worker.bstein.dev (the hermes-agent Deployment) gains the same HUX
shape as chat, staged and inert: a foundation-only hux sidecar on the
reviewed WebUI image line (Flux setters bound, 5s probe budgets), an
init that provisions the HMAC identity as slot-100 on the durable home
subtree (create-once context key, O_EXCL subject binding, per-pod
worker key; no relay/router/evidence keys so those trusts fail closed),
and observe-only hook env in the agent container with the runtime
plugin mounted but deliberately NOT enabled - activation is a reviewed
one-line flip per docs/hux/WORKER-PLAN.md, which carries the rollout,
verification gates, canary/rollback ladder and open questions.
Cross-surface continuity remains unclaimed until the live gates pass.
7 new topology-adaptive delivery gates green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BvMSXH8VH2tMWXanb8SJdf
Park/resume and gateway-owned stop receipts passed the live gates, so
HUX_TOOL_ENFORCEMENT=1 ships to ordinal 3 (partition unchanged). Every
canary tool call now requires a HUX release; the fleet stays observe-off
until the approvals UX proves out under real traffic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BvMSXH8VH2tMWXanb8SJdf
HANDOFF.md and THREAT-MODEL.md now document the actual HMAC subject/
context identity, the shared RWX PVC with kubelet subPathExpr per-pod
isolation and its exact boundary, the uid-10000 no-store-mount agent
model, tmpfs transport key rotation, router X-Hux-* stripping, HUX-12
file-only evidence trust, staged-not-deployed status, and the verified
SO-46/48 (open) and SO-53 (shipped) states.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BvMSXH8VH2tMWXanb8SJdf
GET /hux/v1/conversations/{id}/privacy reports forgotten, memory_disabled,
topics, mode and memory_writes_allowed; the worker hook's memory gate reads it
and fails closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
F1 policy writes and allow grants are human-surface only; F2 worker trust is
confined to the hook allowlist and unexpected exceptions become audited 500
error records; F4 external side effects release only for the same run and
argument hash; F6 the gate honours budget exhaustion; F8 only the gateway
can vouch for an empty process registry and failed receipts can be
superseded; F11/F12 receipt revision and unshipped card routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
Stdlib per-tenant service: trusted-header identity (router/relay/worker,
constant-time keys, slot pinned to the pod), fail-closed card flags with
capability negotiation, tenant-scoped store (atomic writes, revisions,
append-only ledgers, content-addressed blobs, manifest), audit outcome for
every request, and the /hux/v1 pipeline that maps errors to hux.error.v1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNPhwu2bsaRNg3DETSAZoM
