hermes: harden draft PR input boundary
This commit is contained in:
jenkins
parent
49b2fa00e4
commit
f917136e08
@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ configMapGenerator:
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- claude_oauth_broker.py=scripts/claude_oauth_broker.py
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- worker_route_broker.py=scripts/worker_route_broker.py
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- gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
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- gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
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- gitea_askpass.sh=scripts/gitea_askpass.sh
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- hermes_coordinator.py=scripts/hermes_coordinator.py
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- hermes_model_routing.py=scripts/hermes_model_routing.py
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@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import argparse
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import json
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import os
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import re
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import urllib.error
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import urllib.parse
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@ -15,28 +14,22 @@ import urllib.request
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from collections.abc import Callable
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from pathlib import Path
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from gitea_api_policy import (
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PolicyError,
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_draft_title,
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_validate_body,
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_validate_query,
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_validate_ref,
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_validate_repo,
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_validate_sha,
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)
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CANONICAL_BASE_URL = "https://scm.bstein.dev"
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ALLOWED_OWNER = "atlas"
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DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
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REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
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SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
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CREATE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/api/v1/repos/atlas/([^/]+)/pulls\Z")
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MAX_ERROR_BYTES = 8192
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MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
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DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
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GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
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SENSITIVE_BODY_PATTERNS = (
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re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
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re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]"),
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re.compile(r"(?i)\bauthorization\s*:\s*(?:bearer|token|basic)\s+\S+"),
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re.compile(r"\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})\b"),
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re.compile(r"\b(?:AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35})\b"),
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re.compile(r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b"),
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)
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class PolicyError(ValueError):
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"""Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
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class RejectRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
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@ -70,67 +63,6 @@ def configured_base_url() -> str:
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return configured
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def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
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if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
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raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
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return repo
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def _validate_ref(value: object, name: str) -> str:
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"""Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("-"):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
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if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
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result = subprocess.run(
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[GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
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stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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check=False,
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)
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if result.returncode != 0:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
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return value
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def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
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return value.lower()
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def _validate_text(value: object, name: str, maximum: int, *, required: bool) -> str:
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if not isinstance(value, str):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
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if required and not value.strip():
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
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if len(value) > maximum or "\x00" in value:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
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return value
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def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
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body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, required=False)
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if any(secret and secret in body for secret in forbidden):
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raise PolicyError("pull-request body contains runtime credential material")
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if any(pattern.search(body) for pattern in SENSITIVE_BODY_PATTERNS):
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raise PolicyError("pull-request body resembles credential material")
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return body
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def _draft_title(value: object) -> str:
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"""Return a bounded title using Gitea's configured default draft prefix."""
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title = _validate_text(value, "title", 251, required=True).strip()
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for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
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if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
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title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
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break
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if not title:
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raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
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return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
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def _split_api_path(path: str) -> urllib.parse.SplitResult:
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target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)
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if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
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@ -142,29 +74,6 @@ def _split_api_path(path: str) -> urllib.parse.SplitResult:
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return target
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def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
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try:
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pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(
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target.query, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True
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)
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
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if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
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raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
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if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
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raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
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values = dict(pairs)
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for name in ("page", "limit"):
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if name not in values:
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continue
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if not values[name].isdigit() or int(values[name]) < 1:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a positive integer")
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if "limit" in values and int(values["limit"]) > 50:
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raise PolicyError("read limit cannot exceed 50")
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if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
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raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")
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def _authorize_read(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult) -> str:
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"""Allow only repository, PR, branch, commit, and status metadata reads."""
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prefix = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/"
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@ -255,6 +164,10 @@ def build_request(
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) -> urllib.request.Request:
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"""Build an authorized request without putting the token in its URL or body."""
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authorize_request(method, path, data)
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if method.upper() == "POST":
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assert isinstance(data, dict)
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_draft_title(data["title"], forbidden=(token,))
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_validate_body(data["body"], forbidden=(token,))
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payload = None
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if data is not None:
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payload = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
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@ -372,7 +285,7 @@ def create_draft(
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base = _validate_ref(base, "base")
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head = _validate_ref(head, "head")
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head_sha = _validate_sha(head_sha)
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title = _draft_title(title)
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title = _draft_title(title, forbidden=(token,))
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body = _validate_body(body, forbidden=(token,))
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data = {"base": base, "body": body, "head": head, "title": title}
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result = _request(
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160
services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
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160
services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
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@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
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"""Pure validation policy for Hermes' least-authority Atlas Forgejo client."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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import subprocess
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import urllib.parse
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REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
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SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
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DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
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GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
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MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 128
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MAX_QUERY_ITEMS = 3
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MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH = 16
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MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH = 16
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MAX_PAGE = 10_000
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MAX_LIMIT = 50
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CANONICAL_QUERY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_=&-]*\Z")
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SENSITIVE_TEXT_RE = re.compile(
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r"""(?ix)
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(?:
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(?<![A-Za-z0-9])
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(?:client[_-]?secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|private[_-]?key|
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api[_-]?key|password|passwd|secret|token|authorization|bearer|basic)
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[\"']?\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?
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\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}
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-----BEGIN\s+[A-Z0-9 ][A-Z0-9 -]{1,62}-----
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\bssh-(?:rsa|ed25519|dss|ecdsa-[A-Za-z0-9-]+)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}
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\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|
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glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}|
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sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|sk-(?:proj-|live_)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|
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[sr]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|
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ya29\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})\b
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\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b
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\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b
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\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b
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)
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"""
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)
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class PolicyError(ValueError):
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"""Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
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def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
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if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
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raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
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return repo
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def _validate_ref(value: object, name: str) -> str:
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"""Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("-"):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
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if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
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result = subprocess.run(
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[GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
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stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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check=False,
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)
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if result.returncode != 0:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
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return value
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def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
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return value.lower()
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def _validate_text(value: object, name: str, maximum: int, *, required: bool) -> str:
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if not isinstance(value, str):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
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if required and not value.strip():
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
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if len(value) > maximum or "\x00" in value:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
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return value
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def _reject_sensitive(value: str, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
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if any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
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raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} contains runtime credential material")
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if SENSITIVE_TEXT_RE.search(value):
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raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
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def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
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body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, required=False)
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_reject_sensitive(body, "body", forbidden)
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return body
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def _draft_title(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
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"""Return a bounded, secret-screened Gitea draft title."""
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title = _validate_text(value, "title", 251, required=True).strip()
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_reject_sensitive(title, "title", forbidden)
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for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
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if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
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title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
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break
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if not title:
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raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
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return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
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def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
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"""Accept only short canonical ASCII query strings with bounded pagination."""
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raw = target.query
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if (
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len(raw) > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH
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or not raw.isascii()
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or not CANONICAL_QUERY_RE.fullmatch(raw)
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or "%" in raw
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):
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raise PolicyError("API query must use short canonical ASCII form")
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try:
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pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(raw, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True)
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
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if len(pairs) > MAX_QUERY_ITEMS:
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raise PolicyError("too many API query parameters")
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if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
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raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
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if any(
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not key
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or len(key) > MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH
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or len(value) > MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH
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for key, value in pairs
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):
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raise PolicyError("API query key or value exceeds its safe limit")
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if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
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raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
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values = dict(pairs)
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for name in ("page", "limit"):
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if name not in values:
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continue
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if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", values[name]):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use ASCII decimal digits")
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number = int(values[name])
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if values[name] != str(number):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use canonical ASCII decimal form")
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ceiling = MAX_PAGE if name == "page" else MAX_LIMIT
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if not 1 <= number <= ceiling:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} is outside its allowed range")
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if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
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raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")
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@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ import pytest
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ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
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CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py"
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HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
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if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
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def _load():
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@ -179,6 +181,35 @@ def test_read_query_is_bounded(path: str):
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client.authorize_request("GET", path, None)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"query",
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[
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"page=0",
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"page=10001",
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"page=01",
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"limit=0",
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"limit=51",
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"limit=01",
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"page=" + "9" * 4000,
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"page=０",
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"page=%EF%BC%90",
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"state=%6fpen",
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"p%61ge=1",
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"page=1&page=2",
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"page=1&" + "x" * 17 + "=1",
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"state=" + "x" * 17,
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"page=1&limit=2&state=open&extra=3",
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],
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)
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def test_read_query_requires_canonical_bounded_ascii(query: str):
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client = _load()
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with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
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client.authorize_request(
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"GET", f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?{query}", None
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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("method", "path", "data"),
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[
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@ -230,7 +261,7 @@ def test_complete_git_ref_validation_rejects_invalid_names(ref: str):
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def test_git_ref_validation_uses_fixed_trusted_binary():
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client = _load()
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assert client.GIT_BIN == "/usr/bin/git"
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assert client._validate_ref.__globals__["GIT_BIN"] == "/usr/bin/git"
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assert client._validate_ref("hermes/valid-fix", "head") == "hermes/valid-fix"
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@ -272,23 +303,36 @@ def test_runtime_token_is_only_an_authorization_header():
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"body",
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"sensitive",
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[
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"pass" + "word=not-a-real-credential",
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"client_" + "secret=not-a-real-value",
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"ACCESS_" + "TOKEN = 'not-a-real-value'",
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'{"refresh_' + 'token": "not-a-real-value"}',
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"private_" + "key: not-a-real-value",
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"Authorization: " + "Bearer not-a-real-credential-value",
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"token: " + "ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
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"authorization = " + '"Basic not-a-real-credential-value"',
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"Bearer" + "=not-a-real-credential-value",
|
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"Basic" + ": not-a-real-credential-value",
|
||||
"pass" + "word=not-a-real-credential",
|
||||
"ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"github_pat_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"glpat-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"xoxb-" + "not-a-real-credential-value-123456",
|
||||
"sk-ant-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"sk-proj-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"sk_live_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"ya29." + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"AKIA" + "A" * 16,
|
||||
"AIza" + "a" * 35,
|
||||
"-----BEGIN OPENSSH " + "PRIVATE KEY-----",
|
||||
"ssh-ed25519 " + "bm90YXJlYWxjcmVkZW50aWFsdmFsdWU=",
|
||||
"eyJnotarealheader." + "notarealpayloadvalue." + "notarealsignature",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_body_rejects_common_credential_shapes(body: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
|
||||
client._validate_body(body)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network():
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
|
||||
def test_create_rejects_expanded_credential_shapes_before_network(
|
||||
sensitive: str, field: str
|
||||
):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
|
||||
@ -297,15 +341,45 @@ def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network():
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return Response(_draft_response())
|
||||
|
||||
values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
|
||||
values[field] = sensitive
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
|
||||
client.create_draft(
|
||||
"cassandra",
|
||||
base="main",
|
||||
head="hermes/fix",
|
||||
head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
|
||||
title=values["title"],
|
||||
body=values["body"],
|
||||
token="runtime-sentinel",
|
||||
opener=opener,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
|
||||
def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network(field: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal called
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return Response(_draft_response())
|
||||
|
||||
runtime_token = "exact-random-runtime-sentinel-7b73ac61"
|
||||
values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
|
||||
values[field] = f"Accidental {runtime_token} value"
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
|
||||
client.create_draft(
|
||||
"cassandra",
|
||||
base="main",
|
||||
head="hermes/fix",
|
||||
head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
|
||||
title="Focused fix",
|
||||
body="accidental runtime-sentinel value",
|
||||
token="runtime-sentinel",
|
||||
title=values["title"],
|
||||
body=values["body"],
|
||||
token=runtime_token,
|
||||
opener=opener,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert called is False
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import yaml
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
|
||||
CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py"
|
||||
HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
|
||||
if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _load():
|
||||
@ -136,6 +138,13 @@ def test_flux_manifest_projects_runtime_vault_token_and_skill_only():
|
||||
kustomization = yaml.safe_load(
|
||||
(ROOT / "services/hermes/kustomization.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
)
|
||||
coordinator = next(
|
||||
item
|
||||
for item in kustomization["configMapGenerator"]
|
||||
if item["name"] == "hermes-coordinator"
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert "gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py" in coordinator["files"]
|
||||
assert "gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py" in coordinator["files"]
|
||||
generator = next(
|
||||
item
|
||||
for item in kustomization["configMapGenerator"]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ import yaml
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
|
||||
HERMES = ROOT / "services" / "hermes"
|
||||
SCRIPTS = HERMES / "scripts"
|
||||
if str(SCRIPTS) not in sys.path:
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _load(name: str):
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user