message for message in compacted["messages"])
+    assert "[tool evidence]" in encoded
+    assert "[assistant requested an external tool]" in encoded
+    assert "Build and verify the Cassandra release safely." in encoded
+    assert "Turn this cat into a cute clown." in encoded
+    assert "image attachment available to the selected worker" in encoded
+    assert "data:image/png;base64" not in encoded
+    assert "unbounded test output " * 100 not in encoded
+    assert len(encoded) < 18_000
+
+
+def test_switchyard_classifier_is_bounded_and_fails_open_once():
+    """A sick local judge must not hold chat through repeated long retries."""
+    config = tomllib.loads(
+        _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"]["routes.toml"]
+    )
+    classifier = config["llm_clients"]["classifier"]
+    assert classifier["base_url"] == "http://127.0.0.1:9008/v1"
+    assert classifier["max_retries"] == 0
+    for route in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced"):
+        assert config["routes"][route]["recent_turn_window"] == 4
+    for route in ("auto_deep", "auto_maximum", "worker_auto_maximum"):
+        assert config["routes"][route]["recent_turn_window"] == 6
+
+    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    containers = {
+        item["name"]: item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    classifier_container = containers["classifier-broker"]
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in classifier_container["env"]}
+    assert env["HERMES_CLASSIFIER_BROKER_READ_TIMEOUT"] == "60"
+    assert classifier_container["readinessProbe"]["httpGet"]["port"] == "classifier"
+
+
+def test_image_broker_returns_bytes_and_removes_owner_cache(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """The broker must not retain a family user's generated image."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_broker", broker_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    generated = tmp_path / "generated.png"
+    generated.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nprivate-image")
+
+    class Provider:
+        def generate(self, prompt, aspect, **kwargs):
+            assert prompt == "paint a blue sphere"
+            assert aspect == "square"
+            return {
+                "success": True,
+                "image": str(generated),
+                "model": "gpt-image-2-high",
+                "quality": "high",
+            }
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_PROVIDER", Provider())
+    result = module._generate(
+        {
+            "prompt": "paint a blue sphere",
+            "aspect_ratio": "square",
+            "model": "gpt-image-2-high",
+        }
+    )
+
+    assert result["success"] is True
+    assert result["image_b64"]
+    assert "image" not in result
+    assert not generated.exists()
+
+
+def test_image_broker_auto_falls_back_to_local_and_honors_explicit_routes(
+    monkeypatch,
+):
+    """AUTO is hosted-first while explicit local never calls the hosted lane."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_router", broker_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    calls = []
+
+    def hosted(payload, model, prompt, aspect):
+        calls.append(("hosted", model, prompt, aspect))
+        return {"success": False, "error": "hosted refusal"}
+
+    def local(payload, timeout=1800.0):
+        calls.append(("local", payload["model"], timeout))
+        return {
+            "success": True,
+            "image_b64": "aW1hZ2U=",
+            "model": "flux-2-klein-4b-local",
+            "route": "local",
+        }
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_generate_hosted", hosted)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_local_request", local)
+    auto = module._generate(
+        {
+            "prompt": "colorize this family photograph",
+            "aspect_ratio": "portrait",
+            "model": "atlas-image-auto-high",
+        }
+    )
+    assert auto["success"] is True
+    assert auto["route"] == "local"
+    assert auto["hosted_fallback_reason"] == "hosted refusal"
+    assert [call[0] for call in calls] == ["hosted", "local"]
+
+    calls.clear()
+    explicit = module._generate(
+        {
+            "prompt": "make a local landscape",
+            "aspect_ratio": "landscape",
+            "model": "flux-2-klein-4b-local",
+        }
+    )
+    assert explicit["route"] == "local"
+    assert [call[0] for call in calls] == ["local"]
+
+
+def test_image_broker_policy_is_narrow_and_operator_extensible(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Family-photo restoration stays allowed while the hard boundary remains."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_policy", broker_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    policy = tmp_path / "policy.json"
+    policy.write_text('{"additional_blocked_phrases":["site-specific block"]}')
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "POLICY_PATH", policy)
+
+    assert (
+        module._policy_error(
+            "Colorize my baby photograph with a lighter natural skin tone"
+        )
+        is None
+    )
+    assert "minors" in module._policy_error("Create a sexual image of a child")
+    assert module._policy_error("A site-specific block request") == (
+        "request is blocked by the operator image policy"
+    )
+
+
+def test_local_flux_runtime_and_gpu_handoff_are_flux_managed():
+    """FLUX and Wolf share titan-24 while text stays on titan-20."""
+    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "local-image-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    assert deployment["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-local-image"
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    assert pod["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-gpu-runtime"
+    local = next(item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == "local-image")
+    assert len(pod["containers"]) == 1
+    assert local["resources"]["requests"]["nvidia.com/gpu.shared"] == 1
+    assert local["ports"] == [{"name": "local-image", "containerPort": 9004}]
+    assert any(mount["mountPath"] == "/models" for mount in local["volumeMounts"])
+    model_env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in local["env"]}
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_LISTEN_PORT"] == "9004"
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_REVISION"] == (
+        "e7b7dc27f91deacad38e78976d1f2b499d76a294"
+    )
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVITY_NODE"] == "titan-24"
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVE_SM_PERCENT"] == "80"
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_MAX_EXTERNAL_MEMORY_BYTES"] == (
+        "3221225472"
+    )
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_OFFLOAD_MODE"] == "sequential"
+    assert (
+        "nvidia-process-exporter-local.monitoring.svc.cluster.local"
+        in model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVITY_URL"]
+    )
+    models_volume = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "models")
+    assert models_volume["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == (
+        "hermes-image-models"
+    )
+
+    services = _documents(HERMES / "service.yaml")
+    image_service = next(
+        item for item in services if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-local-image"
+    )
+    assert image_service["spec"]["selector"] == {"app": "hermes-local-image"}
+
+    handoff_services = _documents(HERMES / "model-gate-deployment.yaml")
+    handoff = next(
+        item
+        for item in handoff_services
+        if item["kind"] == "Service"
+        and item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-gpu-handoff"
+    )
+    assert handoff["spec"]["ports"][0]["targetPort"] == "handoff"
+
+    ariadne = _documents(
+        Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/maintenance/apps/ariadne-deployment.yaml"
+    )[0]
+    env = {
+        item["name"]: item["value"]
+        for item in ariadne["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"][0]["env"]
+        if "value" in item
+    }
+    assert env["GAME_MODE_OLLAMA_URL"] == (
+        "http://hermes-gpu-handoff.hermes.svc.cluster.local:11434"
+    )
+    assert env["GAME_MODE_OLLAMA_MODEL"] == "flux-2-klein-4b-local"
+
+    for config_name in (
+        "configmap.yaml",
+        "agent-configmap.yaml",
+        "chat-configmap.yaml",
+    ):
+        config = _documents(HERMES / config_name)[0]["data"]["config.yaml"]
+        assert "gpt-oss:20b" not in config
+        assert "atlas-switchyard" in config
+    switchyard = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"][
+        "routes.toml"
+    ]
+    assert 'id = "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0"' in switchyard
+    assert "qwen2.5:3b-instruct-q4_0" not in switchyard
+    assert "route/local/qwen2.5-14b/medium" in switchyard
+    assert "Anthropic and Claude name the same provider" in switchyard
+    assert "OpenAI and Codex name the same provider" in switchyard
+    assert "Choose across every configured Codex and Claude family" in switchyard
+    assert "Claude Fable" in switchyard
+    assert switchyard.count('Treat "think hard"') == 4
+    assert switchyard.count("Never choose below the") >= 5
+    switchyard_config = tomllib.loads(switchyard)
+    routes = switchyard_config["routes"]
+    configured_targets = switchyard_config["targets"]
+    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced", "auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
+        leading_targets = set(routes[route_name]["targets"][:2])
+        assert leading_targets == {"codex_sol_xhigh", "claude_opus_xhigh"}
+        assert "max_output_tokens" not in routes[route_name]
+    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced", "auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
+        targets = routes[route_name]["targets"]
+        selector_targets = routes[route_name]["response_schema"]
+        assert not any(target.startswith("local_") for target in targets)
+        assert any("fable" in target for target in targets)
+        assert "local_qwen" not in selector_targets
+        assert "not eligible for foreground" in routes[route_name]["prompt"]
+    for route_name in ("auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
+        targets = routes[route_name]["targets"]
+        selector_targets = routes[route_name]["response_schema"]
+        assert not any(target.endswith("_low") for target in targets)
+        assert "_low" not in selector_targets
+    maximum_targets = routes["auto_maximum"]["targets"]
+    maximum_selector_targets = routes["auto_maximum"]["response_schema"]
+    assert not any(target.endswith("_medium") for target in maximum_targets)
+    assert "_medium" not in maximum_selector_targets
+    assert "absolute high effort floor" in routes["auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
+    assert "quality mark was missed" in routes["auto_balanced"]["prompt"]
+    assert "raises the next boundary to xhigh" in routes["auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
+    assert (
+        "Repeated quality misses require xhigh"
+        in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
+    )
+    assert any(
+        target.startswith("local_") for target in routes["manual_local_qwen"]["targets"]
+    )
+    for route_name in (
+        "manual_codex_luna",
+        "manual_codex_terra",
+        "manual_codex_sol",
+        "manual_claude_haiku",
+        "manual_claude_fable",
+        "manual_claude_sonnet",
+        "manual_claude_opus",
+    ):
+        assert not any(
+            target.startswith("local_") for target in routes[route_name]["targets"]
+        )
+    for provider, families in {
+        "codex": ("luna", "terra", "sol"),
+        "claude": ("haiku", "fable", "sonnet", "opus"),
+    }.items():
+        for family in families:
+            for effort in ("low", "medium", "high", "xhigh"):
+                route = routes[f"manual_{provider}_{family}_{effort}"]
+                assert route["id"] == f"atlas/manual/{provider}/{family}/{effort}"
+                assert route["targets"][0] == f"{provider}_{family}_{effort}"
+                worker_target = f"worker_{provider}_{family}_{effort}"
+                assert worker_target in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]["targets"]
+                assert configured_targets[worker_target]["id"] == (
+                    f"worker/{provider}/{family}/{effort}"
+                )
+    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced"):
+        prompt = routes[route_name]["prompt"]
+        assert "image tool—not the conversational model" in prompt
+        assert "Do not select a" in prompt
+        assert "local Qwen or Claude target" in prompt
+    assert "max_output_tokens" not in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]
+    model_gate = _documents(HERMES / "model-gate-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"][
+        "model_gate.py"
+    ]
+    assert "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0" in model_gate

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_session_continuity.py

@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+"""Session lineage and continuity contracts for Hermes chat."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
+    HERMES,
+)
+
+
+def test_codex_native_health_overrides_historical_router_errors(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Fresh first-party health is authoritative over old Switchyard probes."""
+    plugin_path = HERMES / "plugins" / "auto-router" / "provider_status.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_provider_status", plugin_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    health_path = tmp_path / "codex.json"
+    health_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "state": "available",
+                "authenticated": True,
+                "transport": "codex-chatgpt-subscription",
+            }
+        )
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "CODEX_HEALTH_PATH", health_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "CLAUDE_HEALTH_PATH", tmp_path / "missing.json")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "_get_json",
+        lambda url: {"status": "ok"}
+        if url.endswith("/health")
+        else {
+            "models": {
+                "route/codex/terra/medium": {
+                    "calls": 1,
+                    "errors": 99,
+                    "total_tokens": 12,
+                }
+            }
+        },
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_codex_account", lambda: {})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_claude_account", lambda: {})
+
+    codex = module.provider_status_payload()["providers"]["codex"]
+
+    assert codex["errors"] == 99
+    assert codex["state"] == "available"
+    assert codex["native_health"]["transport"] == "codex-chatgpt-subscription"
+
+
+def test_api_session_patch_accepts_parent_lineage(tmp_path: Path):
+    """API-created workers must persist the originating Hermes session."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "patch_api_server_sessions.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("patch_api_sessions", module_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    source = tmp_path / "api_server.py"
+    destination = tmp_path / "patched.py"
+    source.write_text(
+        "prefix\n"
+        + module.BEFORE
+        + "middle\n"
+        + module.RUNS_BEFORE
+        + "run body\n"
+        + module.RUN_CLOSE_BEFORE
+        + module.RESPONSES_SESSION_BEFORE
+        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_SIGNATURE_BEFORE
+        + "callback docstring and push helper\n"
+        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_BODY_BEFORE
+        + "tool start body\n"
+        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_END_BEFORE
+        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_CALL_BEFORE
+        + module.RUN_SWEEP_BEFORE
+        + "suffix\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    module.patch(source, destination)
+    patched = destination.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "X-Hermes-Parent-Session-Id" in patched
+    assert "parent_session_id=parent_session_id" in patched
+    assert "Parent session not found" in patched
+    assert "HERMES_API_DEFAULT_PARENT_MATCH_PREFIXES" in patched
+    assert "user_message.startswith(default_prefixes)" in patched
+    assert "session_parent_conflict" in patched
+    assert "X-Hermes-Conversation-Platform" in patched
+    assert "X-Hermes-Conversation-Title" in patched
+    assert 'conversation_platform != "telegram"' in patched
+    assert "db.record_gateway_session_peer(" in patched
+    assert 'display_name="Telegram"' in patched
+    assert "db.reopen_session(session_id)" in patched
+    assert 'db.end_session(session_id, f"api_run_{terminal_status}")' in patched
+    assert "def _record_run_activity(" in patched
+    assert '"_thinking": "Hermes is reasoning"' in patched
+    assert '"run.started": "Worker started"' in patched
+    assert '"run.completed": "Worker completed"' in patched
+    assert '"reasoning.available": "Hermes finished a reasoning step"' in patched
+    assert '"subagent.progress": "Nested worker progress"' in patched
+    assert "redact_sensitive_text" in patched
+    assert 'getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)' in patched
+    assert "os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)" in patched
+    assert "session_id=session_id" in patched
+    assert 'self._record_run_activity(session_id, "run.started")' in patched
+    assert "detail = tool_name if event_type in {" in patched
+    assert 'if event_type == "subagent.tool"' in patched
+    assert "_RUN_ACTIVITY_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = 15.0" in patched
+    assert "heartbeats.get(session_id, 0.0)" in patched
+    assert '"subagent.thinking",' in patched
+    assert "Stream retention and run lifetime are separate" in patched
+    assert 'terminal_status in {"completed", "failed", "cancelled"}' in patched
+    assert patched.index("terminal_status = self._run_statuses") < patched.index(
+        "self._active_run_tasks.pop(run_id, None)"
+    )
+
+
+def test_telegram_api_session_migration_is_bounded_and_idempotent(tmp_path: Path):
+    """Only named Telegram conversations receive presentation metadata."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "migrate_telegram_api_sessions.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "migrate_telegram_sessions", module_path
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    state = tmp_path / "state.db"
+    responses = tmp_path / "response_store.db"
+    with sqlite3.connect(state) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            """CREATE TABLE sessions (
+                id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, source TEXT, session_key TEXT, chat_type TEXT,
+                display_name TEXT, origin_json TEXT, title TEXT
+            )"""
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO sessions (id, source) VALUES (?, ?)",
+            (("telegram-session", "api_server"), ("other-session", "api_server")),
+        )
+    with sqlite3.connect(responses) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE conversations (name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, response_id TEXT NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE responses (response_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, data TEXT NOT NULL, accessed_at REAL NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO responses VALUES (?, ?, 0)",
+            (
+                ("telegram-response", json.dumps({"session_id": "telegram-session"})),
+                ("other-response", json.dumps({"session_id": "other-session"})),
+            ),
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO conversations VALUES (?, ?)",
+            (("telegram", "telegram-response"), ("unrelated", "other-response")),
+        )
+
+    assert module.migrate(state, responses) == 1
+    assert module.migrate(state, responses) == 0
+    with sqlite3.connect(state) as connection:
+        telegram = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT session_key, chat_type, display_name, origin_json, title "
+            "FROM sessions WHERE id = 'telegram-session'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        other = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT session_key, title FROM sessions WHERE id = 'other-session'"
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert telegram[:3] == ("telegram", "private", "Telegram")
+    assert json.loads(telegram[3]) == {
+        "platform": "telegram",
+        "session_key": "telegram",
+    }
+    assert telegram[4] == "Telegram · General"
+    assert other == (None, None)
+
+
+def test_web_session_activity_patch_projects_bounded_events(tmp_path: Path):
+    """The DOM transcript includes events without polluting agent history."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "patch_web_session_activity.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("patch_web_activity", module_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    source = tmp_path / "web_server.py"
+    destination = tmp_path / "patched.py"
+    source.write_text(
+        "prefix\n"
+        + module.LATEST_ROWS_BEFORE
+        + module.LATEST_SELECTION_BEFORE
+        + module.HELPER_MARKER
+        + "    db = object()\n"
+        + module.MESSAGES_BEFORE
+        + "suffix\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    module.patch(source, destination)
+    patched = destination.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "def _run_activity_messages(" in patched
+    assert 'root = get_hermes_home() / "run-activity"' in patched
+    assert "path.stat().st_size > 600_000" in patched
+    assert "entries[-1_000:]" in patched
+    assert "*_run_activity_messages(sid)" in patched
+    assert "messages.sort(" in patched
+    assert "limit: Optional[int] = None" in patched
+    assert "total_messages = len(messages)" in patched
+    assert "min(int(limit), 10_000)" in patched
+    assert '"total_messages": total_messages' in patched
+    assert "SELECT id, parent_session_id, started_at, ended_at" in patched
+    assert "newest still-open member of the lineage" in patched
+    assert "immediate objective parent" in patched
+    assert "mixes unrelated workstreams" in patched
+    assert "orphaned children" in patched
+    assert 'item[0].get("ended_at") is None' in patched
+
+
+def test_web_session_lineage_returns_to_resumed_parent():
+    """An ended reviewer must not strand the live view away from its parent."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "patch_web_session_activity.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("patch_web_lineage", module_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+
+    namespace: dict[str, object] = {}
+    exec(
+        "def select_active(sid, db, rows):\n" + module.LATEST_SELECTION_AFTER,
+        namespace,
+    )
+
+    class FakeDB:
+        def get_session(self, session_id):
+            return next((row for row in rows if row["id"] == session_id), None)
+
+    rows = [
+        {
+            "id": "umbrella",
+            "parent_session_id": None,
+            "started_at": 0.0,
+            "ended_at": None,
+        },
+        {
+            "id": "root",
+            "parent_session_id": "umbrella",
+            "started_at": 1.0,
+            "ended_at": None,
+        },
+        {
+            "id": "review-1",
+            "parent_session_id": "root",
+            "started_at": 2.0,
+            "ended_at": 3.0,
+        },
+        {
+            "id": "review-2",
+            "parent_session_id": "root",
+            "started_at": 4.0,
+            "ended_at": None,
+        },
+    ]
+    select_active = namespace["select_active"]
+
+    assert select_active("root", FakeDB(), rows) == (
+        "review-2",
+        ["root", "review-2"],
+    )
+    assert select_active("review-1", FakeDB(), rows) == (
+        "review-2",
+        ["root", "review-2"],
+    )
+    rows[2]["ended_at"] = 5.0
+    rows[3]["ended_at"] = 5.0
+    assert select_active("root", FakeDB(), rows) == ("root", ["root"])
+
+    rows[1]["ended_at"] = 9.0
+    rows.append(
+        {
+            "id": "orphaned-review",
+            "parent_session_id": "root",
+            "started_at": 6.0,
+            "ended_at": None,
+        }
+    )
+    rows.append(
+        {
+            "id": "accepted-review",
+            "parent_session_id": "root",
+            "started_at": 7.0,
+            "ended_at": 8.0,
+        }
+    )
+    assert select_active("review-1", FakeDB(), rows) == (
+        "accepted-review",
+        ["root", "accepted-review"],
+    )
+
+
+def test_api_activity_patch_coalesces_streaming_heartbeats(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+):
+    """Token callbacks stay bounded while every tool transition is retained."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "patch_api_server_sessions.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("patch_api_activity", module_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    activity_body = module.EVENT_CALLBACK_SIGNATURE_AFTER.split(
+        "    def _make_run_event_callback(", 1
+    )[0]
+    namespace: dict[str, object] = {}
+    exec(
+        "import hashlib, json, logging, os, time\n"
+        "from pathlib import Path\n"
+        "logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)\n"
+        "def redact_sensitive_text(value): return value\n"
+        "class ActivityRecorder:\n" + activity_body,
+        namespace,
+    )
+    recorder = namespace["ActivityRecorder"]()
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path))
+
+    recorder._record_run_activity("session", "_thinking")
+    recorder._record_run_activity("session", "reasoning.available")
+    recorder._record_run_activity("session", "subagent.thinking")
+    recorder._record_run_activity("session", "tool.started", tool_name="terminal")
+    recorder._record_run_activity("session", "tool.completed", tool_name="terminal")
+
+    journals = list((tmp_path / "run-activity").glob("*.jsonl"))
+    assert len(journals) == 1
+    entries = [json.loads(line) for line in journals[0].read_text().splitlines()]
+    assert [entry["activity_event"] for entry in entries] == [
+        "_thinking",
+        "tool.started",
+        "tool.completed",
+    ]
+
+
+def test_legacy_api_sessions_are_nested_idempotently(tmp_path: Path):
+    """Known standalone API workers move under Cassandra without data loss."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "migrate_api_session_lineage.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("migrate_api_sessions", module_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    database = tmp_path / "state.db"
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE sessions (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, source TEXT, "
+            "parent_session_id TEXT, title TEXT, transcript TEXT, archived INTEGER DEFAULT 0)"
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO sessions (id, source, parent_session_id, title, transcript) "
+            "VALUES (?, 'tui', NULL, 'Cassandra', 'parent-data')",
+            (module.LEGACY_CASSANDRA_PARENT,),
+        )
+        worker_id = next(iter(module.LEGACY_CASSANDRA_WORKERS))
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO sessions (id, source, parent_session_id, title, transcript) "
+            "VALUES (?, 'api_server', NULL, 'old', 'keep-me')",
+            (worker_id,),
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO sessions (id, source, parent_session_id, title, transcript) "
+            "VALUES (?, 'api_server', NULL, 'old smoke', 'keep-smoke')",
+            ((orphan_id,) for orphan_id in module.LEGACY_ORPHANED_SMOKE_SESSIONS),
+        )
+
+    assert module.migrate(database) == 1 + len(module.LEGACY_ORPHANED_SMOKE_SESSIONS)
+    assert module.migrate(database) == 0
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT parent_session_id, title, transcript FROM sessions WHERE id = ?",
+            (worker_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert row == (
+        module.LEGACY_CASSANDRA_PARENT,
+        module.LEGACY_CASSANDRA_WORKERS[worker_id],
+        "keep-me",
+    )
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        orphans = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT id, archived, title, transcript FROM sessions "
+            "WHERE id IN ({}) ORDER BY id".format(
+                ",".join("?" for _ in module.LEGACY_ORPHANED_SMOKE_SESSIONS)
+            ),
+            tuple(module.LEGACY_ORPHANED_SMOKE_SESSIONS),
+        ).fetchall()
+    assert orphans == sorted(
+        (
+            orphan_id,
+            1,
+            module.LEGACY_ORPHANED_SMOKE_SESSIONS[orphan_id],
+            "keep-smoke",
+        )
+        for orphan_id in module.LEGACY_ORPHANED_SMOKE_SESSIONS
+    )
+
+
+def test_automated_triage_sessions_are_grouped_without_touching_interactive_runs(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+):
+    """Only the stable Ariadne contract moves below the triage parent."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "migrate_api_session_lineage.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "migrate_triage_sessions", module_path
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    database = tmp_path / "state.db"
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE sessions (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, source TEXT, "
+            "parent_session_id TEXT, title TEXT, started_at REAL, archived INTEGER DEFAULT 0)"
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE messages (session_id TEXT, role TEXT, content TEXT)"
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO sessions (id, source, started_at) VALUES (?, 'api_server', ?)",
+            (("triage-run", 1.0), ("jenkins-run", 1.5), ("interactive-run", 2.0)),
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO messages (session_id, role, content) VALUES (?, 'user', ?)",
+            (
+                (
+                    "triage-run",
+                    module.TRIAGE_MESSAGE_PREFIXES[0]
+                    + " Fix for incident sonar/bstein_home/python:S2208/finding-key.",
+                ),
+                (
+                    "jenkins-run",
+                    module.TRIAGE_MESSAGE_PREFIXES[1]
+                    + "\nAnalyze incident soteria/291 for the Jenkins job soteria.",
+                ),
+                ("interactive-run", "Please explain this alert to me."),
+            ),
+        )
+
+    assert module.migrate(database, group_triage=True) == 2
+    assert module.migrate(database, group_triage=True) == 0
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        parent = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT title FROM sessions WHERE id = ?", (module.TRIAGE_PARENT,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        triage = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT parent_session_id, title FROM sessions WHERE id = 'triage-run'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        interactive = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT parent_session_id FROM sessions WHERE id = 'interactive-run'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        jenkins = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT parent_session_id, title FROM sessions WHERE id = 'jenkins-run'"
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert parent == (module.TRIAGE_PARENT_TITLE,)
+    assert triage == (
+        module.TRIAGE_PARENT,
+        "Sonar · bstein_home · python:S2208 · iage-run",
+    )
+    assert interactive == (None,)
+    assert jenkins == (
+        module.TRIAGE_PARENT,
+        "Sonar · soteria/291 · kins-run",
+    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_support.py

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+"""Shared paths and loaders for Hermes chat capability contracts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+HERMES = ROOT / "services" / "hermes"
+VAULT = ROOT / "services" / "vault"
+
+
+def _documents(path: Path) -> list[dict]:
+    return [doc for doc in yaml.safe_load_all(path.read_text()) if doc]
+
+
+def _load_broker_module(name: str, filename: str, monkeypatch):
+    """Load one broker with its mounted routing-catalog dependency."""
+    catalog_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "routing_catalog.py"
+    catalog_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "routing_catalog", catalog_path
+    )
+    assert catalog_spec and catalog_spec.loader
+    catalog = importlib.util.module_from_spec(catalog_spec)
+    catalog_spec.loader.exec_module(catalog)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "routing_catalog", catalog)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "httpx", SimpleNamespace())
+
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / filename
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, broker_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module

testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes_access.py

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+"""Network, OAuth, Kubernetes, and SSH access contracts for Hermes CLI lanes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_cli_lanes_support import (
+    FLUX_HERMES,
+    HERMES,
+    KEYCLOAK,
+    ROOT,
+    _agent_deployment,
+    _services,
+)
+
+
+def test_broker_services_survive_sibling_container_readiness_loss():
+    services = _services()
+
+    for name in (
+        "hermes-image-broker",
+        "hermes-codex-broker",
+        "hermes-local-image",
+        "hermes-claude-broker",
+    ):
+        assert services[name]["spec"]["publishNotReadyAddresses"] is True
+
+
+def test_agent_dashboard_reconnects_all_transient_websockets():
+    dockerfile = (HERMES.parents[1] / "dockerfiles/Dockerfile.hermes-agent").read_text(
+        encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    assert "eventsRetryAttempt.current" in dockerfile
+    assert "if (!unmounting) setVersion((v) => v + 1);" in dockerfile
+    assert "events feed rejected (${ev.code}) — reload the page" in dockerfile
+    assert 'url = await api.buildWsUrl("/api/pty", params);' in dockerfile
+    assert 'url = await buildWsUrl("/api/events", { channel });' in dockerfile
+    assert dockerfile.count("'        await api.getSessions(1, 0,") == 2
+    assert ".then(() => gw.connect())" in dockerfile
+    assert 'api.getSessions(1, 0, profile ?? "")' in dockerfile
+    assert "dashboard token rotated by a server restart" in dockerfile
+
+
+def test_agent_refreshes_routes_after_restoring_cli_logins():
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    init_containers = {
+        item["name"]: item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["initContainers"]
+    }
+    configure = init_containers["configure-agent-clients"]
+    command = configure["command"][-1]
+    assert "configure_agent_clients.py" in command
+    assert command.index("configure_agent_clients.py") < command.index(
+        "hermes_coordinator.py --once"
+    )
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in configure["env"]}
+    assert env["HERMES_AUTH_FILE"] == "/runtime-access/hermes-auth.json"
+    assert env["PYTHONPATH"] == "/opt/hermes"
+    for name in ("bootstrap-coordinator", "configure-agent-clients"):
+        route_env = {
+            item["name"]: item["value"] for item in init_containers[name]["env"]
+        }
+        assert route_env["CODEX_HOME"] == "/runtime-access/codex"
+        assert route_env["CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR"] == "/runtime-access/claude"
+        assert "/opt/data/tools/bin" in route_env["PATH"]
+
+    assert "patch-web-session-activity" in init_containers
+    web_patch = init_containers["patch-web-session-activity"]
+    assert "/opt/coordinator/patch_web_session_activity.py" in web_patch["command"]
+
+    containers = {
+        item["name"]: item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    steward_env = {
+        item["name"]: item["value"] for item in containers["model-steward"]["env"]
+    }
+    assert steward_env["CODEX_HOME"] == "/runtime-access/codex"
+    assert steward_env["CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR"] == "/runtime-access/claude"
+    assert "/opt/data/tools/bin" in steward_env["PATH"]
+    hermes_mounts = {
+        (item["name"], item["mountPath"], item.get("subPath"))
+        for item in containers["hermes"]["volumeMounts"]
+    }
+    assert (
+        "web-server-patch",
+        "/opt/hermes/hermes_cli/web_server.py",
+        "web_server.py",
+    ) in hermes_mounts
+
+
+def test_flux_health_checks_follow_the_owner_oauth_sidecar():
+    flux = yaml.safe_load(FLUX_HERMES.read_text())
+    checks = {(item["kind"], item["name"]) for item in flux["spec"]["healthChecks"]}
+    assert ("Deployment", "hermes-agent") in checks
+    assert ("DaemonSet", "hermes-node-ssh-access") in checks
+    assert ("Deployment", "oauth2-proxy-hermes-agent") not in checks
+
+
+def test_agent_auth_is_bstein_group_and_email_bounded():
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    oauth = next(
+        item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+        if item["name"] == "oauth2-proxy"
+    )
+    args = oauth["args"]
+    assert "--user-id-claim=sub" in args
+    assert "--oidc-groups-claim=groups" in args
+    assert "--allowed-group=/hermes-owner" in args
+    assert "--authenticated-emails-file=/etc/oauth2-proxy/allowed-emails" in args
+    script = (KEYCLOAK / "scripts/hermes_access_oidc_ensure.sh").read_text()
+    assert 'group_name="hermes-owner"' in script
+    assert "username=bstein&exact=true" in script
+    assert '"full.path":"true"' in script
+
+
+def test_agent_network_boundary_allows_only_authenticated_and_metrics_surfaces():
+    documents = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    ]
+    isolation = next(
+        item
+        for item in documents
+        if item.get("metadata", {}).get("name") == "hermes-agent-isolation"
+    )
+    assert isolation["spec"]["ingress"] == [
+        {
+            "from": [
+                {
+                    "namespaceSelector": {
+                        "matchLabels": {"kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "traefik"}
+                    },
+                    "podSelector": {
+                        "matchLabels": {"app.kubernetes.io/name": "traefik"}
+                    },
+                }
+            ],
+            "ports": [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 4180}],
+        },
+        {
+            "from": [{"podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "hermes-chat-tenant"}}}],
+            "ports": [
+                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9002},
+                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9003},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "from": [{"podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "hermes-switchyard"}}}],
+            "ports": [
+                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9003},
+                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9006},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "from": [
+                {
+                    "namespaceSelector": {
+                        "matchLabels": {"kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "monitoring"}
+                    },
+                    "podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "server"}},
+                }
+            ],
+            "ports": [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9010}],
+        },
+    ]
+    egress = isolation["spec"]["egress"]
+    assert any(
+        rule.get("ports") == [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9081}] for rule in egress
+    )
+    assert "hermes-scm" in yaml.safe_dump(egress)
+    assert "gitea" in yaml.safe_dump(egress)
+    assert egress != [{}]
+
+
+def test_owner_agent_has_scoped_read_only_kubernetes_context():
+    config = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-kubeconfig.yaml").read_text())
+    assert config["current-context"] == "atlas-observer"
+    assert config["contexts"][0]["context"]["namespace"] == "default"
+    rbac_path = ROOT / "services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml"
+    documents = [item for item in yaml.safe_load_all(rbac_path.read_text()) if item]
+    binding = next(item for item in documents if item["kind"] == "ClusterRoleBinding")
+    assert binding["roleRef"] == {
+        "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
+        "kind": "ClusterRole",
+        "name": "hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2",
+    }
+    assert binding["subjects"] == [
+        {"kind": "ServiceAccount", "name": "hermes-agent", "namespace": "hermes"}
+    ]
+
+
+def test_owner_agent_has_pinned_dedicated_node_ssh_access():
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    annotations = deployment["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"]
+    assert (
+        annotations["vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-private-key"]
+        == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"
+    )
+    assert (
+        annotations["vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-config"]
+        == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"
+    )
+    assert (
+        annotations["vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-known-hosts"]
+        == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"
+    )
+
+    init = next(
+        item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["initContainers"]
+        if item["name"] == "init-config"
+    )
+    command = init["command"][2]
+    assert "ln -s /runtime-access/node-ssh-config /opt/data/home/.ssh/config" in command
+    assert (
+        "ln -s /runtime-access/node-ssh-known-hosts /opt/data/home/.ssh/known_hosts"
+        in command
+    )
+    assert "ln -s home/.ssh /opt/data/.ssh" in command
+    assert "chmod 0700 /opt/data/home/.ssh" in command
+    assert (
+        "ln -s /runtime-access/node-ssh-private-key "
+        "/opt/data/home/.ssh/id_ed25519_atlas_nodes"
+    ) in command
+
+    config = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml").read_text())["data"]
+    assert "ssh_config" not in config
+    assert "ssh_known_hosts" not in config
+    assert "ssh-ed25519" not in (HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml").read_text()
+
+    resources = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "kustomization.yaml").read_text())["resources"]
+    assert "node-ssh-access.yaml" in resources
+    access = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "node-ssh-access.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    ]
+    service_account = next(item for item in access if item["kind"] == "ServiceAccount")
+    assert service_account["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access"
+    provider = next(item for item in access if item["kind"] == "SecretProviderClass")
+    assert provider["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access"
+    assert provider["spec"]["provider"] == "vault"
+    parameters = provider["spec"]["parameters"]
+    assert parameters["roleName"] == "hermes-node-ssh"
+    assert 'secretPath: "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"' in parameters["objects"]
+    assert 'secretKey: "public_key"' in parameters["objects"]
+    daemonset = next(item for item in access if item["kind"] == "DaemonSet")
+    pod = daemonset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    assert pod["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access"
+    assert pod["automountServiceAccountToken"] is True
+    host_home = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "host-home")
+    assert host_home["hostPath"] == {"path": "/home", "type": "Directory"}
+    vault_secrets = next(
+        item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "vault-secrets"
+    )
+    assert vault_secrets["csi"]["driver"] == "secrets-store.csi.k8s.io"
+    assert vault_secrets["csi"]["volumeAttributes"] == {
+        "secretProviderClass": "hermes-node-ssh-access"
+    }
+    reconciler = pod["containers"][0]["args"][0]
+    assert "/opt/node-hardener/node_account_hardening.py" in reconciler
+    assert "--public-key-file /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key" in reconciler
+    assert "sleep 300" in reconciler
+    host_etc = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "host-etc")
+    assert host_etc["hostPath"] == {"path": "/etc", "type": "Directory"}
+    hardener = (HERMES / "scripts/node_account_hardening.py").read_text()
+    assert 'ACCOUNT = "hermes-agent"' in hardener
+    assert 'LEGACY_ACCOUNTS = ("atlas", "oceanus")' in hardener
+    assert "ACCOUNT_UID = 1200" in hardener
+    assert "ACCOUNT_GID = 1200" in hardener
+
+
+def test_owner_agent_tracks_no_ssh_identity_or_host_key_material():
+    """Vault references may be tracked; SSH identities and trust data may not."""
+    forbidden = (
+        "BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY",
+        "ssh-ed25519 AAAA",
+        "ssh-rsa AAAA",
+        "IdentityFile ",
+        "UserKnownHostsFile ",
+        "StrictHostKeyChecking ",
+        "ssh_config:",
+        "ssh_known_hosts:",
+    )
+    text_suffixes = {
+        ".conf",
+        ".json",
+        ".md",
+        ".py",
+        ".sh",
+        ".toml",
+        ".yaml",
+        ".yml",
+    }
+    tracked = "\n".join(
+        path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for path in HERMES.rglob("*")
+        if path.is_file() and path.suffix in text_suffixes
+    )
+    for marker in forbidden:
+        assert marker not in tracked
+
+
+def test_switchyard_has_a_dedicated_non_owner_identity_and_read_only_catalog():
+    """Routing must not inherit the owner agent's cluster-admin capability."""
+    service_accounts = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (HERMES / "vault-serviceaccount.yaml").read_text()
+        )
+        if item
+    ]
+    assert any(
+        item["kind"] == "ServiceAccount"
+        and item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-switchyard"
+        for item in service_accounts
+    )
+
+    switchyard = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml").read_text())
+    switchyard_pod = switchyard["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    assert switchyard_pod["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-switchyard"
+    agent_pod = _agent_deployment()["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    for pod, container_name in (
+        (switchyard_pod, "worker-route-broker"),
+        (agent_pod, "claude-broker"),
+    ):
+        container = next(
+            item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == container_name
+        )
+        catalog = next(
+            item
+            for item in container["volumeMounts"]
+            if item["mountPath"] == "/routing-catalog"
+        )
+        assert catalog["readOnly"] is True
+
+    rbac = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (ROOT / "services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml").read_text()
+        )
+        if item
+    ]
+    binding = next(item for item in rbac if item["kind"] == "ClusterRoleBinding")
+    assert binding["subjects"] == [
+        {"kind": "ServiceAccount", "name": "hermes-agent", "namespace": "hermes"}
+    ]
+
+
+def test_switchyard_active_state_uses_a_relocatable_rwx_claim():
+    """A stale node attachment must not strand the routing authority."""
+    claims = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "switchyard-pvc.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    ]
+    active_claim = next(
+        item
+        for item in claims
+        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-switchyard-state-rwx"
+    )
+    assert active_claim["spec"]["accessModes"] == ["ReadWriteMany"]
+
+    deployment = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml").read_text())
+    strategy = deployment["spec"]["strategy"]
+    assert strategy == {
+        "type": "RollingUpdate",
+        "rollingUpdate": {"maxSurge": 1, "maxUnavailable": 0},
+    }
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    state = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "state")
+    assert (
+        state["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == active_claim["metadata"]["name"]
+    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes_configuration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+"""Agent configuration and dashboard contracts for Hermes CLI lanes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sys
+from contextlib import nullcontext
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_cli_lanes_support import (
+    HERMES,
+    _agent_deployment,
+    client_config,
+    lanes,
+    migration,
+    policy,
+)
+
+
+def test_workspace_preparation_failure_durably_blocks_the_claim(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    task = SimpleNamespace(id="t_bad_worktree", current_run_id=7, assignee="cli-auto")
+    calls = []
+
+    class Connection:
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=lambda board: Connection(),
+        get_task=lambda _conn, _task_id: task,
+        worker_log_path=lambda _task_id, board: tmp_path / "worker.log",
+        _resolve_worktree_workspace=lambda _task, board: (_ for _ in ()).throw(
+            ValueError("not a Git repository")
+        ),
+        block_task=lambda *_args, **kwargs: calls.append(kwargs),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", SimpleNamespace(kanban_db=fake_db))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes, "state_path", lambda _board, _task_id: tmp_path / "state.json"
+    )
+
+    lanes.execute_claim("cassandra", "t_bad_worktree")
+
+    assert calls[0]["kind"] == "capability"
+    assert calls[0]["expected_run_id"] == 7
+    assert "not a Git repository" in calls[0]["reason"]
+
+
+def test_artifacts_cannot_escape_the_task_worktree(tmp_path: Path):
+    workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    inside = workspace / "report.json"
+    outside = tmp_path / "auth.json"
+    inside.write_text("{}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    outside.write_text("secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert lanes.workspace_artifacts(
+        workspace,
+        ["report.json", str(outside), "missing.json"],
+    ) == [str(inside)]
+
+
+def test_restart_provider_change_includes_explicit_workspace_handoff(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    task = SimpleNamespace(
+        id="t_resume",
+        current_run_id=9,
+        assignee="cli-auto",
+        max_runtime_seconds=60,
+    )
+    state_file = tmp_path / "state.json"
+    state_file.write_text(
+        json.dumps({"current_route": {"provider": "claude"}}),
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (tmp_path / "worker.log").write_text("prior provider evidence", encoding="utf-8")
+    prompts = []
+
+    class Connection:
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=lambda board: Connection(),
+        get_task=lambda _conn, _task_id: task,
+        worker_log_path=lambda _task_id, board: tmp_path / "worker.log",
+        _resolve_worktree_workspace=lambda _task, board: (tmp_path, "wt/t_resume"),
+        set_branch_name=lambda *_args: None,
+        set_workspace_path=lambda *_args: None,
+        build_worker_context=lambda *_args: "resume objective",
+        add_comment=lambda *_args: None,
+        complete_task=lambda *_args, **_kwargs: None,
+        block_task=lambda *_args, **_kwargs: None,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", SimpleNamespace(kanban_db=fake_db))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(lanes, "state_path", lambda _board, _task_id: state_file)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes,
+        "select_route",
+        lambda *_args, **_kwargs: lanes.Route(
+            "codex", "gpt-5.6-sol", "high", "codex-high", "jetson", "vote", 1, ()
+        ),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes,
+        "git_handoff",
+        lambda _workspace, output: f"HANDOFF:{output}",
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes,
+        "run_provider",
+        lambda _route, prompt, *_args, **_kwargs: (
+            prompts.append(prompt)
+            or lanes.ProcessResult(
+                0,
+                "",
+                {
+                    "status": "completed",
+                    "summary": "done",
+                    "changed_files": [],
+                    "tests_run": [],
+                    "artifacts": [],
+                    "blockers": [],
+                },
+                False,
+            )
+        ),
+    )
+
+    lanes.execute_claim("cassandra", "t_resume")
+
+    assert "HANDOFF:prior provider evidence" in prompts[0]
+
+
+def test_provider_commands_are_structured_unattended_and_capped(tmp_path: Path):
+    route = lanes.Route(
+        "codex", "gpt-5.6-sol", "xhigh", "codex-xhigh", "jetson", "vote", 1, ()
+    )
+    command = lanes._codex_command(
+        route, "Work.", tmp_path, {}, tmp_path / "result.json"
+    )
+    assert "--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox" in command
+    assert "--json" in command
+    assert "--output-schema" in command
+    assert 'model_reasoning_effort="xhigh"' in command
+
+    claude_state = {"claude_session_id": "13864642-2985-4f91-bef5-53f145f878e8"}
+    claude = lanes._claude_command(
+        lanes.Route(
+            "claude", "claude-opus-5", "xhigh", "claude-xhigh", "jetson", "vote", 1, ()
+        ),
+        "Review.",
+        claude_state,
+        False,
+    )
+    assert "--dangerously-skip-permissions" in claude
+    assert "--output-format" in claude and "stream-json" in claude
+    assert "--json-schema" in claude
+    assert "--disallowedTools" in claude
+    assert "Bash(kubectl apply *)" not in claude
+    assert "Bash(flux reconcile *)" not in claude
+    assert "max" not in claude
+
+
+def test_worker_contract_separates_review_findings_from_task_blockers(tmp_path: Path):
+    prompt = lanes.build_prompt("Review the change.", tmp_path)
+
+    assert "put defects and risks in findings" in prompt
+    assert "blockers array must be empty whenever status is completed" in prompt
+    assert "findings" in lanes.RESULT_SCHEMA["properties"]
+    assert set(lanes.RESULT_SCHEMA["required"]) == set(
+        lanes.RESULT_SCHEMA["properties"]
+    )
+    assert (
+        "assigned task itself"
+        in lanes.RESULT_SCHEMA["properties"]["blockers"]["description"]
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "command",
+    [
+        "git push --force origin main",
+        "git reset --hard HEAD~1",
+        "git clean -fd",
+    ],
+)
+def test_claude_pretool_hook_blocks_hard_denies(command: str):
+    assert policy.denial_reason(command)
+
+
+def test_claude_pretool_hook_allows_normal_engineering():
+    assert policy.denial_reason("pytest -q testing/tests") is None
+    assert policy.denial_reason("git push origin feature/hermes") is None
+    assert policy.denial_reason("kubectl delete pod -n cassandra stuck-worker") is None
+    assert policy.denial_reason("flux reconcile kustomization hermes") is None
+    assert policy.denial_reason("vault kv get kv/atlas/hermes") is None
+
+
+def test_claude_settings_preserve_state_and_install_three_guardrail_layers(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+):
+    state = tmp_path / ".claude.json"
+    settings = tmp_path / "settings.json"
+    state.write_text('{"promptQueueUseCount": 4}\n', encoding="utf-8")
+    settings.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "theme": "dark",
+                "permissions": {
+                    "deny": [
+                        "Bash(kubectl apply *)",
+                        "Bash(flux reconcile *)",
+                        "Bash(vault kv *)",
+                        "Bash(custom-owner-rule *)",
+                    ]
+                },
+            }
+        )
+        + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    client_config.configure_claude_state(state)
+    client_config.configure_claude_settings(settings)
+
+    state_value = json.loads(state.read_text())
+    settings_value = json.loads(settings.read_text())
+    assert state_value["promptQueueUseCount"] == 4
+    assert state_value["bypassPermissionsModeAccepted"] is True
+    assert settings_value["theme"] == "dark"
+    assert "Bash(git reset --hard *)" in settings_value["permissions"]["deny"]
+    assert "Bash(custom-owner-rule *)" in settings_value["permissions"]["deny"]
+    assert "Bash(kubectl apply *)" not in settings_value["permissions"]["deny"]
+    assert "Bash(flux reconcile *)" not in settings_value["permissions"]["deny"]
+    assert "Bash(vault kv *)" not in settings_value["permissions"]["deny"]
+    hook = settings_value["hooks"]["PreToolUse"][0]["hooks"][0]
+    assert "claude_command_policy.py" in hook["command"]
+
+
+def test_legacy_state_is_archived_without_removing_provider_transcripts(tmp_path: Path):
+    session = tmp_path / "home/.config/herdr/session.json"
+    session.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    session.write_text(
+        '{"agents":[{"agent":"claude","session_id":"abc"}]}', encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    binary = tmp_path / "tools/bin/herdr"
+    binary.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    binary.write_text("legacy", encoding="utf-8")
+    (tmp_path / "home/.claude").mkdir()
+    (tmp_path / "home/.codex").mkdir()
+
+    archive = migration.archive_legacy_state(tmp_path)
+
+    value = json.loads(archive.read_text())
+    assert value["legacy_session"]["agents"][0]["session_id"] == "abc"
+    assert (tmp_path / "home/.claude").is_dir()
+    assert (tmp_path / "home/.codex").is_dir()
+    assert not binary.exists()
+    assert not (tmp_path / "home/.config/herdr").exists()
+
+
+def test_agent_uses_one_native_kanban_control_plane():
+    configmap = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml").read_text())
+    config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["config.yaml"])
+    assert config["model"] == {
+        "provider": "atlas-switchyard",
+        "default": "atlas/auto/balanced",
+        "model": "atlas/auto/balanced",
+    }
+    assert config["kanban"]["dispatch_in_gateway"] is True
+    assert config["kanban"]["default_assignee"] == "cli-auto"
+    assert config["plugins"]["enabled"] == ["auto-router"]
+
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    assert pod["enableServiceLinks"] is False
+    names = {item["name"] for item in pod["containers"]}
+    assert "cli-lane-runner" in names
+    assert "terminal" in names
+    assert not any("herdr" in name for name in names)
+    rendered = (HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml").read_text()
+    assert "herdr server" not in rendered
+    assert "herdr-dispatch" not in rendered
+
+
+def test_cli_lane_reserves_cpu_headroom_for_ui_and_auth():
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    containers = {
+        item["name"]: item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    lane = containers["cli-lane-runner"]
+    environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in lane["env"]}
+
+    assert environment["HERMES_CLI_LANE_CONCURRENCY"] == "2"
+    assert lane["resources"] == {
+        "requests": {"cpu": "100m", "memory": "256Mi"},
+        "limits": {"cpu": "2", "memory": "6Gi"},
+    }
+
+
+def test_agent_avoids_unhealthy_nodes_and_fits_its_remaining_capacity():
+    """Placement correction: keep the agent off nodes that cannot hold it.
+
+    titan-04 is cordoned after repeated kernel undervoltage and kubelet
+    failure, and titan-19 was probe/Longhorn unstable under worker load, so
+    both must join the existing hard exclusions. That leaves titan-05 as the
+    healthy candidate, which is tight enough on requested CPU that the main
+    container has to give back 50m to schedule there.
+    """
+    pod = _agent_deployment()["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    hostnames = next(
+        item
+        for item in pod["affinity"]["nodeAffinity"][
+            "requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution"
+        ]["nodeSelectorTerms"][0]["matchExpressions"]
+        if item["key"] == "kubernetes.io/hostname"
+    )
+
+    assert hostnames["operator"] == "NotIn"
+    assert set(hostnames["values"]) >= {"titan-04", "titan-19"}
+
+    hermes = next(item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == "hermes")
+    assert hermes["resources"]["requests"]["cpu"] == "300m"
+
+
+def test_agent_root_is_stock_dashboard_and_terminal_is_a_separate_path():
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    containers = {item["name"]: item for item in pod["containers"]}
+    assert "webui" not in containers
+
+    assert "dashboard" not in containers
+    hermes = containers["hermes"]
+    hermes_env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in hermes["env"]}
+    assert hermes_env["HERMES_STREAM_STALE_TIMEOUT"] == "600"
+    assert hermes_env["HERMES_API_CALL_STALE_TIMEOUT"] == "600"
+    assert hermes["command"] == ["/bin/sh", "-ec"]
+    startup = hermes["args"][0]
+    assert ". /opt/data/.env" in startup
+    assert "exec /init /opt/hermes/docker/main-wrapper.sh gateway run" in startup
+    hermes_env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in hermes["env"]}
+    assert hermes_env["HERMES_DASHBOARD"] == "1"
+    assert hermes_env["HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST"] == "127.0.0.1"
+    assert hermes_env["HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORT"] == "9119"
+    assert hermes_env["HERMES_TUI_AGENT_INIT_TIMEOUT_S"] == "180"
+    assert hermes["securityContext"]["runAsUser"] == 0
+    assert hermes["securityContext"]["runAsGroup"] == 0
+    for probe_name in ("startupProbe", "readinessProbe", "livenessProbe"):
+        probe = hermes[probe_name]
+        assert probe["exec"]["command"] == [
+            "curl",
+            "-fsS",
+            "http://127.0.0.1:9119/api/status",
+        ]
+
+    terminal = containers["terminal"]
+    command = terminal["args"][0]
+    assert "--base-path /terminal" in command
+    assert "--check-origin" not in command
+    assert "/usr/bin/tmux new-session -A" in command
+    assert "--continue" in command
+    assert "--yolo" in command
+    terminal_env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in terminal["env"]}
+    assert terminal_env["HERMES_TUI_AGENT_INIT_TIMEOUT_S"] == "180"
+
+    claude_broker = containers["claude-broker"]
+    claude_env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in claude_broker["env"]}
+    assert claude_env["HERMES_CLAUDE_BROKER_CONCURRENCY"] == "2"
+    assert claude_broker["readinessProbe"]["tcpSocket"] == {"port": "claude-broker"}
+    assert claude_broker["livenessProbe"]["tcpSocket"] == {"port": "claude-broker"}
+
+    args = containers["oauth2-proxy"]["args"]
+    terminal_upstream = "--upstream=http://127.0.0.1:7681/terminal/"
+    dashboard_upstream = "--upstream=http://127.0.0.1:9119/"
+    assert terminal_upstream in args
+    assert dashboard_upstream in args
+    assert args.index(terminal_upstream) < args.index(dashboard_upstream)
+    assert "--pass-host-header=false" in args
+    assert "--cookie-refresh=19m" in args
+    assert "--session-store-type=redis" in args
+    assert any(
+        arg.startswith("--redis-connection-url=redis://hermes-oauth-sessions.")
+        for arg in args
+    )
+
+    patch_init = next(
+        item for item in pod["initContainers"] if item["name"] == "patch-tui-gateway"
+    )
+    assert patch_init["command"][-1] == "/patched/server.py"
+    for name in ("hermes", "terminal"):
+        mounts = containers[name]["volumeMounts"]
+        assert {
+            "name": "tui-gateway-patch",
+            "mountPath": "/opt/hermes/tui_gateway/server.py",
+            "subPath": "server.py",
+        } in mounts
+
+    ingress_documents = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "agent-ingress.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    ]
+    middlewares = {
+        item["metadata"]["name"]: item
+        for item in ingress_documents
+        if item["kind"] == "Middleware"
+    }
+    assert middlewares["hermes-agent-terminal-slash"]["spec"]["redirectRegex"][
+        "replacement"
+    ].endswith("/terminal/")
+    assert (
+        middlewares["hermes-agent-stock-dashboard-headers"]["spec"]["headers"][
+            "customRequestHeaders"
+        ]["Origin"]
+        == "http://127.0.0.1:9119"
+    )
+    ingresses = {
+        item["metadata"]["name"]: item
+        for item in ingress_documents
+        if item["kind"] == "Ingress"
+    }
+    assert (
+        ingresses["hermes-agent-dashboard"]["metadata"]["annotations"][
+            "traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares"
+        ]
+        == "hermes-hermes-agent-stock-dashboard-headers@kubernetescrd"
+    )
+    assert (
+        ingresses["hermes-agent-terminal"]["metadata"]["annotations"][
+            "traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares"
+        ]
+        == "hermes-hermes-agent-terminal-slash@kubernetescrd"
+    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes_kanban.py

@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+"""Kanban claim and lifecycle contracts for Hermes CLI lanes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sys
+from contextlib import nullcontext
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_cli_lanes_support import (
+    lanes,
+)
+
+
+def test_unassigned_ready_task_is_persistently_routed_to_auto_lane(monkeypatch):
+    task = SimpleNamespace(id="t_auto", assignee=None, status="ready")
+    assigned = []
+
+    class Connection:
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    def assign_task(_conn, task_id, profile):
+        assigned.append((task_id, profile))
+        task.assignee = profile
+        return True
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        list_boards=lambda include_archived=False: [{"slug": "cassandra"}],
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=lambda board: Connection(),
+        recompute_ready=lambda _conn: None,
+        list_tasks=lambda _conn: [task],
+        assign_task=assign_task,
+        get_task=lambda _conn, _task_id: task,
+        claim_task=lambda _conn, _task_id, **_kwargs: task,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", SimpleNamespace(kanban_db=fake_db))
+
+    assert lanes.claim_ready(set(), 1) == [("cassandra", "t_auto")]
+    assert assigned == [("t_auto", "cli-auto")]
+
+
+def test_corrupt_board_is_quarantined_without_stopping_healthy_lanes(
+    monkeypatch, capsys
+):
+    class CorruptBoardError(Exception):
+        pass
+
+    task = SimpleNamespace(id="t_healthy", assignee="cli-auto", status="ready")
+
+    class Connection:
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    def connect(*, board):
+        if board == "cassandra":
+            raise CorruptBoardError("integrity_check failed")
+        return Connection()
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        KanbanDbCorruptError=CorruptBoardError,
+        list_boards=lambda include_archived=False: [
+            {"slug": "cassandra"},
+            {"slug": "healthy"},
+        ],
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=connect,
+        recompute_ready=lambda _conn: None,
+        list_tasks=lambda _conn: [task],
+        claim_task=lambda _conn, _task_id, **_kwargs: task,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", SimpleNamespace(kanban_db=fake_db))
+    lanes.BOARD_CORRUPTION_ERRORS.clear()
+
+    assert lanes.claim_ready(set(), 1) == [("healthy", "t_healthy")]
+    assert "temporarily skipping Kanban board 'cassandra'" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_transient_board_scan_failure_does_not_stop_healthy_lanes(monkeypatch, capsys):
+    task = SimpleNamespace(id="t_healthy", assignee="cli-auto", status="ready")
+
+    class Connection:
+        def __init__(self, board):
+            self.board = board
+
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    def recompute_ready(connection):
+        if connection.board == "cassandra":
+            raise lanes.sqlite3.OperationalError("disk I/O error")
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        list_boards=lambda include_archived=False: [
+            {"slug": "cassandra"},
+            {"slug": "healthy"},
+        ],
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=lambda board: Connection(board),
+        recompute_ready=recompute_ready,
+        list_tasks=lambda _conn: [task],
+        claim_task=lambda _conn, _task_id, **_kwargs: task,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", SimpleNamespace(kanban_db=fake_db))
+    lanes.BOARD_CORRUPTION_ERRORS.clear()
+
+    assert lanes.claim_ready(set(), 1) == [("healthy", "t_healthy")]
+    error = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert "temporarily skipping Kanban board 'cassandra'" in error
+    assert "storage OperationalError: disk I/O error" in error
+
+
+def test_board_call_retries_storage_faults_on_fresh_connections():
+    connections = []
+
+    class Connection:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.closed = False
+
+        def close(self):
+            self.closed = True
+
+    def connect(*, board):
+        assert board == "cassandra"
+        connection = Connection()
+        connections.append(connection)
+        return connection
+
+    attempts = []
+
+    def operation(_connection):
+        attempts.append(1)
+        if len(attempts) < 3:
+            raise lanes.sqlite3.OperationalError("disk I/O error")
+        return "healthy"
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=connect,
+    )
+    lanes.BOARD_CORRUPTION_ERRORS.clear()
+
+    assert lanes._board_call(fake_db, "cassandra", operation) == "healthy"
+    assert len(connections) == 3
+    assert all(connection.closed for connection in connections)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("result", "expected_action"),
+    [
+        (lanes.ProcessResult(0, "plain text only", None, False), "block"),
+        (
+            lanes.ProcessResult(
+                0,
+                "",
+                {
+                    "status": "completed",
+                    "summary": "done",
+                    "changed_files": ["src/a.py"],
+                    "tests_run": ["pytest -q"],
+                    "artifacts": ["reports/result.json"],
+                    "blockers": [],
+                },
+                False,
+            ),
+            "complete",
+        ),
+        (
+            lanes.ProcessResult(
+                0,
+                "",
+                {
+                    "status": "completed",
+                    "summary": "The full test suite is still running.",
+                    "changed_files": ["src/a.py"],
+                    "tests_run": ["pytest -q — in progress"],
+                    "artifacts": [],
+                    "blockers": [],
+                },
+                False,
+            ),
+            "block",
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_claim_requires_structured_evidence_and_surfaces_artifacts(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    monkeypatch,
+    result,
+    expected_action,
+):
+    task = SimpleNamespace(
+        id="t_worker",
+        current_run_id=4,
+        assignee="cli-auto",
+        max_runtime_seconds=60,
+    )
+    calls = []
+    heartbeats = []
+    connections = []
+    artifact = tmp_path / "reports/result.json"
+    artifact.parent.mkdir()
+    artifact.write_text("{}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    class Connection:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.closed = False
+
+        def close(self):
+            self.closed = True
+
+    def connect(*, board):
+        assert board == "cassandra"
+        connection = Connection()
+        connections.append(connection)
+        return connection
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=connect,
+        get_task=lambda _conn, _task_id: task,
+        worker_log_path=lambda _task_id, board: tmp_path / "worker.log",
+        _resolve_worktree_workspace=lambda _task, board: (tmp_path, "wt/t_worker"),
+        set_branch_name=lambda *_args: None,
+        set_workspace_path=lambda *_args: None,
+        build_worker_context=lambda *_args: "bounded objective",
+        heartbeat_worker=lambda _conn, _task_id, *, note, expected_run_id: (
+            heartbeats.append((note, expected_run_id)) or True
+        ),
+        add_comment=lambda *_args: None,
+        complete_task=lambda *_args, **kwargs: calls.append(("complete", kwargs)),
+        block_task=lambda *_args, **kwargs: calls.append(("block", kwargs)),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", SimpleNamespace(kanban_db=fake_db))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes, "state_path", lambda _board, _task_id: tmp_path / "state.json"
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes,
+        "select_route",
+        lambda *_args, **_kwargs: lanes.Route(
+            "codex", "gpt-5.6-sol", "high", "codex-high", "jetson", "vote", 1, ()
+        ),
+    )
+
+    def run_provider(*args, **_kwargs):
+        assert connections[0].closed
+        before_heartbeat = len(connections)
+        assert args[6]("working") is True
+        assert len(connections) == before_heartbeat + 1
+        assert connections[-1].closed
+        return result
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(lanes, "run_provider", run_provider)
+
+    lanes.execute_claim("cassandra", "t_worker")
+
+    assert calls[0][0] == expected_action
+    assert heartbeats == [("working", 4)]
+    if expected_action == "complete":
+        assert calls[0][1]["metadata"]["artifacts"] == [str(artifact)]
+        assert calls[0][1]["metadata"]["tests_run"] == ["pytest -q"]
+    else:
+        assert calls[0][1]["kind"] == "capability"
+    assert all(connection.closed for connection in connections)
+
+
+def test_goal_card_continues_after_local_judge_rejects_progress(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    monkeypatch,
+):
+    task = SimpleNamespace(
+        id="t_goal",
+        current_run_id=12,
+        assignee="cli-auto",
+        max_runtime_seconds=300,
+        goal_mode=True,
+        goal_max_turns=3,
+    )
+    calls = []
+    comments = []
+
+    class Connection:
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    fake_db = SimpleNamespace(
+        scoped_current_board=lambda _board: nullcontext(),
+        connect=lambda board: Connection(),
+        get_task=lambda _conn, _task_id: task,
+        worker_log_path=lambda _task_id, board: tmp_path / "worker.log",
+        _resolve_worktree_workspace=lambda _task, board: (tmp_path, "wt/t_goal"),
+        set_branch_name=lambda *_args: None,
+        set_workspace_path=lambda *_args: None,
+        build_worker_context=lambda *_args: "Run tests, commit, push, and verify remote HEAD.",
+        heartbeat_worker=lambda *_args, **_kwargs: True,
+        add_comment=lambda _conn, _task_id, _author, body: comments.append(body),
+        complete_task=lambda *_args, **kwargs: calls.append(("complete", kwargs)),
+        block_task=lambda *_args, **kwargs: calls.append(("block", kwargs)),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", SimpleNamespace(kanban_db=fake_db))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes,
+        "state_path",
+        lambda _board, _task_id: tmp_path / "state.json",
+    )
+    claude_low = lanes.Route(
+        "claude", "claude-fable-5", "low", "claude-low", "jetson", "vote", 1, ()
+    )
+    codex_low = lanes.Route(
+        "codex", "gpt-5.6-luna", "low", "codex-low", "manual", "fallback", 1, ()
+    )
+    codex_xhigh = lanes.Route(
+        "codex", "gpt-5.6-sol", "xhigh", "codex-xhigh", "jetson", "escalated", 1, ()
+    )
+    route_calls = []
+
+    def select_route(_prompt, assignee, **kwargs):
+        route_calls.append((assignee, kwargs))
+        if assignee == "cli-codex-low":
+            return codex_low
+        if len(route_calls) == 1:
+            return claude_low
+        return codex_xhigh
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(lanes, "select_route", select_route)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(lanes, "fresh_unavailable_provider", lambda: None)
+    reports = [
+        lanes.ProcessResult(1, "authentication expired", None, True),
+        lanes.ProcessResult(
+            0,
+            "first turn",
+            {
+                "status": "completed",
+                "summary": "Focused tests passed.",
+                "changed_files": ["src/a.py"],
+                "tests_run": ["pytest focused: passed"],
+                "artifacts": [],
+                "blockers": [],
+            },
+            False,
+        ),
+        lanes.ProcessResult(
+            0,
+            "second turn",
+            {
+                "status": "completed",
+                "summary": "Full tests passed; commit pushed and remote HEAD verified.",
+                "changed_files": ["src/a.py"],
+                "tests_run": ["pytest full: passed"],
+                "artifacts": [],
+                "blockers": [],
+            },
+            False,
+        ),
+    ]
+    monkeypatch.setattr(lanes, "run_provider", lambda *_args, **_kwargs: reports.pop(0))
+    verdicts = iter(
+        [
+            (False, "commit, push, and remote verification are missing"),
+            (True, "all explicit acceptance criteria have evidence"),
+        ]
+    )
+    judge_contexts = []
+
+    def judge_goal_completion(objective, *_args, **_kwargs):
+        judge_contexts.append(objective)
+        return next(verdicts)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        lanes.cli_lane_goal,
+        "judge_goal_completion",
+        judge_goal_completion,
+    )
+
+    lanes.execute_claim("cassandra", "t_goal")
+
+    assert calls[0][0] == "complete"
+    assert calls[0][1]["metadata"]["goal_turn"] == 2
+    assert any(
+        "Goal completion rejected; continuing turn 2/3" in item for item in comments
+    )
+    assert any(
+        "Goal route 2/3: codex/gpt-5.6-sol at xhigh" in item for item in comments
+    )
+    assert route_calls[2][1]["exclude_provider"] == "claude"
+    assert "prior rejected reports" in judge_contexts[1]
+    assert "commit, push, and remote verification are missing" in judge_contexts[1]
+    assert reports == []

testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes_support.py

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""Shared loaders and manifest helpers for Hermes CLI-lane contracts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+SCRIPTS = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+HERMES = ROOT / "services/hermes"
+KEYCLOAK = ROOT / "services/keycloak"
+FLUX_HERMES = ROOT / "clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes/kustomization.yaml"
+
+
+def _load(name: str):
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, SCRIPTS / f"{name}.py")
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+lanes = _load("cli_lane_runner")
+policy = _load("claude_command_policy")
+migration = _load("migrate_herdr_state")
+auth_patch = _load("patch_hermes_auth")
+tui_gateway_patch = _load("patch_tui_gateway")
+codex_runtime_patch = _load("patch_codex_runtime")
+ttyd_patch = _load("patch_ttyd_index")
+client_config = _load("configure_agent_clients")
+
+
+def _agent_deployment() -> dict:
+    return yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml").read_text())
+
+
+def _services() -> dict[str, dict]:
+    return {
+        item["metadata"]["name"]: item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "service.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    }
+
+
+def _oauth_deployment(name: str) -> dict:
+    documents = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "oauth2-proxy.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    ]
+    return next(
+        item
+        for item in documents
+        if item["kind"] == "Deployment" and item["metadata"]["name"] == name
+    )
+
+
+class _SwitchyardResponse:
+    """Minimal context-managed response used by routing contract tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self, selected: str, rationale: str = "local classifier vote"):
+        self.headers = {
+            "x-model-router-selected-model": selected,
+            "x-model-router-rationale": rationale,
+        }
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, *_args):
+        return False
+
+    def read(self):
+        return b"{}"

testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes_toolchain.py

@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+"""Operator toolchain and runtime-patch contracts for Hermes CLI lanes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_cli_lanes_support import (
+    HERMES,
+    SCRIPTS,
+    _agent_deployment,
+    auth_patch,
+    client_config,
+    codex_runtime_patch,
+    tui_gateway_patch,
+    ttyd_patch,
+)
+
+
+def test_worker_route_broker_accepts_pod_network_health_checks():
+    """Kubelet probes the pod IP, so the broker cannot bind to loopback only."""
+    script = (SCRIPTS / "worker_route_broker.py").read_text()
+    assert 'ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", PORT), Handler)' in script
+
+
+def test_switchyard_network_boundary_allows_vault_bootstrap():
+    """The pre-populate init container must reach Vault before routing starts."""
+    documents = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    ]
+    isolation = next(
+        item
+        for item in documents
+        if item.get("metadata", {}).get("name") == "hermes-switchyard-isolation"
+    )
+    assert any(
+        rule.get("to")
+        == [
+            {
+                "namespaceSelector": {
+                    "matchLabels": {"kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "vault"}
+                },
+                "podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "vault"}},
+            }
+        ]
+        and rule.get("ports") == [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 8200}]
+        for rule in isolation["spec"]["egress"]
+    )
+
+
+def test_switchyard_network_boundary_allows_metrics_scraping():
+    """VictoriaMetrics may scrape Switchyard without widening its API boundary."""
+    documents = [
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+    ]
+    isolation = next(
+        item
+        for item in documents
+        if item.get("metadata", {}).get("name") == "hermes-switchyard-isolation"
+    )
+    assert any(
+        rule.get("from")
+        == [
+            {
+                "namespaceSelector": {
+                    "matchLabels": {"kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "monitoring"}
+                },
+                "podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "server"}},
+            }
+        ]
+        and rule.get("ports") == [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9005}]
+        for rule in isolation["spec"]["ingress"]
+    )
+
+
+def test_owner_agent_installs_the_pinned_operator_toolchain():
+    script = (SCRIPTS / "install_agent_tools.sh").read_text()
+    for value in [
+        "flux",
+        "helm",
+        "kustomize",
+        "jq",
+        "yq",
+        "gh",
+        "vault",
+        "sops",
+        "age",
+        "age-keygen",
+        "k9s",
+        "terraform",
+        "go",
+        "gofmt",
+    ]:
+        assert value in script
+    assert "go1.26.5.linux-arm64.tar.gz" in script
+    assert "fe4789e92b1f33358680864bbe8704289e7bb5fc207d80623c308935bd696d49" in script
+    assert script.count("sha256sum -c -") == 1
+
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    installer = next(
+        item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["initContainers"]
+        if item["name"] == "install-agent-tools"
+    )
+    assert "/bin/sh /opt/coordinator/install_agent_tools.sh" in installer["command"][2]
+    assert any(mount["name"] == "coordinator" for mount in installer["volumeMounts"])
+    init_config = next(
+        item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["initContainers"]
+        if item["name"] == "init-config"
+    )
+    init_command = init_config["command"][2]
+    assert "# Hermes managed operator PATH." in init_command
+    assert "/opt/coordinator:/opt/data/tools/bin:/opt/hermes/.venv/bin" in init_command
+    assert 'chmod 0644 "${profile_file}"' in init_command
+
+
+def test_owner_agent_uses_only_the_canonical_hostname():
+    paths = [
+        HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml",
+        HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml",
+        HERMES / "agent-ingress.yaml",
+        Path(__file__).parents[2] / "scripts/ops/hermes_triage_monitor.py",
+    ]
+    for path in paths:
+        content = path.read_text()
+        assert "agent.bstein.dev" not in content
+        assert "agent.hermes.bstein.dev" in content
+
+
+def test_agent_reconnect_retains_complete_history_and_long_tool_budget():
+    configmap = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml").read_text())
+    config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["config.yaml"])
+    display = config["display"]
+    assert display["resume_exchanges"] >= 10000
+    assert display["resume_max_user_chars"] >= 10000000
+    assert display["resume_max_assistant_chars"] >= 10000000
+    assert config["agent"]["max_turns"] == 180
+    assert config["delegation"]["max_iterations"] == 120
+
+
+def test_auth_patch_honors_explicit_shared_store(tmp_path: Path):
+    source = tmp_path / "auth.py"
+    destination = tmp_path / "patched/auth.py"
+    source.write_text(
+        'from pathlib import Path\nimport os\n\ndef _auth_file_path() -> Path:\n    path = get_hermes_home() / "auth.json"\n    return path\n',
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    auth_patch.patch(source, destination)
+    content = destination.read_text()
+    assert 'os.environ.get("HERMES_AUTH_FILE"' in content
+
+
+def test_auth_patch_fails_closed_on_upstream_drift(tmp_path: Path):
+    source = tmp_path / "auth.py"
+    source.write_text("def changed():\n    pass\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="context changed"):
+        auth_patch.patch(source, tmp_path / "patched.py")
+
+
+def test_codex_runtime_patch_uses_cli_and_forwards_route(tmp_path: Path):
+    provider = tmp_path / "runtime_provider.py"
+    provider.write_text(codex_runtime_patch.PROVIDER_BEFORE, encoding="utf-8")
+    provider_out = tmp_path / "patched/runtime_provider.py"
+    codex_runtime_patch.patch_provider(provider, provider_out)
+    assert '"api_mode": "codex_app_server"' in provider_out.read_text()
+
+    session = tmp_path / "codex_app_server_session.py"
+    session.write_text(
+        codex_runtime_patch.SESSION_SIGNATURE_BEFORE
+        + codex_runtime_patch.SESSION_REQUEST_BEFORE,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    session_out = tmp_path / "patched/codex_app_server_session.py"
+    codex_runtime_patch.patch_session(session, session_out)
+    session_content = session_out.read_text()
+    assert 'turn_params["model"] = model' in session_content
+    assert 'turn_params["effort"] = effort' in session_content
+    assert '"approvalPolicy": "never"' in session_content
+    assert '"sandboxPolicy": {"type": "dangerFullAccess"}' in session_content
+
+    turn = tmp_path / "codex_runtime.py"
+    turn.write_text(
+        codex_runtime_patch.FALLBACK_CONTEXT_BEFORE + codex_runtime_patch.TURN_BEFORE,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    turn_out = tmp_path / "patched/codex_runtime.py"
+    codex_runtime_patch.patch_turn(turn, turn_out)
+    turn_content = turn_out.read_text()
+    assert "model=str(getattr(agent" in turn_content
+    assert "build_cross_provider_codex_prompt" in turn_content
+
+    fallback = tmp_path / "chat_completion_helpers.py"
+    fallback.write_text(
+        codex_runtime_patch.FALLBACK_RESOLUTION_BEFORE,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    fallback_out = tmp_path / "patched/chat_completion_helpers.py"
+    codex_runtime_patch.patch_fallback(fallback, fallback_out)
+    fallback_content = fallback_out.read_text()
+    assert 'agent.api_mode = "codex_app_server"' in fallback_content
+    assert "agent._codex_cross_provider_fallback = True" in fallback_content
+
+    loop = tmp_path / "conversation_loop.py"
+    loop.write_text(
+        codex_runtime_patch.FALLBACK_DISPATCH_BEFORE
+        + codex_runtime_patch.RETRY_FALLBACK_DISPATCH_BEFORE
+        + codex_runtime_patch.STREAM_RECOVERY_BEFORE,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    loop_out = tmp_path / "patched/conversation_loop.py"
+    codex_runtime_patch.patch_loop(loop, loop_out)
+    loop_content = loop_out.read_text()
+    assert loop_content.count('if agent.api_mode == "codex_app_server"') == 2
+    assert "build_cross_provider_codex_prompt" in loop_content
+    retry_dispatch = loop_content.index(
+        "Fallback activation happens inside this retry loop"
+    )
+    api_kwargs = loop_content.find("agent._build_api_kwargs", retry_dispatch)
+    assert api_kwargs == -1 or retry_dispatch < api_kwargs
+    assert "Provider stream ended before a complete response" in loop_content
+    assert "_is_transport_stub" in loop_content
+    assert "rerouting ({truncated_tool_call_retries}/4)" in loop_content
+
+    auxiliary = tmp_path / "auxiliary_client.py"
+    auxiliary.write_text(
+        codex_runtime_patch.AUXILIARY_TOKEN_BEFORE,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    auxiliary_out = tmp_path / "patched/auxiliary_client.py"
+    codex_runtime_patch.patch_auxiliary(auxiliary, auxiliary_out)
+    auxiliary_content = auxiliary_out.read_text()
+    assert 'os.environ.get("CODEX_HOME"' in auxiliary_content
+    assert 'Path(codex_home).expanduser() / "auth.json"' in auxiliary_content
+    assert "never creates a metered API-key lane" in auxiliary_content
+
+
+def test_agent_mounts_codex_auxiliary_runtime_patch():
+    deployment = _agent_deployment()
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    patch_init = next(
+        item for item in pod["initContainers"] if item["name"] == "patch-codex-runtime"
+    )
+    assert patch_init["command"][-2:] == [
+        "/opt/hermes/agent/auxiliary_client.py",
+        "/patched/auxiliary_client.py",
+    ]
+    expected_mount = {
+        "name": "codex-runtime-patch",
+        "mountPath": "/opt/hermes/agent/auxiliary_client.py",
+        "subPath": "auxiliary_client.py",
+    }
+    containers = {item["name"]: item for item in pod["containers"]}
+    for name in ("hermes", "terminal"):
+        assert expected_mount in containers[name]["volumeMounts"]
+
+
+def test_codex_auxiliary_patch_reads_cli_token_without_copying_it(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    monkeypatch,
+):
+    codex_home = tmp_path / ".codex"
+    codex_home.mkdir()
+    (codex_home / "auth.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps({"tokens": {"access_token": "cli-access-token"}}),
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CODEX_HOME", str(codex_home))
+
+    source = tmp_path / "auxiliary_client.py"
+    source.write_text(
+        "import json, logging, os, time\n"
+        "from pathlib import Path\n"
+        "logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)\n"
+        "def read_token():\n"
+        "    try:\n"
+        "        raise RuntimeError('Hermes provider store intentionally empty')\n"
+        + codex_runtime_patch.AUXILIARY_TOKEN_BEFORE,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    destination = tmp_path / "patched/auxiliary_client.py"
+    codex_runtime_patch.patch_auxiliary(source, destination)
+    namespace: dict = {}
+    exec(compile(destination.read_text(), str(destination), "exec"), namespace)
+
+    assert namespace["read_token"]() == "cli-access-token"
+
+
+def test_codex_runtime_patch_fails_closed_on_upstream_drift(tmp_path: Path):
+    source = tmp_path / "runtime_provider.py"
+    source.write_text("def changed():\n    pass\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="context changed"):
+        codex_runtime_patch.patch_provider(source, tmp_path / "patched.py")
+
+
+def test_codex_runtime_migration_uses_owner_unsafe_mode(tmp_path: Path):
+    config = tmp_path / "config.yaml"
+    config.write_text("model: {}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    codex_home = tmp_path / ".codex"
+    calls = []
+
+    class Report:
+        errors = []
+
+        @staticmethod
+        def summary():
+            return "configured"
+
+    def migrate(value, **kwargs):
+        calls.append((value, kwargs))
+        return Report()
+
+    client_config.configure_codex_runtime(config, migrate, codex_home)
+
+    assert calls[0][1]["default_permission_profile"] is None
+    assert calls[0][1]["codex_home"] == codex_home
+    content = (codex_home / "config.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'approval_policy = "never"' in content
+    assert 'sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access"' in content
+    assert "default_permissions" not in content
+
+
+def test_codex_owner_permissions_replace_stale_profile(tmp_path: Path):
+    config = tmp_path / "config.toml"
+    config.write_text(
+        'default_permissions = ":danger-no-sandbox"\n\n[features]\nhooks = true\n',
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    client_config.configure_codex_owner_permissions(config)
+    client_config.configure_codex_owner_permissions(config)
+
+    content = config.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert content.count(client_config.OWNER_PERMISSIONS_BEGIN) == 1
+    assert content.count('approval_policy = "never"') == 1
+    assert content.count('sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access"') == 1
+    assert "default_permissions" not in content
+    assert "[features]\nhooks = true" in content
+
+
+def test_tui_gateway_patch_extends_and_bounds_agent_startup(tmp_path: Path):
+    source = tmp_path / "server.py"
+    destination = tmp_path / "patched/server.py"
+    source.write_text(
+        "import os\n\n" + tui_gateway_patch.BEFORE + "\ndef unchanged():\n    pass\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    tui_gateway_patch.patch(source, destination)
+
+    content = destination.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "HERMES_TUI_AGENT_INIT_TIMEOUT_S" in content
+    assert "configured = 180.0" in content
+    assert "return max(30.0, min(configured, 900.0))" in content
+    assert "timeout: float | None = None" in content
+    assert "ready.wait(timeout=wait_timeout)" in content
+    assert "def unchanged():" in content
+
+
+def test_tui_gateway_patch_fails_closed_on_upstream_drift(tmp_path: Path):
+    source = tmp_path / "server.py"
+    source.write_text("def changed():\n    pass\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="context changed"):
+        tui_gateway_patch.patch(source, tmp_path / "patched.py")
+
+
+def test_ttyd_clipboard_and_reconnect_patch_remain_enabled():
+    source = '<html><body><script>document.execCommand("copy")</script></body></html>'
+    content = ttyd_patch.patch_html(source)
+    assert 'id="atlas-ttyd-clipboard"' in content
+    assert "navigator.clipboard.writeText(text)" in content
+    assert "class AtlasRecoveringWebSocket" in content
+    assert "window.location.reload()" in content
+    assert "event.stopImmediatePropagation()" in content
+
+
+def test_ttyd_patch_fails_closed_on_upstream_drift():
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="context changed"):
+        ttyd_patch.patch_html("<html><body>changed</body></html>")

testing/tests/test_hermes_coordinator.py

@@ -2,44 +2,20 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import importlib.util
 import json
 import subprocess
-import sys
 import tomllib
 from pathlib import Path
 
-import pytest
 import yaml
 
-
-SCRIPT = Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py"
-sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPT.parent))
-routing = importlib.import_module("hermes_model_routing")
-catalog_resolver = importlib.import_module("routing_catalog")
-SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_coordinator", SCRIPT)
-assert SPEC and SPEC.loader
-coordinator = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
-sys.modules[SPEC.name] = coordinator
-SPEC.loader.exec_module(coordinator)
-
-
-def _base_config() -> dict:
-    """Return the minimal coordinator configuration used by routing tests."""
-    return {
-        "model": {
-            "provider": "openai-codex",
-            "default": "gpt-5.6-terra",
-            "model": "gpt-5.6-terra",
-        },
-        "fallback_providers": [
-            {"provider": "anthropic", "model": "claude-opus-5"},
-            dict(routing.LOCAL_FALLBACK),
-        ],
-        "toolsets": ["kanban"],
-        "terminal": {"cwd": "/opt/data/workspace"},
-    }
-
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_coordinator_support import (
+    SCRIPT,
+    _base_config,
+    catalog_resolver,
+    coordinator,
+    routing,
+)
 
 def test_model_version_and_quality_selection_handle_new_and_small_models():
     assert routing.model_version("claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022") == (3, 5)
@@ -334,177 +310,3 @@ def test_refresh_writes_non_secret_routing_status(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
     assert status["projects"]["cassandra"]["state"] == "ready"
     assert status["projects"]["cassandra"]["board_state"] == {"state": "ready"}
     assert "do-not-report" not in status_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-
-
-def test_corrupt_cassandra_board_is_preserved_without_blocking_refresh(
-    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
-):
-    """A damaged project board degrades Kanban instead of stopping all services."""
-
-    class FakeKanbanDbCorruptError(Exception):
-        def __init__(self):
-            super().__init__("integrity check failed")
-            self.db_path = tmp_path / "kanban.db"
-            self.backup_path = tmp_path / "kanban.db.corrupt.backup"
-            self.reason = "row out of order"
-
-    def raise_corruption(_root: Path) -> None:
-        raise FakeKanbanDbCorruptError()
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "bootstrap_cassandra", raise_corruption)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(
-        coordinator, "_kanban_corruption_type", lambda: FakeKanbanDbCorruptError
-    )
-
-    status = coordinator.bootstrap_cassandra_state(tmp_path)
-
-    assert status == {
-        "state": "corrupt-preserved",
-        "database": str(tmp_path / "kanban.db"),
-        "backup": str(tmp_path / "kanban.db.corrupt.backup"),
-        "reason": "row out of order",
-    }
-
-
-def test_unrelated_cassandra_bootstrap_failure_remains_fatal(
-    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
-):
-    """Only the known fail-closed corruption state may be degraded."""
-
-    class FakeKanbanDbCorruptError(Exception):
-        pass
-
-    def raise_permission_error(_root: Path) -> None:
-        raise PermissionError("cannot access board")
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "bootstrap_cassandra", raise_permission_error)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(
-        coordinator, "_kanban_corruption_type", lambda: FakeKanbanDbCorruptError
-    )
-
-    try:
-        coordinator.bootstrap_cassandra_state(tmp_path)
-    except PermissionError as error:
-        assert str(error) == "cannot access board"
-    else:
-        raise AssertionError("unrelated board errors must fail the coordinator refresh")
-
-
-def test_cassandra_workspace_uses_valid_configured_worktree(
-    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
-):
-    """The coordinator selects an explicit Git worktree but rejects stale paths."""
-    active = tmp_path / "cassandra-v69"
-    active.mkdir()
-    (active / ".git").write_text("gitdir: elsewhere\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_CASSANDRA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", str(active))
-
-    assert coordinator.cassandra_workspace() == active
-
-    (active / ".git").unlink()
-    assert coordinator.cassandra_workspace() == coordinator.CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize(
-    ("current_remote", "repair_action"),
-    [
-        ("https://scm.bstein.dev/bstein/cassandra.git", "set-url"),
-        (None, "add"),
-        (coordinator.CASSANDRA_REMOTE, None),
-    ],
-    ids=["old-origin", "missing-origin", "canonical-origin"],
-)
-def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_existing_worktree(
-    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, current_remote: str | None, repair_action: str | None
-):
-    """Existing worktrees use the canonical Atlas origin before fetching."""
-    workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
-    (workspace / ".git").mkdir(parents=True)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: "/usr/bin/git")
-    token_path = tmp_path / "gitea-token"
-    token_path.write_text("configured\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", str(token_path))
-    commands: list[list[str]] = []
-    environments: list[dict[str, str]] = []
-
-    def run(command, **kwargs):
-        commands.append(command)
-        environments.append(kwargs.get("env", {}))
-        if command[-2:] == ["get-url", "origin"]:
-            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
-                command, 0 if current_remote else 2, stdout=f"{current_remote or ''}\n"
-            )
-        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0)
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.subprocess, "run", run)
-    assert coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({"GITEA_TOKEN": "must-not-pass"}) == "ready"
-    repair_commands = [command for command in commands if repair_action in command]
-    assert bool(repair_commands) is bool(repair_action)
-    assert commands[-1][-4:] == ["fetch", "--quiet", "--prune", "origin"]
-    assert all("GITEA_TOKEN" not in environment for environment in environments)
-
-
-def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_origin_without_token(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
-    """Missing credentials skip only the fetch, not the local origin repair."""
-    workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
-    (workspace / ".git").mkdir(parents=True)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: "/usr/bin/git")
-    commands: list[list[str]] = []
-
-    def run(command, **_kwargs):
-        commands.append(command)
-        stdout = "old-origin\n" if command[-2:] == ["get-url", "origin"] else None
-        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout=stdout)
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.subprocess, "run", run)
-    state = coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({})
-
-    assert state == "ready; fetch skipped until Gitea token is configured"
-    assert [command[-3] for command in commands] == ["remote", "set-url"]
-
-
-def test_migrate_open_cassandra_tasks_preserves_running_and_done_tasks():
-    """A project switch moves queued work without relocating active evidence."""
-
-    class Task:
-        def __init__(self, task_id: str, status: str):
-            self.id = task_id
-            self.status = status
-            self.workspace_kind = "dir"
-            self.workspace_path = str(coordinator.CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH)
-
-    class Closing:
-        def __enter__(self):
-            return object()
-
-        def __exit__(self, *_args):
-            return None
-
-    class FakeKanban:
-        tasks = [
-            Task("queued", "todo"),
-            Task("active", "running"),
-            Task("done", "done"),
-        ]
-        moved: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
-
-        @staticmethod
-        def connect_closing(*, board: str):
-            assert board == "cassandra"
-            return Closing()
-
-        @classmethod
-        def list_tasks(cls, _connection, *, include_archived: bool):
-            assert include_archived is False
-            return cls.tasks
-
-        @classmethod
-        def set_workspace_path(cls, _connection, task_id: str, path: Path):
-            cls.moved.append((task_id, str(path)))
-
-    active = Path("/opt/data/workspace/projects/cassandra-hermes-v69")
-    coordinator._migrate_open_cassandra_tasks(FakeKanban, active)
-
-    assert FakeKanban.moved == [("queued", str(active))]

testing/tests/test_hermes_coordinator_cassandra.py

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+"""Cassandra workspace and board contracts for the Hermes coordinator."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_coordinator_support import coordinator
+
+
+def test_corrupt_cassandra_board_is_preserved_without_blocking_refresh(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """A damaged project board degrades Kanban instead of stopping all services."""
+
+    class FakeKanbanDbCorruptError(Exception):
+        def __init__(self):
+            super().__init__("integrity check failed")
+            self.db_path = tmp_path / "kanban.db"
+            self.backup_path = tmp_path / "kanban.db.corrupt.backup"
+            self.reason = "row out of order"
+
+    def raise_corruption(_root: Path) -> None:
+        raise FakeKanbanDbCorruptError()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "bootstrap_cassandra", raise_corruption)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator, "_kanban_corruption_type", lambda: FakeKanbanDbCorruptError
+    )
+
+    status = coordinator.bootstrap_cassandra_state(tmp_path)
+
+    assert status == {
+        "state": "corrupt-preserved",
+        "database": str(tmp_path / "kanban.db"),
+        "backup": str(tmp_path / "kanban.db.corrupt.backup"),
+        "reason": "row out of order",
+    }
+
+
+def test_unrelated_cassandra_bootstrap_failure_remains_fatal(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Only the known fail-closed corruption state may be degraded."""
+
+    class FakeKanbanDbCorruptError(Exception):
+        pass
+
+    def raise_permission_error(_root: Path) -> None:
+        raise PermissionError("cannot access board")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "bootstrap_cassandra", raise_permission_error)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator, "_kanban_corruption_type", lambda: FakeKanbanDbCorruptError
+    )
+
+    try:
+        coordinator.bootstrap_cassandra_state(tmp_path)
+    except PermissionError as error:
+        assert str(error) == "cannot access board"
+    else:
+        raise AssertionError("unrelated board errors must fail the coordinator refresh")
+
+
+def test_cassandra_workspace_uses_valid_configured_worktree(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """The coordinator selects an explicit Git worktree but rejects stale paths."""
+    active = tmp_path / "cassandra-v69"
+    active.mkdir()
+    (active / ".git").write_text("gitdir: elsewhere\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_CASSANDRA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", str(active))
+
+    assert coordinator.cassandra_workspace() == active
+
+    (active / ".git").unlink()
+    assert coordinator.cassandra_workspace() == coordinator.CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("current_remote", "repair_action"),
+    [
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev/bstein/cassandra.git", "set-url"),
+        (None, "add"),
+        (coordinator.CASSANDRA_REMOTE, None),
+    ],
+    ids=["old-origin", "missing-origin", "canonical-origin"],
+)
+def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_existing_worktree(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, current_remote: str | None, repair_action: str | None
+):
+    """Existing worktrees use the canonical Atlas origin before fetching."""
+    workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
+    (workspace / ".git").mkdir(parents=True)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: "/usr/bin/git")
+    token_path = tmp_path / "gitea-token"
+    token_path.write_text("configured\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", str(token_path))
+    commands: list[list[str]] = []
+    environments: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+
+    def run(command, **kwargs):
+        commands.append(command)
+        environments.append(kwargs.get("env", {}))
+        if command[-2:] == ["get-url", "origin"]:
+            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                command, 0 if current_remote else 2, stdout=f"{current_remote or ''}\n"
+            )
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.subprocess, "run", run)
+    assert coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({"GITEA_TOKEN": "must-not-pass"}) == "ready"
+    repair_commands = [command for command in commands if repair_action in command]
+    assert bool(repair_commands) is bool(repair_action)
+    assert commands[-1][-4:] == ["fetch", "--quiet", "--prune", "origin"]
+    assert all("GITEA_TOKEN" not in environment for environment in environments)
+
+
+def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_origin_through_broker_without_token(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Repository sync uses the credential-isolated broker remote."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv(
+        "HERMES_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", str(tmp_path / "explicitly-unavailable-token")
+    )
+    workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
+    (workspace / ".git").mkdir(parents=True)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: "/usr/bin/git")
+    commands: list[list[str]] = []
+
+    def run(command, **_kwargs):
+        commands.append(command)
+        stdout = "old-origin\n" if command[-2:] == ["get-url", "origin"] else None
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout=stdout)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.subprocess, "run", run)
+    state = coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({})
+
+    assert state == "ready"
+    assert any(
+        "hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local" in " ".join(cmd)
+        for cmd in commands
+    )
+    assert all("token" not in " ".join(cmd).lower() for cmd in commands)
+    assert commands[-1][-4:] == ["fetch", "--quiet", "--prune", "origin"]
+
+
+def test_migrate_open_cassandra_tasks_preserves_running_and_done_tasks():
+    """A project switch moves queued work without relocating active evidence."""
+
+    class Task:
+        def __init__(self, task_id: str, status: str):
+            self.id = task_id
+            self.status = status
+            self.workspace_kind = "dir"
+            self.workspace_path = str(coordinator.CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH)
+
+    class Closing:
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return object()
+
+        def __exit__(self, *_args):
+            return None
+
+    class FakeKanban:
+        tasks = [
+            Task("queued", "todo"),
+            Task("active", "running"),
+            Task("done", "done"),
+        ]
+        moved: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+
+        @staticmethod
+        def connect_closing(*, board: str):
+            assert board == "cassandra"
+            return Closing()
+
+        @classmethod
+        def list_tasks(cls, _connection, *, include_archived: bool):
+            assert include_archived is False
+            return cls.tasks
+
+        @classmethod
+        def set_workspace_path(cls, _connection, task_id: str, path: Path):
+            cls.moved.append((task_id, str(path)))
+
+    active = Path("/opt/data/workspace/projects/cassandra-hermes-v69")
+    coordinator._migrate_open_cassandra_tasks(FakeKanban, active)
+
+    assert FakeKanban.moved == [("queued", str(active))]

testing/tests/test_hermes_coordinator_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for Hermes project coordination."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import types
+from contextlib import nullcontext
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_coordinator_support import coordinator, routing
+
+
+def test_workspace_falls_back_when_unset_or_invalid(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_CASSANDRA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", raising=False)
+    assert coordinator.cassandra_workspace() == coordinator.CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_CASSANDRA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", str(tmp_path / "missing"))
+    assert coordinator.cassandra_workspace() == coordinator.CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH
+
+
+def test_task_migration_is_noop_for_base_workspace():
+    class Board:
+        @staticmethod
+        def connect_closing(**_kwargs):
+            raise AssertionError("base workspace must not access Kanban")
+
+    coordinator._migrate_open_cassandra_tasks(Board, coordinator.CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH)
+
+
+class _Project:
+    id = "project-id"
+
+
+def _fake_hermes_modules(monkeypatch, *, existing: bool, active: bool):
+    events = []
+    kb = types.ModuleType("hermes_cli.kanban_db")
+    kb.board_exists = lambda slug: existing
+    kb.create_board = lambda *args, **kwargs: events.append(
+        ("create-board", args, kwargs)
+    )
+    kb.set_current_board = lambda slug: events.append(("current", slug))
+    kb.connect_closing = lambda **kwargs: nullcontext(object())
+    kb.list_tasks = lambda *_a, **_k: []
+
+    pdb = types.ModuleType("hermes_cli.projects_db")
+    pdb.connect_closing = lambda: nullcontext(object())
+    pdb.get_project = lambda *_a: _Project() if existing else None
+    pdb.get_active_id = lambda *_a: "active" if active else None
+    pdb.create_project = (
+        lambda *args, **kwargs: events.append(("create-project", kwargs)) or "new-id"
+    )
+    pdb.set_active = lambda *args: events.append(("active", args[-1]))
+    pdb.update_project = lambda *args, **kwargs: events.append(("update", kwargs))
+    pdb.add_folder = lambda *args, **kwargs: events.append(("folder", args[-1], kwargs))
+
+    package = types.ModuleType("hermes_cli")
+    package.kanban_db = kb
+    package.projects_db = pdb
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", package)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli.kanban_db", kb)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli.projects_db", pdb)
+    return events
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("existing", "active", "expected"),
+    [
+        (False, False, {"current", "create-project", "active"}),
+        (False, True, {"current", "create-project"}),
+        (True, True, {"update", "folder"}),
+    ],
+)
+def test_bootstrap_cassandra_creates_or_updates_state(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, existing, active, expected
+):
+    events = _fake_hermes_modules(monkeypatch, existing=existing, active=active)
+    base = tmp_path / "projects/cassandra"
+    worktree = tmp_path / "projects/cassandra-worktree"
+    worktree.mkdir(parents=True)
+    (worktree / ".git").write_text("gitdir: elsewhere\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", base)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_CASSANDRA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", str(worktree))
+    coordinator.bootstrap_cassandra(tmp_path / "hermes")
+    names = {event[0] for event in events}
+    assert expected <= names
+    assert "create-board" in names
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_state_ready_path(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "bootstrap_cassandra", lambda _root: None)
+    assert coordinator.bootstrap_cassandra_state(tmp_path) == {"state": "ready"}
+
+
+def test_corruption_type_imports_pinned_exception(monkeypatch):
+    class Expected(Exception):
+        pass
+
+    package = types.ModuleType("hermes_cli")
+    kanban = types.ModuleType("hermes_cli.kanban_db")
+    kanban.KanbanDbCorruptError = Expected
+    package.kanban_db = kanban
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", package)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli.kanban_db", kanban)
+    assert coordinator._kanban_corruption_type() is Expected
+
+
+def test_repo_sync_reports_missing_git_and_unmanaged_directory(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: None)
+    assert coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({}) == "git-unavailable"
+
+    workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    (workspace / "user-file").write_text("preserve", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: "/usr/bin/git")
+    assert coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({}) == "unmanaged-nonempty-directory"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("failure", "expected"),
+    [
+        ("get-url-error", "remote-repair-failed"),
+        ("repair-exit", "remote-repair-failed-9"),
+        ("repair-error", "remote-repair-failed"),
+        ("fetch-exit", "sync-failed-8"),
+        ("fetch-error", "sync-failed"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_existing_repo_sync_reports_each_failure(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, failure, expected
+):
+    workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
+    (workspace / ".git").mkdir(parents=True)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: "/usr/bin/git")
+
+    def run(command, **_kwargs):
+        action = command[-2:] if len(command) >= 2 else []
+        if action == ["get-url", "origin"]:
+            if failure == "get-url-error":
+                raise OSError("git unavailable")
+            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout="old\n")
+        if "set-url" in command:
+            if failure == "repair-error":
+                raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(command, 30)
+            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                command, 9 if failure == "repair-exit" else 0
+            )
+        if failure == "fetch-error":
+            raise OSError("fetch unavailable")
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 8 if failure == "fetch-exit" else 0)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.subprocess, "run", run)
+    assert coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({}) == expected
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("exit_code", "expected"), [(0, "ready"), (7, "sync-failed-7")]
+)
+def test_empty_repo_clones_through_broker(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, exit_code, expected
+):
+    workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.shutil, "which", lambda _name: "/usr/bin/git")
+    seen = []
+
+    def run(command, **kwargs):
+        seen.append((command, kwargs["env"]))
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, exit_code)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.subprocess, "run", run)
+    assert (
+        coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo(
+            {"API_SERVER_KEY": "not-forwarded", "SAFE": "yes"}
+        )
+        == expected
+    )
+    assert coordinator.CASSANDRA_REMOTE in seen[0][0]
+    assert seen[0][1]["SAFE"] == "yes"
+    assert "API_SERVER_KEY" not in seen[0][1]
+
+
+def _catalog(provider):
+    return routing.Catalog(provider, ["model"], True, True, "connected")
+
+
+def test_refresh_once_writes_complete_status(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "_read_env", lambda _path: {"SAFE": "yes"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "discover_codex_models", lambda: _catalog("codex"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator, "discover_claude_models", lambda: _catalog("claude")
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator, "configure_routes", lambda *_a: {"coordinator": ["auto"]}
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator, "bootstrap_cassandra_state", lambda _root: {"state": "ready"}
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "sync_cassandra_repo", lambda _env: "ready")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator, "cassandra_workspace", lambda: tmp_path / "worktree"
+    )
+    written = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator, "_atomic_write", lambda path, value: written.append((path, value))
+    )
+    status = coordinator.refresh_once(tmp_path)
+    assert status["projects"]["cassandra"]["state"] == "ready"
+    assert json.loads(written[0][1])["providers"]["codex"]["connected"] is True
+
+
+def test_main_once_success_and_failure(monkeypatch, capsys):
+    status = {"providers": {"codex": {"state": "ready"}}}
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "argv", ["coordinator", "--once"])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "refresh_once", lambda _root: status)
+    assert coordinator.main() == 0
+    assert "codex=ready" in capsys.readouterr().out
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        coordinator,
+        "refresh_once",
+        lambda _root: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("failed")),
+    )
+    assert coordinator.main() == 1
+    assert "RuntimeError" in capsys.readouterr().out
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("interval", "expected"), [(1, 300), (400, 400)])
+def test_main_loop_sleeps_with_floor(monkeypatch, interval, expected):
+    calls = iter(({"providers": {}}, KeyboardInterrupt()))
+
+    def refresh(_root):
+        value = next(calls)
+        if isinstance(value, BaseException):
+            raise value
+        return value
+
+    sleeps = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "refresh_once", refresh)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.time, "sleep", sleeps.append)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        sys, "argv", ["coordinator", "--loop", "--interval", str(interval)]
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(KeyboardInterrupt):
+        coordinator.main()
+    assert sleeps == [expected]
+
+
+def test_main_loop_recovers_from_refresh_failure(monkeypatch):
+    calls = iter((RuntimeError("temporary"), KeyboardInterrupt()))
+
+    def refresh(_root):
+        error = next(calls)
+        raise error
+
+    sleeps = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "refresh_once", refresh)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.time, "sleep", sleeps.append)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "argv", ["coordinator", "--loop", "--interval", "300"])
+    with pytest.raises(KeyboardInterrupt):
+        coordinator.main()
+    assert sleeps == [300]

testing/tests/test_hermes_coordinator_support.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+"""Shared loader and configuration for Hermes coordinator contracts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+SCRIPT = Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPT.parent))
+routing = importlib.import_module("hermes_model_routing")
+catalog_resolver = importlib.import_module("routing_catalog")
+SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_coordinator", SCRIPT)
+assert SPEC and SPEC.loader
+coordinator = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
+sys.modules[SPEC.name] = coordinator
+SPEC.loader.exec_module(coordinator)
+
+
+def _base_config() -> dict:
+    """Return the minimal coordinator configuration used by routing tests."""
+    return {
+        "model": {
+            "provider": "openai-codex",
+            "default": "gpt-5.6-terra",
+            "model": "gpt-5.6-terra",
+        },
+        "fallback_providers": [
+            {"provider": "anthropic", "model": "claude-opus-5"},
+            dict(routing.LOCAL_FALLBACK),
+        ],
+        "toolsets": ["kanban"],
+        "terminal": {"cwd": "/opt/data/workspace"},
+    }

testing/tests/test_hermes_deadline_http.py

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+"""Absolute-deadline contracts for the killable HTTP control helper."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import io
+import json
+import subprocess
+import threading
+import time
+import urllib.request
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import _load
+
+
+class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def _respond(self):
+        if self.path == "/slow":
+            time.sleep(10)
+        if self.path == "/redirect":
+            self.send_response(302)
+            self.send_header("Location", "http://127.0.0.1:1/evil")
+            self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
+            self.end_headers()
+            return
+        status = 404 if self.path == "/missing" else 200
+        body = b"x" * 64 if self.path == "/large" else b'{"ok":true}'
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    do_GET = _respond
+    do_POST = _respond
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args):
+        return
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
+def server():
+    value = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _Handler)
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=value.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    thread.start()
+    yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{value.server_port}"
+    value.shutdown()
+
+
+def _control(url: str, **overrides):
+    value = {
+        "url": url,
+        "method": "GET",
+        "headers": {"Accept": "application/json"},
+        "body": "",
+        "maximum": 1024,
+        "timeout": 10,
+    }
+    value.update(overrides)
+    return value
+
+
+def test_child_exchange_round_trips_and_reports_http_errors(server):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    result = module._child_exchange(_control(server + "/ok"))
+    assert (result.status, result.content_type) == (200, "application/json")
+    assert result.body == b'{"ok":true}'
+
+    posted = module._child_exchange(
+        _control(
+            server + "/ok",
+            method="POST",
+            body=base64.b64encode(b'{"a":1}').decode(),
+        )
+    )
+    assert posted.status == 200
+
+    missing = module._child_exchange(_control(server + "/missing"))
+    assert missing.status == 404
+
+
+def test_child_exchange_rejects_redirects_and_oversized_responses(server):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    with pytest.raises(Exception):
+        module._child_exchange(_control(server + "/redirect"))
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too large"):
+        module._child_exchange(_control(server + "/large", maximum=8))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "overrides",
+    [
+        {"url": 1},
+        {"method": None},
+        {"headers": ["not", "dict"]},
+        {"headers": {"Accept": 5}},
+        {"body": b"raw"},
+        {"maximum": "big"},
+        {"maximum": -1},
+        {"maximum": 4 * 1024 * 1024},
+        {"timeout": "soon"},
+        {"timeout": 0},
+        {"timeout": 121},
+    ],
+)
+def test_child_exchange_rejects_invalid_control_documents(overrides):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    control = _control("http://127.0.0.1:1/")
+    control.update(overrides)
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="invalid control"):
+        module._child_exchange(control)
+
+
+def test_child_exchange_rejects_bad_or_oversized_encoded_bodies():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        module._child_exchange(_control("http://127.0.0.1:1/", body="!!not-b64!!"))
+    huge = base64.b64encode(b"x" * (module.MAX_CONTROL_BYTES + 1)).decode()
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="request too large"):
+        module._child_exchange(_control("http://127.0.0.1:1/", body=huge))
+
+
+def test_read_response_enforces_deadline_and_size():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+
+    class Reader:
+        def __init__(self, body: bytes):
+            self.stream = io.BytesIO(body)
+
+        def read(self, limit: int):
+            return self.stream.read(limit)
+
+    with pytest.raises(TimeoutError):
+        module._read_response(Reader(b"abc"), 10, time.monotonic() - 1)
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too large"):
+        module._read_response(Reader(b"abcdef"), 4, time.monotonic() + 5)
+    value = module._read_response(Reader(b"abc"), 10, time.monotonic() + 5)
+    assert value == b"abc"
+
+
+def _run_child_main(module, monkeypatch, raw: bytes) -> dict:
+    stdin = type("Stdin", (), {"buffer": io.BytesIO(raw)})()
+    stdout = io.StringIO()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.sys, "stdin", stdin)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.sys, "stdout", stdout)
+    code = module._child_main()
+    return code, json.loads(stdout.getvalue())
+
+
+def test_child_main_reports_success_and_failure_documents(monkeypatch, server):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    code, output = _run_child_main(
+        module, monkeypatch, json.dumps(_control(server + "/ok")).encode()
+    )
+    assert code == 0 and output["ok"] is True
+    assert base64.b64decode(output["body"]) == b'{"ok":true}'
+
+    for raw in (
+        b"x" * (module.MAX_CONTROL_BYTES + 1),
+        b"not json",
+        b"[1,2]",
+    ):
+        code, output = _run_child_main(module, monkeypatch, raw)
+        assert code == 1 and output == {"ok": False}
+
+
+class _FakeProcess:
+    def __init__(self, output: bytes, returncode: int = 0):
+        self.args = ["fake-child"]
+        self.pid = 0
+        self.returncode = returncode
+        self.output = output
+        self.stdin_payload = None
+
+    def communicate(self, payload=None, timeout=None):
+        self.stdin_payload = payload
+        return self.output, b""
+
+
+def _fake_popen(output: bytes, returncode: int = 0):
+    def popen(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        return _FakeProcess(output, returncode)
+
+    return popen
+
+
+def _success_output(body: bytes, **overrides) -> bytes:
+    value = {
+        "ok": True,
+        "status": 200,
+        "content_type": "application/json",
+        "body": base64.b64encode(body).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+    value.update(overrides)
+    return json.dumps(value).encode()
+
+
+def test_exchange_validates_bounds_and_request_body():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    request = urllib.request.Request("https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/x")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="bounds are invalid"):
+        module.exchange(request, maximum=1, timeout=0)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="bounds are invalid"):
+        module.exchange(request, maximum=-1, timeout=10)
+    request.data = "not-bytes"
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="safe size"):
+        module.exchange(request, maximum=1, timeout=10)
+    request.data = b"x" * (module.MAX_CONTROL_BYTES + 1)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="safe size"):
+        module.exchange(request, maximum=1, timeout=10)
+
+
+def test_exchange_returns_result_and_enforces_response_limit():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        "https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/x", data=b"{}", method="POST"
+    )
+    result = module.exchange(
+        request, maximum=64, timeout=10, popen=_fake_popen(_success_output(b"body"))
+    )
+    assert (result.status, result.content_type, result.body) == (
+        200,
+        "application/json",
+        b"body",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="safe size"):
+        module.exchange(
+            request,
+            maximum=2,
+            timeout=10,
+            popen=_fake_popen(_success_output(b"body")),
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("output", "returncode", "match"),
+    [
+        (b"", 1, "request failed"),
+        (b"x" * (4 * 1024 * 1024 + 1), 0, "request failed"),
+        (b"not json", 0, "invalid evidence"),
+        (b'{"ok":false}', 0, "invalid evidence"),
+        (b"[1]", 0, "invalid evidence"),
+        (b'{"ok":true}', 0, "invalid evidence"),
+        (b'{"ok":true,"status":"200","content_type":"a","body":""}', 0, "invalid evidence"),
+        (b'{"ok":true,"status":200,"content_type":"a","body":"!!"}', 0, "invalid evidence"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_exchange_rejects_invalid_helper_evidence(output, returncode, match):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    request = urllib.request.Request("https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/x")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match=match):
+        module.exchange(
+            request, maximum=64, timeout=10, popen=_fake_popen(output, returncode)
+        )
+
+
+def test_exchange_kills_the_helper_when_the_deadline_expires(server):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    request = urllib.request.Request(server + "/slow")
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="deadline exceeded"):
+        module.exchange(request, maximum=64, timeout=1.0)
+    assert time.monotonic() - started < 5
+
+
+def test_exchange_fails_before_spawn_wait_when_time_is_exhausted(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    request = urllib.request.Request("https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/x")
+    killed = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "killpg", lambda pid, sig: killed.append((pid, sig)))
+    clock = iter([0.0, 1_000_000.0, 1_000_000.0, 1_000_000.0])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.time, "monotonic", lambda: next(clock))
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="deadline exceeded"):
+        module.exchange(
+            request, maximum=64, timeout=10, popen=_fake_popen(_success_output(b""))
+        )
+    assert killed
+
+
+def test_terminate_tolerates_already_finished_helpers():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    process = subprocess.Popen(
+        ["/bin/true"], start_new_session=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL
+    )
+    process.wait()
+    module._terminate(process)
+    assert process.returncode == 0
+
+
+def test_child_entrypoint_round_trip_through_real_subprocess(server):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    request = urllib.request.Request(server + "/ok")
+    result = module.exchange(request, maximum=1024, timeout=20)
+    assert result.status == 200 and result.body == b'{"ok":true}'
+
+
+def test_open_bounded_adapts_result_to_the_urlopen_interface():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    request = urllib.request.Request("https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/x")
+    with module.open_bounded(
+        request, maximum=64, timeout=10, popen=_fake_popen(_success_output(b"body"))
+    ) as response:
+        assert response.status == 200
+        assert response.headers.get_content_type() == "application/json"
+        assert response.read(2) == b"bo"
+        assert response.read() == b"dy"

testing/tests/test_hermes_deadline_stream.py

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+"""Watchdog contracts for absolute deadlines on streaming Git exchanges."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+import time
+import urllib.request
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import Response, _load
+
+
+def test_stream_deadline_validates_bounds_and_counts_down():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    for timeout in (0, -1, module.MAX_STREAM_SECONDS + 1):
+        with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="bounds are invalid"):
+            module.StreamDeadline(timeout)
+    guard = module.StreamDeadline(30)
+    try:
+        first = guard.remaining()
+        assert 0 < first <= 30
+    finally:
+        guard.cancel()
+
+
+class _FakeTimer:
+    def __init__(self, timeout, callback):
+        self.timeout = timeout
+        self.callback = callback
+        self.daemon = False
+        self.started = False
+        self.cancelled = False
+
+    def start(self):
+        self.started = True
+
+    def cancel(self):
+        self.cancelled = True
+
+
+class _FakeSocket:
+    def __init__(self, fail: bool = False):
+        self.fail = fail
+        self.shut = False
+
+    def shutdown(self, _how):
+        if self.fail:
+            raise OSError("already gone")
+        self.shut = True
+
+
+class _FakeConnection:
+    def __init__(self, sock=None):
+        self.sock = sock
+        self.closed = False
+
+    def close(self):
+        self.closed = True
+
+
+def test_expiry_shuts_down_and_closes_every_tracked_connection():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    guard = module.StreamDeadline(30, timer=_FakeTimer)
+    assert guard._timer.started and guard._timer.daemon
+    healthy = _FakeConnection(_FakeSocket())
+    broken = _FakeConnection(_FakeSocket(fail=True))
+    bare = _FakeConnection()
+    for connection in (healthy, broken, bare):
+        assert guard._track(connection) is connection
+    guard._expire()
+    assert guard.expired
+    assert healthy.sock.shut and healthy.closed
+    assert broken.closed and not broken.sock.shut
+    assert bare.closed
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="deadline exceeded"):
+        guard.remaining()
+    late = _FakeConnection()
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="deadline exceeded"):
+        guard._track(late)
+    assert late.closed
+    guard.cancel()
+    assert guard._timer.cancelled
+
+
+def test_handlers_build_guarded_connections_without_network(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    guard = module.StreamDeadline(30, timer=_FakeTimer)
+    http_handler, https_handler = guard.handlers()
+    assert isinstance(http_handler, urllib.request.HTTPHandler)
+    assert isinstance(https_handler, urllib.request.HTTPSHandler)
+    for handler, opener_name in (
+        (http_handler, "http_open"),
+        (https_handler, "https_open"),
+    ):
+        seen = {}
+        monkeypatch.setattr(
+            handler,
+            "do_open",
+            lambda factory, req, seen=seen: seen.update(factory=factory, req=req),
+        )
+        getattr(handler, opener_name)("request")
+        connection = seen["factory"]("127.0.0.1", timeout=1)
+        assert connection in guard._connections
+        connection.close()
+    guard.cancel()
+
+
+def test_dns_resolution_is_bounded_by_the_stream_deadline(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+
+    def hang(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        time.sleep(30)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.socket, "getaddrinfo", hang)
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="DNS resolution deadline"):
+        module._resolve_within("example.invalid", 443, 0.4)
+    assert time.monotonic() - started < 3
+
+
+def test_resolve_within_returns_on_success_and_propagates_errors(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    calls = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.socket, "getaddrinfo", lambda *a, **k: calls.append((a, k))
+    )
+    module._resolve_within("127.0.0.1", 80, 5)
+    assert calls
+
+    def boom(*_a, **_k):
+        raise OSError("name resolution failed")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.socket, "getaddrinfo", boom)
+    with pytest.raises(OSError, match="name resolution failed"):
+        module._resolve_within("127.0.0.1", 80, 5)
+
+
+def test_bounded_connection_wraps_connect_to_resolve_first(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    guard = module.StreamDeadline(30, timer=_FakeTimer)
+    order = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "_resolve_within",
+        lambda host, port, timeout: order.append(("resolve", host, port)),
+    )
+
+    class FakeConnection:
+        host = "scm.bstein.dev"
+        port = 443
+
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.sock = None
+
+        def connect(self):
+            order.append(("connect", self.host))
+
+        def close(self):
+            order.append(("close",))
+
+    connection = guard._bounded_connection(FakeConnection())
+    assert connection in guard._connections
+    connection.connect()
+    assert order == [("resolve", "scm.bstein.dev", 443), ("connect", "scm.bstein.dev")]
+    guard.cancel()
+
+
+def test_bounded_connection_connect_fails_closed_once_expired(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    guard = module.StreamDeadline(30, timer=_FakeTimer)
+    resolved = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module, "_resolve_within", lambda *a, **k: resolved.append(a)
+    )
+
+    class FakeConnection:
+        host = "scm.bstein.dev"
+        port = 443
+        sock = None
+
+        def connect(self):
+            resolved.append("connected")
+
+        def close(self):
+            pass
+
+    connection = guard._bounded_connection(FakeConnection())
+    guard._expire()
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="deadline exceeded"):
+        connection.connect()
+    assert resolved == []
+    guard.cancel()
+
+
+class _TrickleHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def do_GET(self):
+        time.sleep(10)
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args):
+        return
+
+
+def test_watchdog_interrupts_a_hung_streaming_exchange():
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _TrickleHandler)
+    threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+    guard = module.StreamDeadline(1.0)
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(*guard.handlers())
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    try:
+        with pytest.raises(OSError):
+            opener.open(
+                f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}/slow", timeout=30
+            ).read()
+        assert time.monotonic() - started < 5
+        assert guard.expired
+    finally:
+        guard.cancel()
+        server.shutdown()
+
+
+def test_upstream_git_request_runs_under_one_wall_clock_budget(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    seen = {}
+
+    class RecordingGuard:
+        def __init__(self, timeout, **_kwargs):
+            seen["timeout"] = timeout
+            self.cancelled = False
+            seen["guard"] = self
+
+        def remaining(self):
+            return 12.5
+
+        def cancel(self):
+            self.cancelled = True
+
+        def handlers(self):
+            return ()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker.deadline_http, "StreamDeadline", RecordingGuard)
+
+    def opener(request, timeout):
+        seen["opener_timeout"] = timeout
+        return Response(b"result", content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result")
+
+    result = broker._upstream_git_request(
+        "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+        method="POST",
+        body=b"request",
+        content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+        expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+        token="sentinel",
+        opener=opener,
+    )
+    assert result == b"result"
+    assert seen["timeout"] == broker.UPSTREAM_DEADLINE_SECONDS
+    assert seen["opener_timeout"] == 12.5
+    assert seen["guard"].cancelled
+
+
+def test_upstream_git_request_cancels_guard_when_deadline_already_passed(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    cancelled = []
+
+    class ExpiredGuard:
+        def __init__(self, _timeout, **_kwargs):
+            pass
+
+        def remaining(self):
+            raise broker.PolicyError("HTTP stream deadline exceeded")
+
+        def cancel(self):
+            cancelled.append(True)
+
+        def handlers(self):
+            return ()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker.deadline_http, "StreamDeadline", ExpiredGuard)
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="deadline exceeded"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: None,
+        )
+    assert cancelled == [True]
+
+
+def test_guarded_opener_wires_redirect_rejection_and_deadline_handlers():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    module = _load("deadline_http")
+    guard = module.StreamDeadline(30, timer=_FakeTimer)
+    opener = broker._guarded_opener(guard)
+    assert callable(opener)
+    handlers = opener.__self__.handlers
+    assert any(isinstance(item, broker.RejectRedirect) for item in handlers)
+    assert any(isinstance(item, urllib.request.HTTPSHandler) for item in handlers)
+    guard.cancel()

testing/tests/test_hermes_git_pack_objects.py

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+"""Bounded pack inflation and delta-resolution contracts for pushed objects."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import io
+import zlib
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import (
+    _load,
+    _object_entry,
+    _pack_of,
+)
+
+
+def _delta_header(type_code: int, size: int, suffix: bytes = b"") -> bytes:
+    byte = (type_code << 4) | (size & 0x0F)
+    size >>= 4
+    header = bytearray()
+    while size:
+        header.append(byte | 0x80)
+        byte = size & 0x7F
+        size >>= 7
+    header.append(byte)
+    return bytes(header) + suffix
+
+
+def _size_varint(value: int) -> bytes:
+    out = bytearray()
+    while True:
+        byte = value & 0x7F
+        value >>= 7
+        if value:
+            out.append(byte | 0x80)
+        else:
+            out.append(byte)
+            return bytes(out)
+
+
+def _ofs_distance(value: int) -> bytes:
+    out = [value & 0x7F]
+    value >>= 7
+    while value:
+        value -= 1
+        out.insert(0, 0x80 | (value & 0x7F))
+        value >>= 7
+    return bytes(out)
+
+
+def _delta(source: bytes, target_size: int, instructions: bytes) -> bytes:
+    return _size_varint(len(source)) + _size_varint(target_size) + instructions
+
+
+def _blob_sha(payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha1(b"blob %d\x00" % len(payload) + payload).digest()
+
+
+def _read_all(objects):
+    try:
+        return [(code, payload.read()) for code, payload in objects]
+    finally:
+        for _code, payload in objects:
+            payload.close()
+
+
+def test_unpack_returns_typed_payloads_for_every_base_object_kind():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    entries = [
+        _object_entry(1, b"tree 1\n"),
+        _object_entry(2, b"\x00tree-bytes"),
+        _object_entry(3, b"blob contents"),
+        _object_entry(4, b"tag contents"),
+    ]
+    result = _read_all(module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of(entries))))
+    assert result == [
+        (1, b"tree 1\n"),
+        (2, b"\x00tree-bytes"),
+        (3, b"blob contents"),
+        (4, b"tag contents"),
+    ]
+
+
+def test_unpack_accepts_the_empty_pack():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    assert module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([]))) == []
+
+
+def test_ofs_delta_resolves_against_its_in_pack_base():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    base = b"base payload for copying"
+    base_entry = _object_entry(3, base)
+    # Copy the first 4 bytes, then insert new bytes.
+    instructions = bytes([0x80 | 0x10, 4]) + bytes([5]) + b"+tail"
+    delta = _delta(base, 9, instructions)
+    delta_entry = _delta_header(
+        6, len(delta), _ofs_distance(len(base_entry))
+    ) + zlib.compress(delta)
+    result = _read_all(module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([base_entry, delta_entry]))))
+    assert result == [(3, base), (3, b"base+tail")]
+
+
+def test_ref_delta_resolves_by_sha_and_supports_chains():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    base = b"chain base"
+    first = _delta(base, 4, bytes([4]) + b"one!")
+    second = _delta(b"one!", 4, bytes([4]) + b"two!")
+    entries = [
+        _object_entry(3, base),
+        _delta_header(7, len(first), _blob_sha(base)) + zlib.compress(first),
+        _delta_header(7, len(second), _blob_sha(b"one!")) + zlib.compress(second),
+    ]
+    result = _read_all(module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of(entries))))
+    assert [payload for _code, payload in result] == [base, b"one!", b"two!"]
+
+
+def test_thin_pack_ref_delta_with_external_base_is_rejected():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    delta = _delta(b"absent", 1, bytes([1]) + b"x")
+    entry = _delta_header(7, len(delta), b"\xaa" * 20) + zlib.compress(delta)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="push full packs"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([entry])))
+
+
+def test_ofs_delta_bad_offsets_fail_closed():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    base_entry = _object_entry(3, b"base")
+    delta = _delta(b"base", 1, bytes([1]) + b"x")
+    # Distance beyond the pack start.
+    early = _delta_header(6, len(delta), _ofs_distance(999)) + zlib.compress(delta)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="base offset is invalid"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([base_entry, early])))
+    # Distance landing between object boundaries.
+    misaligned = _delta_header(6, len(delta), _ofs_distance(3)) + zlib.compress(delta)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="base offset is invalid"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([base_entry, misaligned])))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("mutate", "match"),
+    [
+        (lambda pack: b"JUNK" + pack[4:], "header is invalid"),
+        (lambda pack: pack[:4] + (9).to_bytes(4, "big") + pack[8:], "header is invalid"),
+        (lambda pack: pack[:8] + (2).to_bytes(4, "big") + pack[12:], "Git"),
+        (lambda pack: pack[:-1], "ended early"),
+        (lambda pack: pack[:-20] + b"\x00" * 20, "checksum is invalid"),
+        (lambda pack: pack[:11], "ended early"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_malformed_pack_containers_fail_closed(mutate, match):
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    pack = _pack_of([_object_entry(3, b"payload")])
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match=match):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(mutate(pack)))
+
+
+def test_object_count_and_type_bounds_fail_closed(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    body = b"PACK" + (2).to_bytes(4, "big") + (module.MAX_PACK_OBJECTS + 1).to_bytes(
+        4, "big"
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="too many objects"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(body + hashlib.sha1(body).digest()))
+    reserved = _delta_header(5, 1) + zlib.compress(b"x")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="object type is invalid"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([reserved])))
+
+
+def test_declared_size_mismatches_and_zlib_bombs_fail_closed(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    longer = _delta_header(3, 2) + zlib.compress(b"longer-than-two")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="does not match its header"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([longer])))
+    shorter = _delta_header(3, 9) + zlib.compress(b"x")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="does not match its header"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([shorter])))
+    corrupt = _delta_header(3, 4) + b"\x00not-zlib\x00"
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="corrupt"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([corrupt])))
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_OBJECT_BYTES", 4)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="exceeds the safe size limit"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(_pack_of([_object_entry(3, b"12345")])))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_OBJECT_BYTES", 1024)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_TOTAL_BYTES", 8)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="contents exceed"):
+        module.unpack_objects(
+            io.BytesIO(_pack_of([_object_entry(3, b"12345"), _object_entry(3, b"12345")]))
+        )
+
+
+def test_object_and_distance_varints_are_bounded():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="object header is invalid"):
+        module._object_header(io.BytesIO(b"\xff" * 12))
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="ended early"):
+        module._object_header(io.BytesIO(b"\x80"))
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="distance is invalid"):
+        module._delta_distance(io.BytesIO(b"\xff" * 12))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("base", "delta", "match"),
+    [
+        (b"base", b"", "delta header is invalid"),
+        (b"base", _size_varint(4), "delta header is invalid"),
+        (b"base", _size_varint(9) + _size_varint(1) + bytes([1]) + b"x", "sizes are invalid"),
+        (b"base", _size_varint(4) + _size_varint(2) + bytes([0]), "instruction is invalid"),
+        (b"base", _size_varint(4) + _size_varint(2) + bytes([5]) + b"ab", "insert is truncated"),
+        (b"base", _size_varint(4) + _size_varint(2) + bytes([0x80 | 0x10]), "copy is truncated"),
+        (
+            b"base",
+            _size_varint(4) + _size_varint(2) + bytes([0x80 | 0x01 | 0x10, 3, 9]),
+            "copy is out of bounds",
+        ),
+        (b"base", _size_varint(4) + _size_varint(1) + bytes([2]) + b"ab", "exceeds its declared size"),
+        (b"base", _size_varint(4) + _size_varint(3) + bytes([2]) + b"ab", "result size is invalid"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_delta_application_rejects_malformed_instructions(base, delta, match):
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match=match):
+        module._apply_delta(base, delta)
+
+
+def test_delta_copy_with_zero_size_field_means_the_git_default():
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    base = b"z" * 0x10000
+    delta = _delta(base, 0x10000, bytes([0x80 | 0x10 | 0x20, 0, 0]))
+    assert module._apply_delta(base, delta) == base
+
+
+def test_delta_target_size_cap_applies(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_OBJECT_BYTES", 4)
+    delta = _delta(b"base", 5, bytes([5]) + b"abcde")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="sizes are invalid"):
+        module._apply_delta(b"base", delta)
+
+
+def test_resolution_pass_and_total_caps_apply(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    base = b"pass base"
+    first = _delta(base, 4, bytes([4]) + b"one!")
+    second = _delta(b"one!", 4, bytes([4]) + b"two!")
+    entries = [
+        _delta_header(7, len(second), _blob_sha(b"one!")) + zlib.compress(second),
+        _object_entry(3, base),
+        _delta_header(7, len(first), _blob_sha(base)) + zlib.compress(first),
+    ]
+    pack = _pack_of(entries)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_RESOLVE_PASSES", 1)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="resolution limit"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(pack))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_RESOLVE_PASSES", 64)
+    result = _read_all(module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(pack)))
+    assert [payload for _code, payload in result] == [b"two!", base, b"one!"]
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_TOTAL_BYTES", len(base) + len(first) + len(second) + 1)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="contents exceed"):
+        module.unpack_objects(io.BytesIO(pack))
+
+
+def test_parse_loose_object_round_trip_and_bounds(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("git_pack_objects")
+    payload = b"loose blob"
+    value = zlib.compress(b"blob %d\x00" % len(payload) + payload)
+    assert module.parse_loose_object(value) == (3, payload)
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="corrupt"):
+        module.parse_loose_object(b"\x00junk")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="framing is invalid"):
+        module.parse_loose_object(value + b"trailing")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="framing is invalid"):
+        module.parse_loose_object(value[:-4])
+    for header in (
+        b"noodle 3\x00abc",
+        b"blob3\x00abc",
+        b"blob x\x00abc",
+        b"blob 4\x00abc",
+        b"blob 3",
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="header is invalid"):
+            module.parse_loose_object(zlib.compress(header))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "MAX_OBJECT_BYTES", 4)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="exceeds the safe size limit"):
+        module.parse_loose_object(b"12345")

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_branch_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for the Gitea protection policy checker."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import stat
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import ROOT, _load_path
+
+
+def _module(name: str = "branch_protection_coverage"):
+    return _load_path(
+        name,
+        ROOT / "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+    )
+
+
+def _rule(module, name: str = "main", **updates):
+    value = {
+        "rule_name": name,
+        "priority": 1,
+        "created_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+        **module._required("bstein"),
+    }
+    value.update(updates)
+    return value
+
+
+def test_read_bounded_accepts_regular_file_and_closes_descriptor(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module = _module("branch_read_regular")
+    source = tmp_path / "rules.json"
+    source.write_bytes(b"[]")
+    closed: list[int] = []
+    real_close = os.close
+
+    def close(descriptor: int) -> None:
+        closed.append(descriptor)
+        real_close(descriptor)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "close", close)
+    assert module._read_bounded(source) == b"[]"
+    assert len(closed) == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("kind", ["directory", "oversized", "short"])
+def test_read_bounded_rejects_unsafe_or_changed_input(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, kind
+):
+    module = _module(f"branch_read_{kind}")
+    source = tmp_path / "rules"
+    source.write_bytes(b"[]")
+    real_fstat = module.os.fstat
+    real_read = module.os.read
+
+    if kind == "directory":
+        monkeypatch.setattr(
+            module.os,
+            "fstat",
+            lambda descriptor: os.stat_result(
+                (stat.S_IFDIR | 0o700, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0)
+            ),
+        )
+    elif kind == "oversized":
+        monkeypatch.setattr(
+            module.os,
+            "fstat",
+            lambda descriptor: os.stat_result(
+                (stat.S_IFREG | 0o600, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, module.MAX_INPUT + 1, 0, 0, 0)
+            ),
+        )
+    else:
+        monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "fstat", real_fstat)
+        monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "read", lambda descriptor, maximum: b"[")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError):
+        module._read_bounded(source)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "read", real_read)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "pattern",
+    [
+        "{main}",
+        "{main,master}",
+        "m?in",
+        "m[ai]in",
+        "m[!z]in",
+        "m[a-z]in",
+        "m\\ain",
+        "m\\",
+        "m[",
+        "m[]",
+        "m[!]",
+        "m[[a]",
+        "m[\\a]",
+        "m[-a]",
+        "m[a-]",
+        "m[a-b-c]",
+        "m[z-a]",
+        "m[aa-b]",
+        "m{ain}",
+        "m{ain,}",
+        "m{ain,aster",
+    ],
+)
+def test_every_special_or_malformed_glob_fails_closed(pattern):
+    module = _module("branch_glob_invalid")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="glob branch protection"):
+        module._literal_rule(pattern)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("pattern", ["", "x" * 256, "máin"])
+def test_rule_names_are_ascii_and_bounded(pattern):
+    module = _module("branch_name_bounds")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="rule name"):
+        module._literal_rule(pattern)
+
+
+def test_plain_rule_matching_is_exact_and_case_sensitive():
+    module = _module("branch_literal_case")
+    assert module._literal_rule("main") == "main"
+    assert module._literal_rule("MAIN") == "MAIN"
+    assert module.evaluate(
+        json.dumps([_rule(module, name="MAIN")]).encode(), "main", "bstein"
+    ) == "ABSENT"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [None, "x" * 65, "invalid", "2026-01-01T00:00:00"])
+def test_created_at_requires_short_timezone_aware_iso(value):
+    module = _module("branch_created_bounds")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="creation time"):
+        module._created(value)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value",
+    [b"x" * (1024 * 1024 + 1), b"{}", json.dumps([None]).encode()],
+)
+def test_evaluate_rejects_invalid_top_level_inputs(value):
+    module = _module("branch_evaluate_top")
+    with pytest.raises((module.PolicyError, json.JSONDecodeError)):
+        module.evaluate(value, "main", "bstein")
+
+
+def test_evaluate_rejects_unknown_branch_and_excess_rules():
+    module = _module("branch_evaluate_bounds")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="input"):
+        module.evaluate(b"[]", "release", "bstein")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="response"):
+        module.evaluate(json.dumps([{}] * 101).encode(), "main", "bstein")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("priority", [True, -1, 1_000_001, "1"])
+def test_evaluate_rejects_ambiguous_priority_types(priority):
+    module = _module("branch_priority_bounds")
+    rule = _rule(module, priority=priority)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="priority"):
+        module.evaluate(json.dumps([rule]).encode(), "main", "bstein")
+
+
+def test_legacy_zero_priority_is_accepted_but_duplicate_ties_fail_closed():
+    module = _module("branch_priority_zero")
+    assert module.evaluate(
+        json.dumps([_rule(module, priority=0)]).encode(), "main", "bstein"
+    ) == "PRESENT"
+
+    first = _rule(module, priority=0, created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z")
+    second = _rule(
+        module,
+        priority=0,
+        created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+        enable_force_push=True,
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="duplicate primary-branch"):
+        module.evaluate(json.dumps([first, second]).encode(), "main", "bstein")
+
+
+def test_any_special_rule_blocks_absent_create_and_present_readback():
+    module = _module("branch_special_readback")
+    for rules in (
+        [_rule(module, name="feature/*")],
+        [_rule(module), _rule(module, name="{main}", priority=0)],
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="human review"):
+            module.evaluate(json.dumps(rules).encode(), "main", "bstein")
+
+
+def test_main_reports_success_and_failures(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, capsys):
+    module = _module("branch_main_paths")
+    source = tmp_path / "rules.json"
+    source.write_text(json.dumps([_rule(module)]), encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "argv", ["checker", str(source), "main", "bstein"])
+    assert module.main() == 0
+    assert capsys.readouterr().out.strip() == "PRESENT"
+
+    source.write_text("not-json", encoding="utf-8")
+    assert module.main() == 1
+    assert "branch protection check failed" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module, "_read_bounded", lambda _path: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError())
+    )
+    assert module.main() == 1

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_internal_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+"""Behavioral coverage for internal safe-Gitea client and policy paths."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import types
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+from email.message import Message
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_gitea_support import CLIENT_PATH, Response, _load
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import _load_path
+
+
+def _policy(name: str = "gitea_policy_coverage"):
+    return _load_path(name, CLIENT_PATH.parent / "gitea_api_policy.py")
+
+
+def test_runtime_token_reader_and_fixed_origin(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    token = tmp_path / "token"
+    token.write_text("  synthetic-runtime-value  \n", encoding="utf-8")
+    assert module.read_token(token) == "synthetic-runtime-value"
+    token.write_text(" \n", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="empty"):
+        module.read_token(token)
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BASE_URL", module.CANONICAL_BASE_URL)
+    assert module.configured_base_url() == module.CANONICAL_BASE_URL
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BASE_URL", "https://example.invalid")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="fixed"):
+        module.configured_base_url()
+
+
+def test_safe_urlopen_delegates_only_to_deadline_bounded_exchange(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    sentinel = object()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.deadline_http,
+        "open_bounded",
+        lambda request, *, maximum, timeout: (request, maximum, timeout, sentinel),
+    )
+    request = object()
+    assert module._safe_urlopen(request, 7) == (
+        request,
+        module.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
+        7,
+        sentinel,
+    )
+
+
+def test_api_target_and_request_body_edge_paths(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="path exceeds"):
+        module._split_api_path("/api/v1/" + "x" * 510)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="request body"):
+        module.authorize_request(
+            "GET", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra", {"unexpected": True}
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="query"):
+        module.authorize_request(
+            "POST",
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?page=1",
+            {},
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="only read"):
+        module.authorize_request("TRACE", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls", None)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="accepts only"):
+        module.authorize_request("POST", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls", [])
+
+
+def test_response_status_fallback_and_nested_fail_closed():
+    module = _load()
+
+    class GetCodeResponse(Response):
+        def __init__(self):
+            super().__init__({"name": "cassandra"}, status=200)
+            del self.status
+
+        def getcode(self):
+            return 200
+
+    assert (
+        module.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="synthetic",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: GetCodeResponse(),
+        )
+        == b'{"name": "cassandra"}'
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="omitted required"):
+        module._nested({"base": None}, "base", "ref")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("body", [b"not-json", b"[]"])
+def test_create_response_requires_json_object(body: bytes):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="invalid pull-request metadata"):
+        module._require_create_response(
+            body,
+            repo="cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="feature/test",
+            head_sha="a" * 40,
+            title="WIP: Test",
+            body="Evidence",
+        )
+
+
+def test_write_body_handles_empty_newline_and_missing_newline(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+
+    class Buffer:
+        value = bytearray()
+
+        @classmethod
+        def write(cls, value):
+            cls.value.extend(value)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.sys, "stdout", types.SimpleNamespace(buffer=Buffer))
+    module._write_body(b"")
+    module._write_body(b"one\n")
+    module._write_body(b"two")
+    assert bytes(Buffer.value) == b"one\ntwo\n"
+
+
+def test_main_executes_broker_read_and_create_paths(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    outputs: list[bytes] = []
+    client = types.ModuleType("scm_broker_client")
+    client.read = lambda path: json.dumps({"path": path}).encode()
+    client.create_draft = lambda repo, **data: json.dumps(
+        {"repo": repo, **data}, sort_keys=True
+    ).encode()
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "scm_broker_client", client)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_write_body", outputs.append)
+
+    assert module.main(["read", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"]) == 0
+    assert json.loads(outputs.pop()) == {"path": "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"}
+    assert (
+        module.main(
+            [
+                "create-draft",
+                "cassandra",
+                "--base",
+                "main",
+                "--head",
+                "feature/coverage",
+                "--head-sha",
+                "a" * 40,
+                "--title",
+                "Coverage repair",
+                "--body",
+                "Review the focused tests",
+            ]
+        )
+        == 0
+    )
+    assert json.loads(outputs.pop())["repo"] == "cassandra"
+
+
+def test_main_handles_http_and_policy_failures(monkeypatch, capsys):
+    module = _load()
+    client = types.ModuleType("scm_broker_client")
+
+    def http_failure(_path):
+        headers = Message()
+        raise urllib.error.HTTPError("url", 503, "unavailable", headers, None)
+
+    client.read = http_failure
+    client.create_draft = lambda *_a, **_k: b"{}"
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "scm_broker_client", client)
+    assert module.main(["read", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"]) == 1
+    assert "HTTP 503" in capsys.readouterr().err
+    client.read = lambda _path: (_ for _ in ()).throw(module.PolicyError("rejected"))
+    assert module.main(["read", "/not-allowed"]) == 1
+    assert "no credential" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("function", "value"),
+    [
+        ("_validate_repo", "."),
+        ("_validate_repo", ".."),
+        ("_validate_sha", "short"),
+        ("_validate_pr_number", True),
+        ("_validate_pr_number", 0),
+        ("_validate_pr_number", 2_147_483_648),
+    ],
+)
+def test_policy_scalar_validators_reject_ambiguous_values(function, value):
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_scalar")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError):
+        getattr(module, function)(value)
+
+
+def test_ref_bounds_cover_utf8_controls_git_failure_and_success(monkeypatch):
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_refs")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="valid UTF-8"):
+        module._validate_ref_bounds("\ud800", "head")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="UTF-8"):
+        module._validate_ref_bounds("🧪" * 64, "head")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="safe same"):
+        module._validate_ref("bad\nref", "head")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.subprocess,
+        "run",
+        lambda *_a, **_k: subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 1),
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="same-repository"):
+        module._validate_ref("invalid-ref", "head")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.subprocess,
+        "run",
+        lambda *_a, **_k: subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0),
+    )
+    assert module._validate_ref("feature/valid", "head") == "feature/valid"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("value", "required", "match"),
+    [
+        (None, False, "must be text"),
+        ("  ", True, "must not be empty"),
+        ("\ud800", False, "valid UTF-8"),
+        ("x\x00y", False, "safe request limit"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_text_validation_rejects_nontext_empty_invalid_and_controls(
+    value, required, match
+):
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_text")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match=match):
+        module._validate_text(value, "field", 20, 20, required=required)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("key", "expected"),
+    [
+        ("password", True),
+        ("accountKey", True),
+        ("registry-key", True),
+        ("clientEmail", True),
+        ("clientId", True),
+        ("accessId", True),
+        ("connectionString", True),
+        ("dockerConfigJson", True),
+        ("release_note", False),
+    ],
+)
+def test_sensitive_key_semantics_cover_generic_forms(key, expected):
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_keys")
+    assert module._is_sensitive_key(key) is expected
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("value", "expected"),
+    [
+        ("", False),
+        ('"synthetic"', True),
+        ("{encoded}", True),
+        ("Bearer value-12345678", True),
+        ("ghp_" + "a" * 24, True),
+        ("https://example.invalid/value", True),
+        ("name@example.invalid", True),
+        ("${RUNTIME_VALUE}", True),
+        ("AbCdEf0123456789", True),
+        ("reject empty values", False),
+        ("ordinary", True),
+    ],
+)
+def test_assignment_value_shape_distinguishes_prose_from_credentials(value, expected):
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_assignment_values")
+    assert module._looks_sensitive_assignment_value(value) is expected
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("value", "expected"),
+    [
+        ("single", False),
+        ("add regression coverage", True),
+        ("add regression_coverage", False),
+        ("ordinary engineering prose", False),
+    ],
+)
+def test_prose_classifier_covers_length_punctuation_and_lead_words(value, expected):
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_prose")
+    assert module._looks_like_prose(value) is expected
+
+
+def test_structured_json_walk_covers_lists_nonstring_keys_and_limits():
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_json_walk")
+    assert module._json_value_has_sensitive_assignment({1: "ignored"}) is False
+    assert module._json_value_has_sensitive_assignment([{"release": "safe"}]) is False
+    assert (
+        module._json_value_has_sensitive_assignment({"client_secret": "value"}) is True
+    )
+    assert (
+        module._json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(
+            {"outer": {"client_secret": "value"}}
+        )
+        is True
+    )
+    assert (
+        module._json_value_has_sensitive_assignment({"type": "service-account"}) is True
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="scan limit"):
+        module._json_value_has_sensitive_assignment([], depth=33)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="scan limit"):
+        module._json_value_has_sensitive_assignment([], nodes=[2048])
+
+
+def test_json_key_decoder_and_embedded_document_scanner_cover_failures():
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_json_decoder")
+    assert module._decode_json_key("client\\u005fsecret") == ("client_secret", True)
+    decoded, valid = module._decode_json_key("client\\qsecret")
+    assert valid is False and "client" in decoded
+    assert list(module._decoded_json_documents("prose only")) == []
+    assert list(module._decoded_json_documents("x {bad y [1, 2]")) == [[1, 2]]
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="scan limit"):
+        list(module._decoded_json_documents("{" * 33))
+    assert (
+        module._has_structured_sensitive_assignment('"client\\qsecret": value') is True
+    )
+    assert (
+        module._has_structured_sensitive_assignment("type:\n  service-account") is True
+    )
+
+
+def test_high_entropy_detector_covers_long_mixed_and_low_entropy_values():
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_entropy")
+    assert module._has_high_entropy_token("A1_" * 100) is True
+    assert (
+        module._has_high_entropy_token(
+            "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789+/_="
+        )
+        is True
+    )
+    assert module._has_high_entropy_token("a" * 64) is False
+    assert module._has_high_entropy_token("short prose") is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "query",
+    [
+        "bad",
+        "a=1&b=2&c=3&d=4",
+        "page=1&page=2",
+        "=value",
+        "unexpected=1",
+        "page=abc",
+        "page=01",
+        "page=10001",
+        "limit=51",
+        "state=merged",
+    ],
+)
+def test_query_validator_covers_each_rejection_class(query):
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_query")
+    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit("/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?" + query)
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError):
+        module._validate_query(target, {"page", "limit", "state"})
+
+
+def test_draft_title_rejects_prefix_without_content():
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_empty_draft")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="after the draft prefix"):
+        module._draft_title("WIP:")
+
+
+def test_query_validator_rejects_noncanonical_raw_form():
+    module = _policy("gitea_policy_raw_query")
+    target = urllib.parse.SplitResult("", "", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra", "%", "")
+    with pytest.raises(module.PolicyError, match="canonical ASCII"):
+        module._validate_query(target, set())

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_pr_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+"""Route and request-boundary contracts for the Atlas Gitea client."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_gitea_support import HEAD_SHA, Response, _load
+
+def test_default_opener_rejects_redirects_under_an_absolute_deadline(monkeypatch):
+    client = _load()
+    source = urllib.request.Request(
+        "https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+        headers={"Authorization": "token redirect-sentinel"},
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(urllib.error.URLError) as exc:
+        client.deadline_http._RejectRedirect().redirect_request(
+            source,
+            None,
+            302,
+            "Found",
+            {},
+            "https://evil.example/collect",
+        )
+
+    assert "redirect-sentinel" not in str(exc.value)
+    seen = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        client.deadline_http,
+        "open_bounded",
+        lambda request, *, maximum, timeout: seen.append(
+            (request, maximum, timeout)
+        ),
+    )
+    client._safe_urlopen(source, 30)
+    assert seen == [(source, client.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, 30)]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("base_url", "path"),
+    [
+        ("https://evil.example", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("http://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev:443", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev/", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("HTTPS://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://SCM.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://user@scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev", "https://evil.example/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/evil/cassandra"),
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/%61tlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/../admin"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_host_owner_and_path_escape_attempts_are_rejected(base_url: str, path: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.build_request("GET", path, base_url=base_url, token="secret")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\nHost: evil.example",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\r\nX-Test: value",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\tignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x00ignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x1fignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x7fignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra\\pulls\\1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/%31",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/１",
+        " https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+        "https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+    ],
+)
+def test_raw_noncanonical_target_is_rejected_before_urlsplit_and_opener(
+    path: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    split_called = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_urlsplit = client.urllib.parse.urlsplit
+
+    def urlsplit(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal split_called
+        split_called = True
+        return original_urlsplit(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client.urllib.parse, "urlsplit", urlsplit)
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
+    assert split_called is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1?",
+        "//scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/./pulls/1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/../admin",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra//pulls/1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1?limit=01",
+    ],
+)
+def test_noncanonical_round_trip_or_segments_never_reach_opener(path: str):
+    client = _load()
+    opener_called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?state=open&limit=20&page=1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/7",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/7/commits?limit=20",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/7/files?page=1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/branches",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/branches/main",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/commits?limit=10",
+        f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/git/commits/{HEAD_SHA}",
+        f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/commits/{HEAD_SHA}/status",
+        f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/commits/{HEAD_SHA}/statuses?limit=10",
+        f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/statuses/{HEAD_SHA}?page=1",
+    ],
+)
+def test_explicit_read_allowlist_accepts_only_engineering_metadata(path: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    request = client.build_request(
+        "GET", path, base_url=client.CANONICAL_BASE_URL, token="runtime"
+    )
+    assert request.method == "GET"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/hooks",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/actions/secrets",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/actions/variables",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/collaborators",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/branch_protections",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/keys",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/7/reviews",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/7/merge",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/7.diff",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/releases",
+    ],
+)
+def test_privileged_or_content_routes_are_denied_even_for_get(path: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="outside the metadata read allowlist"):
+        client.authorize_request("GET", path, None)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?limit=51",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?state=merged",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?private=true",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?limit=1&limit=2",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra?p=1",
+    ],
+)
+def test_read_query_is_bounded(path: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.authorize_request("GET", path, None)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "query",
+    [
+        "page=0",
+        "page=10001",
+        "page=01",
+        "limit=0",
+        "limit=51",
+        "limit=01",
+        "page=" + "9" * 4000,
+        "page=０",
+        "page=%EF%BC%90",
+        "state=%6fpen",
+        "p%61ge=1",
+        "page=1&page=2",
+        "page=1&" + "x" * 17 + "=1",
+        "state=" + "x" * 17,
+        "page=1&limit=2&state=open&extra=3",
+    ],
+)
+def test_read_query_requires_canonical_bounded_ascii(query: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.authorize_request(
+            "GET", f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?{query}", None
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "suffix",
+    [
+        "pulls/{number}",
+        "pulls/{number}.patch",
+        "pulls/{number}.diff",
+        "pulls/{number}/commits",
+        "pulls/{number}/files",
+        "commits/{number}/status",
+        "commits/{number}/statuses",
+        "statuses/{number}",
+        "branches/{number}",
+    ],
+)
+def test_oversized_numeric_or_captured_path_never_reaches_opener(suffix: str):
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    path = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/" + suffix.format(number="9" * 4000)
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
+    assert called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "number",
+    ["0", "01", "2147483648", "１２", "%31", "12345678901"],
+)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("tail", ["", ".patch", ".diff", "/commits", "/files"])
+def test_noncanonical_or_out_of_range_pr_number_never_reaches_opener(
+    number: str, tail: str
+):
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(
+            f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/{number}{tail}",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert called is False
+
+
+def test_maximum_bounded_pr_number_is_readable():
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    assert (
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/2147483647",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+        == b"{}"
+    )
+    assert called is True

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_pr_creation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+"""Draft-creation input contracts for the Atlas Gitea client."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_gitea_support import (
+    HEAD_SHA,
+    Response,
+    _draft_payload,
+    _draft_response,
+    _load,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("method", "path", "data"),
+    [
+        ("DELETE", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/4", None),
+        ("POST", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/4/merge", {}),
+        (
+            "POST",
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/4/reviews",
+            {"event": "APPROVED"},
+        ),
+        ("PATCH", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/4", {"title": "WIP: x"}),
+        ("PUT", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/branches/main", {}),
+    ],
+)
+def test_merge_approve_close_delete_update_and_other_mutations_are_rejected(
+    method: str, path: str, data: object
+):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.build_request(
+            method, path, base_url=client.CANONICAL_BASE_URL, token="secret", data=data
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "ref",
+    [
+        "foo/.bar",
+        "foo/bar.lock/baz",
+        "foo..bar",
+        "foo@{bar",
+        "foo//bar",
+        "-danger",
+        "danger.",
+        "danger~one",
+        "danger^one",
+        "danger:one",
+        "danger one",
+    ],
+)
+def test_complete_git_ref_validation_rejects_invalid_names(ref: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client._validate_ref(ref, "head")
+
+
+def test_git_ref_validation_uses_fixed_trusted_binary():
+    client = _load()
+
+    assert client._validate_ref.__globals__["GIT_BIN"] == "/usr/bin/git"
+    assert client._validate_ref("hermes/valid-fix", "head") == "hermes/valid-fix"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["base", "head"])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("oversized", ["r" * 100_000, "🧪" * 128])
+def test_oversized_ref_never_invokes_git_request_or_opener(
+    field: str, oversized: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    git_called = False
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def git_run(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal git_called
+        git_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("Git must not receive an oversized ref")
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    refs = {"base": "main", "head": "hermes/fix"}
+    refs[field] = oversized
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="branch-name limit"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base=refs["base"],
+            head=refs["head"],
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title="Focused fix",
+            body="Review evidence",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert git_called is False
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "oversized"),
+    [("repo", "r" * 101), ("title", "🧪" * 200), ("body", "🧪" * 9_000)],
+)
+def test_other_text_bounds_fail_before_git_request_or_opener(
+    field: str, oversized: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    git_called = False
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def git_run(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal git_called
+        git_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("Git must not run before cheap input bounds")
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    values = {
+        "repo": "cassandra",
+        "title": "Focused fix",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+    }
+    values[field] = oversized
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.create_draft(
+            values["repo"],
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert git_called is False
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+def test_create_forces_draft_title_and_same_repository_branch_names():
+    client = _load()
+    assert (
+        client.authorize_request(
+            "POST", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls", _draft_payload()
+        )
+        == "create-draft"
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="draft-title prefix"):
+        client.authorize_request(
+            "POST",
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls",
+            _draft_payload(title="Not a draft"),
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.authorize_request(
+            "POST",
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls",
+            _draft_payload(head="someone:branch"),
+        )
+
+
+def test_runtime_token_is_only_an_authorization_header():
+    client = _load()
+    request = client.build_request(
+        "POST",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls",
+        base_url=client.CANONICAL_BASE_URL,
+        token="do-not-leak",
+        data=_draft_payload(),
+    )
+
+    assert "do-not-leak" not in request.full_url
+    assert b"do-not-leak" not in request.data
+    assert request.get_header("Authorization") == "token do-not-leak"

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_pr_dlp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+"""Credential-loss-prevention contracts for Atlas draft creation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_gitea_support import (
+    HEAD_SHA,
+    Response,
+    _draft_response,
+    _load,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "sensitive",
+    [
+        "client_" + "secret=not-a-real-value",
+        '{"client_' + 'secret":\n"synthetic-value"}',
+        '{"client_' + 'secret"\n:\n"synthetic-value"}',
+        '{"client\\u005f' + 'secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        "client_" + "secret:\n  synthetic-value",
+        '{"client\\q' + 'secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        '{"client\n' + 'secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        '"client_' + 'secret"\x0b:\n"synthetic-value"',
+        "ACCESS_" + "TOKEN = 'not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"refresh_' + 'token": "not-a-real-value"}',
+        "private_" + "key: not-a-real-value",
+        "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_" + "KEY=not-a-real-value",
+        "aws_access_key_" + "id: not-a-real-value",
+        "AWS_SESSION_" + "TOKEN = 'not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"AccessKey' + 'Id":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"SecretAccess' + 'Key":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"Session' + 'Token":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        "aws-security-" + "token: not-a-real-value",
+        "Account" + "Key=not-a-real-value",
+        "SharedAccess" + "Signature: not-a-real-value",
+        "AZURE_STORAGE_CONNECTION_" + "STRING='not-a-real-value'",
+        "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=fake;Account"
+        + "Key=not-a-real-value;EndpointSuffix=example",
+        "?sv=2024-11-04&ss=b&srt=sco&sp=rwdlac&se=2099-01-01&sig=" + "not-a-real-value",
+        "DOCKER_AUTH_" + "CONFIG='not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"auths":{"registry.example":{"auth":"bm90LXJlYWw="}}}',
+        '{"identity' + 'token":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"type":"service_' + 'account","client_email":"fake@example.test"}',
+        '{"private_key_' + 'id":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"client_' + 'email":"fake@example.test"}',
+        "GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS" + "=not-a-real-value",
+        "personal_access_" + "token: not-a-real-value",
+        "GITEA_" + "TOKEN=not-a-real-value",
+        "gitlab-token" + ": not-a-real-value",
+        "pat" + "=not-a-real-value",
+        "Authorization: " + "Bearer not-a-real-credential-value",
+        "authorization = " + '"Basic not-a-real-credential-value"',
+        "Bearer" + "=not-a-real-credential-value",
+        "Basic" + ": not-a-real-credential-value",
+        "pass" + "word=not-a-real-credential",
+        "ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "github_pat_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "glpat-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "xoxb-" + "not-a-real-credential-value-123456",
+        "sk-ant-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "sk-proj-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "sk_live_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "ya29." + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "gta_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "whsec_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "npm_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "pypi-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456789012345",
+        "hf_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "SG." + "notarealvalue1234" + ".notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "SK" + "a" * 32,
+        "https://hooks.slack.com/services/" + "T000/B000/notarealvalue123456",
+        "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123456789/" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "https://fake.webhook.office.com/" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "webhook_" + "url=https://example.test/not-real",
+        "FutureCloudSigning" + "Credential=not-a-real-value",
+        "future-client-signing-" + "key: not-a-real-value",
+        "future_client_signing_" + "key='not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"serviceAccountPrivate' + 'Key":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        "CONTAINER_REGISTRY_" + "CREDENTIAL=not-a-real-value",
+        "someWebhookSigning" + "Secret: not-a-real-value",
+        "client" + "Key=not-a-real-value",
+        "session" + "Key: not-a-real-value",
+        "access" + "Id=not-a-real-value",
+        "credentials" + ": {user: fake}",
+        "private" + "Key: |",
+        "nuget_api_" + "key=not-a-real-value",
+        "oy2" + "a" * 44,
+        "sk_test_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "A1b2C3d4E5f6G7h8I9j0K_l-M+n/O=pQ2rS3tU4vW5xY6zZ7aB8cC9d",
+        "AKIA" + "A" * 16,
+        "AIza" + "a" * 35,
+        "-----BEGIN OPENSSH " + "PRIVATE KEY-----",
+        "ssh-ed25519 " + "bm90YXJlYWxjcmVkZW50aWFsdmFsdWU=",
+        "eyJnotarealheader." + "notarealpayloadvalue." + "notarealsignature",
+    ],
+)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
+def test_create_rejects_expanded_credential_shapes_before_network(
+    sensitive: str, field: str
+):
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+    request_built = False
+
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
+    values[field] = sensitive
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert called is False
+
+
+def test_very_long_compact_body_is_rejected_before_request_or_network():
+    client = _load()
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title="Focused fix",
+            body="a" * 300,
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "safe_text",
+    [
+        "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY is injected at runtime",
+        "Token: reject empty values",
+        "Authorization = preserve header behavior",
+        "Password: add regression",
+        "Review the Authorization header behavior",
+        "Bearer authentication is required for this route",
+        "Document Docker auths payload rejection",
+        "The client_email field belongs to service accounts",
+        "AccountKey assignments must be blocked",
+        "This patch changes token validation without including a value",
+        "FutureCloudSigningCredential handling needs a regression test",
+        "The clientKey name is documented without an assigned value",
+        "A SHA-256 digest 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef is evidence",
+    ],
+)
+def test_credential_policy_keeps_normal_engineering_prose_usable(safe_text: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    assert client._validate_body(safe_text) == safe_text
+    assert client._draft_title(safe_text) == f"WIP: {safe_text}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
+def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network(field: str):
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+    request_built = False
+
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    runtime_token = "exact-random-runtime-sentinel-7b73ac61"
+    values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
+    values[field] = f"Accidental {runtime_token} value"
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token=runtime_token,
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["repo", "base", "head", "title", "body"])
+def test_every_public_field_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_git_or_network(
+    field: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    git_called = False
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    runtime_token = "runtime-sentinel"
+    values = {
+        "repo": "cassandra",
+        "base": "main",
+        "head": "hermes/fix",
+        "title": "Focused fix",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+    }
+    values[field] = runtime_token
+
+    def git_run(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal git_called
+        git_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("Git must not run for a credential-bearing field")
+
+    def build_request(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        raise AssertionError("a request must not be built")
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("the opener must not be called")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client, "build_request", build_request)
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            values["repo"],
+            base=values["base"],
+            head=values["head"],
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token=runtime_token,
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert git_called is False
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "sensitive",
+    [
+        " ".join(["{}"] * 32) + ' {"client_secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        "prefix_" + "ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456_suffix",
+        "client_secret: correct horse battery staple",
+        "'client_secret':\n  synthetic-value",
+    ],
+)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
+def test_structured_scanner_closes_bounded_and_wrapped_token_bypasses(
+    sensitive: str, field: str
+):
+    client = _load()
+    values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
+    values[field] = sensitive
+    called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert called is False

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_pr_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+"""Runtime and Flux integration contracts for the safe Atlas PR client."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import json
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py"
+HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
+if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
+
+
+def _load():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "safe_gitea_api_integration", CLIENT_PATH
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_dry_run_has_no_file_input_and_uses_no_token_or_network(monkeypatch, capsys):
+    client = _load()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client, "read_token", lambda: pytest.fail("read token"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        client, "_safe_urlopen", lambda *_a, **_k: pytest.fail("network")
+    )
+
+    assert (
+        client.main(
+            [
+                "--dry-run",
+                "create-draft",
+                "cassandra",
+                "--base",
+                "main",
+                "--head",
+                "hermes/fix",
+                "--head-sha",
+                HEAD_SHA,
+                "--title",
+                "Repair",
+                "--body",
+                "Evidence only",
+            ]
+        )
+        == 0
+    )
+    output = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out)
+    assert output["operation"] == "create-draft"
+    assert output["owner"] == "atlas"
+    assert "Evidence only" not in json.dumps(output)
+    with pytest.raises(SystemExit):
+        client.parse_args(
+            [
+                "create-draft",
+                "cassandra",
+                "--base",
+                "main",
+                "--head",
+                "hermes/fix",
+                "--head-sha",
+                HEAD_SHA,
+                "--title",
+                "Repair",
+                "--body-file",
+                "/runtime-access/gitea-token",
+            ]
+        )
+
+
+def test_http_error_path_redacts_token(monkeypatch, capsys):
+    client = _load()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client, "read_token", lambda: "do-not-leak")
+
+    def fail(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        raise urllib.error.HTTPError(
+            "https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            403,
+            "forbidden",
+            {},
+            io.BytesIO(b"Authorization: token do-not-leak"),
+        )
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client, "read", lambda *_a, **_k: fail())
+
+    assert client.main(["read", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"]) == 1
+    captured = capsys.readouterr()
+    assert "do-not-leak" not in captured.err
+    assert "credential was disclosed" in captured.err
+
+
+def test_flux_manifest_isolates_vault_token_in_separate_broker_only():
+    client_source = CLIENT_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "scm_broker_client" in client_source
+    assert "GITEA_TOKEN" not in client_source
+
+    deployment = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/agent-deployment.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )
+    template = deployment["spec"]["template"]
+    annotations = template["metadata"]["annotations"]
+    assert not any("gitea" in key.lower() for key in annotations)
+    runtime = next(
+        volume
+        for volume in template["spec"]["volumes"]
+        if volume["name"] == "runtime-access"
+    )
+    assert runtime["emptyDir"]["medium"] == "Memory"
+
+    expected = {"hermes", "terminal", "cli-lane-runner"}
+    mounted = {
+        container["name"]
+        for container in template["spec"]["containers"]
+        if any(
+            mount["name"] == "atlas-pr-skill"
+            and mount["mountPath"]
+            == "/opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests"
+            and mount.get("readOnly") is True
+            for mount in container.get("volumeMounts", [])
+        )
+    }
+    assert mounted == expected
+
+    kustomization = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/kustomization.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )
+    common = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    )
+    boundary = common["configMapGenerator"][0]
+    assert boundary["name"] == "hermes-scm-boundary"
+    assert "gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py" in boundary["files"]
+    assert "gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py" in boundary["files"]
+    assert "scm_broker_client.py=scripts/scm_broker_client.py" in boundary["files"]
+    assert not any("gitea_askpass" in item for item in boundary["files"])
+    generator = next(
+        item
+        for item in kustomization["configMapGenerator"]
+        if item["name"] == "hermes-atlas-pr-skill"
+    )
+    assert generator["files"] == [
+        "SKILL.md=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/SKILL.md",
+        "openai.yaml=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/agents/openai.yaml",
+    ]
+
+    broker = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    )
+    assert broker["metadata"]["namespace"] == "hermes-scm"
+    pod = broker["spec"]["template"]
+    assert pod["spec"]["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-scm-broker"
+    assert pod["metadata"]["annotations"][
+        "vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token"
+    ] == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea"
+    assert not any(
+        volume.get("hostPath") or volume.get("persistentVolumeClaim")
+        for volume in pod["spec"]["volumes"]
+    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_pr_postconditions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+"""Response and postcondition contracts for Atlas draft creation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import copy
+import json
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_gitea_support import (
+    HEAD_SHA,
+    Response,
+    _draft_response,
+    _load,
+)
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [200, 202, 204, 206])
+def test_create_accepts_only_http_201(status: int):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="unexpected HTTP status"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title="Focused fix",
+            body="Review evidence",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(_draft_response(), status=status),
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [201, 202, 204, 206])
+def test_read_accepts_only_http_200(status: int):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="unexpected HTTP status"):
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(b"{}", status=status),
+        )
+
+
+def test_successful_create_validates_each_ref_once(monkeypatch):
+    client = _load()
+    calls = []
+
+    def git_run(command, **_kwargs):
+        calls.append(command)
+        return type("Result", (), {"returncode": 0})()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    client.create_draft(
+        "cassandra",
+        base="main",
+        head="hermes/fix",
+        head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+        title="Focused fix",
+        body="Review evidence",
+        token="runtime",
+        opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(_draft_response()),
+    )
+
+    assert [command[-1] for command in calls] == [
+        "refs/heads/main",
+        "refs/heads/hermes/fix",
+    ]
+
+
+def test_create_verifies_every_server_postcondition():
+    client = _load()
+    calls = []
+
+    def opener(request, timeout):
+        calls.append((request, timeout))
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    result = client.create_draft(
+        "cassandra",
+        base="main",
+        head="hermes/fix",
+        head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+        title="Focused fix",
+        body="Review evidence",
+        token="runtime",
+        opener=opener,
+    )
+
+    assert json.loads(result) == _draft_response()
+    payload = json.loads(calls[0][0].data)
+    assert payload == {
+        "base": "main",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+        "head": "hermes/fix",
+        "title": "WIP: Focused fix",
+    }
+    assert calls[0][1] == 30
+
+
+def test_create_postcondition_rejects_every_material_mismatch():
+    client = _load()
+    mutations = [
+        ("number", 0),
+        ("number", 2_147_483_648),
+        ("state", "closed"),
+        ("draft", False),
+        ("merged", True),
+        ("html_url", "https://evil.example/pulls/3"),
+        ("url", "https://evil.example/api/pulls/3"),
+        ("title", "Focused fix"),
+        ("body", "different"),
+    ]
+    documents = []
+    for key, value in mutations:
+        document = _draft_response()
+        document[key] = value
+        documents.append(document)
+    for path, value in [
+        (("base", "ref"), "master"),
+        (("base", "repo", "full_name"), "evil/cassandra"),
+        (("head", "ref"), "other"),
+        (("head", "sha"), "0" * 40),
+        (("head", "repo", "full_name"), "evil/cassandra"),
+    ]:
+        document = copy.deepcopy(_draft_response())
+        target = document
+        for key in path[:-1]:
+            target = target[key]
+        target[path[-1]] = value
+        documents.append(document)
+
+    for document in documents:
+        with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+            client._require_create_response(
+                json.dumps(document).encode(),
+                repo="cassandra",
+                base="main",
+                head="hermes/fix",
+                head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+                title="WIP: Focused fix",
+                body="Review evidence",
+            )
+
+
+def test_read_response_is_bounded():
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="safe size limit"):
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(b"x" * (client.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)),
+        )
+
+
+def test_direct_api_rejects_unexpected_success_content_type():
+    client = _load()
+    response = Response(b"{}")
+    response.headers.replace_header("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="unexpected response type"):
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: response,
+        )
+
+
+def test_output_redaction_covers_exact_token_and_authorization_header():
+    client = _load()
+    raw = b'{"message":"do-not-leak","debug":"Authorization: token do-not-leak"}'
+    redacted = client.redact_bytes(raw, "do-not-leak")
+
+    assert b"do-not-leak" not in redacted
+    assert redacted.count(b"[REDACTED]") >= 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "reflected",
+    [
+        b"runtime-sentinel",
+        base64.b64encode(b"runtime-sentinel"),
+        base64.b64encode(b"hermes-automation:runtime-sentinel"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_direct_api_rejects_credential_reflection(reflected: bytes):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b'{"unexpected":"' + reflected + b'"}'
+            ),
+        )

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_support.py

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+"""Shared fixtures for the Atlas-only Gitea client contracts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import sys
+from email.message import Message
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py"
+HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
+if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
+
+
+def _load():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("safe_gitea_api", CLIENT_PATH)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def _draft_payload(**updates):
+    payload = {
+        "base": "main",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+        "head": "hermes/review-fix",
+        "title": "WIP: Repair review findings",
+    }
+    payload.update(updates)
+    return payload
+
+
+def _draft_response(**updates):
+    response = {
+        "number": 3,
+        "state": "open",
+        "draft": True,
+        "merged": False,
+        "html_url": "https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/cassandra/pulls/3",
+        "url": "https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/cassandra/pulls/3",
+        "title": "WIP: Focused fix",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+        "base": {"ref": "main", "repo": {"full_name": "atlas/cassandra"}},
+        "head": {
+            "ref": "hermes/fix",
+            "sha": HEAD_SHA,
+            "repo": {"full_name": "atlas/cassandra"},
+        },
+    }
+    response.update(updates)
+    return response
+
+
+class Response:
+    def __init__(self, body: object, status: int | None = None):
+        self.body = body if isinstance(body, bytes) else json.dumps(body).encode()
+        self.status = (
+            status if status is not None else (201 if isinstance(body, dict) else 200)
+        )
+        self.headers = Message()
+        self.headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, *_args):
+        return False
+
+    def read(self, limit=-1):
+        return self.body if limit < 0 else self.body[:limit]

testing/tests/test_hermes_image_builder_vault.py

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ def test_flux_orders_seed_then_jenkins_then_hermes() -> None:
     role_check = {
         "apiVersion": "batch/v1",
         "kind": "Job",
-        "name": "vault-k8s-auth-hermes-9",
+        "name": "vault-k8s-auth-hermes-10",
         "namespace": "vault",
     }
     seed_check = {

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_account_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+"""Core contracts for the dedicated Hermes node SSH identity."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_node_account_support import (
+    ROOT,
+    SCRIPT,
+    _fixture,
+    _key,
+    _load,
+)
+
+def test_reconciler_creates_locked_groupless_account_and_moves_only_exact_key(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, key, other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+    first = {
+        name: (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for name in originals
+    }
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+    second = {
+        name: (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for name in originals
+    }
+
+    assert first == second
+    expected = module._expected_records()
+    for name, original in originals.items():
+        assert first[name] == original + ":".join(expected[name]) + "\n"
+        backup = module.HOST_ETC / f"{name}.hermes-boundary-backup"
+        assert backup.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == original
+    assert expected["shadow"][1] == "!"
+    assert expected["group"][-1] == ""
+    assert "disk:x:6:atlas\n" in first["group"]
+    assert "sudo:x:27:oceanus\n" in first["group"]
+
+    hermes_keys = (
+        module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert hermes_keys == key + "\n"
+    for user in module.LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        legacy = (
+            module.HOST_HOME / user / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+        ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        assert legacy == f"{other} {user}\n"
+        backup = module.HOST_HOME / user / ".ssh/authorized_keys.hermes-boundary-backup"
+        assert backup.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == f"{other} {user}\n{key}\n"
+
+
+def test_identity_conflict_fails_closed_without_editing_account_databases(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, _key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    conflict = originals["passwd"] + (
+        f"unrelated:x:{module.ACCOUNT_UID}:{module.ACCOUNT_GID}:Other:/home/other:/bin/bash\n"
+    )
+    (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").write_text(conflict, encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="identity conflicts"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == conflict
+    for name in ("group", "shadow", "gshadow"):
+        assert (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") == originals[name]
+    assert not (module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT).exists()
+
+
+def test_malformed_account_file_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module, originals, _key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    (module.HOST_ETC / "group").write_text("malformed\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="invalid record"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == originals[
+        "passwd"
+    ]
+    assert (module.HOST_ETC / "group").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "malformed\n"
+
+
+def test_preexisting_home_fails_before_account_database_or_key_changes(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, _key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    home = module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT
+    home.mkdir()
+    (home / "unrelated").write_text("preserve\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="home already exists"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    for name, original in originals.items():
+        assert (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") == original
+        assert not (module.HOST_ETC / f"{name}.hermes-boundary-backup").exists()
+    assert (home / "unrelated").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "preserve\n"
+
+
+def test_flux_daemonset_reconciles_every_node_without_mutating_human_groups():
+    documents = list(
+        yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (ROOT / "services/hermes/node-ssh-access.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        )
+    )
+    daemonset = next(item for item in documents if item["kind"] == "DaemonSet")
+    spec = daemonset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    assert spec["tolerations"] == [{"operator": "Exists"}]
+    command = spec["containers"][0]["args"][0]
+    assert "/opt/node-hardener/node_account_hardening.py" in command
+    assert "sleep 300" in command
+    mounts = {item["name"]: item for item in spec["volumes"]}
+    assert mounts["host-home"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/home"
+    assert mounts["host-etc"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/etc"
+    assert mounts["host-k3s"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/var/lib/rancher/k3s"
+    assert mounts["host-kubelet"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/var/lib/kubelet"
+    assert mounts["host-run-k3s"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/run/k3s"
+    assert mounts["host-run-containerd"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/run/containerd"
+    assert "usermod" not in command
+    assert "groupmod" not in command
+
+    policies = list(
+        yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (ROOT / "services/hermes/networkpolicy.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        )
+    )
+    isolation = next(
+        item
+        for item in policies
+        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access-isolation"
+    )
+    assert isolation["spec"]["ingress"] == []
+    assert isolation["spec"]["egress"] == []
+
+    source = SCRIPT.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "ACCOUNT = \"hermes-agent\"" in source
+    assert "ACCOUNT_UID = 1200" in source
+    assert "ACCOUNT_GID = 1200" in source
+    assert 'LEGACY_ACCOUNTS = ("atlas", "oceanus")' in source
+    assert "audit_membership" in source
+    image = spec["containers"][0]["image"]
+    assert image == (
+        "python@sha256:6d43704baacd1bfbe7c295d7f13079d5d8104ed33568873133f8fc69980419df"
+    )
+    assert mounts["host-polkit-share"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/usr/share/polkit-1"
+
+
+def test_sensitive_roots_get_explicit_zero_permission_acl_for_hermes(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module = _load()
+    sensitive = tmp_path / "k3s"
+    sensitive.mkdir(mode=0o755)
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_UID", 1200)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_GID", os.getgid())
+    # Production requires uid 0. The test process owns its fixture but runs the
+    # real xattr/ACL implementation using the test owner's uid as that boundary.
+
+    module._deny_sensitive_root(sensitive)
+    first = module._read_acl(sensitive)
+    module._deny_sensitive_root(sensitive)
+    second = module._read_acl(sensitive)
+
+    assert first == second
+    entries = module._decode_acl(first, 0o755)
+    assert (module.ACL_USER, 0, 1200) in entries
+    assert (module.ACL_USER_OBJ, 0o7, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) in entries
+    assert (module.ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 0o5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) in entries
+    assert (module.ACL_OTHER, 0o5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) in entries
+    backup = host_etc / "hermes-node-boundary/k3s.acl"
+    assert backup.read_bytes() == b"N"
+    assert backup.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
+
+
+def test_sensitive_root_rejects_non_directory_and_non_root_owner(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module = _load()
+    regular = tmp_path / "not-a-directory"
+    regular.write_text("preserve", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe sensitive directory"):
+        module._deny_sensitive_root(regular)
+
+    directory = tmp_path / "not-root-owned"
+    directory.mkdir()
+    if directory.stat().st_uid == 0:
+        pytest.skip("cannot construct a non-root-owned fixture as root")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="not root-owned"):
+        module._deny_sensitive_root(directory)
+
+
+def test_acl_parser_rejects_malformed_or_incomplete_values():
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="malformed"):
+        module._decode_acl(b"too short", 0o755)
+    incomplete = module._encode_acl(
+        [(module.ACL_USER_OBJ, 0o7, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)]
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="incomplete"):
+        module._decode_acl(incomplete, 0o755)
+
+
+def test_acl_failure_stops_before_installing_the_ssh_key(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    public_key = tmp_path / "public-key"
+    public_key.write_text(
+        _key(b"synthetic-key") + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    moved = False
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_reconcile_databases", lambda: None)
+
+    def fail_acl():
+        raise module.HardeningError("ACL unavailable")
+
+    def move_key(_path):
+        nonlocal moved
+        moved = True
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_deny_sensitive_roots", fail_acl)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_move_key", move_key)
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="ACL unavailable"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert moved is False
+
+
+def test_runtime_ssh_config_forces_dedicated_account_for_every_titan():
+    stage = (
+        ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert '"Host titan-*\\n  User hermes-agent\\n"' in stage
+    agent = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/agent-deployment.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )
+    assert "User atlas" not in yaml.safe_dump(agent)
+    assert "User oceanus" not in yaml.safe_dump(agent)

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_account_io.py

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+"""Crash-safety and metadata contracts for Hermes node-account writes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_node_account_support import (
+    ROOT,
+    _fixture,
+    _load,
+    _typed_key,
+)
+
+def test_key_identity_ignores_options_and_comments_and_removes_legacy_first(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, _originals, key, other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    key_fields = key.split()
+    decorated = f'restrict,command="echo denied" {key_fields[0]} {key_fields[1]} old-comment'
+    for user in module.LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        path = module.HOST_HOME / user / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+        path.write_text(f"{other} {user}\n{decorated}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    writes: list[Path] = []
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+
+    def recording_write(path, value, metadata):
+        writes.append(path)
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", recording_write)
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    key_writes = [path for path in writes if path.name == "authorized_keys"]
+    assert key_writes[-1].parts[-3:] == (module.ACCOUNT, ".ssh", "authorized_keys")
+    assert all(module.ACCOUNT not in path.parts for path in key_writes[:-1])
+
+
+def test_unrelated_modern_human_key_type_is_preserved(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module, _originals, key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    modern = _typed_key("sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com", b"human-security-key", "human")
+    for user in module.LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        path = module.HOST_HOME / user / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+        path.write_text(f"{modern}\n{key}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    for user in module.LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        path = module.HOST_HOME / user / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+        assert path.read_text() == modern + "\n"
+
+
+def test_crash_during_legacy_key_removal_never_installs_duplicate_key(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, _originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+    key_writes = 0
+
+    def crash_on_second_key(path, value, metadata):
+        nonlocal key_writes
+        if path.name == "authorized_keys":
+            key_writes += 1
+            if key_writes == 2:
+                raise module.HardeningError("synthetic crash")
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", crash_on_second_key)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="synthetic crash"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert not (module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys").exists()
+
+
+def test_preexisting_target_key_is_removed_before_legacy_cleanup_and_reinstalled(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, _originals, key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    target = module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    target.write_text(key + " existing\n")
+    writes: list[Path] = []
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+
+    def recording_write(path, value, metadata):
+        if path.name == "authorized_keys":
+            writes.append(path)
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", recording_write)
+    module._move_key(public_key)
+
+    assert writes[0] == target
+    assert writes[-1] == target
+    assert all(path != target for path in writes[1:-1])
+    assert target.read_text() == key + "\n"
+
+
+def test_account_database_write_preserves_mode_owner_and_xattrs(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    passwd = module.HOST_ETC / "passwd"
+    passwd.chmod(0o640)
+    os.setxattr(passwd, "user.hermes-test", b"preserve")
+    before = passwd.stat()
+
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    after = passwd.stat()
+    assert after.st_mode & 0o777 == 0o640
+    assert (after.st_uid, after.st_gid) == (before.st_uid, before.st_gid)
+    assert os.getxattr(passwd, "user.hermes-test") == b"preserve"
+    backup = module.HOST_ETC / "passwd.hermes-boundary-backup"
+    assert os.getxattr(backup, "user.hermes-test") == b"preserve"
+    assert backup.read_text() == originals["passwd"]
+
+
+def test_atomic_write_restores_acl_and_security_label_xattrs(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    io_module = sys.modules[module.atomic_write.__module__]
+    target = tmp_path / "passwd"
+    target.write_bytes(b"old\n")
+    metadata = io_module.FileSnapshot(
+        value=b"old\n",
+        device=target.stat().st_dev,
+        inode=target.stat().st_ino,
+        mode=0o600,
+        uid=os.getuid(),
+        gid=os.getgid(),
+        size=4,
+        mtime_ns=target.stat().st_mtime_ns,
+        ctime_ns=target.stat().st_ctime_ns,
+        xattrs=(
+            ("system.posix_acl_access", b"synthetic-acl"),
+            ("security.selinux", b"synthetic-label"),
+            ("user.audit", b"synthetic-xattr"),
+        ),
+    )
+    restored: list[tuple[str, bytes]] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        io_module.os,
+        "setxattr",
+        lambda _fd, name, value: restored.append((name, value)),
+    )
+
+    io_module.atomic_write(target, b"new\n", metadata)
+
+    assert target.read_bytes() == b"new\n"
+    assert restored == list(metadata.xattrs)
+
+
+def test_concurrent_database_change_is_detected_before_any_account_write(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    real_backup = module.backup_once
+    backup_count = 0
+    writes: list[Path] = []
+
+    def racing_backup(path, snapshot, maximum):
+        nonlocal backup_count
+        result = real_backup(path, snapshot, maximum)
+        backup_count += 1
+        if backup_count == 4:
+            group = module.HOST_ETC / "group"
+            group.write_text(originals["group"] + "race:x:4000:\n")
+        return result
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "backup_once", racing_backup)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", lambda path, *_args: writes.append(path))
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="concurrent host account change"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert writes == []
+
+
+def test_flux_orders_observer_rbac_before_hermes_prunes_old_authority():
+    observer = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml").read_text()
+    )
+    hermes = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes/kustomization.yaml").read_text()
+    )
+    bindings = yaml.safe_load(
+        (
+            ROOT
+            / "clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml"
+        ).read_text()
+    )
+    assert "dependsOn" not in observer["spec"]
+    assert {item["name"] for item in hermes["spec"]["dependsOn"]} >= {
+        "hermes-observer-rbac",
+        "hermes-scm-broker",
+    }
+    assert {item["name"] for item in bindings["spec"]["dependsOn"]} == {
+        "hermes-observer-rbac",
+        "hermes",
+    }
+    assert "hermes-observer-bindings" not in {
+        item["name"] for item in hermes["spec"]["dependsOn"]
+    }
+
+
+def test_sensitive_root_acl_backups_have_unique_host_path_names(monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    seen = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "_deny_sensitive_root",
+        lambda path, backup_name=None: seen.append((path, backup_name)),
+    )
+    module._deny_sensitive_roots()
+    assert [name for _path, name in seen] == [
+        "var-lib-rancher-k3s",
+        "var-lib-kubelet",
+        "run-k3s",
+        "run-containerd",
+    ]
+    assert len({name for _path, name in seen}) == 4

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_account_privilege_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+"""Host privilege-policy audits for the Hermes node SSH identity."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_node_account_support import _fixture
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "database,record",
+    [
+        ("group", "disk:x:6:atlas,hermes-agent\n"),
+        ("gshadow", "disk:!:hermes-agent:atlas\n"),
+        ("gshadow", "disk:!::atlas,hermes-agent\n"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_unexpected_group_or_gshadow_membership_fails_before_writes(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, database: str, record: str
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    path = module.HOST_ETC / database
+    path.write_text(
+        "\n".join(
+            line
+            for line in originals[database].splitlines()
+            if not line.startswith("disk:")
+        )
+        + "\n"
+        + record,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    before = {name: (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_bytes() for name in originals}
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="group access"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert {name: (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_bytes() for name in originals} == before
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "relative,value",
+    [
+        ("sudoers.d/hermes", "hermes-agent ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL\n"),
+        ("sudoers", "ALL ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL\n"),
+        (
+            "polkit-1/rules.d/90-root.rules",
+            'if (subject.user == "hermes-agent") return polkit.Result.YES;\n',
+        ),
+        (
+            "polkit-1/rules.d/90-root.rules",
+            "unix-user:* org.freedesktop.policykit.exec polkit.Result.YES\n",
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_sudo_and_root_equivalent_polkit_authority_fail_closed(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, relative: str, value: str
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    policy = module.HOST_ETC / relative
+    policy.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    policy.write_text(value, encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="sudo|polkit"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert all(
+        (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text() == original
+        for name, original in originals.items()
+    )
+
+
+def test_external_group_authority_source_is_rejected(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    (module.HOST_ETC / "nsswitch.conf").write_text("passwd: files\ngroup: files ldap\n")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="external group"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert all(
+        (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text() == original
+        for name, original in originals.items()
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("database", ["passwd", "group", "initgroups", "shadow"])
+def test_external_identity_authority_sources_fail_closed(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, database: str
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    (module.HOST_ETC / "nsswitch.conf").write_text(
+        f"passwd: files\n{database}: files ldap\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="external group/account"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert all(
+        (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text() == original
+        for name, original in originals.items()
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value",
+    [
+        "#1200 ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL\n",
+        "User_Alias HERMES_IDS = #1200\nHERMES_IDS ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL\n",
+        "User_Alias HERMES_GROUP = %#1200\nHERMES_GROUP ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL\n",
+    ],
+)
+def test_visudo_valid_numeric_and_alias_grants_fail_closed(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, value: str
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_UID", 1200)
+    policy = module.HOST_ETC / "sudoers"
+    policy.write_text(value, encoding="utf-8")
+    validation = subprocess.run(
+        ["/usr/bin/visudo", "-c", "-f", str(policy)],
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    assert validation.returncode == 0, validation.stderr
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="sudo authority"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert all(
+        (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text() == original
+        for name, original in originals.items()
+    )
+
+
+def test_sudo_include_is_bounded_to_the_audited_standard_directory(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    sudoers = module.HOST_ETC / "sudoers"
+    sudoers.write_text("#includedir /opt/external-sudoers\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unaudited authority source"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    sudoers.write_text("#includedir /etc/sudoers.d\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert all(
+        (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text().startswith(original)
+        for name, original in originals.items()
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "relative,value",
+    [
+        (
+            "polkit-1/rules.d/90-hermes.rules",
+            "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\n"
+            "  if (subject.uid == 1200) return polkit.Result.YES;\n"
+            "});\n",
+        ),
+        (
+            "polkit-1/localauthority/50-local.d/hermes.pkla",
+            "[Hermes]\nIdentity=unix-user:1200\n"
+            "Action=org.freedesktop.policykit.exec\nResultActive=yes\n",
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_numeric_polkit_grants_fail_closed(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, relative: str, value: str
+):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_UID", 1200)
+    policy = module.HOST_ETC / relative
+    policy.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    policy.write_text(value, encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="polkit authority"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert all(
+        (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text() == original
+        for name, original in originals.items()
+    )
+
+
+def test_writable_privilege_policy_is_rejected(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    sudoers = module.HOST_ETC / "sudoers"
+    sudoers.write_text("root ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL\n")
+    sudoers.chmod(0o666)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe mutation"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert all(
+        (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text() == original
+        for name, original in originals.items()
+    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_account_support.py

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+"""Shared fixtures for dedicated Hermes node-account contracts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+SCRIPT = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPT.parent))
+
+
+def _key(material: bytes, comment: str = "") -> str:
+    key_type = b"ssh-ed25519"
+    blob = len(key_type).to_bytes(4, "big") + key_type + material
+    suffix = f" {comment}" if comment else ""
+    return "ssh-ed25519 " + base64.b64encode(blob).decode() + suffix
+
+
+def _typed_key(key_type: str, material: bytes, comment: str = "") -> str:
+    encoded_type = key_type.encode()
+    blob = len(encoded_type).to_bytes(4, "big") + encoded_type + material
+    suffix = f" {comment}" if comment else ""
+    return f"{key_type} {base64.b64encode(blob).decode()}{suffix}"
+
+
+def _load():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("node_account_hardening_test", SCRIPT)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def _fixture(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_home = tmp_path / "home"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    host_home.mkdir()
+    originals = {
+        "passwd": (
+            "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n"
+            "atlas:x:2000:2000:Atlas:/home/atlas:/bin/bash\n"
+            "oceanus:x:2001:2001:Oceanus:/home/oceanus:/bin/bash\n"
+        ),
+        "group": (
+            "root:x:0:\n"
+            "atlas:x:2000:\n"
+            "oceanus:x:2001:\n"
+            "disk:x:6:atlas\n"
+            "sudo:x:27:oceanus\n"
+        ),
+        "shadow": (
+            "root:!:1:0:99999:7:::\n"
+            "atlas:!:1:0:99999:7:::\n"
+            "oceanus:!:1:0:99999:7:::\n"
+        ),
+        "gshadow": (
+            "root:!::\n"
+            "atlas:!::\n"
+            "oceanus:!::\n"
+            "disk:!::atlas\n"
+            "sudo:!::oceanus\n"
+        ),
+    }
+    for name, value in originals.items():
+        (host_etc / name).write_text(value, encoding="utf-8")
+    key = _key(b"synthetic-hermes-key")
+    other = _key(b"human-operator-key")
+    for user in ("atlas", "oceanus"):
+        ssh = host_home / user / ".ssh"
+        ssh.mkdir(parents=True)
+        (ssh / "authorized_keys").write_text(
+            f"{other} {user}\n{key}\n", encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    public_key = tmp_path / "public-key"
+    public_key.write_text(key + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_HOME", host_home)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_GID", os.getgid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_POLKIT_SHARE", tmp_path / "missing-polkit")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_deny_sensitive_roots", lambda: None)
+    return module, originals, key, other, public_key

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_acl_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for node-storage ACL hardening."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import errno
+import os
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_node_account_support import _fixture, _load
+
+
+def test_acl_decoder_rejects_version_permissions_and_adds_missing_mask():
+    module = _load()
+    valid = [
+        (module.ACL_USER_OBJ, 7, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+        (module.ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+        (module.ACL_OTHER, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+    ]
+    wrong_version = module.ACL_HEADER.pack(99) + b"".join(
+        module.ACL_ENTRY.pack(*entry) for entry in valid
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="version"):
+        module._decode_acl(wrong_version, 0o755)
+    bad_permission = module._encode_acl([*valid, (module.ACL_USER, 8, 1200)])
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="permission"):
+        module._decode_acl(bad_permission, 0o755)
+    updated = module._decode_acl(
+        module._acl_with_deny(module._encode_acl(valid), 0o755), 0o755
+    )
+    assert (module.ACL_MASK, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) in updated
+    assert (module.ACL_USER, 0, module.ACCOUNT_UID) in updated
+
+
+def test_read_acl_handles_absence_and_propagates_other_errors(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    module = _load()
+    path = tmp_path / "root"
+    path.mkdir()
+
+    def missing(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        raise OSError(errno.ENODATA, "missing")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "getxattr", missing)
+    assert module._read_acl(path) == b""
+
+    def denied(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        raise OSError(errno.EPERM, "denied")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "getxattr", denied)
+    with pytest.raises(OSError):
+        module._read_acl(path)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [b"", b"X", b"A", b"Nextra"])
+def test_acl_backup_validator_rejects_malformed_encodings(value):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="backup is malformed"):
+        module._validate_acl_backup(value)
+    module._validate_acl_backup(b"N")
+    valid = module._encode_acl(
+        [
+            (module.ACL_USER_OBJ, 7, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (module.ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (module.ACL_OTHER, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+        ]
+    )
+    module._validate_acl_backup(b"A" + valid)
+
+
+def test_acl_backup_reuses_valid_existing_copy(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    root = host_etc / "hermes-node-boundary"
+    root.mkdir(parents=True)
+    backup = root / "k3s.acl"
+    backup.write_bytes(b"N")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_GID", os.getgid())
+    module._acl_backup_once(tmp_path / "k3s", b"")
+    assert backup.read_bytes() == b"N"
+
+
+def test_acl_backup_short_write_cleans_temporary(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_GID", os.getgid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "write", lambda _fd, _value: 0)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="short sensitive"):
+        module._acl_backup_once(tmp_path / "k3s", b"")
+    assert not list((host_etc / "hermes-node-boundary").glob(".*.hermes-*"))
+
+
+def test_acl_backup_tolerates_concurrent_first_writer(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_GID", os.getgid())
+    real_link = os.link
+
+    def race(source, target, **kwargs):
+        real_link(source, target, **kwargs)
+        raise FileExistsError()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "link", race)
+    module._acl_backup_once(tmp_path / "k3s", b"")
+    assert (host_etc / "hermes-node-boundary/k3s.acl").read_bytes() == b"N"
+
+
+def test_sensitive_root_failure_restores_existing_acl(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    root = tmp_path / "k3s"
+    root.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    current = module._encode_acl(
+        [
+            (module.ACL_USER_OBJ, 7, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (module.ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (module.ACL_MASK, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (module.ACL_OTHER, 5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+        ]
+    )
+    reads = iter((current, current))
+    writes = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_read_acl", lambda _path: next(reads))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_acl_backup_once", lambda *_a, **_k: None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.os, "setxattr", lambda *args, **kwargs: writes.append(args[2])
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="validation failed"):
+        module._deny_sensitive_root(root)
+    assert writes[-1] == current
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("remove_errno", [errno.ENODATA, errno.EPERM])
+def test_sensitive_root_failure_removes_new_acl_or_propagates_cleanup_error(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch, remove_errno
+):
+    module = _load()
+    root = tmp_path / "k3s"
+    root.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_read_acl", lambda _path: b"")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_acl_backup_once", lambda *_a, **_k: None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.os,
+        "setxattr",
+        lambda *_a, **_k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("set failed")),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.os,
+        "removexattr",
+        lambda *_a, **_k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError(remove_errno, "remove")),
+    )
+    expected = OSError if remove_errno == errno.EPERM else RuntimeError
+    with pytest.raises(expected):
+        module._deny_sensitive_root(root)
+
+
+def test_database_validation_failure_rolls_back_all_writes(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, _public = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    real_read = module._read_regular
+    calls = 0
+
+    def missing_expected(path, maximum=module.MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        if calls == 1:
+            return originals["passwd"].encode(), path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+        return real_read(path, maximum)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_read_regular", missing_expected)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="validation failed"):
+        module._reconcile_databases()
+    for name, value in originals.items():
+        assert (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text() == value
+
+
+def test_preexisting_target_key_removal_is_verified(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, _originals, key, _other, public = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    target = module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    target.write_text(key + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+
+    def ignore_preinstall_target(path, value, metadata):
+        if path == target and value == b"":
+            return
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", ignore_preinstall_target)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="preexisting Hermes authorization"):
+        module._move_key(public)
+
+
+def test_existing_target_without_key_does_not_need_precleanup(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, _originals, _key_value, other, public = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    target = module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    target.write_text(other + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    module._move_key(public)
+    assert target.read_text().endswith("\n")

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_audit_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for dedicated node-account privilege audits."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import struct
+import sys
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_node_account_support import _load
+
+
+def _audit_module():
+    hardening = _load()
+    return sys.modules[hardening.audit_membership.__module__]
+
+
+def test_member_parser_handles_empty_valid_malformed_and_duplicates():
+    module = _audit_module()
+    assert module._members("", "group") == set()
+    assert module._members("one,two", "group") == {"one", "two"}
+    for value in ("one,", " one", "one,one"):
+        with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError):
+            module._members(value, "group")
+
+
+def test_membership_audit_accepts_unrelated_records_and_rejects_account():
+    module = _audit_module()
+    module.audit_membership(
+        "hermes-agent", [["disk", "x", "6", "atlas"]], [["disk", "!", "atlas", ""]]
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="supplementary"):
+        module.audit_membership(
+            "hermes-agent", [["disk", "x", "6", "hermes-agent"]], []
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="gshadow"):
+        module.audit_membership("hermes-agent", [], [["disk", "!", "hermes-agent", ""]])
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("kind", ["mode", "symlink"])
+def test_policy_files_reject_unsafe_directories(tmp_path, kind):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    root = host_etc / "sudoers.d"
+    if kind == "mode":
+        root.mkdir(mode=0o777)
+        root.chmod(0o777)
+    else:
+        target = tmp_path / "target"
+        target.mkdir()
+        root.symlink_to(target)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe sudo/polkit"):
+        module._policy_files(host_etc, tmp_path / "share", os.getuid())
+
+
+def test_policy_file_count_is_bounded(tmp_path):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    root = tmp_path / "etc/sudoers.d"
+    root.mkdir(parents=True)
+    for index in range(257):
+        (root / str(index)).write_text("# safe\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="too many"):
+        module._policy_files(tmp_path / "etc", tmp_path / "share", os.getuid())
+
+
+def _acl(*entries):
+    return struct.pack("<I", 2) + b"".join(
+        struct.pack("<HHI", *entry) for entry in entries
+    )
+
+
+def test_policy_metadata_accepts_safe_acl_and_rejects_malformed_or_writable():
+    module = _audit_module()
+    safe = SimpleNamespace(
+        uid=0,
+        mode=0o600,
+        xattrs=(("system.posix_acl_access", _acl((1, 6, 0xFFFFFFFF))),),
+    )
+    module._audit_policy_metadata(safe, 0, 1200)
+    malformed = SimpleNamespace(
+        uid=0, mode=0o600, xattrs=(("system.posix_acl_access", b"bad"),)
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="ACL is malformed"):
+        module._audit_policy_metadata(malformed, 0, 1200)
+    writable = SimpleNamespace(
+        uid=0, mode=0o600, xattrs=(("system.posix_acl_access", _acl((2, 2, 1200))),)
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="grants Hermes write"):
+        module._audit_policy_metadata(writable, 0, 1200)
+
+
+def test_active_sudo_policy_handles_blank_comments_numeric_and_includes():
+    module = _audit_module()
+    text = (
+        "\n# ordinary comment\n#1200 ALL=(ALL) ALL\n"
+        "#includedir /etc/sudoers.d\nroot ALL=(ALL) ALL\n"
+    )
+    active = module._active_sudo_policy(text)
+    assert "#1200" in active and "root ALL" in active
+    assert "ordinary" not in active and "includedir" not in active
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unaudited"):
+        module._active_sudo_policy("@include /external/policy\n")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "directive",
+    [
+        '#include "/etc/evil path"',
+        "#include '/etc/evil path'",
+        "#include /etc/evil\\ path",
+        "#include\t/etc/evil",
+        "#include /etc/evil",
+        "#includedir /opt/other",
+        '#includedir "/etc/sudoers.d"',
+        "@include /external/policy",
+        '@include "/etc/evil path"',
+        "@includedir /opt/other",
+        "#include",
+        "@includedir",
+    ],
+)
+def test_every_include_spelling_outside_the_standard_dir_fails_closed(directive: str):
+    """No include form may reach the comment branch and stay unaudited."""
+    module = _audit_module()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unaudited"):
+        module._active_sudo_policy(directive + "\n")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "directive",
+    ["#includedir /etc/sudoers.d", "@includedir /etc/sudoers.d"],
+)
+def test_standard_includedir_is_the_only_allowed_include(directive: str):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    active = module._active_sudo_policy(directive + "\nroot ALL=(ALL) ALL\n")
+    assert active == "root ALL=(ALL) ALL"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "line",
+    ["#included by an operator note", "#include-guard notes", "#includes history"],
+)
+def test_comment_lines_that_only_resemble_includes_stay_comments(line: str):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    active = module._active_sudo_policy(line + "\nroot ALL=(ALL) ALL\n")
+    assert active == "root ALL=(ALL) ALL"
+
+
+def test_identity_matcher_covers_account_numeric_and_unrelated_values():
+    module = _audit_module()
+    assert module._mentions_dedicated_identity("hermes-agent ALL", "hermes-agent", 1200)
+    assert module._mentions_dedicated_identity("#1200 ALL", "hermes-agent", 1200)
+    assert not module._mentions_dedicated_identity(
+        "hermes-agent-extra 12001", "hermes-agent", 1200
+    )
+
+
+def _snapshot(value: bytes, *, mode=0o600, uid=0, xattrs=()):
+    return SimpleNamespace(value=value, mode=mode, uid=uid, xattrs=tuple(xattrs))
+
+
+def test_privilege_audit_accepts_files_systemd_nss_and_comments(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    nss = host_etc / "nsswitch.conf"
+    nss.write_text(
+        "passwd: files systemd\nhosts: files dns\n# comment\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    sudoers = host_etc / "sudoers"
+    sudoers.write_text("# safe comment\nroot ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "read_regular",
+        lambda path, maximum: _snapshot(path.read_bytes(), uid=os.getuid()),
+    )
+    module.audit_privilege_policies(
+        "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "share"
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("value", "match"),
+    [
+        (b"passwd: \n", "external group/account"),
+        (b"passwd: files\xff\n", "not UTF-8"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_nsswitch_audit_rejects_empty_or_non_utf8_sources(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch, value, match
+):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    path = host_etc / "nsswitch.conf"
+    path.write_bytes(value)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "read_regular",
+        lambda _path, _maximum: _snapshot(value, uid=os.getuid()),
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match=match):
+        module.audit_privilege_policies(
+            "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "share"
+        )
+
+
+def test_policy_input_rejects_non_utf8_and_total_size(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    sudoers = host_etc / "sudoers"
+    sudoers.write_bytes(b"\xff")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "read_regular",
+        lambda _path, _maximum: _snapshot(b"\xff", uid=os.getuid()),
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="not UTF-8"):
+        module.audit_privilege_policies(
+            "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "share"
+        )
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_policy_files", lambda *_a: [sudoers] * 9)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "read_regular",
+        lambda _path, _maximum: _snapshot(b"#" * (256 * 1024), uid=os.getuid()),
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="exceeds safe limit"):
+        module.audit_privilege_policies(
+            "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "share"
+        )
+
+
+def test_broad_sudo_and_pkla_paths_are_rejected(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _audit_module()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    sudoers = host_etc / "sudoers"
+    sudoers.write_text("%ALL ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module,
+        "read_regular",
+        lambda path, maximum: _snapshot(path.read_bytes(), uid=os.getuid()),
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="broad sudo"):
+        module.audit_privilege_policies(
+            "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "share"
+        )
+
+    sudoers.unlink()
+    policy = host_etc / "polkit-1/localauthority/policy.pkla"
+    policy.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    policy.write_text(
+        "Identity=unix-user:*\nAction=org.freedesktop.policykit.exec\nResultAny=yes\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="root-equivalent broad polkit"):
+        module.audit_privilege_policies(
+            "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "share"
+        )

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_hardening_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for node account/key reconciliation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import os
+import sys
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_node_account_support import (
+    _fixture,
+    _key,
+    _load,
+    _typed_key,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("value", "fields", "match"),
+    [
+        (b"name:\xff\n", 2, "not UTF-8"),
+        (b"name:x", 2, "final newline"),
+        (b":x\n", 2, "invalid record"),
+        (b"name:x\nname:y\n", 2, "invalid record"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_account_record_parser_rejects_encoding_shape_and_duplicates(
+    value, fields, match
+):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match=match):
+        module._records(value, fields, "database")
+
+
+def test_reconcile_record_accepts_exact_existing_identity():
+    module = _load()
+    expected = ["hermes-agent", "x", "1200", "1200"]
+    records = [["root", "x", "0", "0"], expected]
+    assert module._reconcile_record(records, expected, identity_index=2) is records
+
+
+def test_database_transaction_rolls_back_prior_writes(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, originals, _key_value, _other, _public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+    writes = 0
+
+    def fail_second(path, value, metadata):
+        nonlocal writes
+        writes += 1
+        if writes == 2:
+            raise module.HardeningError("synthetic database failure")
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", fail_second)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="synthetic database failure"):
+        module._reconcile_databases()
+    assert (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == originals[
+        "passwd"
+    ]
+
+
+def test_database_rollback_rejects_concurrent_postwrite_change(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, _originals, _key_value, _other, _public_key = _fixture(
+        tmp_path, monkeypatch
+    )
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+    writes = 0
+
+    def race_then_fail(path, value, metadata):
+        nonlocal writes
+        writes += 1
+        if writes == 2:
+            (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").write_text(
+                "raced:x:1:1:r:/r:/bin/sh\n", encoding="utf-8"
+            )
+            raise module.HardeningError("synthetic failure")
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", race_then_fail)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="prevents rollback"):
+        module._reconcile_databases()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("line", "match"),
+    [
+        (b"", None),
+        (b"# comment", None),
+        (b"\xff", "malformed"),
+        (b'command="unterminated ssh-ed25519 data', "malformed"),
+        (b"ordinary text", "ambiguous"),
+        (b"ssh-ed25519", "ambiguous"),
+        (b"ssh-ed25519 bad-base64!", "payload"),
+        (b"ssh-ed25519 YWJj", "blob"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_key_identity_rejects_malformed_authorized_key_lines(line, match):
+    module = _load()
+    if match is None:
+        assert module._key_identity(line) is None
+    else:
+        with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match=match):
+            module._key_identity(line)
+
+
+def test_key_identity_rejects_type_blob_mismatch():
+    module = _load()
+    actual = b"ssh-rsaXXXX"
+    blob = len(actual).to_bytes(4, "big") + actual + b"material"
+    line = b"ssh-ed25519 " + base64.b64encode(blob)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="does not match"):
+        module._key_identity(line)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("kind", ["multiline", "unsupported"])
+def test_public_key_validator_rejects_multiline_and_unsupported(tmp_path, kind):
+    module = _load()
+    path = tmp_path / "key"
+    value = (
+        "line-one\nline-two\n"
+        if kind == "multiline"
+        else _typed_key("ssh-dss", b"synthetic-material") + "\n"
+    )
+    path.write_text(value, encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError):
+        module._validated_public_key(path)
+
+
+def test_directory_rejects_file_and_conflicting_owner(tmp_path):
+    module = _load()
+    file_path = tmp_path / "file"
+    file_path.write_text("not-directory", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe account directory"):
+        module._directory(file_path, mode=0o700, uid=os.getuid(), gid=os.getgid())
+    directory = tmp_path / "directory"
+    directory.mkdir()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="ownership conflicts"):
+        module._directory(directory, mode=0o700, uid=123456, gid=123456)
+
+
+def test_move_key_skips_missing_legacy_files(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    key = _key(b"synthetic-key")
+    public = tmp_path / "public"
+    public.write_text(key + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    home = tmp_path / "home"
+    home.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_HOME", home)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_GID", os.getgid())
+    module._move_key(public)
+    assert (home / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys").read_text() == key + "\n"
+
+
+def test_move_key_backs_up_different_existing_target(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, _originals, key, other, public = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    for legacy in module.LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        (module.HOST_HOME / legacy / ".ssh/authorized_keys").write_text(other + "\n")
+    target = module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    target.write_text(other + "\n")
+    module._move_key(public)
+    assert target.read_text() == key + "\n"
+    assert (
+        target.with_name(target.name + ".hermes-boundary-backup").read_text()
+        == other + "\n"
+    )
+
+
+def test_move_key_fails_if_legacy_removal_or_target_install_does_not_persist(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, _originals, _key_value, _other, public = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+
+    def ignore_legacy(path, value, metadata):
+        if module.ACCOUNT not in path.parts and path.name == "authorized_keys":
+            return
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", ignore_legacy)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="legacy Hermes authorization"):
+        module._move_key(public)
+
+    second = tmp_path / "second"
+    second.mkdir()
+    module, _originals, _key_value, _other, public = _fixture(second, monkeypatch)
+    real_write = module.atomic_write
+
+    def ignore_target(path, value, metadata):
+        if module.ACCOUNT in path.parts and path.name == "authorized_keys":
+            path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            path.write_bytes(b"wrong\n")
+            return
+        real_write(path, value, metadata)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "atomic_write", ignore_target)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="validation failed"):
+        module._move_key(public)
+
+
+def test_main_reconciles_requested_key(monkeypatch, tmp_path, capsys):
+    module = _load()
+    key = tmp_path / "key"
+    key.write_text("value", encoding="utf-8")
+    seen = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "reconcile", seen.append)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "argv", ["hardener", "--public-key-file", str(key)])
+    assert module.main() == 0
+    assert seen == [key]
+    assert "reconciled" in capsys.readouterr().out

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_io_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for crash-safe node account file I/O."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import stat
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_node_account_support import _load
+
+
+def _io_module():
+    hardening = _load()
+    return sys.modules[hardening.atomic_write.__module__]
+
+
+def _snapshot(module, path: Path, *, value=None, xattrs=()):
+    metadata = path.stat()
+    content = path.read_bytes() if value is None else value
+    return module.FileSnapshot(
+        value=content,
+        device=metadata.st_dev,
+        inode=metadata.st_ino,
+        mode=stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode),
+        uid=metadata.st_uid,
+        gid=metadata.st_gid,
+        size=len(content),
+        mtime_ns=metadata.st_mtime_ns,
+        ctime_ns=metadata.st_ctime_ns,
+        xattrs=tuple(xattrs),
+    )
+
+
+def test_xattr_reader_uses_compatibility_fallback(monkeypatch):
+    module = _io_module()
+    calls = []
+
+    def listxattr(target, **kwargs):
+        calls.append((target, kwargs))
+        if kwargs:
+            raise TypeError("fd API")
+        return ["user.safe"]
+
+    def getxattr(target, name, **kwargs):
+        if kwargs:
+            raise TypeError("fd API")
+        return b"value"
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "listxattr", listxattr)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "getxattr", getxattr)
+    assert module._xattrs(7) == (("user.safe", b"value"),)
+    assert len(calls) == 2
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("failure", ["count", "name", "value", "total"])
+def test_xattr_reader_enforces_all_bounds(monkeypatch, failure):
+    module = _io_module()
+    if failure == "count":
+        names = [f"user.{index}" for index in range(module.MAX_XATTRS + 1)]
+    elif failure == "name":
+        names = ["x" * (module.MAX_XATTR_NAME + 1)]
+    elif failure == "total":
+        names = ["user.one", "user.two", "user.three", "user.four", "user.five"]
+    else:
+        names = ["user.large"]
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "listxattr", lambda *_a, **_k: names)
+    size = module.MAX_XATTR_VALUE + 1 if failure == "value" else module.MAX_XATTR_VALUE
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "getxattr", lambda *_a, **_k: b"x" * size)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError):
+        module._xattrs(7)
+
+
+def test_restore_xattrs_removes_unexpected_and_sets_expected(monkeypatch):
+    module = _io_module()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module, "_xattrs", lambda _fd: (("user.old", b"old"), ("user.keep", b"before"))
+    )
+    removed = []
+    written = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.os, "removexattr", lambda fd, name: removed.append((fd, name))
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        module.os, "setxattr", lambda fd, name, value: written.append((fd, name, value))
+    )
+    module._restore_xattrs(4, (("user.keep", b"after"),))
+    assert removed == [(4, "user.old")]
+    assert written == [(4, "user.keep", b"after")]
+
+
+def test_read_regular_rejects_directory_oversize_and_changed_read(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module = _io_module()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe regular"):
+        module.read_regular(tmp_path, 10)
+    source = tmp_path / "file"
+    source.write_bytes(b"12345")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe regular"):
+        module.read_regular(source, 4)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "read", lambda _fd, _size: b"1")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="short file read"):
+        module.read_regular(source, 10)
+
+
+def test_assert_unchanged_rejects_changed_snapshot(tmp_path):
+    module = _io_module()
+    source = tmp_path / "passwd"
+    source.write_bytes(b"old")
+    snapshot = module.read_regular(source, 16)
+    source.write_bytes(b"new")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="concurrent"):
+        module.assert_unchanged(source, snapshot, 16)
+
+
+def test_atomic_write_short_write_unlinks_temporary(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _io_module()
+    target = tmp_path / "passwd"
+    target.write_bytes(b"old")
+    snapshot = module.read_regular(target, 16)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "write", lambda _fd, _value: 0)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="short atomic write"):
+        module.atomic_write(target, b"new", snapshot)
+    assert target.read_bytes() == b"old"
+    assert not list(tmp_path.glob(".passwd.hermes-*"))
+
+
+def test_backup_existing_is_validated_and_short_write_is_removed(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _io_module()
+    source = tmp_path / "passwd"
+    source.write_bytes(b"old")
+    snapshot = module.read_regular(source, 16)
+    backup = tmp_path / "passwd.hermes-boundary-backup"
+    backup.write_bytes(b"preserved")
+    assert module.backup_once(source, snapshot, 16) == backup
+
+    backup.unlink()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "write", lambda _fd, _value: 0)
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="short backup write"):
+        module.backup_once(source, snapshot, 16)
+    assert not backup.exists()
+
+
+def test_account_lock_rejects_unsafe_metadata(tmp_path):
+    module = _io_module()
+    lock = tmp_path / ".pwd.lock"
+    lock.write_text("", encoding="utf-8")
+    lock.chmod(0o644)
+    with (
+        pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe standard account lock"),
+        module.account_lock(tmp_path, expected_uid=os.getuid()),
+    ):
+        pass
+
+
+def test_account_lock_retries_then_succeeds(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _io_module()
+    attempts = []
+
+    def lockf(_descriptor, operation):
+        attempts.append(operation)
+        if len(attempts) == 1:
+            raise BlockingIOError()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.fcntl, "lockf", lockf)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.time, "sleep", lambda _seconds: None)
+    with module.account_lock(tmp_path, expected_uid=os.getuid()):
+        assert attempts
+    assert len(attempts) == 3
+
+
+def test_account_lock_reports_timeout(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _io_module()
+
+    def lockf(_descriptor, operation):
+        if operation != module.fcntl.LOCK_UN:
+            raise BlockingIOError()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.fcntl, "lockf", lockf)
+    ticks = iter((0.0, 16.0))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.time, "monotonic", lambda: next(ticks))
+    with (
+        pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="lock is busy"),
+        module.account_lock(tmp_path, expected_uid=os.getuid()),
+    ):
+        pass

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_polkit_identity.py

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+"""Literal-identity denial proofs for polkit grants near the Hermes account."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+SCRIPTS = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+
+
+def _load():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "node_polkit_audit_test", SCRIPTS / "node_polkit_audit.py"
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def _rules(module, text: str):
+    module.audit_polkit_policy(Path("rules.d/50-test.rules"), text)
+
+
+def test_literal_distribution_rule_passes():
+    module = _load()
+    _rules(
+        module,
+        "// allow the network daemon\n"
+        "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\n"
+        '    if (action.id == "org.freedesktop.network1.set-dns" &&\n'
+        '        subject.user == "systemd-network") {\n'
+        "        return polkit.Result.YES;\n"
+        "    }\n"
+        "});\n",
+    )
+    _rules(
+        module,
+        "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\n"
+        '    if (subject.isInGroup("wheel") && subject.uid === 4242) {\n'
+        "        return polkit.Result.YES;\n"
+        "    }\n"
+        "});\n",
+    )
+    _rules(
+        module,
+        "/* deny-only rules may use constructs the audit cannot prove */\n"
+        "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\n"
+        "    if (subject.user.indexOf(\"x\") == 0) { return polkit.Result.NO; }\n"
+        "});\n",
+    )
+
+
+def test_reversed_literal_comparisons_pass():
+    module = _load()
+    _rules(
+        module,
+        "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\n"
+        '    if ("atlas" == subject.user || 4242 === subject.uid) {\n'
+        "        return polkit.Result.YES;\n"
+        "    }\n"
+        "});\n",
+    )
+
+
+def test_unconditional_grant_fails_closed():
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="explicit identity"):
+        _rules(module, "polkit.addRule(function() { return polkit.Result.YES; });\n")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("snippet", "match"),
+    [
+        ('subject.user == "herme" + "s-agent"', "operators"),
+        ("subject.uid == 1199 + 1", "operators"),
+        ("subject.uid == 0x4B0", "exact literal"),
+        ("subject.uid >= 1000", "exact literal"),
+        ("subject.uid == -1", "operators"),
+        ("subject.user == name", "exact literal"),
+        ("subject.user.indexOf(\"h\") == 0", "exact literal"),
+        ("subject.isInGroup(group)", "exact literal"),
+        ('subject["user"] == "atlas"', "computed lookup"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_computed_identity_grants_fail_closed(snippet: str, match: str):
+    module = _load()
+    text = (
+        "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\n"
+        f"    if ({snippet}) {{ return polkit.Result.YES; }}\n"
+        "});\n"
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match=match):
+        _rules(module, text)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("text", "match"),
+    [
+        ("var x = `hermes`;\n", "template strings"),
+        ('var x = "unterminated\n', "unterminated"),
+        ('var x = "bad\\x2descape";\n', "computed escapes"),
+        ('var x = "dangling\\', "computed escapes"),
+        ("/* never closed\n", "comment is unterminated"),
+        ("var f = eval;\n", "cannot prove"),
+        ('var s = String.fromCharCode(104);\n', "cannot prove"),
+        ("var a = arguments;\n", "cannot prove"),
+        ('var r = polkit.Result["YES"];\n', "computed lookup"),
+        ("var r = polkit.Result;\n", "computed lookup"),
+        ("var s = subject;\n", "computed code"),
+        ("check(subject);\n", "computed code"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_unprovable_rule_constructs_fail_closed(text: str, match: str):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match=match):
+        _rules(module, text)
+
+
+def test_regex_literal_tokenizer_desync_grant_is_rejected():
+    """A regex literal embedding a quote must not open a phantom string.
+
+    Without regex awareness the two /'/ literals fool the string scanner into
+    swallowing the unconditional Result.YES between their quotes; the grant
+    then reads as unscoped and would slip past every later check.
+    """
+    module = _load()
+    exploit = (
+        "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) { "
+        "var a = /'/; "
+        'if (action.id == "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec") '
+        "{ return polkit.Result.YES; } "
+        "var b = /'/; });\n"
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="regex or division"):
+        _rules(module, exploit)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "snippet",
+    [
+        "var a = /'/;",
+        'var a = /"/;',
+        "var a = /abc/;",
+        "var a = /[/'\"]/;",
+        "var a = /x\\/y/;",
+        "var a = subject.user / 2;",
+        "// a comment / with a slash then\nvar a = /'/;",
+        '/* block */ var a = /"/;',
+        "return polkit.Result.YES / 1;",
+    ],
+)
+def test_every_slash_form_outside_a_comment_fails_closed(snippet: str):
+    module = _load()
+    text = f"polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {{ {snippet} }});\n"
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="regex or division"):
+        _rules(module, text)
+
+
+def test_slashes_confined_to_strings_and_comments_stay_legal():
+    module = _load()
+    # Slashes inside string literals and // or /* */ comments are inert.
+    _rules(
+        module,
+        "// path-like /usr/bin comment\n"
+        "/* another /etc/ comment */\n"
+        "polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\n"
+        '    if (action.id == "org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units" &&\n'
+        '        subject.user == "systemd-network") {\n'
+        "        return polkit.Result.YES;\n"
+        "    }\n"
+        "});\n",
+    )
+
+
+def test_string_and_comment_handling_keeps_literal_rules_auditable():
+    module = _load()
+    code, strings = module._split_strings(
+        'var a = "with // not a comment"; // trailing\n'
+        "/* block */ var b = 'quo\\'te\\n';\n"
+    )
+    assert strings == ["with // not a comment", "quo'te\n"]
+    assert "//" not in code and "block" not in code
+    assert "\x000\x00" in code and "\x001\x00" in code
+
+
+def test_grant_detection_survives_spacing_and_strings():
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="explicit identity"):
+        _rules(module, "polkit.addRule(function() { return polkit.Result .  YES; });\n")
+    # A grant token inside a string is inert and needs no identity scope.
+    _rules(module, 'var label = "polkit.Result.YES";\n')
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("text", "match"),
+    [
+        (
+            "[All]\nIdentity=unix-user:*\nAction=org.example\nResultAny=yes\n",
+            "exact literal",
+        ),
+        (
+            "[N]\nIdentity=unix-netgroup:ops\nAction=org.example\nResultActive=yes\n",
+            "exact literal",
+        ),
+        ("[N]\nAction=org.example\nResultInactive=yes\n", "identity scope"),
+        ("[N]\nIdentity=\nAction=org.example\nResultAny=yes\n", "identity scope"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_pkla_grants_require_exact_literal_identities(text: str, match: str):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match=match):
+        module.audit_polkit_policy(Path("localauthority/50-local.d/a.pkla"), text)
+
+
+def test_pkla_literal_grants_and_deny_entries_pass():
+    module = _load()
+    module.audit_polkit_policy(
+        Path("localauthority/50-local.d/a.pkla"),
+        "[Mount]\nIdentity=unix-user:atlas;unix-group:operators\n"
+        "Action=org.freedesktop.udisks2.filesystem-mount\nResultAny=yes\n",
+    )
+    module.audit_polkit_policy(
+        Path("etc/b.pkla"),
+        "[Deny]\nIdentity=unix-user:*\nAction=org.example\nResultAny=no\n",
+    )
+
+
+def test_integration_rejects_previously_invisible_grants(tmp_path: Path):
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "node_account_audit_polkit_test", SCRIPTS / "node_account_audit.py"
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    audit = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = audit
+    spec.loader.exec_module(audit)
+
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    rules = host_etc / "polkit-1/rules.d"
+    rules.mkdir(parents=True)
+    (rules / "90-open.rules").write_text(
+        "polkit.addRule(function() { return polkit.Result.YES; });\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(audit.HardeningError, match="explicit identity"):
+        audit.audit_privilege_policies(
+            "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "missing"
+        )
+
+    (rules / "90-open.rules").unlink()
+    local = host_etc / "polkit-1/localauthority/50-local.d"
+    local.mkdir(parents=True)
+    (local / "wide.pkla").write_text(
+        "[W]\nIdentity=unix-user:*\nAction=org.example.benign\nResultAny=yes\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(audit.HardeningError, match="exact literal"):
+        audit.audit_privilege_policies(
+            "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "missing"
+        )

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_sudo_alias_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+"""Sudo alias and computed-identity denial proofs for the Hermes account."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+SCRIPTS = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+
+
+def _load():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "node_account_audit_sudo_test", SCRIPTS / "node_account_audit.py"
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def _audit(tmp_path: Path, sudoers: str):
+    module = _load()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    (host_etc / "sudoers.d").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    (host_etc / "sudoers.d/atlas").write_text(sudoers, encoding="utf-8")
+    module.audit_privilege_policies(
+        "hermes-agent", 1200, os.getuid(), host_etc, tmp_path / "missing-share"
+    )
+
+
+def test_benign_distribution_policy_passes(tmp_path: Path):
+    _audit(
+        tmp_path,
+        "Defaults secure_path=/usr/bin\n"
+        "root ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL\n"
+        "%sudo ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL\n"
+        "#999 ALL=(root) /usr/bin/uptime\n"
+        "alice, bob ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl status\n",
+    )
+
+
+def test_alias_reaching_hermes_directly_is_denied(tmp_path: Path):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="sudo authority"):
+        _audit(
+            tmp_path,
+            "User_Alias OPERATORS = atlas, hermes-agent\n"
+            "OPERATORS ALL=(ALL) ALL\n",
+        )
+
+
+def test_alias_reaching_hermes_by_numeric_uid_is_denied(tmp_path: Path):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="sudo authority"):
+        _audit(tmp_path, "User_Alias OPERATORS = #1200\nOPERATORS ALL=(ALL) ALL\n")
+
+
+def test_alias_expanding_to_all_is_denied(tmp_path: Path):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="broad sudo authority"):
+        _audit(tmp_path, "User_Alias ADMINS = ALL\nADMINS ALL=(ALL) ALL\n")
+
+
+def test_nested_alias_expanding_to_all_via_continuation_is_denied(tmp_path: Path):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="broad sudo authority"):
+        _audit(
+            tmp_path,
+            "User_Alias INNER = atlas, \\\n    ALL\n"
+            "User_Alias OUTER = INNER\n"
+            "OUTER ALL=(ALL) ALL\n",
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("sudoers", "match"),
+    [
+        ("+operators ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "netgroup"),
+        ("%:S-1-5-32 ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "netgroup"),
+        ("GHOSTS ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "alias is undefined"),
+        ("User_Alias A = B\nUser_Alias B = A\nA ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "cyclic"),
+        ("User_Alias broken\nroot ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "not auditable"),
+        ("User_Alias lower = atlas\n", "not auditable"),
+        ("User_Alias A = atlas\nUser_Alias A = bob\nA ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "not auditable"),
+        ("User_Alias A = atlas,,bob\nA ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "not auditable"),
+        ("stray-line-without-equals\n", "not auditable"),
+        ("=orphan (ALL) ALL\n", "not auditable"),
+        ("! ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "malformed"),
+        ("User_Alias A = atlas : B = ALL\nB ALL=(ALL) ALL\n", "broad sudo"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_unauditable_or_broad_sudo_policies_fail_closed(
+    tmp_path: Path, sudoers: str, match: str
+):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match=match):
+        _audit(tmp_path, sudoers)
+
+
+def test_negated_and_quoted_principals_are_expanded_before_judging(tmp_path: Path):
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="broad sudo authority"):
+        _audit(tmp_path, '!"ALL" ALL=(ALL) ALL\n')
+    _audit(tmp_path, "!alice ALL=(ALL) ALL\n")
+
+
+def test_continuation_join_requires_a_complete_final_line():
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="line continuation"):
+        module._joined_sudo_lines("root ALL=(ALL) ALL \\")
+    assert module._joined_sudo_lines("a \\\nb\nc") == ["a  b", "c"]
+
+
+def test_alias_definitions_parse_multiple_groups_per_line():
+    module = _load()
+    aliases = module._sudo_user_aliases(
+        ["User_Alias A = atlas, bob : B = carol", "Runas_Alias R = root"]
+    )
+    assert aliases == {"A": ["atlas", "bob"], "B": ["carol"]}
+
+
+def test_expansion_accepts_nested_literal_users():
+    module = _load()
+    aliases = {"A": ["atlas", "B"], "B": ["carol"]}
+    module._expand_sudo_principal("A", aliases, frozenset())
+    module._expand_sudo_principal("%wheel", aliases, frozenset())
+    module._expand_sudo_principal("#999", aliases, frozenset())

testing/tests/test_hermes_receive_pack_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+"""Quarantine content-scanning contracts for brokered Git pushes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import io
+import zlib
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import (
+    _blob_pack,
+    _load,
+    _object_entry,
+    _pack_of,
+    _receive_command,
+)
+
+ZERO = b"0" * 40
+COMMIT = b"1" * 40
+TOKEN = "runtime-sentinel"
+FORMS = (b"runtime-sentinel",)
+
+
+def _request(pack: bytes, ref: bytes = b"refs/heads/hermes/scan") -> bytes:
+    return _receive_command(ZERO, COMMIT, ref, pack)
+
+
+def test_clean_push_with_real_content_passes():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    pack = _blob_pack(
+        b"# services/example/deployment.yaml\napiVersion: apps/v1\n",
+        b"tree 5b3a\nparent none\n",
+    )
+    scan.validate_receive_pack(_request(pack), TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "payload",
+    [
+        b"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nb3BlbnNzaA==\n",
+        b"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIE\n",
+        b"key = ghp_" + b"a1" * 12,
+        b"aws_access_key_id = AKIAABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP",
+        b"jwt eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.c2lnbmF0dXJlLXNlZ21lbnQ",
+        b"hook https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/tokentokentokentoken",
+        b"AGE-SECRET-KEY-1QQPCXR7QQPCXR7QQPCXR7QQPCXR7",
+        b"PuTTY-User-Key-File-3: ssh-ed25519",
+        b"Authorization: Bearer abc123-tokenvalue",
+        b"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIF2c hermes@atlas",
+        b"gitea gta_" + b"z9" * 12,
+    ],
+)
+def test_credential_shaped_object_content_is_rejected(payload):
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="credential-shaped"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(_request(_blob_pack(payload)), TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+def test_runtime_token_hidden_by_compression_is_still_caught():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    pack = _blob_pack(b"config value: runtime-sentinel\n")
+    # The compressed wire bytes do not contain the token; only the
+    # decompressed payload does.
+    assert b"runtime-sentinel" not in pack
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="runtime credential material"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(_request(pack), TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+def _size_varint(value: int) -> bytes:
+    out = bytearray()
+    while True:
+        byte = value & 0x7F
+        value >>= 7
+        if value:
+            out.append(byte | 0x80)
+        else:
+            out.append(byte)
+            return bytes(out)
+
+
+def _typed_header(type_code: int, size: int) -> bytes:
+    byte = (type_code << 4) | (size & 0x0F)
+    size >>= 4
+    header = bytearray()
+    while size:
+        header.append(byte | 0x80)
+        byte = size & 0x7F
+        size >>= 7
+    header.append(byte)
+    return bytes(header)
+
+
+def test_secret_assembled_only_by_delta_resolution_is_caught():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    base = b"docs: AKIAABCD"
+    completion = b"EFGHIJKLMNOP"
+    delta = (
+        _size_varint(len(base))
+        + _size_varint(len(base) + len(completion))
+        + bytes([0x80 | 0x10, len(base)])
+        + bytes([len(completion)])
+        + completion
+    )
+    base_sha = hashlib.sha1(b"blob %d\x00" % len(base) + base).digest()
+    delta_entry = _typed_header(7, len(delta)) + base_sha + zlib.compress(delta)
+    pack = _pack_of([_object_entry(3, base), delta_entry])
+    # Neither the base nor the delta insert alone matches; the resolved
+    # payload is the only place the credential exists.
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="runtime credential|credential-shaped"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(_request(pack), TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+def test_thin_pack_deltas_are_rejected_outright():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    delta = _size_varint(4) + _size_varint(1) + bytes([1]) + b"x"
+    entry = _typed_header(7, len(delta)) + b"\xbb" * 20 + zlib.compress(delta)
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="push full packs"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(_request(_pack_of([entry])), TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+def test_trailing_bytes_after_the_pack_are_rejected():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    body = _request(_pack_of([])) + b"extra"
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="bytes after its pack"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(body, TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("line", "match"),
+    [
+        (b"shallow " + COMMIT, "ref command is invalid"),
+        (COMMIT + b" " + COMMIT + b" refs/heads/hermes/x", "feature-branch creation"),
+        (ZERO + b" " + ZERO + b" refs/heads/hermes/x", "feature-branch creation"),
+        (ZERO + b" " + COMMIT + b" refs/heads/main", "namespaced feature branches"),
+        (ZERO + b" " + COMMIT + b" refs/tags/v1", "namespaced feature branches"),
+        (ZERO + b" " + COMMIT + b" refs/heads/hermes/\xff", "canonical ASCII"),
+        (b"zz" * 20 + b" " + COMMIT + b" refs/heads/hermes/x", "ref command is invalid"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_push_commands_outside_the_narrow_grant_are_rejected(line, match):
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    framed = f"{len(line) + 5:04x}".encode() + line + b"\n" + b"0000"
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match=match):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(framed + _pack_of([]), TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+def test_command_stream_bounds_are_enforced():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="no ref command"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(b"0000" + _pack_of([]), TOKEN, FORMS)
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="omitted its command terminator"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(b"", TOKEN, FORMS)
+    line = ZERO + b" " + COMMIT + b" refs/heads/hermes/x\n"
+    framed = f"{len(line) + 4:04x}".encode() + line
+    many = framed * (scan.MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS + 1) + b"0000" + _pack_of([])
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="too many ref commands"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(many, TOKEN, FORMS)
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="framing is invalid"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(b"zzzz", TOKEN, FORMS)
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="framing is invalid"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(b"0003", TOKEN, FORMS)
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="framing is invalid"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(b"0009abc", TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+def test_credential_forms_in_command_lines_are_rejected():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    line = ZERO + b" " + COMMIT + b" refs/heads/hermes/x runtime-sentinel\n"
+    framed = f"{len(line) + 4:04x}".encode() + line + b"0000"
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="runtime credential material"):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(framed + _pack_of([]), TOKEN, FORMS)
+
+
+def test_scan_crosses_chunk_boundaries_with_carry(monkeypatch):
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(scan, "SCAN_CHUNK", 8)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(scan, "SCAN_CARRY", 48)
+    payload = b"x" * 20 + b" AKIAABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP " + b"y" * 20
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="credential-shaped"):
+        scan._scan_payload(io.BytesIO(payload), FORMS)
+    scan._scan_payload(io.BytesIO(b"clean " * 40), FORMS)
+    scan._scan_payload(io.BytesIO(b""), FORMS)
+
+
+def test_scan_loose_object_reports_type_and_scans_content():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    clean = zlib.compress(b"blob 5\x00clean")
+    assert scan.scan_loose_object(clean, FORMS) == 3
+    secret = b"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
+    dirty = zlib.compress(b"blob %d\x00" % len(secret) + secret)
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="credential-shaped"):
+        scan.scan_loose_object(dirty, FORMS)
+    leaked = b"the runtime-sentinel value"
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError, match="runtime credential material"):
+        scan.scan_loose_object(
+            zlib.compress(b"blob %d\x00" % len(leaked) + leaked), FORMS
+        )
+
+
+def test_content_patterns_extend_the_shared_standalone_corpus():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    policy = _load("gitea_api_policy")
+    assert len(scan.CONTENT_SECRET_PATTERNS) == len(policy.STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS) + 3
+    assert all(
+        isinstance(pattern.pattern, bytes) for pattern in scan.CONTENT_SECRET_PATTERNS
+    )
+
+
+def test_validation_rewinds_the_stream_for_upstream_forwarding():
+    scan = _load("receive_pack_scan")
+    body = _request(_blob_pack(b"safe content"))
+    stream = io.BytesIO(body)
+    scan.validate_receive_pack(stream, TOKEN, FORMS)
+    assert stream.tell() == 0
+    with pytest.raises(scan.PolicyError):
+        scan.validate_receive_pack(io.BytesIO(b"zzzz"), TOKEN, FORMS)

testing/tests/test_hermes_runtime_access.py

@@ -11,14 +11,19 @@ from pathlib import Path
 import pytest
 import yaml
 
-
 ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
 HERMES = ROOT / "services" / "hermes"
 SCRIPTS = HERMES / "scripts"
+SCM_SCRIPTS = HERMES / "scm-common" / "scripts"
+if str(SCRIPTS) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+if str(SCM_SCRIPTS) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(SCM_SCRIPTS))
 
 
 def _load(name: str):
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, SCRIPTS / f"{name}.py")
+    root = SCM_SCRIPTS if name == "gitea_api" else SCRIPTS
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, root / f"{name}.py")
     assert spec and spec.loader
     module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
     sys.modules[spec.name] = module
@@ -31,19 +36,23 @@ def test_gitea_api_builds_runtime_authenticated_same_origin_requests():
 
     request = gitea_api.build_request(
         "POST",
-        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/issues/1/comments",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls",
         base_url="https://scm.bstein.dev",
         token="runtime-only-value",
-        data={"body": "reviewed"},
+        data={
+            "base": "main",
+            "body": "Ready for review.",
+            "head": "hermes/repair",
+            "title": "WIP: Repair semantic review findings",
+        },
     )
 
     assert isinstance(request, urllib.request.Request)
-    assert request.full_url == (
-        "https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/issues/1/comments"
-    )
+    assert request.full_url == "https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls"
     assert request.method == "POST"
     assert request.get_header("Authorization") == "token runtime-only-value"
-    assert json.loads(request.data) == {"body": "reviewed"}
+    assert json.loads(request.data)["title"].startswith("WIP: ")
+    assert "draft" not in json.loads(request.data)
 
 
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
@@ -61,25 +70,14 @@ def test_gitea_api_rejects_foreign_or_non_api_targets(path: str):
         gitea_api.api_url("https://scm.bstein.dev", path)
 
 
-def test_gitea_api_parses_shell_safe_fields_as_json_values():
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["DELETE", "PUT", "OPTIONS"])
+def test_gitea_api_rejects_unavailable_methods(method: str):
     gitea_api = _load("gitea_api")
 
-    assert gitea_api.parse_fields(
-        ["Do=manually-merged", "MergeCommitID=abc123", "enabled=true", "count=2"]
-    ) == {
-        "Do": "manually-merged",
-        "MergeCommitID": "abc123",
-        "enabled": True,
-        "count": 2,
-    }
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["missing-separator", "=missing-key", "bad key=x"])
-def test_gitea_api_rejects_invalid_shell_safe_fields(value: str):
-    gitea_api = _load("gitea_api")
-
-    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
-        gitea_api.parse_fields([value])
+    with pytest.raises(gitea_api.PolicyError):
+        gitea_api.authorize_request(
+            method, "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1", None
+        )
 
 
 def test_jenkins_evidence_ignores_nested_execution_result():
@@ -175,6 +173,9 @@ def test_agent_runtime_stage_keeps_credentials_in_memory(tmp_path: Path, monkeyp
     values = {
         "agent-api-key": "agent-key",
         "chat-relay-key": "relay-key",
+        # gitea-token/username are present in Vault but the agent staging must
+        # deliberately not copy them (the least-authority broker holds Gitea
+        # access); the assertions below prove they never reach the runtime.
         "gitea-token": "gitea-key",
         "gitea-username": "hermes-automation",
         "jenkins-image-build-token": "job-scoped-token",
@@ -202,6 +203,10 @@ def test_agent_runtime_stage_keeps_credentials_in_memory(tmp_path: Path, monkeyp
     assert (runtime / "codex/skills").is_symlink()
     assert not (runtime / "claude/backups").exists()
     assert not (runtime / "codex/sessions").exists()
+    assert not (runtime / "gitea-token").exists()
+    assert not (runtime / "gitea-username").exists()
+    ssh_config = (runtime / "node-ssh-config").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert ssh_config.startswith("Host titan-*\n  User hermes-agent\n")
     auth = json.loads((runtime / "hermes-auth.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
     assert auth == {"version": 1, "providers": {}, "credential_pool": {}}
 
@@ -365,12 +370,12 @@ def test_manifests_never_seed_access_material_into_persistent_env():
     assert triage_annotations[
         "vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-triage-api-key"
     ] == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/triage-api"
-    askpass = (SCRIPTS / "gitea_askpass.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    assert "/runtime-access/gitea-token" in askpass
-    assert "GITEA_TOKEN" not in askpass
-    gitea_api = (SCRIPTS / "gitea_api.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    assert "/runtime-access/gitea-token" in gitea_api
+    gitea_api = (
+        ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "scm_broker_client" in gitea_api
     assert "GITEA_TOKEN" not in gitea_api
+    assert "gitea-token" not in annotations
 
 
 def test_chat_media_reads_one_raw_runtime_secret(tmp_path: Path):

testing/tests/test_hermes_runtime_stage_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for Vault-to-memory runtime access staging."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_runtime_access import _load
+
+
+def _stage(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load("stage_runtime_access")
+    vault = tmp_path / "vault"
+    runtime = tmp_path / "runtime"
+    home = tmp_path / "home"
+    vault.mkdir()
+    home.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "VAULT_ROOT", vault)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "RUNTIME_ROOT", runtime)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "PERSISTENT_HOME", home)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.os, "chown", lambda *_args: None)
+    return module, vault, runtime, home
+
+
+def test_private_directory_and_secret_copy_validate_mode_and_content(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, vault, runtime, _home = _stage(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    module._owned_directory(runtime)
+    assert runtime.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o700
+    (vault / "empty").write_text(" \n", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="is empty"):
+        module._copy_secret("empty", runtime / "empty")
+    (vault / "value").write_text("  staged  \n", encoding="utf-8")
+    assert module._copy_secret("value", runtime / "value") == "staged"
+    assert (runtime / "value").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "staged\n"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("document", "required", "match"),
+    [
+        ({"outer": {}}, ("outer", "token"), "invalid shape"),
+        ({"outer": {"token": ""}}, ("outer", "token"), "empty credential"),
+        ({"outer": {"token": 7}}, ("outer", "token"), "empty credential"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_json_staging_rejects_missing_nontext_and_empty_credentials(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch, document, required, match
+):
+    module, vault, runtime, _home = _stage(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    runtime.mkdir()
+    (vault / "credential").write_text(json.dumps(document), encoding="utf-8")
+    destination = runtime / "credential.json"
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=match):
+        module._validated_json("credential", destination, required)
+    assert not destination.exists()
+
+
+def test_noncredential_linker_skips_absent_symlink_and_existing_entries(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, _vault, runtime, home = _stage(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    runtime.mkdir()
+    source = home / "state"
+    destination = runtime / "state"
+    destination.mkdir()
+    module._link_noncredential_state(source, destination, ("allowed",))
+
+    source.mkdir()
+    (source / "allowed").write_text("safe", encoding="utf-8")
+    (source / "existing").write_text("new", encoding="utf-8")
+    (source / "target-link").write_text("new", encoding="utf-8")
+    (source / "linked").symlink_to(source / "allowed")
+    (destination / "existing").write_text("preserve", encoding="utf-8")
+    (destination / "target-link").symlink_to(destination / "existing")
+    module._link_noncredential_state(
+        source,
+        destination,
+        ("missing", "linked", "existing", "target-link", "allowed"),
+    )
+    assert (destination / "allowed").is_symlink()
+    assert (destination / "existing").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "preserve"
+
+
+def test_empty_auth_store_is_private_and_noncredential(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, _vault, runtime, _home = _stage(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    runtime.mkdir()
+    module._write_empty_auth_store()
+    path = runtime / "hermes-auth.json"
+    assert json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) == {
+        "version": 1,
+        "providers": {},
+        "credential_pool": {},
+    }
+    assert path.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
+
+
+def test_node_ssh_config_rejects_nul_and_removes_partial_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    module, vault, runtime, _home = _stage(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    runtime.mkdir()
+    (vault / "node-ssh-config").write_bytes(b"Host titan-01\x00\n")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="control data"):
+        module._stage_node_ssh_config()
+    assert not (runtime / "node-ssh-config").exists()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("mode", "secret_name"),
+    [("chat", "chat-relay-key"), ("triage", "triage-api-key")],
+)
+def test_isolated_tenant_staging_exposes_only_required_secret(
+    tmp_path, monkeypatch, mode, secret_name
+):
+    module, vault, runtime, _home = _stage(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    (vault / secret_name).write_text("synthetic-value\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    getattr(module, f"stage_{mode}")()
+    assert (runtime / secret_name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "synthetic-value\n"
+    assert (runtime / "hermes-auth.json").exists()
+    assert sorted(path.name for path in runtime.iterdir()) == sorted(
+        ["hermes-auth.json", secret_name]
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", ["agent", "chat", "triage"])
+def test_main_dispatches_each_mode(mode, monkeypatch, capsys):
+    module = _load("stage_runtime_access")
+    calls = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "stage_agent", lambda: calls.append("agent"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "stage_chat", lambda: calls.append("chat"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "stage_triage", lambda: calls.append("triage"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "argv", ["stage-runtime-access", mode])
+    assert module.main() == 0
+    assert calls == [mode]
+    assert "staged from Vault" in capsys.readouterr().out

testing/tests/test_hermes_scm_broker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+"""Atlas route and Git protocol contracts for the Hermes SCM broker."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import (
+    Response,
+    _load,
+    _receive_command,
+)
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "target",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/merge",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/reviews",
+        "/api/v1/admin/users",
+        "/git/evil/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/hooks",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-receive-pack?force=true",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\nignored",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\tignored",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack#fragment",
+    ],
+)
+def test_broker_rejects_privileged_or_non_atlas_routes(target: str):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError):
+        broker._git_target(target)
+
+
+def test_broker_metadata_boundary_reuses_explicit_read_allowlist():
+    api = _load("gitea_api")
+
+    assert (
+        api.authorize_request("GET", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1", None)
+        == "pull"
+    )
+    for path in (
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/merge",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/reviews",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/hooks",
+        "/api/v1/admin/users",
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(api.PolicyError):
+            api.authorize_request("GET", path, None)
+
+
+def test_receive_pack_allows_only_new_namespaced_feature_branch():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    zero = b"0" * 40
+    commit = b"1" * 40
+
+    broker._validate_receive_pack(
+        _receive_command(zero, commit, b"refs/heads/hermes/focused-fix"),
+        "runtime-sentinel",
+    )
+    for old, new, ref in (
+        (commit, b"2" * 40, b"refs/heads/hermes/focused-fix"),
+        (commit, zero, b"refs/heads/hermes/focused-fix"),
+        (zero, commit, b"refs/heads/main"),
+        (zero, commit, b"refs/heads/master"),
+        (zero, commit, b"refs/tags/release"),
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError):
+            broker._validate_receive_pack(
+                _receive_command(old, new, ref), "runtime-sentinel"
+            )
+
+
+def test_git_proxy_uses_fixed_origin_and_never_reflects_credential():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    seen = []
+
+    def opener(request, timeout):
+        seen.append((request, timeout))
+        return Response(
+            b"git-result",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+        )
+
+    result = broker._upstream_git_request(
+        "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+        method="POST",
+        body=b"request",
+        content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+        expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+        token="runtime-sentinel",
+        opener=opener,
+    )
+
+    assert result == b"git-result"
+    request = seen[0][0]
+    assert request.full_url == (
+        "https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack"
+    )
+    assert b"runtime-sentinel" not in request.data
+    assert "runtime-sentinel" not in request.full_url
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b"runtime-sentinel",
+                content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            ),
+        )
+    encoded = broker._credential_forms("runtime-sentinel")[1]
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b"Authorization: Basic " + encoded,
+                content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            ),
+        )
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [201, 202, 204, 206, 301, 302, 307, 308])
+def test_git_proxy_requires_exact_http_200(status: int):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="unexpected HTTP status"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b"result",
+                status=status,
+                content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            ),
+        )

testing/tests/test_hermes_scm_broker_client_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+"""Behavioral coverage for the credential-free SCM broker client and I/O."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import json
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import Response, _load
+
+
+def test_client_default_opener_uses_deadline_bounded_exchange(monkeypatch):
+    client = _load("scm_broker_client")
+    sentinel = object()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        client.deadline_http,
+        "open_bounded",
+        lambda request, *, maximum, timeout: (request, maximum, timeout, sentinel),
+    )
+    assert client._open("request", 4) == (
+        "request",
+        client.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
+        4,
+        sentinel,
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("endpoint", "payload", "match"),
+    [
+        ("/v1/admin", {}, "outside"),
+        ("/v1/metadata", {"path": "x" * (64 * 1024)}, "safe size"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_client_rejects_unknown_or_oversized_operations(endpoint, payload, match):
+    client = _load("scm_broker_client")
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match=match):
+        client.request(endpoint, payload, opener=lambda *_a, **_k: None)
+
+
+class _GetCodeResponse(Response):
+    def __init__(self, body: bytes, *, content_type="application/json", code=200):
+        super().__init__(body, content_type=content_type)
+        del self.status
+        self._code = code
+
+    def getcode(self):
+        return self._code
+
+
+def test_client_accepts_getcode_fallback_and_create_payload():
+    client = _load("scm_broker_client")
+    seen = []
+
+    def opener(request, timeout):
+        seen.append((request, timeout))
+        return _GetCodeResponse(b"{}")
+
+    result = client.create_draft(
+        "cassandra",
+        base="main",
+        head="feature/coverage",
+        head_sha="a" * 40,
+        title="WIP: Coverage",
+        body="Review evidence",
+        opener=opener,
+    )
+    assert result == b"{}"
+    assert json.loads(seen[0][0].data)["repo"] == "cassandra"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("response", "match"),
+    [
+        (_GetCodeResponse(b"{}", code=201), "HTTP status"),
+        (_GetCodeResponse(b"{}", content_type="text/plain"), "response type"),
+        (
+            Response(b"x" * (2 * 1024 * 1024 + 1), content_type="application/json"),
+            "safe size",
+        ),
+        (Response(b"not-json", content_type="application/json"), "Expecting value"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_client_rejects_bad_status_type_size_and_json(response, match):
+    client = _load("scm_broker_client")
+    expected = (
+        json.JSONDecodeError if match == "Expecting value" else client.PolicyError
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(expected, match=match):
+        client.request(
+            "/v1/metadata",
+            {"path": "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"},
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: response,
+        )
+
+
+class _Socket:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.timeouts = []
+
+    def settimeout(self, value):
+        self.timeouts.append(value)
+
+
+class _Stream:
+    def __init__(self, body: bytes, socket_shape: str = "direct"):
+        self.body = io.BytesIO(body)
+        self.socket = _Socket()
+        if socket_shape == "nested":
+            self.fp = type(
+                "FP", (), {"raw": type("Raw", (), {"_sock": self.socket})()}
+            )()
+        elif socket_shape == "direct":
+            self.fp = type("FP", (), {"raw": self.socket})()
+        else:
+            self.fp = None
+
+    def read(self, size):
+        return self.body.read(size)
+
+
+def test_response_spool_handles_direct_and_absent_socket_shapes():
+    module = _load("scm_broker_io")
+    for shape in ("direct", "absent"):
+        stream = _Stream(b"safe", shape)
+        spool, length = module.spool_response(
+            stream,
+            16,
+            (b"forbidden",),
+            memory_limit=8,
+            chunk_size=2,
+            deadline_seconds=5,
+        )
+        try:
+            assert length == 4 and spool.read() == b"safe"
+        finally:
+            spool.close()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("failure", ["deadline", "size", "credential", "read"])
+def test_response_spool_closes_and_rejects_each_failure(monkeypatch, failure):
+    module = _load("scm_broker_io")
+    stream = _Stream(b"safe-forbidden-value")
+    kwargs = {
+        "maximum": 128,
+        "forbidden": (b"forbidden",),
+        "memory_limit": 8,
+        "chunk_size": 5,
+        "deadline_seconds": 5,
+    }
+    if failure == "deadline":
+        ticks = iter((10.0, 16.0))
+        monkeypatch.setattr(module.time, "monotonic", lambda: next(ticks))
+    elif failure == "size":
+        kwargs["maximum"] = 2
+    elif failure == "read":
+        stream.read = lambda _size: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError("read failed"))
+    expected = module.PolicyError if failure != "read" else OSError
+    with pytest.raises(expected):
+        module.spool_response(stream, **kwargs)

testing/tests/test_hermes_scm_broker_handler_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for SCM broker request handling."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import json
+import sys
+from email.message import Message
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import _load, _receive_command
+
+
+class _Connection:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.timeouts = []
+
+    def settimeout(self, value):
+        self.timeouts.append(value)
+
+
+def _headers(*, content_type="application/json", body=b""):
+    value = Message()
+    value["Content-Type"] = content_type
+    value["Content-Length"] = str(len(body))
+    return value
+
+
+def _handler(broker, *, path="/healthz", body=b"", content_type="application/json"):
+    handler = object.__new__(broker.BrokerHandler)
+    handler.path = path
+    handler.headers = _headers(content_type=content_type, body=body)
+    handler.rfile = io.BytesIO(body)
+    handler.wfile = io.BytesIO()
+    handler.connection = _Connection()
+    handler.events = []
+    handler.send_response = lambda status: handler.events.append(("status", status))
+    handler.send_header = lambda name, value: handler.events.append((name, value))
+    handler.end_headers = lambda: handler.events.append(("headers", "done"))
+    return handler
+
+
+def test_header_validation_accepts_safe_ascii_and_rejects_controls():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    handler = _handler(broker)
+    handler._validate_headers()
+
+    class HeaderBag:
+        def items(self):
+            return [("X-Test", "bad\x01value")]
+
+        def get_all(self, _name, default):
+            return default
+
+    handler.headers = HeaderBag()
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="controls"):
+        handler._validate_headers()
+
+    class UnicodeHeader(HeaderBag):
+        def items(self):
+            return [("X-Test", "máin")]
+
+    handler.headers = UnicodeHeader()
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="ASCII"):
+        handler._validate_headers()
+
+
+def test_json_reject_and_stream_response_methods(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    handler = _handler(broker)
+    handler._json(202, b'{"ok":true}')
+    assert ("status", 202) in handler.events
+    assert handler.wfile.getvalue() == b'{"ok":true}'
+
+    handler = _handler(broker)
+    handler._reject(403)
+    assert ("status", 403) in handler.events
+    assert json.loads(handler.wfile.getvalue()) == {"error": "request rejected"}
+
+    handler = _handler(broker)
+    handler._stream(200, "application/test", io.BytesIO(b"streamed"), 8)
+    assert handler.wfile.getvalue() == b"streamed"
+    assert handler.connection.timeouts
+    handler.log_message("ignored %s", "value")
+
+    handler = _handler(broker)
+    ticks = iter((0.0, 121.0))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker.time, "monotonic", lambda: next(ticks))
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="write deadline"):
+        handler._stream(200, "application/test", io.BytesIO(b"x"), 1)
+
+
+def test_get_health_and_git_discovery_paths(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    handler = _handler(broker)
+    handler.do_GET()
+    assert json.loads(handler.wfile.getvalue()) == {"status": "ok"}
+
+    closed = []
+
+    class Body(io.BytesIO):
+        def close(self):
+            closed.append(True)
+            super().close()
+
+    handler = _handler(
+        broker,
+        path="/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "read_token", lambda: "sentinel")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        broker,
+        "_upstream_git_request",
+        lambda *args, **kwargs: (Body(b"advertisement"), 13),
+    )
+    handler.do_GET()
+    assert handler.wfile.getvalue() == b"advertisement"
+    assert closed == [True]
+
+    handler = _handler(broker, path="/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack")
+    handler.do_GET()
+    assert json.loads(handler.wfile.getvalue()) == {"error": "request rejected"}
+
+
+def test_post_dispatches_control_and_git_or_rejects(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    control = _handler(broker, path="/v1/metadata", body=b"{}")
+    git = _handler(broker, path="/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack", body=b"")
+    calls = []
+    control._control = lambda: calls.append("control")
+    control._git_rpc = lambda: calls.append("git")
+    git._control = lambda: calls.append("control")
+    git._git_rpc = lambda: calls.append("git")
+    control.do_POST()
+    git.do_POST()
+    assert calls == ["control", "git"]
+
+    rejected = _handler(broker, path="/v1/metadata", body=b"{}")
+    rejected._control = lambda: (_ for _ in ()).throw(broker.PolicyError("no"))
+    rejected.do_POST()
+    assert json.loads(rejected.wfile.getvalue()) == {"error": "request rejected"}
+
+
+def test_control_metadata_and_draft_fields(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "read_token", lambda: "sentinel")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        broker, "read", lambda path, token: json.dumps({"path": path}).encode()
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        broker,
+        "create_draft",
+        lambda token, **data: json.dumps({"token_used": bool(token), **data}).encode(),
+    )
+
+    metadata_body = b'{"path":"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"}'
+    metadata = _handler(broker, path="/v1/metadata", body=metadata_body)
+    metadata._control()
+    assert json.loads(metadata.wfile.getvalue())["path"].endswith("cassandra")
+
+    draft_data = {
+        "base": "main",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+        "head": "feature/coverage",
+        "head_sha": "a" * 40,
+        "repo": "cassandra",
+        "title": "WIP: Coverage",
+    }
+    draft_body = json.dumps(draft_data).encode()
+    draft = _handler(broker, path="/v1/drafts", body=draft_body)
+    draft._control()
+    assert json.loads(draft.wfile.getvalue())["repo"] == "cassandra"
+
+    for path, body, match in (
+        ("/v1/metadata", b'{"wrong":"field"}', "fields"),
+        ("/v1/drafts", b'{"repo":1}', "fields"),
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match=match):
+            _handler(broker, path=path, body=body)._control()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "read", lambda *_a, **_k: b"sentinel")
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="reflected"):
+        _handler(broker, path="/v1/metadata", body=metadata_body)._control()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("service", ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"])
+def test_git_rpc_streams_allowed_upload_and_receive(monkeypatch, service):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    if service == "git-receive-pack":
+        body = _receive_command(b"0" * 40, b"1" * 40, b"refs/heads/hermes/coverage")
+    else:
+        body = b"upload-request"
+    handler = _handler(
+        broker,
+        path=f"/git/atlas/cassandra.git/{service}",
+        body=body,
+        content_type=f"application/x-{service}-request",
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "read_token", lambda: "sentinel")
+    seen = []
+
+    def upstream(target, **kwargs):
+        seen.append((target, kwargs))
+        return io.BytesIO(b"result"), 6
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "_upstream_git_request", upstream)
+    handler._git_rpc()
+    assert handler.wfile.getvalue() == b"result"
+    assert seen[0][0].endswith(service)
+    assert seen[0][1]["body_length"] == len(body)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("path", "content_type", "transfer", "match"),
+    [
+        (
+            "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            "application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            None,
+            "operation",
+        ),
+        (
+            "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            "text/plain",
+            None,
+            "request type",
+        ),
+        (
+            "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            "application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            "chunked",
+            "request type",
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_git_rpc_rejects_discovery_wrong_type_and_chunking(
+    path, content_type, transfer, match
+):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    handler = _handler(broker, path=path, content_type=content_type)
+    if transfer:
+        handler.headers["Transfer-Encoding"] = transfer
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match=match):
+        handler._git_rpc()
+
+
+def test_broker_main_constructs_bounded_server(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    seen = []
+
+    class Server:
+        def __init__(self, address, handler):
+            seen.append((address, handler))
+
+        def serve_forever(self):
+            seen.append("served")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "BoundedThreadingHTTPServer", Server)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        sys, "argv", ["broker", "--listen", "127.0.0.1", "--port", "9191"]
+    )
+    assert broker.main() == 0
+    assert seen[0] == (("127.0.0.1", 9191), broker.BrokerHandler)
+    assert seen[1] == "served"

testing/tests/test_hermes_scm_broker_internal_coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+"""Behavioral branch coverage for SCM broker protocol helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+from email.message import Message
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_scm_broker_support import (
+    Response,
+    _load,
+    _receive_command,
+)
+
+
+def test_broker_redirect_status_and_bounded_read_helpers(monkeypatch):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="redirects"):
+        broker.RejectRedirect().redirect_request(
+            object(), None, 302, "redirect", {}, "https://elsewhere.invalid"
+        )
+
+    class CodeOnly:
+        def getcode(self):
+            return 204
+
+    assert broker._status(type("Status", (), {"status": 200})()) == 200
+    assert broker._status(CodeOnly()) == 204
+    assert broker._status(object()) is None
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="safe size"):
+        broker._read_bounded(io.BytesIO(b"x"), 4, -1)
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="safe size"):
+        broker._read_bounded(io.BytesIO(b"xxxxx"), 4)
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="safe size"):
+        broker._read_bounded(io.BytesIO(b"x"), 4, 2)
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="deadline"):
+        broker._read_bounded(io.BytesIO(b"x"), 4, 1, deadline=0)
+
+    timeouts = []
+    assert (
+        broker._read_bounded(
+            io.BytesIO(b"xy"),
+            4,
+            2,
+            deadline=broker.time.monotonic() + 5,
+            set_timeout=timeouts.append,
+        )
+        == b"xy"
+    )
+    assert timeouts
+
+
+def test_spool_bounded_rejects_bounds_early_eof_and_closes_on_read_error():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    for length in (-1, 5):
+        with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="safe size"):
+            broker._spool_bounded(
+                io.BytesIO(b"x"),
+                4,
+                length,
+                token="sentinel",
+                context="request",
+                deadline=999999999,
+            )
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="ended early"):
+        broker._spool_bounded(
+            io.BytesIO(b"x"),
+            4,
+            2,
+            token="sentinel",
+            context="request",
+            deadline=999999999,
+        )
+
+    class Broken:
+        def read(self, _size):
+            raise OSError("broken stream")
+
+    with pytest.raises(OSError, match="broken"):
+        broker._spool_bounded(
+            Broken(), 4, 1, token="sentinel", context="request", deadline=999999999
+        )
+
+
+class _HandlerInput:
+    def __init__(self, body: bytes, *, content_type="application/json", length=None):
+        self.headers = Message()
+        self.headers["Content-Type"] = content_type
+        if length is None:
+            length = len(body)
+        self.headers["Content-Length"] = str(length)
+        self.rfile = io.BytesIO(body)
+        self.connection = type(
+            "Connection", (), {"settimeout": lambda self, value: None}
+        )()
+
+
+def test_control_json_loader_requires_fixed_json_object():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    handler = _HandlerInput(b"{}")
+    handler.headers["Transfer-Encoding"] = "chunked"
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="chunked"):
+        broker._load_json(handler)
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="must be JSON"):
+        broker._load_json(_HandlerInput(b"{}", content_type="text/plain"))
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="must be an object"):
+        broker._load_json(_HandlerInput(b"[]"))
+    assert broker._load_json(_HandlerInput(b'{"path":"safe"}')) == {"path": "safe"}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("target", "expected"),
+    [
+        (
+            "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            ("cassandra", "info/refs", "git-upload-pack"),
+        ),
+        (
+            "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack",
+            ("cassandra", "info/refs", "git-receive-pack"),
+        ),
+        (
+            "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            ("cassandra", "git-upload-pack", "git-upload-pack"),
+        ),
+        (
+            "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-receive-pack",
+            ("cassandra", "git-receive-pack", "git-receive-pack"),
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_git_target_accepts_each_exact_smart_http_route(target, expected):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    assert broker._git_target(target) == expected
+
+
+def test_content_length_and_credential_helpers_cover_safe_and_rejected_values():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    headers = Message()
+    headers["Content-Length"] = "0"
+    assert broker._content_length(headers, 1) == 0
+    forms = broker._credential_forms("sentinel")
+    assert len(forms) == 3 and forms[0] == b"sentinel"
+    zero = b"0" * 40
+    commit = b"1" * 40
+    line = zero + b" " + commit + b" refs/heads/hermes/x " + forms[2] + b"\n"
+    framed = f"{len(line) + 4:04x}".encode() + line + b"0000"
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        broker._validate_receive_pack(framed, "sentinel")
+
+
+def test_receive_pack_validation_rewinds_stream_and_accepts_bytes():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    body = _receive_command(b"0" * 40, b"1" * 40, b"refs/heads/hermes/rewind")
+    stream = io.BytesIO(body)
+    stream.seek(9)
+    broker._validate_receive_pack(stream, "sentinel")
+    assert stream.tell() == 0
+    broker._validate_receive_pack(body, "sentinel")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("body", "match"),
+    [
+        (b"bad!", "framing"),
+        (b"0000", "no ref command"),
+        (b"0003", "framing"),
+        (b"0008abc", "framing"),
+        (b"0008a b\n0000", "ref command"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_receive_pack_rejects_bad_framing_and_commands(body, match):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match=match):
+        broker._validate_receive_pack(body, "sentinel")
+
+
+def _packet(old: bytes, new: bytes, ref: bytes, *, terminator=True) -> bytes:
+    command = old + b" " + new + b" " + ref + b"\n"
+    framed = f"{len(command) + 4:04x}".encode() + command
+    return framed + (b"0000" if terminator else b"")
+
+
+def test_receive_pack_rejects_nonascii_many_commands_and_missing_terminator(
+    monkeypatch,
+):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    zero = b"0" * 40
+    commit = b"1" * 40
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="canonical ASCII"):
+        broker._validate_receive_pack(
+            _packet(zero, commit, b"refs/heads/hermes/\xff"), "sentinel"
+        )
+    command = _packet(zero, commit, b"refs/heads/hermes/fix", terminator=False)
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="terminator"):
+        broker._validate_receive_pack(command, "sentinel")
+    limit = _load("receive_pack_scan").MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS
+    many = command * (limit + 1) + b"0000"
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="too many"):
+        broker._validate_receive_pack(many, "sentinel")
+
+
+def test_upstream_request_infers_byte_length_and_requires_stream_length():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    seen = []
+
+    def opener(request, timeout):
+        seen.append((request, timeout))
+        return Response(b"result", content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result")
+
+    assert (
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type=None,
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+        == b"result"
+    )
+    assert seen[0][0].get_header("Content-length") == "7"
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="length is missing"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=io.BytesIO(b"request"),
+            content_type=None,
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+
+
+def test_upstream_request_rejects_wrong_type_and_supports_getcode_status():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+
+    class CodeOnly(Response):
+        def __init__(self, body, content_type):
+            super().__init__(body, content_type=content_type)
+            del self.status
+
+        def getcode(self):
+            return 200
+
+    assert (
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            method="GET",
+            body=None,
+            content_type=None,
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement",
+            token="sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: CodeOnly(
+                b"advertisement", "application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement"
+            ),
+        )
+        == b"advertisement"
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="response type"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            method="GET",
+            body=None,
+            content_type=None,
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement",
+            token="sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(b"bad", content_type="text/plain"),
+        )