hermes: harden draft PR input boundary
This commit is contained in:
jenkins
parent
49b2fa00e4
commit
f416b8a47c
@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ configMapGenerator:
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- claude_oauth_broker.py=scripts/claude_oauth_broker.py
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- worker_route_broker.py=scripts/worker_route_broker.py
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- gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
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- gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
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- gitea_askpass.sh=scripts/gitea_askpass.sh
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- hermes_coordinator.py=scripts/hermes_coordinator.py
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- hermes_model_routing.py=scripts/hermes_model_routing.py
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@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import argparse
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import json
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import os
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import re
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import urllib.error
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import urllib.parse
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@ -15,28 +14,27 @@ import urllib.request
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from collections.abc import Callable
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from pathlib import Path
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from gitea_api_policy import (
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PolicyError,
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_draft_title,
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_validate_body,
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_validate_pr_number,
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_validate_pr_number_segment,
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_validate_query,
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_validate_ref,
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_validate_repo,
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_validate_sha,
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)
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CANONICAL_BASE_URL = "https://scm.bstein.dev"
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ALLOWED_OWNER = "atlas"
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DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
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REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
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SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
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CREATE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/api/v1/repos/atlas/([^/]+)/pulls\Z")
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MAX_ERROR_BYTES = 8192
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MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
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DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
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GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
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SENSITIVE_BODY_PATTERNS = (
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re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
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re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]"),
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re.compile(r"(?i)\bauthorization\s*:\s*(?:bearer|token|basic)\s+\S+"),
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re.compile(r"\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})\b"),
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re.compile(r"\b(?:AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35})\b"),
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re.compile(r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b"),
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)
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class PolicyError(ValueError):
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"""Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
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MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH = 768
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MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH = 512
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RAW_API_TARGET_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9/_.?&=-]+\Z")
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class RejectRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
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@ -64,107 +62,38 @@ def read_token(path: Path = DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE) -> str:
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def configured_base_url() -> str:
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"""Reject attempts to redirect credentials away from the canonical origin."""
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configured = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", CANONICAL_BASE_URL).rstrip("/")
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configured = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", CANONICAL_BASE_URL)
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if configured != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
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raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
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return configured
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def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
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if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
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raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
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return repo
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def _validate_ref(value: object, name: str) -> str:
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"""Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("-"):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
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if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
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result = subprocess.run(
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[GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
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stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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check=False,
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)
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if result.returncode != 0:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
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return value
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def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
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return value.lower()
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def _validate_text(value: object, name: str, maximum: int, *, required: bool) -> str:
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if not isinstance(value, str):
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
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if required and not value.strip():
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
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if len(value) > maximum or "\x00" in value:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
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return value
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def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
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body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, required=False)
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if any(secret and secret in body for secret in forbidden):
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raise PolicyError("pull-request body contains runtime credential material")
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if any(pattern.search(body) for pattern in SENSITIVE_BODY_PATTERNS):
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raise PolicyError("pull-request body resembles credential material")
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return body
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def _draft_title(value: object) -> str:
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"""Return a bounded title using Gitea's configured default draft prefix."""
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title = _validate_text(value, "title", 251, required=True).strip()
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for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
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if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
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title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
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break
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if not title:
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raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
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return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
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def _split_api_path(path: str) -> urllib.parse.SplitResult:
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if not isinstance(path, str) or len(path) > MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH:
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raise PolicyError("API target exceeds the safe size limit")
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if (
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not path.isascii()
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or any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in path)
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or "\\" in path
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or not RAW_API_TARGET_RE.fullmatch(path)
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):
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raise PolicyError("API target contains non-canonical raw characters")
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target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)
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canonical = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(("", "", target.path, target.query, ""))
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if canonical != path:
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raise PolicyError("API target is not in exact canonical form")
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if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
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raise PolicyError("API path must be relative to the Atlas SCM origin")
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if not target.path.startswith("/api/v1/"):
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raise PolicyError("API path must start with /api/v1/")
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if "%" in target.path or "//" in target.path or "/../" in f"{target.path}/":
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if len(target.path) > MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH:
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raise PolicyError("API path exceeds the safe size limit")
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segments = target.path.split("/")
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if "//" in target.path or any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in segments):
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raise PolicyError("encoded or non-canonical API paths are not allowed")
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return target
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def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
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try:
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pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(
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target.query, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True
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)
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
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if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
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raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
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if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
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raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
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values = dict(pairs)
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for name in ("page", "limit"):
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if name not in values:
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continue
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if not values[name].isdigit() or int(values[name]) < 1:
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raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a positive integer")
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if "limit" in values and int(values["limit"]) > 50:
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raise PolicyError("read limit cannot exceed 50")
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if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
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raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")
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def _authorize_read(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult) -> str:
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"""Allow only repository, PR, branch, commit, and status metadata reads."""
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prefix = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/"
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@ -180,10 +109,18 @@ def _authorize_read(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult) -> str:
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if suffix == "pulls":
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_validate_query(target, {"page", "limit", "state"})
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return "pull-list"
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if re.fullmatch(r"pulls/[1-9][0-9]*", suffix):
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content_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)\.(?:patch|diff)", suffix)
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if content_match:
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_validate_pr_number_segment(content_match.group(1))
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raise PolicyError("repository API route is outside the metadata read allowlist")
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pull_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)", suffix)
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if pull_match:
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_validate_pr_number_segment(pull_match.group(1))
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_validate_query(target, set())
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return "pull"
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if re.fullmatch(r"pulls/[1-9][0-9]*/(?:commits|files)", suffix):
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evidence_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)/(?:commits|files)", suffix)
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if evidence_match:
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_validate_pr_number_segment(evidence_match.group(1))
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_validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
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return "pull-evidence"
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if suffix == "branches":
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@ -211,7 +148,7 @@ def _authorize_read(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult) -> str:
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def api_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
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"""Return a canonical same-origin URL without forwarding credentials."""
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if base_url.rstrip("/") != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
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if base_url != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
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raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
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target = _split_api_path(path)
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return urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
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@ -255,6 +192,10 @@ def build_request(
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) -> urllib.request.Request:
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"""Build an authorized request without putting the token in its URL or body."""
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authorize_request(method, path, data)
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if method.upper() == "POST":
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assert isinstance(data, dict)
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_draft_title(data["title"], forbidden=(token,))
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_validate_body(data["body"], forbidden=(token,))
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payload = None
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if data is not None:
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payload = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
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@ -332,9 +273,7 @@ def _require_create_response(
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raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata") from exc
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if not isinstance(document, dict):
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raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata")
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number = document.get("number")
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if not isinstance(number, int) or isinstance(number, bool) or number < 1:
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raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted a valid pull-request number")
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number = _validate_pr_number(document.get("number"))
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full_name = f"{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}"
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expected_html = f"{CANONICAL_BASE_URL}/{full_name}/pulls/{number}"
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checks = (
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@ -372,7 +311,7 @@ def create_draft(
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base = _validate_ref(base, "base")
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head = _validate_ref(head, "head")
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head_sha = _validate_sha(head_sha)
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title = _draft_title(title)
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title = _draft_title(title, forbidden=(token,))
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body = _validate_body(body, forbidden=(token,))
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data = {"base": base, "body": body, "head": head, "title": title}
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result = _request(
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417
services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
Normal file
417
services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
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"""Validation policy for Hermes' least-authority Atlas Forgejo client.
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The screening catches structured credential assignments, known token formats,
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and long high-entropy values. It is a fail-closed accident barrier, not proof
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that text is secret-free: a short or multiword secret under an innocuous key is
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not reliably distinguishable from prose and must never be supplied by callers.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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import subprocess
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import urllib.parse
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from collections import Counter
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from math import log2
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REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
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SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
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DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
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GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
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MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 128
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MAX_QUERY_ITEMS = 3
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MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH = 16
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MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH = 16
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MAX_PAGE = 10_000
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MAX_LIMIT = 50
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MAX_PR_NUMBER = 2_147_483_647
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MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS = 10
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CANONICAL_QUERY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_=&-]*\Z")
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ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(
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r"""(?mx)
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(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])
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(?P<key_quote>[\"']?)
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(?P<key>\.?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127})
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(?P=key_quote)
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[ \t]*(?P<separator>[:=])[ \t]*
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(?P<value>
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\"(?:\\.|[^\"\\\r\n])*\" |
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'(?:\\.|[^'\\\r\n])*' |
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[^\r\n,;}&]*
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)
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"""
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)
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CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE = re.compile(r"(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])|(?<=[A-Z])(?=[A-Z][a-z])")
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CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic|token)\s+"
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r"(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}\b)(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]*[0-9+/_=.-])"
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r"[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}"
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)
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STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS = tuple(
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re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE)
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for pattern in (
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r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b",
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r"\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b",
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r"\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b",
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r"\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}\b",
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r"\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b",
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r"\b[rs]k_(?:test|live)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b",
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r"\bwhsec_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b",
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r"\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b",
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r"\bpypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}\b",
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r"\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b",
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r"\b(?:gta|gto|gitea|forgejo)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b",
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r"\bya29\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b",
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r"\boy2[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}\b",
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r"\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b",
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r"\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b",
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r"\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b",
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r"\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b",
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r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b",
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r"-----BEGIN\s+[A-Z0-9 ][A-Z0-9 -]{1,62}-----",
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r"\bssh-(?:rsa|ed25519|dss|ecdsa-[A-Za-z0-9-]+)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}",
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r"https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Za-z0-9/_-]{20,}",
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r"https://(?:discord(?:app)?\.com)/api/webhooks/[0-9]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,}",
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r"https://[^\s/]*webhook\.office\.com/[^\s]{20,}",
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)
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)
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HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])[A-Za-z0-9+/_=-]{48,}(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"
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)
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PROSE_LEAD_WORDS = {
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"add",
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"allow",
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"change",
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"check",
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"describe",
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"document",
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"ensure",
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"explain",
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"fix",
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"handle",
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"keep",
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"preserve",
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"prevent",
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"reject",
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"remove",
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"review",
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"support",
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"test",
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"validate",
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}
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SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS = {
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"auth",
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"authentication",
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"authorization",
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"auths",
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"basic",
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"bearer",
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"credential",
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"credentials",
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"passwd",
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"password",
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"pat",
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"private",
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"sas",
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"secret",
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"secrets",
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"sig",
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"signature",
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"signing",
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"token",
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"tokens",
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"webhook",
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}
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KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS = {
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"access",
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"account",
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"api",
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"auth",
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"client",
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"encryption",
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"identity",
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"private",
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"registry",
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"secret",
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"service",
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"session",
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"signing",
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"ssh",
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}
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SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS = {
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"accessid",
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"accesskeyid",
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"accountkey",
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"clientemail",
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"clientid",
|
||||
"connectionstring",
|
||||
"dockerconfigjson",
|
||||
"privatekeyid",
|
||||
"serviceaccountkey",
|
||||
"sharedaccesssignature",
|
||||
}
|
||||
SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES = (
|
||||
"accesskey",
|
||||
"accesskeyid",
|
||||
"accountkey",
|
||||
"apikey",
|
||||
"authkey",
|
||||
"clientemail",
|
||||
"clientid",
|
||||
"clientkey",
|
||||
"connectionstring",
|
||||
"credential",
|
||||
"credentials",
|
||||
"encryptionkey",
|
||||
"identitykey",
|
||||
"password",
|
||||
"passwd",
|
||||
"privatekeyid",
|
||||
"privatekey",
|
||||
"secret",
|
||||
"secretkey",
|
||||
"servicekey",
|
||||
"sessionkey",
|
||||
"signature",
|
||||
"signingkey",
|
||||
"sshkey",
|
||||
"token",
|
||||
"webhook",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class PolicyError(ValueError):
|
||||
"""Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
|
||||
if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
|
||||
raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
|
||||
return repo
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_ref(value: object, name: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("-"):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
|
||||
if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
|
||||
result = subprocess.run(
|
||||
[GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
|
||||
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
|
||||
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
|
||||
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if result.returncode != 0:
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
|
||||
return value.lower()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_pr_number_segment(value: object) -> int:
|
||||
"""Validate a canonical bounded pull-request number from an API path."""
|
||||
if (
|
||||
not isinstance(value, str)
|
||||
or len(value) > MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS
|
||||
or not re.fullmatch(r"[1-9][0-9]*", value)
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise PolicyError("pull-request number must use bounded canonical ASCII digits")
|
||||
number = int(value)
|
||||
if number > MAX_PR_NUMBER:
|
||||
raise PolicyError("pull-request number is outside its allowed range")
|
||||
return number
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_pr_number(value: object) -> int:
|
||||
"""Validate a bounded pull-request number returned by Forgejo."""
|
||||
if (
|
||||
not isinstance(value, int)
|
||||
or isinstance(value, bool)
|
||||
or not 1 <= value <= MAX_PR_NUMBER
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted a valid pull-request number")
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_text(value: object, name: str, maximum: int, *, required: bool) -> str:
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
|
||||
if required and not value.strip():
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
|
||||
if len(value) > maximum or "\x00" in value:
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalized_key(value: str) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], str]:
|
||||
"""Split camelCase and separator-based assignment keys into semantics."""
|
||||
separated = CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE.sub(" ", value.strip(".\"'"))
|
||||
words = tuple(re.findall(r"[A-Za-z0-9]+", separated.lower()))
|
||||
return words, "".join(words)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_sensitive_key(value: str) -> bool:
|
||||
words, compact = _normalized_key(value)
|
||||
word_set = set(words)
|
||||
if word_set & SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if compact in SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if compact.endswith(SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if "key" in word_set and word_set & KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if {"client", "email"} <= word_set or {"client", "id"} <= word_set:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if {"access", "id"} <= word_set or {"connection", "string"} <= word_set:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return compact.endswith("configjson")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _strip_assignment_value(value: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
|
||||
stripped = value.strip()
|
||||
quoted = (
|
||||
len(stripped) >= 2 and stripped[0] in {'"', "'"} and stripped[-1] == stripped[0]
|
||||
)
|
||||
if quoted:
|
||||
stripped = stripped[1:-1].strip()
|
||||
return stripped, quoted
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _looks_like_prose(value: str) -> bool:
|
||||
words = re.findall(r"[A-Za-z]+(?:[-'][A-Za-z]+)?", value)
|
||||
if len(words) < 2:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if re.search(r"[$`{}\[\]\\@/:=+_]", value):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return words[0].lower() in PROSE_LEAD_WORDS or len(words) >= 4
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(value: str) -> bool:
|
||||
stripped, quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
|
||||
if not stripped:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if quoted or stripped.startswith(("{", "[", "|", ">", "!!", "&", "*")):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(stripped):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if any(pattern.search(stripped) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if re.search(r"(?:https?://|[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+)", stripped):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if re.search(r"(?:\$\{|\$\(|\\[nrt]|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}\Z)", stripped):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return not _looks_like_prose(stripped)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_structural_credential_assignment(key: str, value: str) -> bool:
|
||||
words, compact_key = _normalized_key(key)
|
||||
stripped, _quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
|
||||
_value_words, compact_value = _normalized_key(stripped)
|
||||
return (
|
||||
compact_key == "type" and compact_value in {"serviceaccount", "credential"}
|
||||
) or ("service" in words and "account" in words and bool(stripped))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _has_high_entropy_token(value: str) -> bool:
|
||||
for match in HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE.finditer(value):
|
||||
token = match.group(0)
|
||||
if len(token) > 256:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
groups = sum(
|
||||
bool(re.search(pattern, token))
|
||||
for pattern in (r"[a-z]", r"[A-Z]", r"[0-9]", r"[+/_=-]")
|
||||
)
|
||||
counts = Counter(token)
|
||||
entropy = -sum(
|
||||
(count / len(token)) * log2(count / len(token)) for count in counts.values()
|
||||
)
|
||||
if groups >= 3 and entropy >= 4.0:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reject_sensitive(value: str, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
|
||||
if any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} contains runtime credential material")
|
||||
if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(value):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
|
||||
if any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
|
||||
for candidate in ASSIGNMENT_RE.finditer(value):
|
||||
key = candidate.group("key")
|
||||
assigned = candidate.group("value")
|
||||
if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned) or (
|
||||
_is_sensitive_key(key) and _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(assigned)
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
|
||||
if _has_high_entropy_token(value):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
|
||||
body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, required=False)
|
||||
_reject_sensitive(body, "body", forbidden)
|
||||
return body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _draft_title(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return a bounded, secret-screened Gitea draft title."""
|
||||
title = _validate_text(value, "title", 251, required=True).strip()
|
||||
_reject_sensitive(title, "title", forbidden)
|
||||
for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
|
||||
if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
|
||||
title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
|
||||
break
|
||||
if not title:
|
||||
raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
|
||||
return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
|
||||
"""Accept only short canonical ASCII query strings with bounded pagination."""
|
||||
raw = target.query
|
||||
if (
|
||||
len(raw) > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH
|
||||
or not raw.isascii()
|
||||
or not CANONICAL_QUERY_RE.fullmatch(raw)
|
||||
or "%" in raw
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise PolicyError("API query must use short canonical ASCII form")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(raw, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True)
|
||||
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||
raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
|
||||
if len(pairs) > MAX_QUERY_ITEMS:
|
||||
raise PolicyError("too many API query parameters")
|
||||
if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
|
||||
raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
|
||||
if any(
|
||||
not key
|
||||
or len(key) > MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH
|
||||
or len(value) > MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH
|
||||
for key, value in pairs
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise PolicyError("API query key or value exceeds its safe limit")
|
||||
if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
|
||||
raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
|
||||
values = dict(pairs)
|
||||
for name in ("page", "limit"):
|
||||
if name not in values:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", values[name]):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use ASCII decimal digits")
|
||||
number = int(values[name])
|
||||
if values[name] != str(number):
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use canonical ASCII decimal form")
|
||||
ceiling = MAX_PAGE if name == "page" else MAX_LIMIT
|
||||
if not 1 <= number <= ceiling:
|
||||
raise PolicyError(f"{name} is outside its allowed range")
|
||||
if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
|
||||
raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")
|
||||
@ -29,7 +29,11 @@ evidence, not authorization to change it.
|
||||
Before opening a PR, verify the remote, branch, clean worktree, diff, tests, and
|
||||
exact pushed commit. Never force-push. Pass that full 40-character pushed head
|
||||
SHA explicitly. Keep the short body free of credentials and credential-like
|
||||
text. Validate without reading a credential or using the network:
|
||||
text. The client screens structured assignments, known token formats, and long
|
||||
high-entropy values as an accidental-disclosure barrier. It cannot prove text
|
||||
is secret-free: short or multiword secrets under innocuous names may resemble
|
||||
ordinary prose, so never place credential material in either field. Validate
|
||||
without reading a credential or using the network:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py --dry-run create-draft REPO \
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ import pytest
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
|
||||
CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py"
|
||||
HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
|
||||
if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _load():
|
||||
@ -101,6 +103,10 @@ def test_redirect_handler_rejects_cross_origin_with_sentinel_authorization():
|
||||
("https://evil.example", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("http://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("https://scm.bstein.dev:443", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("https://scm.bstein.dev/", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("HTTPS://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("https://SCM.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("https://user@scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("https://scm.bstein.dev", "https://evil.example/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
("https://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/evil/cassandra"),
|
||||
("https://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/%61tlas/cassandra"),
|
||||
@ -114,6 +120,72 @@ def test_host_owner_and_path_escape_attempts_are_rejected(base_url: str, path: s
|
||||
client.build_request("GET", path, base_url=base_url, token="secret")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"path",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\nHost: evil.example",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\r\nX-Test: value",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\tignored",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x00ignored",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x1fignored",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x7fignored",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra\\pulls\\1",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/%31",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/１",
|
||||
" https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
|
||||
"https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_raw_noncanonical_target_is_rejected_before_urlsplit_and_opener(
|
||||
path: str, monkeypatch
|
||||
):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
split_called = False
|
||||
opener_called = False
|
||||
original_urlsplit = client.urllib.parse.urlsplit
|
||||
|
||||
def urlsplit(*args, **kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal split_called
|
||||
split_called = True
|
||||
return original_urlsplit(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal opener_called
|
||||
opener_called = True
|
||||
return Response(b"{}")
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(client.urllib.parse, "urlsplit", urlsplit)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
|
||||
client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
|
||||
assert split_called is False
|
||||
assert opener_called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"path",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1?",
|
||||
"//scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/./pulls/1",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/../admin",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra//pulls/1",
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1?limit=01",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_noncanonical_round_trip_or_segments_never_reach_opener(path: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
opener_called = False
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal opener_called
|
||||
opener_called = True
|
||||
return Response(b"{}")
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
|
||||
client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
|
||||
assert opener_called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"path",
|
||||
[
|
||||
@ -179,6 +251,109 @@ def test_read_query_is_bounded(path: str):
|
||||
client.authorize_request("GET", path, None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"query",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"page=0",
|
||||
"page=10001",
|
||||
"page=01",
|
||||
"limit=0",
|
||||
"limit=51",
|
||||
"limit=01",
|
||||
"page=" + "9" * 4000,
|
||||
"page=０",
|
||||
"page=%EF%BC%90",
|
||||
"state=%6fpen",
|
||||
"p%61ge=1",
|
||||
"page=1&page=2",
|
||||
"page=1&" + "x" * 17 + "=1",
|
||||
"state=" + "x" * 17,
|
||||
"page=1&limit=2&state=open&extra=3",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_read_query_requires_canonical_bounded_ascii(query: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
|
||||
client.authorize_request(
|
||||
"GET", f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?{query}", None
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"suffix",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"pulls/{number}",
|
||||
"pulls/{number}.patch",
|
||||
"pulls/{number}.diff",
|
||||
"pulls/{number}/commits",
|
||||
"pulls/{number}/files",
|
||||
"commits/{number}/status",
|
||||
"commits/{number}/statuses",
|
||||
"statuses/{number}",
|
||||
"branches/{number}",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_oversized_numeric_or_captured_path_never_reaches_opener(suffix: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal called
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return Response(b"{}")
|
||||
|
||||
path = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/" + suffix.format(number="9" * 4000)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
|
||||
client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
|
||||
assert called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"number",
|
||||
["0", "01", "2147483648", "１２", "%31", "12345678901"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("tail", ["", ".patch", ".diff", "/commits", "/files"])
|
||||
def test_noncanonical_or_out_of_range_pr_number_never_reaches_opener(
|
||||
number: str, tail: str
|
||||
):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal called
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return Response(b"{}")
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
|
||||
client.read(
|
||||
f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/{number}{tail}",
|
||||
token="runtime",
|
||||
opener=opener,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_maximum_bounded_pr_number_is_readable():
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal called
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return Response(b"{}")
|
||||
|
||||
assert (
|
||||
client.read(
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/2147483647",
|
||||
token="runtime",
|
||||
opener=opener,
|
||||
)
|
||||
== b"{}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert called is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
("method", "path", "data"),
|
||||
[
|
||||
@ -230,7 +405,7 @@ def test_complete_git_ref_validation_rejects_invalid_names(ref: str):
|
||||
def test_git_ref_validation_uses_fixed_trusted_binary():
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
|
||||
assert client.GIT_BIN == "/usr/bin/git"
|
||||
assert client._validate_ref.__globals__["GIT_BIN"] == "/usr/bin/git"
|
||||
assert client._validate_ref("hermes/valid-fix", "head") == "hermes/valid-fix"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -272,42 +447,212 @@ def test_runtime_token_is_only_an_authorization_header():
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"body",
|
||||
"sensitive",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"pass" + "word=not-a-real-credential",
|
||||
"client_" + "secret=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"ACCESS_" + "TOKEN = 'not-a-real-value'",
|
||||
'{"refresh_' + 'token": "not-a-real-value"}',
|
||||
"private_" + "key: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_" + "KEY=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"aws_access_key_" + "id: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"AWS_SESSION_" + "TOKEN = 'not-a-real-value'",
|
||||
'{"AccessKey' + 'Id":"not-a-real-value"}',
|
||||
'{"SecretAccess' + 'Key":"not-a-real-value"}',
|
||||
'{"Session' + 'Token":"not-a-real-value"}',
|
||||
"aws-security-" + "token: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"Account" + "Key=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"SharedAccess" + "Signature: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"AZURE_STORAGE_CONNECTION_" + "STRING='not-a-real-value'",
|
||||
"DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=fake;Account"
|
||||
+ "Key=not-a-real-value;EndpointSuffix=example",
|
||||
"?sv=2024-11-04&ss=b&srt=sco&sp=rwdlac&se=2099-01-01&sig=" + "not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"DOCKER_AUTH_" + "CONFIG='not-a-real-value'",
|
||||
'{"auths":{"registry.example":{"auth":"bm90LXJlYWw="}}}',
|
||||
'{"identity' + 'token":"not-a-real-value"}',
|
||||
'{"type":"service_' + 'account","client_email":"fake@example.test"}',
|
||||
'{"private_key_' + 'id":"not-a-real-value"}',
|
||||
'{"client_' + 'email":"fake@example.test"}',
|
||||
"GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS" + "=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"personal_access_" + "token: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"GITEA_" + "TOKEN=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"gitlab-token" + ": not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"pat" + "=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"Authorization: " + "Bearer not-a-real-credential-value",
|
||||
"token: " + "ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"authorization = " + '"Basic not-a-real-credential-value"',
|
||||
"Bearer" + "=not-a-real-credential-value",
|
||||
"Basic" + ": not-a-real-credential-value",
|
||||
"pass" + "word=not-a-real-credential",
|
||||
"ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"github_pat_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"glpat-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"xoxb-" + "not-a-real-credential-value-123456",
|
||||
"sk-ant-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"sk-proj-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"sk_live_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"ya29." + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"gta_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"whsec_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"npm_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"pypi-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456789012345",
|
||||
"hf_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"SG." + "notarealvalue1234" + ".notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"SK" + "a" * 32,
|
||||
"https://hooks.slack.com/services/" + "T000/B000/notarealvalue123456",
|
||||
"https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123456789/" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"https://fake.webhook.office.com/" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"webhook_" + "url=https://example.test/not-real",
|
||||
"FutureCloudSigning" + "Credential=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"future-client-signing-" + "key: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"future_client_signing_" + "key='not-a-real-value'",
|
||||
'{"serviceAccountPrivate' + 'Key":"not-a-real-value"}',
|
||||
"CONTAINER_REGISTRY_" + "CREDENTIAL=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"someWebhookSigning" + "Secret: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"client" + "Key=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"session" + "Key: not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"access" + "Id=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"credentials" + ": {user: fake}",
|
||||
"private" + "Key: |",
|
||||
"nuget_api_" + "key=not-a-real-value",
|
||||
"oy2" + "a" * 44,
|
||||
"sk_test_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
|
||||
"A1b2C3d4E5f6G7h8I9j0K_l-M+n/O=pQ2rS3tU4vW5xY6zZ7aB8cC9d",
|
||||
"AKIA" + "A" * 16,
|
||||
"AIza" + "a" * 35,
|
||||
"-----BEGIN OPENSSH " + "PRIVATE KEY-----",
|
||||
"ssh-ed25519 " + "bm90YXJlYWxjcmVkZW50aWFsdmFsdWU=",
|
||||
"eyJnotarealheader." + "notarealpayloadvalue." + "notarealsignature",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_body_rejects_common_credential_shapes(body: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
|
||||
client._validate_body(body)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network():
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
|
||||
def test_create_rejects_expanded_credential_shapes_before_network(
|
||||
sensitive: str, field: str
|
||||
):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
request_built = False
|
||||
|
||||
original_build_request = client.build_request
|
||||
|
||||
def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal request_built
|
||||
request_built = True
|
||||
return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal called
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return Response(_draft_response())
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
|
||||
client.build_request = build_request
|
||||
values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
|
||||
values[field] = sensitive
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
|
||||
client.create_draft(
|
||||
"cassandra",
|
||||
base="main",
|
||||
head="hermes/fix",
|
||||
head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
|
||||
title=values["title"],
|
||||
body=values["body"],
|
||||
token="runtime-sentinel",
|
||||
opener=opener,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert request_built is False
|
||||
assert called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_very_long_compact_body_is_rejected_before_request_or_network():
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
request_built = False
|
||||
opener_called = False
|
||||
original_build_request = client.build_request
|
||||
|
||||
def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal request_built
|
||||
request_built = True
|
||||
return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal opener_called
|
||||
opener_called = True
|
||||
return Response(_draft_response())
|
||||
|
||||
client.build_request = build_request
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
|
||||
client.create_draft(
|
||||
"cassandra",
|
||||
base="main",
|
||||
head="hermes/fix",
|
||||
head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
|
||||
title="Focused fix",
|
||||
body="accidental runtime-sentinel value",
|
||||
body="a" * 300,
|
||||
token="runtime-sentinel",
|
||||
opener=opener,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert request_built is False
|
||||
assert opener_called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"safe_text",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY is injected at runtime",
|
||||
"Token: reject empty values",
|
||||
"Authorization = preserve header behavior",
|
||||
"Password: add regression",
|
||||
"Review the Authorization header behavior",
|
||||
"Bearer authentication is required for this route",
|
||||
"Document Docker auths payload rejection",
|
||||
"The client_email field belongs to service accounts",
|
||||
"AccountKey assignments must be blocked",
|
||||
"This patch changes token validation without including a value",
|
||||
"FutureCloudSigningCredential handling needs a regression test",
|
||||
"The clientKey name is documented without an assigned value",
|
||||
"A SHA-256 digest 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef is evidence",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_credential_policy_keeps_normal_engineering_prose_usable(safe_text: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
|
||||
assert client._validate_body(safe_text) == safe_text
|
||||
assert client._draft_title(safe_text) == f"WIP: {safe_text}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
|
||||
def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network(field: str):
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
called = False
|
||||
request_built = False
|
||||
|
||||
original_build_request = client.build_request
|
||||
|
||||
def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal request_built
|
||||
request_built = True
|
||||
return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
|
||||
nonlocal called
|
||||
called = True
|
||||
return Response(_draft_response())
|
||||
|
||||
client.build_request = build_request
|
||||
runtime_token = "exact-random-runtime-sentinel-7b73ac61"
|
||||
values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
|
||||
values[field] = f"Accidental {runtime_token} value"
|
||||
with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
|
||||
client.create_draft(
|
||||
"cassandra",
|
||||
base="main",
|
||||
head="hermes/fix",
|
||||
head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
|
||||
title=values["title"],
|
||||
body=values["body"],
|
||||
token=runtime_token,
|
||||
opener=opener,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert request_built is False
|
||||
assert called is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -345,6 +690,7 @@ def test_create_postcondition_rejects_every_material_mismatch():
|
||||
client = _load()
|
||||
mutations = [
|
||||
("number", 0),
|
||||
("number", 2_147_483_648),
|
||||
("state", "closed"),
|
||||
("draft", False),
|
||||
("merged", True),
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import yaml
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
|
||||
CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py"
|
||||
HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
|
||||
if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _load():
|
||||
@ -136,6 +138,13 @@ def test_flux_manifest_projects_runtime_vault_token_and_skill_only():
|
||||
kustomization = yaml.safe_load(
|
||||
(ROOT / "services/hermes/kustomization.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
)
|
||||
coordinator = next(
|
||||
item
|
||||
for item in kustomization["configMapGenerator"]
|
||||
if item["name"] == "hermes-coordinator"
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert "gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py" in coordinator["files"]
|
||||
assert "gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py" in coordinator["files"]
|
||||
generator = next(
|
||||
item
|
||||
for item in kustomization["configMapGenerator"]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ import yaml
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
|
||||
HERMES = ROOT / "services" / "hermes"
|
||||
SCRIPTS = HERMES / "scripts"
|
||||
if str(SCRIPTS) not in sys.path:
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _load(name: str):
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user