hermes: isolate Atlas SCM write authority

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-observer-rbac
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-observer-rbac
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: hermes

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker-code
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes/scm-common
+  targetNamespace: hermes-scm
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: hermes-scm-namespace

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-scm-broker
+  targetNamespace: hermes-scm
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 10m
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: apps/v1
+      kind: Deployment
+      name: hermes-scm-broker
+      namespace: hermes-scm
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: vault
+    - name: gitea
+    - name: hermes-scm-namespace
+    - name: hermes-scm-broker-code

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-namespace
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-scm-namespace
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes/kustomization.yaml

@@ -60,3 +60,4 @@ spec:
     - name: keycloak
     - name: longhorn
     - name: vault
+    - name: hermes-scm-broker

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/kustomization.yaml

@@ -27,7 +27,11 @@ resources:
   - jenkins/kustomization.yaml
   - ai-llm/kustomization.yaml
   - openclaw/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes-chat/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes-triage-demo/kustomization.yaml
   - game-stream/kustomization.yaml

services/gitea/atlas-identity-bootstrap-job.yaml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 apiVersion: batch/v1
 kind: Job
 metadata:
-  name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap-3
+  name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap-4
   namespace: gitea
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea

services/gitea/scripts/gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ source_owner="${GITEA_SOURCE_OWNER:-bstein}"
 managed_repositories="${GITEA_MANAGED_REPOSITORIES:-hermes-code-demo cassandra soteria pegasus metis ananke ariadne typhon titan-iac}"
 contributor_team=Contributors
 contributor_units='["repo.actions","repo.packages","repo.code","repo.issues","repo.wiki","repo.pulls","repo.releases","repo.projects"]'
+protected_reviewer=bstein
 
 die() {
   echo "Gitea Atlas identity bootstrap failed: $*" >&2
@@ -272,6 +273,63 @@ transfer_managed_repositories() {
   trap - EXIT HUP INT TERM
 }
 
+ensure_default_branch_protection() {
+  repository=$1
+  repo_file=$(mktemp)
+  protections_file=$(mktemp)
+  protection_file=$(mktemp)
+  response_file=$(mktemp)
+
+  status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}" '' "${repo_file}")
+  expect_status "${status}" 200 "read ${repository} metadata for branch protection"
+  default_branch=$(sed -n 's/.*"default_branch":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "${repo_file}")
+  case "${default_branch}" in
+    main|master) ;;
+    *) die "${repository} has unsupported default branch ${default_branch:-missing}" ;;
+  esac
+
+  status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" '' "${protections_file}")
+  expect_status "${status}" 200 "list ${repository} branch protections"
+  tr -d '[:space:]' <"${protections_file}" | sed 's/},{/}\
+{/g' | grep -F "\"rule_name\":\"${default_branch}\"" >"${protection_file}" || true
+  matching_rules=$(grep -c . "${protection_file}" || true)
+  [ "${matching_rules}" -le 1 ] || die "${repository} has duplicate ${default_branch} protection rules"
+
+  if [ "${matching_rules}" -eq 0 ]; then
+    payload="{\"rule_name\":\"${default_branch}\",\"enable_push\":true,\"enable_push_whitelist\":true,\"push_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"push_whitelist_teams\":[],\"push_whitelist_deploy_keys\":false,\"enable_force_push\":false,\"enable_force_push_allowlist\":false,\"force_push_allowlist_usernames\":[],\"force_push_allowlist_teams\":[],\"force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys\":false,\"enable_merge_whitelist\":true,\"merge_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"merge_whitelist_teams\":[],\"enable_approvals_whitelist\":true,\"approvals_whitelist_username\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"approvals_whitelist_teams\":[],\"required_approvals\":1,\"block_on_rejected_reviews\":true,\"block_on_outdated_branch\":true,\"dismiss_stale_approvals\":true,\"block_admin_merge_override\":true}"
+    status=$(api_request POST "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" "${payload}" "${response_file}")
+    expect_status "${status}" 201 "protect ${repository} ${default_branch}"
+    status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" '' "${protections_file}")
+    expect_status "${status}" 200 "read back ${repository} branch protections"
+    tr -d '[:space:]' <"${protections_file}" | sed 's/},{/}\
+{/g' | grep -F "\"rule_name\":\"${default_branch}\"" >"${protection_file}" || true
+  fi
+
+  compact=$(tr -d '[:space:]' <"${protection_file}")
+  for required in \
+    "\"rule_name\":\"${default_branch}\"" \
+    '"enable_push":true' \
+    '"enable_push_whitelist":true' \
+    "\"push_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"]" \
+    '"push_whitelist_deploy_keys":false' \
+    '"enable_force_push":false' \
+    '"enable_merge_whitelist":true' \
+    "\"merge_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"]" \
+    '"enable_approvals_whitelist":true' \
+    "\"approvals_whitelist_username\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"]" \
+    '"required_approvals":1' \
+    '"block_on_rejected_reviews":true' \
+    '"block_on_outdated_branch":true' \
+    '"dismiss_stale_approvals":true' \
+    '"block_admin_merge_override":true'
+  do
+    printf '%s' "${compact}" | grep -Fq "${required}" || \
+      die "${repository} ${default_branch} protection differs from the human-review policy"
+  done
+
+  rm -f "${repo_file}" "${protections_file}" "${protection_file}" "${response_file}"
+}
+
 wait_for_gitea
 ensure_user "${reconciler_user}" "${reconciler_email}" true
 ensure_user "${hermes_user}" "${hermes_email}" false
@@ -318,6 +376,10 @@ expect_status "${status}" 204 "add Hermes to Atlas contributors"
 
 transfer_managed_repositories
 
+for repository in ${managed_repositories}; do
+  ensure_default_branch_protection "${repository}"
+done
+
 vault_write gitea/atlas-reconciler "{\"data\":{\"username\":\"${reconciler_user}\",\"token\":\"${reconciler_token}\",\"base_url\":\"${public_url}\"}}"
 vault_write hermes/developer-gitea "{\"data\":{\"username\":\"${hermes_user}\",\"email\":\"${hermes_email}\",\"token\":\"${hermes_token}\",\"base_url\":\"${public_url}\"}}"
 

services/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - rbac.yaml
+  - rolebindings.yaml

services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources:
+      - namespaces
+      - nodes
+      - persistentvolumes
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["ingressclasses"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["storage.k8s.io"]
+    resources:
+      - csidrivers
+      - csinodes
+      - storageclasses
+      - volumeattachments
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["metrics.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["nodes"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources:
+      - configmaps
+      - endpoints
+      - events
+      - persistentvolumeclaims
+      - pods
+      - pods/log
+      - replicationcontrollers
+      - resourcequotas
+      - services
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["apps"]
+    resources:
+      - controllerrevisions
+      - daemonsets
+      - deployments
+      - replicasets
+      - statefulsets
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["batch"]
+    resources: ["cronjobs", "jobs"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["autoscaling"]
+    resources: ["horizontalpodautoscalers"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["ingresses", "networkpolicies"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["discovery.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["endpointslices"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["policy"]
+    resources: ["poddisruptionbudgets"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["storage.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["csistoragecapacities"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["metrics.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["pods"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list"]
+  - apiGroups:
+      - helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - image.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - notification.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - source.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+    resources: ["*"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["longhorn.io"]
+    resources:
+      - backingimages
+      - engines
+      - instancemanagers
+      - nodes
+      - replicas
+      - settings
+      - volumes
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: hermes-agent
+    namespace: hermes
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2

services/hermes-observer-rbac/rolebindings.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-rbac/rolebindings.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: List
+items:
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: ai}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: bstein-dev-home}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: cassandra}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: cert-manager}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: climate}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: comms}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: crypto}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: default}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: finance}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: flux-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: game-stream}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: gitea}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: harbor}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: health}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes-chat}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes-triage-demo}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: jellyfin}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: jenkins}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-node-lease}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-public}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: logging}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: longhorn-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: mailu-mailserver}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: maintenance}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: metallb-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: monitoring}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: nextcloud}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: openclaw}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: outline}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: planka}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: postgres}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: quality}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: sso}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: sui-metrics}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: traefik}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: vault}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: vaultwarden}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: veles}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}

services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+  labels:
+    app: hermes-scm-broker
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  revisionHistoryLimit: 2
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-scm-broker
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: hermes-scm-broker
+      annotations:
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/role: hermes-scm-broker
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-token: |
+          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
+          {{ .Data.data.token }}
+          {{- end }}
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-pre-populate-only: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-init-first: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-requests-cpu: 10m
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-requests-mem: 32Mi
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-limits-cpu: 50m
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-limits-mem: 64Mi
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: hermes-scm-broker
+      automountServiceAccountToken: true
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 10000
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      affinity:
+        nodeAffinity:
+          requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            nodeSelectorTerms:
+              - matchExpressions:
+                  - key: kubernetes.io/arch
+                    operator: In
+                    values: [arm64]
+                  - key: node-role.kubernetes.io/worker
+                    operator: In
+                    values: ["true"]
+          preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            - weight: 100
+              preference:
+                matchExpressions:
+                  - key: hardware
+                    operator: In
+                    values: [rpi5]
+      containers:
+        - name: broker
+          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command:
+            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python
+            - /opt/broker/scm_broker.py
+          ports:
+            - {name: http, containerPort: 9081, protocol: TCP}
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet: {path: /healthz, port: http}
+            initialDelaySeconds: 3
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet: {path: /healthz, port: http}
+            initialDelaySeconds: 15
+            periodSeconds: 30
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: [ALL]
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 10000
+            runAsGroup: 10000
+          volumeMounts:
+            - {name: broker-code, mountPath: /opt/broker, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
+          resources:
+            requests: {cpu: 50m, memory: 128Mi}
+            limits: {cpu: "1", memory: 768Mi}
+      volumes:
+        - name: broker-code
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-scm-boundary
+            defaultMode: 0555
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 1Gi

services/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: hermes-scm
+resources:
+  - service.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - networkpolicy.yaml
+images:
+  - name: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent
+    digest: sha256:37ebf720c783ae908a602916ffccf88d43d205a157957f5dc4b487867aee45e7

services/hermes-scm-broker/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/networkpolicy.yaml
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker-isolation
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-scm-broker
+  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
+  ingress:
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: hermes
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: hermes-agent
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 9081}
+  egress:
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              k8s-app: kube-dns
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: vault
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: vault
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 8200}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 192.168.22.9/32
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 443}

services/hermes-scm-broker/service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/service.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app: hermes-scm-broker
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 9081
+      targetPort: http

services/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml

services/hermes-scm-namespace/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-namespace/namespace.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-scm-broker
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+automountServiceAccountToken: true

services/hermes/agent-configmap.yaml

@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ data:
     not replace these coordinator-wide rules. Never call `kanban_show` without
     a known, non-empty task ID. Ad-hoc inspection and acceptance checks do not
     need a synthetic Kanban lookup, and must load a skill only when its workflow
-    materially applies. Atlas HTTPS Git authentication is already supplied by
+    materially applies. Atlas Git access is supplied by the isolated SCM
-    the runtime-only `GIT_ASKPASS`; use it without reading or exposing the
+    broker; no repository token is present in this pod. Use only configured
-    credential. Coordinator guidance lives at
+    broker remotes and clients. Coordinator guidance lives at
     `/opt/data/workspace/AGENTS.md` when more detail is needed.
 
     The Jetson classifier is mandatory for AUTO selection. Switchyard may use
@@ -295,21 +295,21 @@ data:
     objective's difficulty warrants it; otherwise synthesize at the original
     effort.
 
-    This owner-only pod has cluster-admin access across Atlas, including logs,
+    This owner-only pod has scoped read-only Kubernetes diagnostics across
-    Secrets, exec, port-forwarding, rollout operations, and Flux reconciliation.
+    Atlas, including resource status, events, logs, and Flux/Helm evidence. It
-    Prefer the titan-iac Git/Flux workflow for every durable cluster change;
+    cannot read Secrets, exec or attach to pods, create service-account tokens,
-    direct operations are available for explicit operator requests, incident
+    mutate workloads or RBAC, or reconcile Flux. Put every durable cluster
-    recovery, and verification, and must be followed by a matching source-of-
+    change on a reviewed titan-iac branch. Never expose credentials in chat or
-    truth change when they alter desired state. Never expose credentials in
+    logs. Triage belongs at triage.hermes.bstein.dev.
-    chat or logs. Triage belongs at triage.hermes.bstein.dev.
 
     ## Atlas engineering access
 
     The Atlas organization has private visibility. Repository visibility is
     preserved per project and may be public or private; do not infer a
     repository's visibility from the organization setting. Repositories are
-    canonical at `https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/<repo>.git`. HTTPS Git
+    canonical at `https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/<repo>.git`; worker Git traffic
-    authentication is already supplied through `GIT_ASKPASS`. Verify the remote
+    uses `http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081/git/atlas/<repo>.git`.
+    Verify the broker remote
     and cleanly separate pre-existing changes, create a task branch, run the
     repository's tests, use `git push --dry-run` when proving access, and push a
     real branch only when the requested implementation is review-ready. Never
@@ -318,11 +318,13 @@ data:
     `scm.bstein.dev` is Forgejo/Gitea, not GitHub. Never load or follow a
     GitHub/`gh` skill for an Atlas remote, and do not interpret an
     unauthenticated Gitea HTTP 404 as a missing private repository. Use
-    authenticated Git for clone, fetch, and non-force push. For bounded
+    brokered Git for clone, fetch, and creation of a new namespaced feature
+    branch. Existing-ref updates, protected refs, deletion, and force-push are
+    rejected. For bounded
     repository/pull-request evidence or to create a review-ready draft PR, load
-    `$manage-atlas-pull-requests` and use `/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py`. The
+    `$manage-atlas-pull-requests` and use `/opt/scm/gitea_api.py`. The
-    client injects the runtime Vault token without exposing it to the command
+    client carries no repository credential; a separate least-authority
-    line, environment, output, or transcript. It permits only Atlas-scoped
+    workload performs the allowed operation. It permits only Atlas-scoped
     metadata reads and verified same-repository draft creation. Updates, merge,
     approve, close, delete, comments, repository administration, and force-push
     are unavailable; never bypass the client with raw HTTP. Leave every PR
@@ -330,14 +332,10 @@ data:
     verify the exact base/head ancestry and diff, run the relevant tests, and
     confirm the candidate Jenkins result before presenting a handoff. Prefer
     the internal endpoint in
-    `JENKINS_BASE_URL`; when Jenkins API authorization prevents a read, use the
+    `JENKINS_BASE_URL`; when Jenkins API authorization prevents a read, use
-    existing cluster access to inspect the controller's job/build files and
+    Kubernetes pod logs and status evidence without exec or secret access.
-    logs rather than guessing a public hostname. The preferred read-only path
+    Do not bypass the boundary to inspect controller files. If Brad separately
-    is `/opt/coordinator/jenkins_build_evidence.py JOB [--branch BRANCH]
+    reports that he merged the PR, observe
-    [--commit SHA] --wait`; it distinguishes a genuinely terminal build from
-    nested Jenkins execution metadata and returns bounded JSON/log evidence.
-    With a branch, the helper also tries the conventional `JOB-branches`
-    multibranch name. If Brad separately reports that he merged the PR, observe
     the default-branch build to a terminal result and report exact commit,
     build, and test evidence.
 
@@ -349,19 +347,21 @@ data:
 
     The terminal PATH contains the pinned operator tools. Start cluster work
     with `kubectl config current-context`, read-only status/events/logs, and the
-    relevant `titan-iac` manifests. Put durable desired-state changes on a
+    relevant `titan-iac` manifests. The broker namespace is deliberately
+    excluded from agent RBAC. Kubernetes cannot express a deny on one namespace
+    inside an all-namespace list, so enumerate namespaces and run namespaced
+    diagnostics instead of relying on `kubectl ... --all-namespaces`. Put
+    durable desired-state changes on a
     reviewable `titan-iac` branch and validate Kustomize and client dry-run.
-    Brad owns merge and routine Flux reconciliation; perform either only under
+    Brad owns merge and Flux reconciliation. Direct `kubectl` mutation is not
-    a separate explicit operator request. Direct `kubectl` mutations are for
+    available to the agent; hand an explicit incident mutation back to Brad.
-    explicit incident recovery or ephemeral verification, not ordinary
-    delivery.
 
-    Node SSH uses a dedicated audited Hermes identity: `ssh titan-04` (or any
+    Node SSH uses the dedicated locked-password `hermes-agent` OS account:
-    current Kubernetes node name). Host keys are pinned and password fallback
+    `ssh titan-04` (or any current Kubernetes node name). Host keys are pinned,
-    is disabled. Use SSH only for host-level evidence or repairs that cannot be
+    password fallback is disabled, and the account has no sudo, disk, runtime,
-    performed through Kubernetes. Read first, identify the exact node and
+    or Kubernetes-storage authority. Use it for unprivileged host evidence;
-    impact, avoid fleet-wide destructive commands, and reflect persistent host
+    hand privileged host repair back to Brad and reflect persistent changes in
-    configuration in the appropriate tracked provisioning source.
+    the tracked provisioning source.
 
     Treat every credential, SSH identity, host-trust record, and
     credential-bearing access-client state as runtime-only Vault data. Keep
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ data:
     <low|medium|high|xhigh> [model]` for a persistent override. The first native
     Codex worker requires one device-code login; refreshed provider credentials
     persist through Vault while client caches remain disposable. The owner
-    workspace includes cluster-admin Kubernetes
+    workspace includes scoped read-only Kubernetes diagnostics plus `kubectl`,
-    access plus `kubectl`, `flux`, `helm`, `kustomize`, `vault`, `sops`, `age`,
+    `flux`, `helm`, `kustomize`, `vault`, `sops`, `age`,
     `terraform`, `k9s`, `jq`, `yq`, `gh`, Git, SSH, Python, Node, the
     browser/computer tools, and the native provider CLIs.

services/hermes/agent-deployment.yaml

@@ -46,16 +46,6 @@ spec:
           {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/agent-tokens" -}}
           {{ .Data.data.codex_auth_json }}
           {{- end }}
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-token: |
-          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
-          {{ .Data.data.token }}
-          {{- end }}
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-username: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-username: |
-          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
-          {{ .Data.data.username }}
-          {{- end }}
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-private-key: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-node-ssh-private-key: |
           {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh" -}}
@@ -185,9 +175,8 @@ spec:
                 chmod 0600 "${profile_env}"
                 chown 10000:10000 "${profile_env}"
               done
-              upsert_env GIT_ASKPASS /opt/coordinator/gitea_askpass.sh
               upsert_env GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT 0
-              upsert_env GITEA_BASE_URL https://scm.bstein.dev
+              upsert_env HERMES_SCM_BROKER_URL http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081
               upsert_env JENKINS_BASE_URL http://jenkins.jenkins.svc.cluster.local:8080
               upsert_env ARIADNE_BASE_URL http://ariadne.maintenance.svc.cluster.local
               upsert_env VICTORIA_METRICS_URL http://victoria-metrics-single-server.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:8428
@@ -663,6 +652,7 @@ spec:
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
             - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: routing-catalog, mountPath: /routing-catalog, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
           startupProbe:
@@ -827,6 +817,7 @@ spec:
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
             - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: routing-catalog, mountPath: /routing-catalog, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
             - {name: ttyd-index, mountPath: /ttyd-index, readOnly: true}
@@ -896,6 +887,7 @@ spec:
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
             - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
           resources:
             requests: {cpu: 100m, memory: 256Mi}
@@ -1196,6 +1188,10 @@ spec:
             items:
               - {key: SKILL.md, path: SKILL.md}
               - {key: openai.yaml, path: agents/openai.yaml}
+        - name: scm-boundary
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-scm-boundary
+            defaultMode: 0555
         - name: image-policy
           configMap:
             name: hermes-image-policy

services/hermes/agent-kubeconfig.yaml

@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ users:
     user:
       tokenFile: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
 contexts:
-  - name: atlas-owner
+  - name: atlas-observer
     context:
       cluster: atlas
       user: hermes-agent
       namespace: default
-current-context: atlas-owner
+current-context: atlas-observer

services/hermes/agent-rbac.yaml

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# services/hermes/agent-rbac.yaml
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: ClusterRoleBinding
-metadata:
-  name: hermes-agent-cluster-admin
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
-subjects:
-  - kind: ServiceAccount
-    name: hermes-agent
-    namespace: hermes
-roleRef:
-  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-  kind: ClusterRole
-  name: cluster-admin

services/hermes/kustomization.yaml

@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ images:
     digest: sha256:37ebf720c783ae908a602916ffccf88d43d205a157957f5dc4b487867aee45e7
 resources:
   - namespace.yaml
+  - scm-common
   - vault-serviceaccount.yaml
   - configmap.yaml
   - agent-configmap.yaml
   - chat-configmap.yaml
   - switchyard-configmap.yaml
   - rbac.yaml
-  - agent-rbac.yaml
   - node-ssh-access.yaml
   - pvc.yaml
   - switchyard-pvc.yaml
@@ -69,8 +69,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - classifier_broker.py=scripts/classifier_broker.py
       - claude_oauth_broker.py=scripts/claude_oauth_broker.py
       - worker_route_broker.py=scripts/worker_route_broker.py
-      - gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
-      - gitea_askpass.sh=scripts/gitea_askpass.sh
       - hermes_coordinator.py=scripts/hermes_coordinator.py
       - hermes_model_routing.py=scripts/hermes_model_routing.py
       - hermes_stt_client.py=scripts/hermes_stt_client.py
@@ -104,6 +102,12 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - config=agent-kubeconfig.yaml
     options:
       disableNameSuffixHash: true
+  - name: hermes-node-account-hardener
+    namespace: hermes
+    files:
+      - node_account_hardening.py=scripts/node_account_hardening.py
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true
   - name: hermes-auto-router-plugin
     namespace: hermes
     files:

services/hermes/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -119,11 +119,65 @@ spec:
               app: server
       ports:
         - {protocol: TCP, port: 9010}
-  # agent.hermes.bstein.dev is an owner-only engineering workstation. The
-  # browser boundary remains OAuth-protected, while its workers need to reach
-  # every cluster namespace, Atlas LAN service, and hosted provider endpoint.
   egress:
-    - {}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              k8s-app: kube-dns
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchExpressions:
+              - key: kubernetes.io/metadata.name
+                operator: NotIn
+                values: [gitea, hermes-scm]
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: hermes-scm
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: hermes-scm-broker
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 9081}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 10.43.0.1/32
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 443}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 192.168.0.0/16
+            except:
+              - 192.168.22.9/32
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
+            except:
+              - 10.0.0.0/8
+              - 100.64.0.0/10
+              - 127.0.0.0/8
+              - 169.254.0.0/16
+              - 172.16.0.0/12
+              - 192.168.0.0/16
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-node-ssh-access-isolation
+  namespace: hermes
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-node-ssh-access
+  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
+  ingress: []
+  egress: []
 ---
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: NetworkPolicy

services/hermes/node-ssh-access.yaml

@@ -45,32 +45,15 @@ spec:
         - operator: Exists
       containers:
         - name: key-reconciler
-          image: busybox:1.37
+          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           command: [/bin/sh, -ec]
           args:
             - |
-              reconcile() {
-                key="$(cat /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key)"
-                found=0
-                for user in atlas oceanus; do
-                  home="/host-home/${user}"
-                  [ -d "${home}" ] || continue
-                  found=1
-                  identity="$(awk -F: -v name="${user}" '$1 == name {print $3 ":" $4; exit}' /host-etc/passwd)"
-                  [ -n "${identity}" ] || identity="$(stat -c %u:%g "${home}")"
-                  uid="${identity%%:*}"
-                  gid="${identity##*:}"
-                  install -d -m 0700 -o "${uid}" -g "${gid}" "${home}/.ssh"
-                  touch "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  grep -qxF "${key}" "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys" || printf '%s\n' "${key}" >> "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  chown "${uid}:${gid}" "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  chmod 0600 "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                done
-                [ "${found}" = 1 ] || { echo "no supported node SSH account found" >&2; return 1; }
-              }
               while true; do
-                reconcile
+                /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python \
+                  /opt/node-hardener/node_account_hardening.py \
+                  --public-key-file /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key
                 sleep 300
               done
           securityContext:
@@ -83,8 +66,18 @@ spec:
           volumeMounts:
             - name: host-home
               mountPath: /host-home
-            - name: host-passwd
+            - name: host-etc
-              mountPath: /host-etc/passwd
+              mountPath: /host-etc
+            - name: host-k3s
+              mountPath: /host-k3s
+            - name: host-kubelet
+              mountPath: /host-kubelet
+            - name: host-run-k3s
+              mountPath: /host-run-k3s
+            - name: host-run-containerd
+              mountPath: /host-run-containerd
+            - name: coordinator
+              mountPath: /opt/node-hardener
               readOnly: true
             - name: vault-secrets
               mountPath: /vault/secrets
@@ -94,19 +87,39 @@ spec:
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 5m
-              memory: 8Mi
+              memory: 32Mi
             limits:
               cpu: 50m
-              memory: 32Mi
+              memory: 128Mi
       volumes:
         - name: host-home
           hostPath:
             path: /home
             type: Directory
-        - name: host-passwd
+        - name: host-etc
           hostPath:
-            path: /etc/passwd
+            path: /etc
-            type: File
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-k3s
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/rancher/k3s
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-kubelet
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/kubelet
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-run-k3s
+          hostPath:
+            path: /run/k3s
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-run-containerd
+          hostPath:
+            path: /run/containerd
+            type: Directory
+        - name: coordinator
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-node-account-hardener
+            defaultMode: 0555
         - name: vault-secrets
           csi:
             driver: secrets-store.csi.k8s.io

services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+configMapGenerator:
+  - name: hermes-scm-boundary
+    files:
+      - gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
+      - gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
+      - scm_broker.py=scripts/scm_broker.py
+      - scm_broker_client.py=scripts/scm_broker_client.py
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import argparse
+import base64
 import json
 import os
 import re
-import subprocess
 import sys
 import urllib.error
 import urllib.parse
@@ -15,28 +15,29 @@ import urllib.request
 from collections.abc import Callable
 from pathlib import Path
 
+from gitea_api_policy import (
+    PolicyError,
+    _draft_title,
+    _reject_forbidden,
+    _validate_body,
+    _validate_pr_number,
+    _validate_pr_number_segment,
+    _validate_query,
+    _validate_ref,
+    _validate_ref_bounds,
+    _validate_repo,
+    _validate_sha,
+)
+
 CANONICAL_BASE_URL = "https://scm.bstein.dev"
 ALLOWED_OWNER = "atlas"
-DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
+DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/vault/secrets/gitea-token")
-REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
-SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
 CREATE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/api/v1/repos/atlas/([^/]+)/pulls\Z")
 MAX_ERROR_BYTES = 8192
 MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
-DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
+MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH = 768
-GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
+MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH = 512
-SENSITIVE_BODY_PATTERNS = (
+RAW_API_TARGET_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9/_.?&=-]+\Z")
-    re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)\bauthorization\s*:\s*(?:bearer|token|basic)\s+\S+"),
-    re.compile(r"\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})\b"),
-    re.compile(r"\b(?:AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35})\b"),
-    re.compile(r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b"),
-)
-
-
-class PolicyError(ValueError):
-    """Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
 
 
 class RejectRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
@@ -64,114 +65,48 @@ def read_token(path: Path = DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE) -> str:
 
 def configured_base_url() -> str:
     """Reject attempts to redirect credentials away from the canonical origin."""
-    configured = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", CANONICAL_BASE_URL).rstrip("/")
+    configured = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", CANONICAL_BASE_URL)
     if configured != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
         raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
     return configured
 
 
-def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
-    if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
-        raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
-    return repo
-
-
-def _validate_ref(value: object, name: str) -> str:
-    """Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("-"):
-        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
-    if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
-        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        [GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
-        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        check=False,
-    )
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
-    return value
-
-
-def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
-    return value.lower()
-
-
-def _validate_text(value: object, name: str, maximum: int, *, required: bool) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
-    if required and not value.strip():
-        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
-    if len(value) > maximum or "\x00" in value:
-        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
-    return value
-
-
-def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
-    body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, required=False)
-    if any(secret and secret in body for secret in forbidden):
-        raise PolicyError("pull-request body contains runtime credential material")
-    if any(pattern.search(body) for pattern in SENSITIVE_BODY_PATTERNS):
-        raise PolicyError("pull-request body resembles credential material")
-    return body
-
-
-def _draft_title(value: object) -> str:
-    """Return a bounded title using Gitea's configured default draft prefix."""
-    title = _validate_text(value, "title", 251, required=True).strip()
-    for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
-        if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
-            title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
-            break
-    if not title:
-        raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
-    return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
-
-
 def _split_api_path(path: str) -> urllib.parse.SplitResult:
+    if not isinstance(path, str) or len(path) > MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH:
+        raise PolicyError("API target exceeds the safe size limit")
+    if (
+        not path.isascii()
+        or any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in path)
+        or "\\" in path
+        or not RAW_API_TARGET_RE.fullmatch(path)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API target contains non-canonical raw characters")
     target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)
+    canonical = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(("", "", target.path, target.query, ""))
+    if canonical != path:
+        raise PolicyError("API target is not in exact canonical form")
     if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
         raise PolicyError("API path must be relative to the Atlas SCM origin")
     if not target.path.startswith("/api/v1/"):
         raise PolicyError("API path must start with /api/v1/")
-    if "%" in target.path or "//" in target.path or "/../" in f"{target.path}/":
+    if len(target.path) > MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH:
+        raise PolicyError("API path exceeds the safe size limit")
+    segments = target.path.split("/")
+    if "//" in target.path or any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in segments):
         raise PolicyError("encoded or non-canonical API paths are not allowed")
     return target
 
 
-def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
+def _authorize_read(
-    try:
+    target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-        pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(
+) -> str:
-            target.query, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True
-        )
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
-    if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
-        raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
-    if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
-        raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
-    values = dict(pairs)
-    for name in ("page", "limit"):
-        if name not in values:
-            continue
-        if not values[name].isdigit() or int(values[name]) < 1:
-            raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a positive integer")
-    if "limit" in values and int(values["limit"]) > 50:
-        raise PolicyError("read limit cannot exceed 50")
-    if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
-        raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")
-
-
-def _authorize_read(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult) -> str:
     """Allow only repository, PR, branch, commit, and status metadata reads."""
     prefix = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/"
     remainder = target.path.removeprefix(prefix)
     if remainder == target.path:
         raise PolicyError("reads are limited to explicit Atlas repository metadata")
     repo, separator, suffix = remainder.partition("/")
+    _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", forbidden)
     _validate_repo(repo)
 
     if not separator:
@@ -180,10 +115,18 @@ def _authorize_read(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult) -> str:
     if suffix == "pulls":
         _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit", "state"})
         return "pull-list"
-    if re.fullmatch(r"pulls/[1-9][0-9]*", suffix):
+    content_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)\.(?:patch|diff)", suffix)
+    if content_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(content_match.group(1))
+        raise PolicyError("repository API route is outside the metadata read allowlist")
+    pull_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)", suffix)
+    if pull_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(pull_match.group(1))
         _validate_query(target, set())
         return "pull"
-    if re.fullmatch(r"pulls/[1-9][0-9]*/(?:commits|files)", suffix):
+    evidence_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)/(?:commits|files)", suffix)
+    if evidence_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(evidence_match.group(1))
         _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
         return "pull-evidence"
     if suffix == "branches":
@@ -211,7 +154,7 @@ def _authorize_read(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult) -> str:
 
 def api_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
     """Return a canonical same-origin URL without forwarding credentials."""
-    if base_url.rstrip("/") != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
+    if base_url != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
         raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
     target = _split_api_path(path)
     return urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
@@ -219,14 +162,20 @@ def api_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
     )
 
 
-def authorize_request(method: str, path: str, data: object | None) -> str:
+def authorize_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    data: object | None,
+    *,
+    forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+) -> str:
     """Validate one request and return its bounded operation name."""
     normalized_method = method.upper()
     target = _split_api_path(path)
     if normalized_method == "GET":
         if data is not None:
             raise PolicyError("read operations cannot include a request body")
-        return _authorize_read(target)
+        return _authorize_read(target, forbidden=forbidden)
     if target.query:
         raise PolicyError("mutating operations cannot include query parameters")
     if normalized_method != "POST":
@@ -234,14 +183,17 @@ def authorize_request(method: str, path: str, data: object | None) -> str:
     match = CREATE_PATH_RE.fullmatch(target.path)
     if not match:
         raise PolicyError("POST is limited to creating an Atlas draft pull request")
+    _reject_forbidden(match.group(1), "repository", forbidden)
     _validate_repo(match.group(1))
     if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) != {"base", "body", "head", "title"}:
         raise PolicyError("draft creation accepts only base, body, head, and title")
-    _validate_ref(data["base"], "base")
+    if data["title"] != _draft_title(data["title"], forbidden=forbidden):
-    _validate_ref(data["head"], "head")
-    if data["title"] != _draft_title(data["title"]):
         raise PolicyError("new pull requests must use the Gitea draft-title prefix")
-    _validate_body(data["body"])
+    _validate_body(data["body"], forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(data["base"], "base", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(data["head"], "head", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref(data["base"], "base", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref(data["head"], "head", forbidden=forbidden)
     return "create-draft"
 
 
@@ -254,7 +206,19 @@ def build_request(
     data: object | None = None,
 ) -> urllib.request.Request:
     """Build an authorized request without putting the token in its URL or body."""
-    authorize_request(method, path, data)
+    authorize_request(method, path, data, forbidden=(token,))
+    return _build_request(method, path, base_url=base_url, token=token, data=data)
+
+
+def _build_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    base_url: str,
+    token: str,
+    data: object | None = None,
+) -> urllib.request.Request:
+    """Build one already-authorized upstream request."""
     payload = None
     if data is not None:
         payload = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
@@ -281,6 +245,19 @@ def redact_bytes(value: bytes, token: str) -> bytes:
     )
 
 
+def _reject_response_credential(value: bytes, token: str) -> None:
+    """Fail closed if an upstream body reflects any ordinary token encoding."""
+    raw = token.encode("utf-8")
+    forms = {
+        raw,
+        base64.b64encode(raw),
+        base64.b64encode(b"hermes-automation:" + raw),
+        urllib.parse.quote(token, safe="").encode("ascii"),
+    }
+    if any(form and form in value for form in forms):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo response contains runtime credential material")
+
+
 def _request(
     method: str,
     path: str,
@@ -288,14 +265,23 @@ def _request(
     *,
     token: str,
     opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen,
+    authorized: bool = False,
+    expected_status: int,
 ) -> bytes:
-    request = build_request(
+    builder = _build_request if authorized else build_request
-        method, path, base_url=configured_base_url(), token=token, data=data
+    request = builder(method, path, base_url=configured_base_url(), token=token, data=data)
-    )
     with opener(request, timeout=30) as response:  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        status = getattr(response, "status", None)
+        if status is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+            status = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if status != expected_status:
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+        if response.headers.get_content_type() != "application/json":  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned an unexpected response type")
         body = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
     if len(body) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
         raise PolicyError("Forgejo response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    _reject_response_credential(body, token)
     return redact_bytes(body, token)
 
 
@@ -303,7 +289,9 @@ def read(
     path: str, *, token: str, opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen
 ) -> bytes:
     """Read one explicitly allowed Atlas repository metadata resource."""
-    return _request("GET", path, None, token=token, opener=opener)
+    return _request(
+        "GET", path, None, token=token, opener=opener, expected_status=200
+    )
 
 
 def _nested(document: dict[str, object], *keys: str) -> object:
@@ -332,9 +320,7 @@ def _require_create_response(
         raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata") from exc
     if not isinstance(document, dict):
         raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata")
-    number = document.get("number")
+    number = _validate_pr_number(document.get("number"))
-    if not isinstance(number, int) or isinstance(number, bool) or number < 1:
-        raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted a valid pull-request number")
     full_name = f"{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}"
     expected_html = f"{CANONICAL_BASE_URL}/{full_name}/pulls/{number}"
     checks = (
@@ -368,12 +354,15 @@ def create_draft(
     opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen,
 ) -> bytes:
     """Create and verify a same-repository draft pull request for human review."""
+    _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
     repo = _validate_repo(repo)
-    base = _validate_ref(base, "base")
+    title = _draft_title(title, forbidden=(token,))
-    head = _validate_ref(head, "head")
-    head_sha = _validate_sha(head_sha)
-    title = _draft_title(title)
     body = _validate_body(body, forbidden=(token,))
+    head_sha = _validate_sha(head_sha)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(base, "base", forbidden=(token,))
+    _validate_ref_bounds(head, "head", forbidden=(token,))
+    base = _validate_ref(base, "base", forbidden=(token,))
+    head = _validate_ref(head, "head", forbidden=(token,))
     data = {"base": base, "body": body, "head": head, "title": title}
     result = _request(
         "POST",
@@ -381,6 +370,8 @@ def create_draft(
         data,
         token=token,
         opener=opener,
+        authorized=True,
+        expected_status=201,
     )
     _require_create_response(
         result,
@@ -417,16 +408,24 @@ def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
     return parser.parse_args(argv)
 
 
-def _operation(args: argparse.Namespace) -> tuple[str, str, object | None]:
+def _operation(
+    args: argparse.Namespace, *, validate_refs: bool = True
+) -> tuple[str, str, object | None]:
     if args.operation == "read":
         return "GET", args.path, None
     repo = _validate_repo(args.repo)
     _validate_sha(args.head_sha)
+    body = _validate_body(args.body)
+    title = _draft_title(args.title)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(args.base, "base")
+    _validate_ref_bounds(args.head, "head")
+    base = _validate_ref(args.base, "base") if validate_refs else args.base
+    head = _validate_ref(args.head, "head") if validate_refs else args.head
     data = {
-        "base": _validate_ref(args.base, "base"),
+        "base": base,
-        "body": _validate_body(args.body),
+        "body": body,
-        "head": _validate_ref(args.head, "head"),
+        "head": head,
-        "title": _draft_title(args.title),
+        "title": title,
     }
     return "POST", f"/api/v1/repos/{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}/pulls", data
 
@@ -440,12 +439,11 @@ def _write_body(body: bytes) -> None:
 
 def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     """Validate, optionally describe, and execute one safe Forgejo operation."""
-    token = ""
     try:
         args = parse_args(argv)
-        method, path, data = _operation(args)
-        operation = authorize_request(method, path, data)
         if args.dry_run:
+            method, path, data = _operation(args, validate_refs=False)
+            operation = authorize_request(method, path, data)
             print(
                 json.dumps(
                     {
@@ -462,29 +460,27 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
                 )
             )
             return 0
-        token = read_token()
+        method, path, data = _operation(args, validate_refs=False)
+        from scm_broker_client import create_draft as broker_create_draft
+        from scm_broker_client import read as broker_read
+
         if args.operation == "read":
-            body = read(path, token=token)
+            body = broker_read(path)
         else:
             assert isinstance(data, dict)
-            body = create_draft(
+            body = broker_create_draft(
                 args.repo,
                 base=str(data["base"]),
                 head=str(data["head"]),
                 head_sha=args.head_sha,
                 title=str(data["title"]),
                 body=str(data["body"]),
-                token=token,
             )
         _write_body(body)
         return 0
     except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        body = redact_bytes(exc.read(MAX_ERROR_BYTES), token) if token else b""
+        exc.read(MAX_ERROR_BYTES)
-        print(f"Forgejo request failed with HTTP {exc.code}", file=sys.stderr)
+        print(f"SCM broker request failed with HTTP {exc.code}", file=sys.stderr)
-        if body:
-            sys.stderr.buffer.write(body)
-            if not body.endswith(b"\n"):
-                sys.stderr.buffer.write(b"\n")
         return 1
     except (OSError, PolicyError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
         print(

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+"""Validation policy for Hermes' least-authority Atlas Forgejo client.
+
+The screening catches structured credential assignments, known token formats,
+and long high-entropy values. It is a fail-closed accident barrier, not proof
+that text is secret-free: a short or multiword secret under an innocuous key is
+not reliably distinguishable from prose and must never be supplied by callers.
+JSON depth/nodes/documents and multiline gaps are deliberately bounded; large
+or unusual configuration blobs are not a supported pull-request field format.
+"""
+
+# ruff: noqa: SIM905
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+import subprocess
+import urllib.parse
+from collections import Counter
+from math import log2
+
+REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
+DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
+GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
+MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 128
+MAX_QUERY_ITEMS = 3
+MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH = 16
+MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH = 16
+MAX_PAGE = 10_000
+MAX_LIMIT = 50
+MAX_PR_NUMBER = 2_147_483_647
+MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS = 10
+MAX_REF_CHARACTERS = 200
+MAX_REF_UTF8_BYTES = 255
+MAX_TITLE_UTF8_BYTES = 512
+MAX_BODY_UTF8_BYTES = 32_768
+MAX_JSON_DOCUMENTS = 32
+MAX_JSON_NODES = 2_048
+MAX_JSON_DEPTH = 32
+CANONICAL_QUERY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_=&-]*\Z")
+ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(
+    r"""(?mx)
+    (?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])
+    (?P<key_quote>[\"']?)
+    (?P<key>\.?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127})
+    (?P=key_quote)
+    [ \t]*(?P<separator>[:=])[ \t]*
+    (?P<value>
+      \"(?:\\.|[^\"\\\r\n])*\" |
+      '(?:\\.|[^'\\\r\n])*' |
+      [^\r\n,;}&]{0,2048}
+    )
+    """
+)
+JSON_KEY_RE = re.compile(r'"(?P<key>[^"]{1,512})"(?P<spacing>[\x00-\x20\x7f]{0,256}):')
+MULTILINE_ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(
+    r"""(?mx)
+    (?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])
+    (?P<key_quote>["']?)
+    (?P<key>\.?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127})
+    (?P=key_quote)
+    [ \t]{0,64}(?:\r?\n[ \t]{0,64}){0,4}
+    (?P<separator>[:=])
+    [ \t]{0,64}(?:\r?\n[ \t]{0,64}){1,4}
+    (?P<value>[^\r\n,;}&]{1,2048})
+    """
+)
+CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE = re.compile(r"(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])|(?<=[A-Z])(?=[A-Z][a-z])")
+CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic|token)\s+"
+    r"(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}\b)(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]*[0-9+/_=.-])"
+    r"[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}"
+)
+STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE)
+    for pattern in (
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])sk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])[rs]k_(?:test|live)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])whsec_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:gta|gto|gitea|forgejo)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])ya29\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])oy2[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])SK[0-9a-f]{32}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"-----BEGIN\s+[A-Z0-9 ][A-Z0-9 -]{1,62}-----",
+        r"\bssh-(?:rsa|ed25519|dss|ecdsa-[A-Za-z0-9-]+)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}",
+        r"https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Za-z0-9/_-]{20,}",
+        r"https://(?:discord(?:app)?\.com)/api/webhooks/[0-9]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,}",
+        r"https://[^\s/]*webhook\.office\.com/[^\s]{20,}",
+    )
+)
+HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])[A-Za-z0-9+/_=-]{48,16384}(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"
+)
+PROSE_LEAD_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "add allow change check describe document ensure explain fix handle keep preserve "
+    "prevent reject remove review support test validate".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "auth authentication authorization auths basic bearer credential credentials "
+    "passwd password pat private sas secret secrets sig signature signing token tokens "
+    "webhook".split()
+)
+KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "access account api auth client encryption identity private registry secret service "
+    "session signing ssh".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS = frozenset(
+    "accessid accesskeyid accountkey clientemail clientid connectionstring "
+    "dockerconfigjson privatekeyid serviceaccountkey sharedaccesssignature".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES = tuple(
+    "accesskey accesskeyid accountkey apikey authkey clientemail clientid clientkey "
+    "connectionstring credential credentials encryptionkey identitykey password passwd "
+    "privatekeyid privatekey secret secretkey servicekey sessionkey signature signingkey "
+    "sshkey token webhook".split()
+)
+
+
+class PolicyError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
+
+
+def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
+    if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
+        raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
+    return repo
+
+
+def _reject_forbidden(value: object, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    """Reject exact runtime credentials before invoking helpers or the network."""
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} contains runtime credential material")
+
+
+def _validate_ref_bounds(
+    value: object, name: str, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Reject oversized or non-encodable refs before invoking Git."""
+    _reject_forbidden(value, name, forbidden)
+    if not value or len(value) > MAX_REF_CHARACTERS:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe branch-name limit")
+    try:
+        encoded = value.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} is not valid UTF-8 text") from exc
+    if len(encoded) > MAX_REF_UTF8_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe UTF-8 branch-name limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_ref(
+    value: object, name: str, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
+    value = _validate_ref_bounds(value, name, forbidden=forbidden)
+    if value.startswith("-"):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
+    if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
+        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
+    return value.lower()
+
+
+def _validate_pr_number_segment(value: object) -> int:
+    """Validate a canonical bounded pull-request number from an API path."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, str)
+        or len(value) > MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS
+        or not re.fullmatch(r"[1-9][0-9]*", value)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request number must use bounded canonical ASCII digits")
+    number = int(value)
+    if number > MAX_PR_NUMBER:
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request number is outside its allowed range")
+    return number
+
+
+def _validate_pr_number(value: object) -> int:
+    """Validate a bounded pull-request number returned by Forgejo."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, int)
+        or isinstance(value, bool)
+        or not 1 <= value <= MAX_PR_NUMBER
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted a valid pull-request number")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_text(
+    value: object,
+    name: str,
+    maximum: int,
+    maximum_bytes: int,
+    *,
+    required: bool,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
+    if required and not value.strip():
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
+    try:
+        encoded = value.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} is not valid UTF-8 text") from exc
+    if len(value) > maximum or len(encoded) > maximum_bytes or "\x00" in value:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _normalized_key(value: str) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], str]:
+    """Split camelCase and separator-based assignment keys into semantics."""
+    separated = CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE.sub(" ", value.strip(".\"'"))
+    words = tuple(re.findall(r"[A-Za-z0-9]+", separated.lower()))
+    return words, "".join(words)
+
+
+def _is_sensitive_key(value: str) -> bool:
+    words, compact = _normalized_key(value)
+    word_set = set(words)
+    if word_set & SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS:
+        return True
+    if compact in SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS:
+        return True
+    if compact.endswith(SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES):
+        return True
+    if "key" in word_set and word_set & KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS:
+        return True
+    if {"client", "email"} <= word_set or {"client", "id"} <= word_set:
+        return True
+    if {"access", "id"} <= word_set or {"connection", "string"} <= word_set:
+        return True
+    return compact.endswith("configjson")
+
+
+def _strip_assignment_value(value: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    stripped = value.strip()
+    quoted = (
+        len(stripped) >= 2 and stripped[0] in {'"', "'"} and stripped[-1] == stripped[0]
+    )
+    if quoted:
+        stripped = stripped[1:-1].strip()
+    return stripped, quoted
+
+
+def _looks_like_prose(value: str) -> bool:
+    words = re.findall(r"[A-Za-z]+(?:[-'][A-Za-z]+)?", value)
+    if len(words) < 2:
+        return False
+    if re.search(r"[$`{}\[\]\\@/:=+_]", value):
+        return False
+    return words[0].lower() in PROSE_LEAD_WORDS
+
+
+def _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(value: str) -> bool:
+    stripped, quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
+    if not stripped:
+        return False
+    if quoted or stripped.startswith(("{", "[", "|", ">", "!!", "&", "*")):
+        return True
+    if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(stripped):
+        return True
+    if any(pattern.search(stripped) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+        return True
+    if re.search(r"(?:https?://|[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+)", stripped):
+        return True
+    if re.search(r"(?:\$\{|\$\(|\\[nrt]|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}\Z)", stripped):
+        return True
+    return not _looks_like_prose(stripped)
+
+
+def _is_structural_credential_assignment(key: str, value: str) -> bool:
+    words, compact_key = _normalized_key(key)
+    stripped, _quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
+    _value_words, compact_value = _normalized_key(stripped)
+    return (
+        compact_key == "type" and compact_value in {"serviceaccount", "credential"}
+    ) or ("service" in words and "account" in words and bool(stripped))
+
+
+def _decode_json_key(raw: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    """Decode one bounded JSON key without silently accepting bad escapes."""
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(f'"{raw}"')
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeError):
+        approximate = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+", "_", raw.replace("\\", ""))
+        return approximate, False
+    return decoded if isinstance(decoded, str) else "", True
+
+
+def _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(
+    value: object, *, depth: int = 0, nodes: list[int] | None = None
+) -> bool:
+    """Walk one decoded JSON value with explicit depth and node ceilings."""
+    if nodes is None:
+        nodes = [0]
+    nodes[0] += 1
+    if nodes[0] > MAX_JSON_NODES or depth > MAX_JSON_DEPTH:
+        raise PolicyError("structured pull-request text exceeds the scan limit")
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        for key, assigned in value.items():
+            if not isinstance(key, str):
+                continue
+            if _is_sensitive_key(key):
+                return True
+            assigned_text = assigned if isinstance(assigned, str) else ""
+            if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned_text):
+                return True
+            if _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(
+                assigned, depth=depth + 1, nodes=nodes
+            ):
+                return True
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        return any(
+            _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(item, depth=depth + 1, nodes=nodes)
+            for item in value
+        )
+    return False
+
+
+def _decoded_json_documents(value: str):
+    """Yield bounded embedded JSON object or array fragments."""
+    decoder = json.JSONDecoder()
+    index = 0
+    attempts = 0
+    while attempts < MAX_JSON_DOCUMENTS:
+        positions = [
+            position for token in "{[" if (position := value.find(token, index)) >= 0
+        ]
+        if not positions:
+            return
+        start = min(positions)
+        attempts += 1
+        try:
+            document, end = decoder.raw_decode(value, start)
+        except (json.JSONDecodeError, RecursionError, ValueError):
+            index = start + 1
+            continue
+        yield document
+        index = max(end, start + 1)
+    if "{" in value[index:] or "[" in value[index:]:
+        raise PolicyError("structured pull-request text exceeds the scan limit")
+
+
+def _has_structured_sensitive_assignment(value: str) -> bool:
+    """Detect bounded JSON and multiline YAML/env credential assignments."""
+    for candidate in JSON_KEY_RE.finditer(value):
+        decoded, valid = _decode_json_key(candidate.group("key"))
+        if _is_sensitive_key(decoded):
+            return True
+        if not valid and _is_sensitive_key(candidate.group("key").replace("\\", "")):
+            return True
+    for candidate in MULTILINE_ASSIGNMENT_RE.finditer(value):
+        key = candidate.group("key")
+        assigned = candidate.group("value")
+        if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned) or (
+            _is_sensitive_key(key) and _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(assigned)
+        ):
+            return True
+    return any(
+        _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(item)
+        for item in _decoded_json_documents(value)
+    )
+
+
+def _has_high_entropy_token(value: str) -> bool:
+    for match in HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE.finditer(value):
+        token = match.group(0)
+        if len(token) > 256:
+            return True
+        groups = sum(
+            bool(re.search(pattern, token))
+            for pattern in (r"[a-z]", r"[A-Z]", r"[0-9]", r"[+/_=-]")
+        )
+        counts = Counter(token)
+        entropy = -sum(
+            (count / len(token)) * log2(count / len(token)) for count in counts.values()
+        )
+        if groups >= 3 and entropy >= 4.0:
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def _reject_sensitive(value: str, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    if any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} contains runtime credential material")
+    if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if _has_structured_sensitive_assignment(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    for candidate in ASSIGNMENT_RE.finditer(value):
+        key = candidate.group("key")
+        assigned = candidate.group("value")
+        if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned) or (
+            _is_sensitive_key(key) and _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(assigned)
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if _has_high_entropy_token(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+
+
+def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
+    body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, MAX_BODY_UTF8_BYTES, required=False)
+    _reject_sensitive(body, "body", forbidden)
+    return body
+
+
+def _draft_title(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
+    """Return a bounded, secret-screened Gitea draft title."""
+    title = _validate_text(
+        value, "title", 251, MAX_TITLE_UTF8_BYTES, required=True
+    ).strip()
+    _reject_sensitive(title, "title", forbidden)
+    for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
+        if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
+            title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
+            break
+    if not title:
+        raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
+    return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
+
+
+def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
+    """Accept only short canonical ASCII query strings with bounded pagination."""
+    raw = target.query
+    if (
+        len(raw) > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH
+        or not raw.isascii()
+        or not CANONICAL_QUERY_RE.fullmatch(raw)
+        or "%" in raw
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API query must use short canonical ASCII form")
+    try:
+        pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(raw, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
+    if len(pairs) > MAX_QUERY_ITEMS:
+        raise PolicyError("too many API query parameters")
+    if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
+        raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
+    if any(
+        not key
+        or len(key) > MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH
+        or len(value) > MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH
+        for key, value in pairs
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API query key or value exceeds its safe limit")
+    if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
+        raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
+    values = dict(pairs)
+    for name in ("page", "limit"):
+        if name not in values:
+            continue
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", values[name]):
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use ASCII decimal digits")
+        number = int(values[name])
+        if values[name] != str(number):
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use canonical ASCII decimal form")
+        ceiling = MAX_PAGE if name == "page" else MAX_LIMIT
+        if not 1 <= number <= ceiling:
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} is outside its allowed range")
+    if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Serve the credential-isolated Atlas API and Git smart-HTTP boundary."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import json
+import re
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+from gitea_api import (
+    CANONICAL_BASE_URL,
+    PolicyError,
+    create_draft,
+    read,
+    read_token,
+)
+from gitea_api_policy import _reject_forbidden, _validate_ref, _validate_repo
+
+BROKER_PORT = 9081
+GIT_USER = "hermes-automation"
+MAX_CONTROL_BODY = 64 * 1024
+MAX_GIT_REQUEST = 128 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_GIT_RESPONSE = 128 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS = 16
+ZERO_SHA = b"0" * 40
+GIT_PATH_RE = re.compile(
+    r"/git/atlas/(?P<repo>[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99})\.git/"
+    r"(?P<operation>info/refs|git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack)\Z"
+)
+FEATURE_REF_RE = re.compile(
+    r"refs/heads/(?:(?:feature|fix|hermes|handoff)/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,190})\Z"
+)
+
+
+class RejectRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Reject every upstream redirect before credentials can be forwarded."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM upstream redirects are not allowed")
+
+
+UPSTREAM_OPENER = urllib.request.build_opener(RejectRedirect())
+
+
+def _status(response: object) -> int | None:
+    value = getattr(response, "status", None)
+    if value is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+        value = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    return value
+
+
+def _read_bounded(stream, maximum: int, length: int | None = None) -> bytes:
+    if length is not None and not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    value = stream.read(maximum + 1 if length is None else length)
+    if len(value) > maximum or (length is not None and len(value) != length):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _load_json(handler: BaseHTTPRequestHandler) -> dict[str, object]:
+    if handler.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding"):
+        raise PolicyError("chunked broker control requests are not allowed")
+    if handler.headers.get_content_type() != "application/json":
+        raise PolicyError("broker control request must be JSON")
+    length = _content_length(handler.headers, MAX_CONTROL_BODY)
+    value = json.loads(_read_bounded(handler.rfile, MAX_CONTROL_BODY, length))
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise PolicyError("broker control request must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def _git_target(raw: str) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
+    if (
+        not raw.isascii()
+        or any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in raw)
+        or "%" in raw
+        or "\\" in raw
+        or len(raw) > 512
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is not canonical ASCII")
+    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(raw)
+    canonical = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(("", "", target.path, target.query, ""))
+    if canonical != raw:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is not in exact canonical form")
+    if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target must be relative")
+    match = GIT_PATH_RE.fullmatch(target.path)
+    if not match:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is outside the Atlas allowlist")
+    repo = _validate_repo(match.group("repo"))
+    operation = match.group("operation")
+    query = target.query
+    if operation == "info/refs":
+        if query not in {"service=git-upload-pack", "service=git-receive-pack"}:
+            raise PolicyError("Git discovery service is outside the allowlist")
+        service = query.removeprefix("service=")
+    elif query:
+        raise PolicyError("Git RPC query parameters are not allowed")
+    else:
+        service = operation
+    return repo, operation, service
+
+
+def _content_length(headers: object, maximum: int) -> int:
+    """Parse one short canonical bounded Content-Length header."""
+    raw = headers.get("Content-Length", "")  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw, str)
+        or not raw.isascii()
+        or len(raw) > 10
+        or not raw.isdigit()
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request length is invalid")
+    length = int(raw)
+    if raw != str(length) or not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request length is invalid")
+    return length
+
+
+def _credential_forms(token: str) -> tuple[bytes, ...]:
+    basic = base64.b64encode(f"{GIT_USER}:{token}".encode("utf-8"))
+    return token.encode("utf-8"), basic, b"Basic " + basic
+
+
+def _reject_credential_bytes(value: bytes, token: str, context: str) -> None:
+    if any(form in value for form in _credential_forms(token)):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{context} contains runtime credential material")
+
+
+def _validate_receive_pack(body: bytes, token: str) -> None:
+    """Permit only creation of new, namespaced feature branches."""
+    _reject_credential_bytes(body, token, "Git request")
+    position = 0
+    commands = 0
+    while position + 4 <= len(body):
+        header = body[position : position + 4]
+        if not re.fullmatch(rb"[0-9a-f]{4}", header):
+            raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+        size = int(header, 16)
+        if size == 0:
+            if commands == 0:
+                raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack request has no ref command")
+            return
+        if size < 4 or position + size > len(body):
+            raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+        command = body[position + 4 : position + size].rstrip(b"\n")
+        command = command.split(b"\x00", 1)[0]
+        fields = command.split(b" ")
+        if len(fields) != 3 or not all(re.fullmatch(rb"[0-9a-f]{40}", item) for item in fields[:2]):
+            raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack ref command is invalid")
+        old_sha, new_sha, raw_ref = fields
+        if old_sha != ZERO_SHA or new_sha == ZERO_SHA:
+            raise PolicyError("Git broker permits only new feature-branch creation")
+        try:
+            ref = raw_ref.decode("ascii")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise PolicyError("Git ref must be canonical ASCII") from exc
+        if not FEATURE_REF_RE.fullmatch(ref):
+            raise PolicyError("Git push is limited to namespaced feature branches")
+        _validate_ref(ref.removeprefix("refs/heads/"), "head", forbidden=(token,))
+        commands += 1
+        if commands > MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS:
+            raise PolicyError("Git push contains too many ref commands")
+        position += size
+    raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack request omitted its command terminator")
+
+
+def _upstream_git_request(
+    target: str,
+    *,
+    method: str,
+    body: bytes | None,
+    content_type: str | None,
+    expected_type: str,
+    token: str,
+    opener=UPSTREAM_OPENER.open,
+) -> bytes:
+    credentials = base64.b64encode(f"{GIT_USER}:{token}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+    headers = {"Accept": expected_type, "Authorization": f"Basic {credentials}"}
+    if content_type:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = content_type
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        CANONICAL_BASE_URL + target,
+        data=body,
+        method=method,
+        headers=headers,
+    )
+    with opener(request, timeout=120) as response:
+        if _status(response) != 200:
+            raise PolicyError("Git upstream returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+        if response.headers.get_content_type() != expected_type:
+            raise PolicyError("Git upstream returned an unexpected response type")
+        result = _read_bounded(response, MAX_GIT_RESPONSE)
+    _reject_credential_bytes(result, token, "Git upstream response")
+    return result
+
+
+class BrokerHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Expose only bounded metadata, draft creation, and smart-HTTP Git."""
+
+    server_version = "HermesSCMBroker/1"
+    sys_version = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: object) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, status: int, body: bytes) -> None:
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def _reject(self, status: int = 400) -> None:
+        self._json(status, b'{"error":"request rejected"}')
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            if self.path == "/healthz":
+                self._json(200, b'{"status":"ok"}')
+                return
+            repo, operation, service = _git_target(self.path)
+            if operation != "info/refs":
+                raise PolicyError("Git RPC requires POST")
+            token = read_token()
+            _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+            expected = f"application/x-{service}-advertisement"
+            body = _upstream_git_request(
+                f"/atlas/{repo}.git/info/refs?service={service}",
+                method="GET",
+                body=None,
+                content_type=None,
+                expected_type=expected,
+                token=token,
+            )
+            self.send_response(200)
+            self.send_header("Content-Type", expected)
+            self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+            self.end_headers()
+            self.wfile.write(body)
+        except (OSError, PolicyError, urllib.error.URLError, ValueError):
+            self._reject()
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            if self.path in {"/v1/metadata", "/v1/drafts"}:
+                self._control()
+            else:
+                self._git_rpc()
+        except (OSError, PolicyError, urllib.error.URLError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+            self._reject()
+
+    def _control(self) -> None:
+        data = _load_json(self)
+        token = read_token()
+        if self.path == "/v1/metadata":
+            if set(data) != {"path"} or not isinstance(data["path"], str):
+                raise PolicyError("metadata request fields are invalid")
+            result = read(data["path"], token=token)
+        else:
+            expected = {"base", "body", "head", "head_sha", "repo", "title"}
+            if set(data) != expected or not all(isinstance(data[key], str) for key in expected):
+                raise PolicyError("draft request fields are invalid")
+            result = create_draft(token=token, **data)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        if token.encode("utf-8") in result:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM upstream reflected credential material")
+        self._json(200, result)
+
+    def _git_rpc(self) -> None:
+        repo, operation, service = _git_target(self.path)
+        if operation not in {"git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"} or service != operation:
+            raise PolicyError("Git RPC operation is outside the allowlist")
+        expected_request = f"application/x-{service}-request"
+        if self.headers.get_content_type() != expected_request or self.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding"):
+            raise PolicyError("Git RPC request type is invalid")
+        length = _content_length(self.headers, MAX_GIT_REQUEST)
+        body = _read_bounded(self.rfile, MAX_GIT_REQUEST, length)
+        token = read_token()
+        _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+        if service == "git-receive-pack":
+            _validate_receive_pack(body, token)
+        else:
+            _reject_credential_bytes(body, token, "Git request")
+        expected = f"application/x-{service}-result"
+        result = _upstream_git_request(
+            f"/atlas/{repo}.git/{service}",
+            method="POST",
+            body=body,
+            content_type=expected_request,
+            expected_type=expected,
+            token=token,
+        )
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", expected)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(result)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(result)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--listen", default="0.0.0.0")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=BROKER_PORT)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((args.listen, args.port), BrokerHandler).serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Call the credential-isolated Hermes SCM broker over its fixed cluster origin."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import urllib.request
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+BROKER_ORIGIN = "http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081"
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+
+class RejectRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Keep every broker request on its fixed in-cluster origin."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker redirects are not allowed")
+
+
+_OPENER = urllib.request.build_opener(RejectRedirectHandler())
+
+
+def _open(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int):
+    return _OPENER.open(request, timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def request(
+    endpoint: str,
+    payload: dict[str, object],
+    *,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _open,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Send one bounded broker operation without any repository credential."""
+    if endpoint not in {"/v1/metadata", "/v1/drafts"}:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker operation is outside the client allowlist")
+    body = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    if len(body) > 64 * 1024:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    outgoing = urllib.request.Request(
+        BROKER_ORIGIN + endpoint,
+        data=body,
+        method="POST",
+        headers={
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": "hermes-scm-broker-client/1",
+        },
+    )
+    with opener(outgoing, timeout=30) as response:  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        status = getattr(response, "status", None)
+        if status is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+            status = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if status != 200:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM broker returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+        content_type = response.headers.get_content_type()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise PolicyError("SCM broker returned an unexpected response type")
+        result = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if len(result) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    json.loads(result)
+    return result
+
+
+def read(path: str, *, opener: Callable[..., object] = _open) -> bytes:
+    """Read explicitly allowed Atlas metadata through the broker."""
+    return request("/v1/metadata", {"path": path}, opener=opener)
+
+
+def create_draft(
+    repo: str,
+    *,
+    base: str,
+    head: str,
+    head_sha: str,
+    title: str,
+    body: str,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _open,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Create one verified draft through the broker for human review."""
+    return request(
+        "/v1/drafts",
+        {
+            "base": base,
+            "body": body,
+            "head": head,
+            "head_sha": head_sha,
+            "repo": repo,
+            "title": title,
+        },
+        opener=opener,
+    )

services/hermes/scripts/gitea_askpass.sh

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env sh
-set -eu
-
-case "${1:-}" in
-  *Username*)
-    if [ -s /runtime-access/gitea-username ]; then
-      tr -d '\r\n' </runtime-access/gitea-username
-    else
-      printf '%s' hermes-automation
-    fi
-    printf '\n'
-    ;;
-  *Password*)
-    test -s /runtime-access/gitea-token
-    tr -d '\r\n' </runtime-access/gitea-token
-    printf '\n'
-    ;;
-  *) exit 1 ;;
-esac

services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py

@@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ from hermes_model_routing import (
 
 
 CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH = Path("/opt/data/workspace/projects/cassandra")
-CASSANDRA_REMOTE = "https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/cassandra.git"
+CASSANDRA_REMOTE = (
-DEFAULT_GITEA_TOKEN_PATH = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
+    "http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081/"
+    "git/atlas/cassandra.git"
+)
 
 
 def cassandra_workspace() -> Path:
@@ -139,24 +141,8 @@ def bootstrap_cassandra_state(root: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
     return {"state": "ready"}
 
 
-def _gitea_token_path() -> Path:
-    """Return the runtime-only Gitea credential path without reading it."""
-    configured = os.environ.get("HERMES_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", "").strip()
-    return Path(configured) if configured else DEFAULT_GITEA_TOKEN_PATH
-
-
-def _gitea_token_available() -> bool:
-    """Check credential readiness without loading it into process memory."""
-    try:
-        path = _gitea_token_path()
-        return path.is_file() and path.stat().st_size > 0
-    except OSError:
-        return False
-
-
 def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
-    """Clone or fetch Cassandra through the runtime-only askpass credential."""
+    """Clone or fetch Cassandra through the credential-isolated SCM broker."""
-    token_available = _gitea_token_available()
     if shutil.which("git") is None:
         return "git-unavailable"
     child_env = os.environ.copy()
@@ -173,9 +159,7 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
             }
         }
     )
-    child_env["GIT_ASKPASS"] = env_values.get(
+    child_env.pop("GIT_ASKPASS", None)
-        "GIT_ASKPASS", "/opt/coordinator/gitea_askpass.sh"
-    )
     child_env["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"] = "0"
     if (CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH / ".git").exists():
         try:
@@ -232,8 +216,6 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
                     return f"remote-repair-failed-{repaired.returncode}"
         except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
             return "remote-repair-failed"
-        if not token_available:
-            return "ready; fetch skipped until Gitea token is configured"
         command = [
             "git",
             "-C",
@@ -247,8 +229,6 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
         CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         if any(CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH.iterdir()):
             return "unmanaged-nonempty-directory"
-        if not token_available:
-            return "awaiting-gitea-token"
         command = [
             "git",
             "clone",

services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Reconcile a dedicated unprivileged Hermes SSH account on one Atlas node."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import errno
+import os
+import stat
+import struct
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HOST_ETC = Path("/host-etc")
+HOST_HOME = Path("/host-home")
+HOST_K3S = Path("/host-k3s")
+HOST_KUBELET = Path("/host-kubelet")
+HOST_RUN_K3S = Path("/host-run-k3s")
+HOST_RUN_CONTAINERD = Path("/host-run-containerd")
+ACCOUNT = "hermes-agent"
+ACCOUNT_UID = 1200
+ACCOUNT_GID = 1200
+ACCOUNT_HOME = "/home/hermes-agent"
+ACCOUNT_SHELL = "/bin/bash"
+HOST_ROOT_UID = 0
+HOST_ROOT_GID = 0
+LEGACY_ACCOUNTS = ("atlas", "oceanus")
+MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS = 1024 * 1024
+ACL_VERSION = 2
+ACL_UNDEFINED_ID = 0xFFFFFFFF
+ACL_USER_OBJ = 0x01
+ACL_USER = 0x02
+ACL_GROUP_OBJ = 0x04
+ACL_GROUP = 0x08
+ACL_MASK = 0x10
+ACL_OTHER = 0x20
+ACL_HEADER = struct.Struct("<I")
+ACL_ENTRY = struct.Struct("<HHI")
+ACL_XATTR = "system.posix_acl_access"
+
+
+class HardeningError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised before an unsafe or ambiguous host-account change."""
+
+
+def _read_regular(path: Path, maximum: int = MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE) -> tuple[bytes, os.stat_result]:
+    flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags)
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) or metadata.st_size > maximum:
+            raise HardeningError(f"unsafe regular file: {path.name}")
+        value = os.read(descriptor, maximum + 1)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    if len(value) != metadata.st_size:
+        raise HardeningError(f"short file read: {path.name}")
+    return value, metadata
+
+
+def _records(value: bytes, fields: int, name: str) -> list[list[str]]:
+    try:
+        text = value.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise HardeningError(f"{name} is not UTF-8") from exc
+    if not text.endswith("\n"):
+        raise HardeningError(f"{name} is missing its final newline")
+    records = []
+    names = set()
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        parts = line.split(":")
+        if len(parts) != fields or not parts[0] or parts[0] in names:
+            raise HardeningError(f"{name} has an invalid record")
+        names.add(parts[0])
+        records.append(parts)
+    return records
+
+
+def _encode(records: list[list[str]]) -> bytes:
+    return ("\n".join(":".join(record) for record in records) + "\n").encode()
+
+
+def _expected_records() -> dict[str, list[str]]:
+    return {
+        "passwd": [
+            ACCOUNT,
+            "x",
+            str(ACCOUNT_UID),
+            str(ACCOUNT_GID),
+            "Hermes Agent",
+            ACCOUNT_HOME,
+            ACCOUNT_SHELL,
+        ],
+        "group": [ACCOUNT, "x", str(ACCOUNT_GID), ""],
+        "shadow": [ACCOUNT, "!", "1", "0", "99999", "7", "", "", ""],
+        "gshadow": [ACCOUNT, "!", "", ""],
+    }
+
+
+def _reconcile_record(
+    records: list[list[str]], expected: list[str], *, identity_index: int
+) -> list[list[str]]:
+    for record in records:
+        same_name = record[0] == expected[0]
+        same_identity = record[identity_index] == expected[identity_index]
+        if same_name or same_identity:
+            if record != expected:
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account identity conflicts")
+            return records
+    return [*records, expected]
+
+
+def _backup_once(path: Path, value: bytes, metadata: os.stat_result) -> Path:
+    backup = path.with_name(path.name + ".hermes-boundary-backup")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    try:
+        descriptor = os.open(backup, flags, stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode))
+    except FileExistsError:
+        _read_regular(backup)
+        return backup
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, value) != len(value):
+            raise HardeningError(f"short backup write: {path.name}")
+        os.fchown(descriptor, metadata.st_uid, metadata.st_gid)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    return backup
+
+
+def _atomic_write(
+    path: Path, value: bytes, *, mode: int, uid: int, gid: int
+) -> None:
+    temporary = path.with_name(f".{path.name}.hermes-{os.getpid()}")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(temporary, flags, mode)
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, value) != len(value):
+            raise HardeningError(f"short atomic write: {path.name}")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, mode)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, uid, gid)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+    directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY)
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+
+
+def _reconcile_databases() -> None:
+    expected = _expected_records()
+    definitions = (
+        ("passwd", 7, 2),
+        ("group", 4, 2),
+        ("shadow", 9, 0),
+        ("gshadow", 4, 0),
+    )
+    planned = []
+    account_present = False
+    for name, fields, identity_index in definitions:
+        path = HOST_ETC / name
+        value, metadata = _read_regular(path)
+        records = _records(value, fields, name)
+        updated = _reconcile_record(
+            records, expected[name], identity_index=identity_index
+        )
+        if name == "passwd":
+            account_present = expected[name] in records
+        planned.append((path, value, metadata, _encode(updated)))
+    try:
+        (HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT).lstat()
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        if not account_present:
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account home already exists")
+    for path, value, metadata, _updated in planned:
+        _backup_once(path, value, metadata)
+    try:
+        for path, _old, metadata, updated in planned:
+            _atomic_write(
+                path,
+                updated,
+                mode=stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode),
+                uid=metadata.st_uid,
+                gid=metadata.st_gid,
+            )
+        for path, _old, _metadata, _updated in planned:
+            name = path.name
+            fields = next(item[1] for item in definitions if item[0] == name)
+            records = _records(_read_regular(path)[0], fields, name)
+            if expected[name] not in records:
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account validation failed")
+    except Exception:
+        for path, old, metadata, _updated in planned:
+            _atomic_write(
+                path,
+                old,
+                mode=stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode),
+                uid=metadata.st_uid,
+                gid=metadata.st_gid,
+            )
+        raise
+
+
+def _validated_public_key(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    value, _ = _read_regular(path, 16 * 1024)
+    line = value.strip()
+    if b"\n" in line or b"\r" in line:
+        raise HardeningError("Hermes public key must contain one line")
+    fields = line.split()
+    if len(fields) not in {2, 3} or fields[0] not in {
+        b"ssh-ed25519",
+        b"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256",
+        b"ssh-rsa",
+    }:
+        raise HardeningError("Hermes public key format is unsupported")
+    try:
+        base64.b64decode(fields[1], validate=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise HardeningError("Hermes public key payload is invalid") from exc
+    return line
+
+
+def _directory(path: Path, *, mode: int, uid: int, gid: int) -> None:
+    try:
+        path.mkdir(mode=mode)
+    except FileExistsError:
+        pass
+    metadata = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise HardeningError(f"unsafe account directory: {path.name}")
+    if metadata.st_uid not in {0, uid} or metadata.st_gid not in {0, gid}:
+        raise HardeningError(f"account directory ownership conflicts: {path.name}")
+    os.chown(path, uid, gid)
+    path.chmod(mode)
+
+
+def _without_key(value: bytes, key: bytes) -> bytes:
+    return b"".join(
+        line
+        for line in value.splitlines(keepends=True)
+        if line.strip(b"\r\n") != key
+    )
+
+
+def _move_key(public_key: Path) -> None:
+    key = _validated_public_key(public_key)
+    home = HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT
+    ssh = home / ".ssh"
+    _directory(home, mode=0o700, uid=ACCOUNT_UID, gid=ACCOUNT_GID)
+    _directory(ssh, mode=0o700, uid=ACCOUNT_UID, gid=ACCOUNT_GID)
+    target = ssh / "authorized_keys"
+    if target.exists():
+        current, metadata = _read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        if current != key + b"\n":
+            _backup_once(target, current, metadata)
+    _atomic_write(target, key + b"\n", mode=0o600, uid=ACCOUNT_UID, gid=ACCOUNT_GID)
+    for legacy in LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        authorized = HOST_HOME / legacy / ".ssh" / "authorized_keys"
+        try:
+            value, metadata = _read_regular(authorized, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            continue
+        updated = _without_key(value, key)
+        if updated == value:
+            continue
+        _backup_once(authorized, value, metadata)
+        _atomic_write(
+            authorized,
+            updated,
+            mode=stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode),
+            uid=metadata.st_uid,
+            gid=metadata.st_gid,
+        )
+    if _read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)[0] != key + b"\n":
+        raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes authorized key validation failed")
+
+
+def _decode_acl(value: bytes, mode: int) -> list[tuple[int, int, int]]:
+    """Decode a bounded POSIX ACL or derive one from ordinary mode bits."""
+    if not value:
+        group = (mode >> 3) & 0o7
+        return [
+            (ACL_USER_OBJ, (mode >> 6) & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_GROUP_OBJ, group, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_MASK, group, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_OTHER, mode & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+        ]
+    if len(value) < ACL_HEADER.size or (len(value) - ACL_HEADER.size) % ACL_ENTRY.size:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL is malformed")
+    if ACL_HEADER.unpack_from(value)[0] != ACL_VERSION:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL version is unsupported")
+    entries = [
+        ACL_ENTRY.unpack_from(value, offset)
+        for offset in range(ACL_HEADER.size, len(value), ACL_ENTRY.size)
+    ]
+    if any(permission > 0o7 for _tag, permission, _identifier in entries):
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL permission is malformed")
+    required = {ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, ACL_OTHER}
+    if not required <= {tag for tag, _permission, _identifier in entries}:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL is incomplete")
+    return entries
+
+
+def _encode_acl(entries: list[tuple[int, int, int]]) -> bytes:
+    return ACL_HEADER.pack(ACL_VERSION) + b"".join(
+        ACL_ENTRY.pack(*entry) for entry in entries
+    )
+
+
+def _acl_with_deny(value: bytes, mode: int) -> bytes:
+    entries = _decode_acl(value, mode)
+    entries = [
+        entry
+        for entry in entries
+        if not (entry[0] == ACL_USER and entry[2] == ACCOUNT_UID)
+    ]
+    entries.append((ACL_USER, 0, ACCOUNT_UID))
+    if not any(tag == ACL_MASK for tag, _permission, _identifier in entries):
+        entries.append((ACL_MASK, (mode >> 3) & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID))
+    order = {
+        ACL_USER_OBJ: 0,
+        ACL_USER: 1,
+        ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 2,
+        ACL_GROUP: 3,
+        ACL_MASK: 4,
+        ACL_OTHER: 5,
+    }
+    entries.sort(key=lambda entry: (order.get(entry[0], 99), entry[2]))
+    return _encode_acl(entries)
+
+
+def _read_acl(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return os.getxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, follow_symlinks=False)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno in {errno.ENODATA, getattr(errno, "ENOATTR", errno.ENODATA)}:
+            return b""
+        raise
+
+
+def _validate_acl_backup(value: bytes) -> None:
+    if value[:1] not in {b"A", b"N"}:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+    if value[:1] == b"A":
+        if len(value) == 1:
+            raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+        _decode_acl(value[1:], 0)
+    elif value != b"N":
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+
+
+def _acl_backup_once(path: Path, value: bytes) -> None:
+    """Persist the original ACL as a private, durable host recovery file."""
+    root = HOST_ETC / "hermes-node-boundary"
+    _directory(root, mode=0o700, uid=HOST_ROOT_UID, gid=HOST_ROOT_GID)
+    backup = root / f"{path.name}.acl"
+    encoded = b"A" + value if value else b"N"
+    try:
+        existing, _metadata = _read_regular(backup, 64 * 1024)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        _validate_acl_backup(existing)
+        return
+
+    temporary = root / f".{path.name}.acl.hermes-{os.getpid()}"
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(temporary, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, encoded) != len(encoded):
+            raise HardeningError("short sensitive directory ACL backup write")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, HOST_ROOT_UID, HOST_ROOT_GID)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    try:
+        os.link(temporary, backup, follow_symlinks=False)
+    except FileExistsError:
+        # Another reconciler won the race; never overwrite the first backup.
+        pass
+    finally:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    stored, _metadata = _read_regular(backup, 64 * 1024)
+    _validate_acl_backup(stored)
+    directory = os.open(root, os.O_RDONLY)
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+
+
+def _deny_sensitive_root(path: Path) -> None:
+    metadata = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise HardeningError(f"unsafe sensitive directory: {path.name}")
+    if metadata.st_uid != HOST_ROOT_UID:
+        raise HardeningError(f"sensitive directory is not root-owned: {path.name}")
+    current = _read_acl(path)
+    _acl_backup_once(path, current)
+    updated = _acl_with_deny(current, stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode))
+    try:
+        os.setxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, updated, follow_symlinks=False)
+        verified = _decode_acl(_read_acl(path), stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode))
+        if (ACL_USER, 0, ACCOUNT_UID) not in verified:
+            raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL validation failed")
+    except Exception:
+        if current:
+            os.setxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, current, follow_symlinks=False)
+        else:
+            try:
+                os.removexattr(path, ACL_XATTR, follow_symlinks=False)
+            except OSError as exc:
+                if exc.errno not in {
+                    errno.ENODATA,
+                    getattr(errno, "ENOATTR", errno.ENODATA),
+                }:
+                    raise
+        raise
+
+
+def _deny_sensitive_roots() -> None:
+    for path in (HOST_K3S, HOST_KUBELET, HOST_RUN_K3S, HOST_RUN_CONTAINERD):
+        _deny_sensitive_root(path)
+
+
+def reconcile(public_key: Path) -> None:
+    """Create the locked account and move only the Hermes authorization key."""
+    _reconcile_databases()
+    _deny_sensitive_roots()
+    _move_key(public_key)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--public-key-file", type=Path, required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    reconcile(args.public_key_file)
+    print("Dedicated Hermes node account reconciled.", flush=True)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py

@@ -86,6 +86,21 @@ def _write_empty_auth_store() -> None:
     os.chown(path, OWNER_UID, OWNER_GID)
 
 
+def _stage_node_ssh_config() -> None:
+    """Force every Atlas node alias onto the dedicated Hermes OS account."""
+    destination = RUNTIME_ROOT / "node-ssh-config"
+    source = _copy_secret("node-ssh-config", destination)
+    if "\x00" in source:
+        destination.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise RuntimeError("node SSH config contains invalid control data")
+    destination.write_text(
+        "Host titan-*\n  User hermes-agent\n" + source.rstrip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    destination.chmod(0o600)
+    os.chown(destination, OWNER_UID, OWNER_GID)
+
+
 def stage_agent() -> None:
     """Stage the owner agent's complete runtime access set."""
     for path in (RUNTIME_ROOT, RUNTIME_ROOT / "claude", RUNTIME_ROOT / "codex"):
@@ -93,13 +108,11 @@ def stage_agent() -> None:
     for name in (
         "agent-api-key",
         "chat-relay-key",
-        "gitea-token",
-        "gitea-username",
         "node-ssh-private-key",
-        "node-ssh-config",
         "node-ssh-known-hosts",
     ):
         _copy_secret(name, RUNTIME_ROOT / name)
+    _stage_node_ssh_config()
     _validated_json(
         "claude-credentials",
         RUNTIME_ROOT / "claude" / ".credentials.json",

services/hermes/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/SKILL.md

@@ -5,17 +5,21 @@ description: Read bounded private Atlas repository and pull-request metadata or
 
 # Manage Atlas pull requests
 
-Use `/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py` for Forgejo API access. It reads its token
+Use `/opt/scm/gitea_api.py` for Forgejo API access. The agent pod has no
-from the pod-lifetime Vault projection; never read that file, copy the token,
+repository credential. The client calls a separate least-authority broker;
-put it in an argument or environment variable, or replace this client with
+never bypass it with `curl` or direct Gitea HTTP.
-`curl`.
+
+Use the configured broker Git remote for clone, fetch, and creation of a new
+namespaced feature branch. Existing-ref updates, protected refs, deletion,
+and force-push are rejected by the broker. Never replace that remote with a
+credential-bearing URL.
 
 ## Read repository or PR state
 
 Pass one allowed Atlas metadata API path to the read operation:
 
 ```sh
-/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py read /api/v1/repos/atlas/REPO/pulls/NUMBER
+/opt/scm/gitea_api.py read /api/v1/repos/atlas/REPO/pulls/NUMBER
 ```
 
 The client exposes only repository metadata, PRs and PR evidence, branches,
@@ -29,10 +33,16 @@ evidence, not authorization to change it.
 Before opening a PR, verify the remote, branch, clean worktree, diff, tests, and
 exact pushed commit. Never force-push. Pass that full 40-character pushed head
 SHA explicitly. Keep the short body free of credentials and credential-like
-text. Validate without reading a credential or using the network:
+text. The client screens structured assignments, known token formats, and long
+high-entropy values as an accidental-disclosure barrier. It cannot prove text
+is secret-free: short or multiword secrets under innocuous names may resemble
+ordinary prose, so never place credential material in either field. Structured
+inspection is deliberately bounded; large, deeply nested, or unusual config
+blobs do not belong in these fields and may be rejected. Validate without
+reading a credential or using the network:
 
 ```sh
-/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py --dry-run create-draft REPO \
+/opt/scm/gitea_api.py --dry-run create-draft REPO \
   --base main --head hermes/TASK --head-sha FULL_PUSHED_SHA \
   --title "Focused change" --body "Tests and review evidence"
 ```

services/vault/hermes-auth-role-bootstrap-job.yaml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 apiVersion: batch/v1
 kind: Job
 metadata:
-  name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-8
+  name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-9
   namespace: vault
 spec:
   backoffLimit: 2

services/vault/scripts/vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh

@@ -256,7 +256,9 @@ write_policy_and_role "game-stream" "game-stream" "game-stream-vault" \
 write_policy_and_role "hermes" "hermes" "hermes-vault,hermes-triage" \
   "hermes/triage-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/triage-api" ""
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent" "hermes" "hermes-agent,hermes-switchyard" \
-  "hermes/agent-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/chat-telegram hermes/developer-keycloak hermes/developer-gitea hermes/developer-harbor hermes/developer-jenkins hermes/developer-ssh" ""
+  "hermes/agent-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/chat-telegram hermes/developer-keycloak hermes/developer-harbor hermes/developer-jenkins hermes/developer-ssh" ""
+write_policy_and_role "hermes-scm-broker" "hermes-scm" "hermes-scm-broker" \
+  "hermes/developer-gitea" ""
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-credential-sync" "hermes" "hermes-agent" \
   "" "hermes/agent-tokens"
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-node-ssh" "hermes" "hermes-node-ssh-access" \

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_quality.py

@@ -92,13 +92,14 @@ def test_agent_config_keeps_delegated_reviewers_from_owning_task_lifecycle():
     assert "Atlas organization has private visibility" in instructions
     assert "may be public or private" in instructions
     assert "do not infer a\nrepository's visibility" in instructions
-    assert "already supplied through `GIT_ASKPASS`" in instructions
+    assert "brokered Git for clone, fetch" in instructions
+    assert "client carries no repository credential" in instructions
     assert "Never call `kanban_show` without a known, non-empty task ID" in instructions
     assert "bounded ad-hoc inspection and acceptance checks may" in instructions
     assert "load implementation or TDD skills" in instructions
     assert "Never call `kanban_show` without\na known, non-empty task ID" in soul
     assert "must load a skill only when its workflow\nmaterially applies" in soul
-    assert "runtime-only `GIT_ASKPASS`" in soul
+    assert "no repository token is present in this pod" in soul
     assert "`scm.bstein.dev` is Forgejo/Gitea, not GitHub" in instructions
     assert "GitHub/`gh` skill for an Atlas remote" in instructions
     assert "load\n`$manage-atlas-pull-requests`" in instructions
@@ -560,13 +561,15 @@ def test_chat_image_generation_uses_private_owner_broker():
         "app": "hermes-chat-tenant"
     }
     vault_policy = (VAULT / "scripts" / "vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh").read_text()
-    assert (
+    agent_role = vault_policy[
-        '"hermes/agent-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/chat-telegram '
+        vault_policy.index('write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent"') :
-        'hermes/developer-keycloak hermes/developer-gitea '
+        vault_policy.index(
-        'hermes/developer-harbor hermes/developer-jenkins '
+            "write_policy_and_role",
-        'hermes/developer-ssh"'
+            vault_policy.index('write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent"') + 1,
-        in vault_policy
+        )
-    )
+    ]
+    assert "hermes/developer-gitea" not in agent_role
+    assert 'write_policy_and_role "hermes-scm-broker" "hermes-scm"' in vault_policy
     assert (
         'write_policy_and_role "hermes-node-ssh" "hermes" '
         '"hermes-node-ssh-access"' in vault_policy

testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes.py

@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ import pytest
 import yaml
 
 
-SCRIPTS = Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/hermes/scripts"
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+SCRIPTS = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts"
 sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
 HERMES = Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/hermes"
 KEYCLOAK = Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/keycloak"
@@ -1353,20 +1354,27 @@ def test_agent_network_boundary_allows_only_authenticated_and_metrics_surfaces()
             "ports": [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9010}],
         },
     ]
-    assert isolation["spec"]["egress"] == [{}]
+    egress = isolation["spec"]["egress"]
+    assert any(
+        rule.get("ports") == [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9081}]
+        for rule in egress
+    )
+    assert "hermes-scm" in yaml.safe_dump(egress)
+    assert "gitea" in yaml.safe_dump(egress)
+    assert egress != [{}]
 
 
-def test_owner_agent_has_cluster_admin_kubernetes_context():
+def test_owner_agent_has_scoped_read_only_kubernetes_context():
     config = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-kubeconfig.yaml").read_text())
-    assert config["current-context"] == "atlas-owner"
+    assert config["current-context"] == "atlas-observer"
     assert config["contexts"][0]["context"]["namespace"] == "default"
-    rbac_path = HERMES / "agent-rbac.yaml"
+    rbac_path = ROOT / "services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml"
     documents = [item for item in yaml.safe_load_all(rbac_path.read_text()) if item]
     binding = next(item for item in documents if item["kind"] == "ClusterRoleBinding")
     assert binding["roleRef"] == {
         "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
         "kind": "ClusterRole",
-        "name": "cluster-admin",
+        "name": "hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2",
     }
     assert binding["subjects"] == [
         {"kind": "ServiceAccount", "name": "hermes-agent", "namespace": "hermes"}
@@ -1441,15 +1449,16 @@ def test_owner_agent_has_pinned_dedicated_node_ssh_access():
         "secretProviderClass": "hermes-node-ssh-access"
     }
     reconciler = pod["containers"][0]["args"][0]
-    assert "cat /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key" in reconciler
+    assert "/opt/node-hardener/node_account_hardening.py" in reconciler
-    assert "grep -qxF" in reconciler
+    assert "--public-key-file /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key" in reconciler
-    assert "for user in atlas oceanus" in reconciler
+    assert "sleep 300" in reconciler
-    assert "/host-etc/passwd" in reconciler
+    host_etc = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "host-etc")
-    assert "chown \"${uid}:${gid}\"" in reconciler
+    assert host_etc["hostPath"] == {"path": "/etc", "type": "Directory"}
-    host_passwd = next(
+    hardener = (HERMES / "scripts/node_account_hardening.py").read_text()
-        item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "host-passwd"
+    assert 'ACCOUNT = "hermes-agent"' in hardener
-    )
+    assert 'LEGACY_ACCOUNTS = ("atlas", "oceanus")' in hardener
-    assert host_passwd["hostPath"] == {"path": "/etc/passwd", "type": "File"}
+    assert 'ACCOUNT_UID = 1200' in hardener
+    assert 'ACCOUNT_GID = 1200' in hardener
 
 
 def test_owner_agent_tracks_no_ssh_identity_or_host_key_material():
@@ -1518,7 +1527,9 @@ def test_switchyard_has_a_dedicated_non_owner_identity_and_read_only_catalog():
 
     rbac = [
         item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "agent-rbac.yaml").read_text())
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (ROOT / "services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml").read_text()
+        )
         if item
     ]
     binding = next(item for item in rbac if item["kind"] == "ClusterRoleBinding")

testing/tests/test_hermes_coordinator.py

@@ -445,8 +445,10 @@ def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_existing_worktree(
     assert all("GITEA_TOKEN" not in environment for environment in environments)
 
 
-def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_origin_without_token(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_origin_through_broker_without_token(
-    """Missing credentials skip only the fetch, not the local origin repair."""
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Repository sync uses the credential-isolated broker remote."""
     workspace = tmp_path / "cassandra"
     (workspace / ".git").mkdir(parents=True)
     monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator, "CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH", workspace)
@@ -461,8 +463,13 @@ def test_cassandra_sync_repairs_origin_without_token(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
     monkeypatch.setattr(coordinator.subprocess, "run", run)
     state = coordinator.sync_cassandra_repo({})
 
-    assert state == "ready; fetch skipped until Gitea token is configured"
+    assert state == "ready"
-    assert [command[-3] for command in commands] == ["remote", "set-url"]
+    assert any(
+        "hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local" in " ".join(cmd)
+        for cmd in commands
+    )
+    assert all("token" not in " ".join(cmd).lower() for cmd in commands)
+    assert commands[-1][-4:] == ["fetch", "--quiet", "--prune", "origin"]
 
 
 def test_migrate_open_cassandra_tasks_preserves_running_and_done_tasks():

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_pr_client.py

@@ -2,18 +2,22 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import base64
 import copy
 import importlib.util
 import json
 import sys
 import urllib.request
+from email.message import Message
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import pytest
 
 ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
-CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py"
+CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py"
 HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
+if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
 
 
 def _load():
@@ -58,8 +62,11 @@ def _draft_response(**updates):
 
 
 class Response:
-    def __init__(self, body: object):
+    def __init__(self, body: object, status: int | None = None):
         self.body = body if isinstance(body, bytes) else json.dumps(body).encode()
+        self.status = status if status is not None else (201 if isinstance(body, dict) else 200)
+        self.headers = Message()
+        self.headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
 
     def __enter__(self):
         return self
@@ -101,6 +108,10 @@ def test_redirect_handler_rejects_cross_origin_with_sentinel_authorization():
         ("https://evil.example", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
         ("http://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
         ("https://scm.bstein.dev:443", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://scm.bstein.dev/", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("HTTPS://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://SCM.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
+        ("https://user@scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
         ("https://scm.bstein.dev", "https://evil.example/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"),
         ("https://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/evil/cassandra"),
         ("https://scm.bstein.dev", "/api/v1/repos/%61tlas/cassandra"),
@@ -114,6 +125,72 @@ def test_host_owner_and_path_escape_attempts_are_rejected(base_url: str, path: s
         client.build_request("GET", path, base_url=base_url, token="secret")
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\nHost: evil.example",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\r\nX-Test: value",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\tignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x00ignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x1fignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1\x7fignored",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra\\pulls\\1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/%31",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/１",
+        " https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+        "https://scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+    ],
+)
+def test_raw_noncanonical_target_is_rejected_before_urlsplit_and_opener(
+    path: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    split_called = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_urlsplit = client.urllib.parse.urlsplit
+
+    def urlsplit(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal split_called
+        split_called = True
+        return original_urlsplit(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client.urllib.parse, "urlsplit", urlsplit)
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
+    assert split_called is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1?",
+        "//scm.bstein.dev/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/./pulls/1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/../admin",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra//pulls/1",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1?limit=01",
+    ],
+)
+def test_noncanonical_round_trip_or_segments_never_reach_opener(path: str):
+    client = _load()
+    opener_called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
     "path",
     [
@@ -179,6 +256,109 @@ def test_read_query_is_bounded(path: str):
         client.authorize_request("GET", path, None)
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "query",
+    [
+        "page=0",
+        "page=10001",
+        "page=01",
+        "limit=0",
+        "limit=51",
+        "limit=01",
+        "page=" + "9" * 4000,
+        "page=０",
+        "page=%EF%BC%90",
+        "state=%6fpen",
+        "p%61ge=1",
+        "page=1&page=2",
+        "page=1&" + "x" * 17 + "=1",
+        "state=" + "x" * 17,
+        "page=1&limit=2&state=open&extra=3",
+    ],
+)
+def test_read_query_requires_canonical_bounded_ascii(query: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.authorize_request(
+            "GET", f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls?{query}", None
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "suffix",
+    [
+        "pulls/{number}",
+        "pulls/{number}.patch",
+        "pulls/{number}.diff",
+        "pulls/{number}/commits",
+        "pulls/{number}/files",
+        "commits/{number}/status",
+        "commits/{number}/statuses",
+        "statuses/{number}",
+        "branches/{number}",
+    ],
+)
+def test_oversized_numeric_or_captured_path_never_reaches_opener(suffix: str):
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    path = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/" + suffix.format(number="9" * 4000)
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(path, token="runtime", opener=opener)
+    assert called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "number",
+    ["0", "01", "2147483648", "１２", "%31", "12345678901"],
+)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("tail", ["", ".patch", ".diff", "/commits", "/files"])
+def test_noncanonical_or_out_of_range_pr_number_never_reaches_opener(
+    number: str, tail: str
+):
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.read(
+            f"/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/{number}{tail}",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert called is False
+
+
+def test_maximum_bounded_pr_number_is_readable():
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(b"{}")
+
+    assert (
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/2147483647",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+        == b"{}"
+    )
+    assert called is True
+
+
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
     ("method", "path", "data"),
     [
@@ -230,10 +410,108 @@ def test_complete_git_ref_validation_rejects_invalid_names(ref: str):
 def test_git_ref_validation_uses_fixed_trusted_binary():
     client = _load()
 
-    assert client.GIT_BIN == "/usr/bin/git"
+    assert client._validate_ref.__globals__["GIT_BIN"] == "/usr/bin/git"
     assert client._validate_ref("hermes/valid-fix", "head") == "hermes/valid-fix"
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["base", "head"])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("oversized", ["r" * 100_000, "🧪" * 128])
+def test_oversized_ref_never_invokes_git_request_or_opener(
+    field: str, oversized: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    git_called = False
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def git_run(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal git_called
+        git_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("Git must not receive an oversized ref")
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    refs = {"base": "main", "head": "hermes/fix"}
+    refs[field] = oversized
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="branch-name limit"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base=refs["base"],
+            head=refs["head"],
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title="Focused fix",
+            body="Review evidence",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert git_called is False
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "oversized"),
+    [("repo", "r" * 101), ("title", "🧪" * 200), ("body", "🧪" * 9_000)],
+)
+def test_other_text_bounds_fail_before_git_request_or_opener(
+    field: str, oversized: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    git_called = False
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def git_run(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal git_called
+        git_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("Git must not run before cheap input bounds")
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    values = {
+        "repo": "cassandra",
+        "title": "Focused fix",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+    }
+    values[field] = oversized
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError):
+        client.create_draft(
+            values["repo"],
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert git_called is False
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
 def test_create_forces_draft_title_and_same_repository_branch_names():
     client = _load()
     assert (
@@ -272,24 +550,289 @@ def test_runtime_token_is_only_an_authorization_header():
 
 
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
-    "body",
+    "sensitive",
     [
-        "pass" + "word=not-a-real-credential",
+        "client_" + "secret=not-a-real-value",
+        '{"client_' + 'secret":\n"synthetic-value"}',
+        '{"client_' + 'secret"\n:\n"synthetic-value"}',
+        '{"client\\u005f' + 'secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        "client_" + "secret:\n  synthetic-value",
+        '{"client\\q' + 'secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        '{"client\n' + 'secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        '"client_' + 'secret"\x0b:\n"synthetic-value"',
+        "ACCESS_" + "TOKEN = 'not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"refresh_' + 'token": "not-a-real-value"}',
+        "private_" + "key: not-a-real-value",
+        "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_" + "KEY=not-a-real-value",
+        "aws_access_key_" + "id: not-a-real-value",
+        "AWS_SESSION_" + "TOKEN = 'not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"AccessKey' + 'Id":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"SecretAccess' + 'Key":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"Session' + 'Token":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        "aws-security-" + "token: not-a-real-value",
+        "Account" + "Key=not-a-real-value",
+        "SharedAccess" + "Signature: not-a-real-value",
+        "AZURE_STORAGE_CONNECTION_" + "STRING='not-a-real-value'",
+        "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=fake;Account"
+        + "Key=not-a-real-value;EndpointSuffix=example",
+        "?sv=2024-11-04&ss=b&srt=sco&sp=rwdlac&se=2099-01-01&sig=" + "not-a-real-value",
+        "DOCKER_AUTH_" + "CONFIG='not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"auths":{"registry.example":{"auth":"bm90LXJlYWw="}}}',
+        '{"identity' + 'token":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"type":"service_' + 'account","client_email":"fake@example.test"}',
+        '{"private_key_' + 'id":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        '{"client_' + 'email":"fake@example.test"}',
+        "GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS" + "=not-a-real-value",
+        "personal_access_" + "token: not-a-real-value",
+        "GITEA_" + "TOKEN=not-a-real-value",
+        "gitlab-token" + ": not-a-real-value",
+        "pat" + "=not-a-real-value",
         "Authorization: " + "Bearer not-a-real-credential-value",
-        "token: " + "ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "authorization = " + '"Basic not-a-real-credential-value"',
+        "Bearer" + "=not-a-real-credential-value",
+        "Basic" + ": not-a-real-credential-value",
+        "pass" + "word=not-a-real-credential",
+        "ghp_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "github_pat_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "glpat-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "xoxb-" + "not-a-real-credential-value-123456",
+        "sk-ant-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "sk-proj-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "sk_live_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "ya29." + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "gta_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "whsec_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "npm_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "pypi-" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456789012345",
+        "hf_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "SG." + "notarealvalue1234" + ".notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "SK" + "a" * 32,
+        "https://hooks.slack.com/services/" + "T000/B000/notarealvalue123456",
+        "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123456789/" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "https://fake.webhook.office.com/" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "webhook_" + "url=https://example.test/not-real",
+        "FutureCloudSigning" + "Credential=not-a-real-value",
+        "future-client-signing-" + "key: not-a-real-value",
+        "future_client_signing_" + "key='not-a-real-value'",
+        '{"serviceAccountPrivate' + 'Key":"not-a-real-value"}',
+        "CONTAINER_REGISTRY_" + "CREDENTIAL=not-a-real-value",
+        "someWebhookSigning" + "Secret: not-a-real-value",
+        "client" + "Key=not-a-real-value",
+        "session" + "Key: not-a-real-value",
+        "access" + "Id=not-a-real-value",
+        "credentials" + ": {user: fake}",
+        "private" + "Key: |",
+        "nuget_api_" + "key=not-a-real-value",
+        "oy2" + "a" * 44,
+        "sk_test_" + "notarealcredentialvalue123456",
+        "A1b2C3d4E5f6G7h8I9j0K_l-M+n/O=pQ2rS3tU4vW5xY6zZ7aB8cC9d",
+        "AKIA" + "A" * 16,
+        "AIza" + "a" * 35,
         "-----BEGIN OPENSSH " + "PRIVATE KEY-----",
+        "ssh-ed25519 " + "bm90YXJlYWxjcmVkZW50aWFsdmFsdWU=",
         "eyJnotarealheader." + "notarealpayloadvalue." + "notarealsignature",
     ],
 )
-def test_body_rejects_common_credential_shapes(body: str):
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
+def test_create_rejects_expanded_credential_shapes_before_network(
+    sensitive: str, field: str
+):
     client = _load()
+    called = False
+    request_built = False
+
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
+    values[field] = sensitive
 
     with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
-        client._validate_body(body)
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert called is False
 
 
-def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network():
+def test_very_long_compact_body_is_rejected_before_request_or_network():
     client = _load()
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title="Focused fix",
+            body="a" * 300,
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "safe_text",
+    [
+        "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY is injected at runtime",
+        "Token: reject empty values",
+        "Authorization = preserve header behavior",
+        "Password: add regression",
+        "Review the Authorization header behavior",
+        "Bearer authentication is required for this route",
+        "Document Docker auths payload rejection",
+        "The client_email field belongs to service accounts",
+        "AccountKey assignments must be blocked",
+        "This patch changes token validation without including a value",
+        "FutureCloudSigningCredential handling needs a regression test",
+        "The clientKey name is documented without an assigned value",
+        "A SHA-256 digest 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef is evidence",
+    ],
+)
+def test_credential_policy_keeps_normal_engineering_prose_usable(safe_text: str):
+    client = _load()
+
+    assert client._validate_body(safe_text) == safe_text
+    assert client._draft_title(safe_text) == f"WIP: {safe_text}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
+def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network(field: str):
+    client = _load()
+    called = False
+    request_built = False
+
+    original_build_request = client.build_request
+
+    def build_request(*args, **kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        return original_build_request(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal called
+        called = True
+        return Response(_draft_response())
+
+    client.build_request = build_request
+    runtime_token = "exact-random-runtime-sentinel-7b73ac61"
+    values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
+    values[field] = f"Accidental {runtime_token} value"
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token=runtime_token,
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["repo", "base", "head", "title", "body"])
+def test_every_public_field_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_git_or_network(
+    field: str, monkeypatch
+):
+    client = _load()
+    git_called = False
+    request_built = False
+    opener_called = False
+    runtime_token = "runtime-sentinel"
+    values = {
+        "repo": "cassandra",
+        "base": "main",
+        "head": "hermes/fix",
+        "title": "Focused fix",
+        "body": "Review evidence",
+    }
+    values[field] = runtime_token
+
+    def git_run(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal git_called
+        git_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("Git must not run for a credential-bearing field")
+
+    def build_request(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal request_built
+        request_built = True
+        raise AssertionError("a request must not be built")
+
+    def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        nonlocal opener_called
+        opener_called = True
+        raise AssertionError("the opener must not be called")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client, "build_request", build_request)
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            values["repo"],
+            base=values["base"],
+            head=values["head"],
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token=runtime_token,
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert git_called is False
+    assert request_built is False
+    assert opener_called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "sensitive",
+    [
+        " ".join(["{}"] * 32) + ' {"client_secret":"synthetic-value"}',
+        "prefix_ghp_notarealcredentialvalue123456_suffix",
+        "client_secret: correct horse battery staple",
+        "'client_secret':\n  synthetic-value",
+    ],
+)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["title", "body"])
+def test_structured_scanner_closes_bounded_and_wrapped_token_bypasses(
+    sensitive: str, field: str
+):
+    client = _load()
+    values = {"title": "Focused fix", "body": "Review evidence"}
+    values[field] = sensitive
     called = False
 
     def opener(*_args, **_kwargs):
@@ -297,18 +840,73 @@ def test_create_rejects_exact_runtime_token_before_network():
         called = True
         return Response(_draft_response())
 
-    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="runtime credential"):
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        client.create_draft(
+            "cassandra",
+            base="main",
+            head="hermes/fix",
+            head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+            title=values["title"],
+            body=values["body"],
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=opener,
+        )
+    assert called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [200, 202, 204, 206])
+def test_create_accepts_only_http_201(status: int):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="unexpected HTTP status"):
         client.create_draft(
             "cassandra",
             base="main",
             head="hermes/fix",
             head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
             title="Focused fix",
-            body="accidental runtime-sentinel value",
+            body="Review evidence",
-            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            token="runtime",
-            opener=opener,
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(_draft_response(), status=status),
         )
-    assert called is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [201, 202, 204, 206])
+def test_read_accepts_only_http_200(status: int):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="unexpected HTTP status"):
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(b"{}", status=status),
+        )
+
+
+def test_successful_create_validates_each_ref_once(monkeypatch):
+    client = _load()
+    calls = []
+
+    def git_run(command, **_kwargs):
+        calls.append(command)
+        return type("Result", (), {"returncode": 0})()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(client._validate_ref.__globals__["subprocess"], "run", git_run)
+    client.create_draft(
+        "cassandra",
+        base="main",
+        head="hermes/fix",
+        head_sha=HEAD_SHA,
+        title="Focused fix",
+        body="Review evidence",
+        token="runtime",
+        opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(_draft_response()),
+    )
+
+    assert [command[-1] for command in calls] == [
+        "refs/heads/main",
+        "refs/heads/hermes/fix",
+    ]
 
 
 def test_create_verifies_every_server_postcondition():
@@ -345,6 +943,7 @@ def test_create_postcondition_rejects_every_material_mismatch():
     client = _load()
     mutations = [
         ("number", 0),
+        ("number", 2_147_483_648),
         ("state", "closed"),
         ("draft", False),
         ("merged", True),
@@ -396,6 +995,19 @@ def test_read_response_is_bounded():
         )
 
 
+def test_direct_api_rejects_unexpected_success_content_type():
+    client = _load()
+    response = Response(b"{}")
+    response.headers.replace_header("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="unexpected response type"):
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="runtime",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: response,
+        )
+
+
 def test_output_redaction_covers_exact_token_and_authorization_header():
     client = _load()
     raw = b'{"message":"do-not-leak","debug":"Authorization: token do-not-leak"}'
@@ -403,3 +1015,24 @@ def test_output_redaction_covers_exact_token_and_authorization_header():
 
     assert b"do-not-leak" not in redacted
     assert redacted.count(b"[REDACTED]") >= 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "reflected",
+    [
+        b"runtime-sentinel",
+        base64.b64encode(b"runtime-sentinel"),
+        base64.b64encode(b"hermes-automation:runtime-sentinel"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_direct_api_rejects_credential_reflection(reflected: bytes):
+    client = _load()
+
+    with pytest.raises(client.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        client.read(
+            "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b'{"unexpected":"' + reflected + b'"}'
+            ),
+        )

testing/tests/test_hermes_gitea_pr_integration.py

@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ import pytest
 import yaml
 
 ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
-CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py"
+CLIENT_PATH = ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py"
 HEAD_SHA = "465cf9146b05c174a2a8d310aff6c64be58277b6"
+if str(CLIENT_PATH.parent) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(CLIENT_PATH.parent))
 
 
 def _load():
@@ -96,12 +98,12 @@ def test_http_error_path_redacts_token(monkeypatch, capsys):
     assert client.main(["read", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"]) == 1
     captured = capsys.readouterr()
     assert "do-not-leak" not in captured.err
-    assert "HTTP 403" in captured.err
+    assert "credential was disclosed" in captured.err
 
 
-def test_flux_manifest_projects_runtime_vault_token_and_skill_only():
+def test_flux_manifest_isolates_vault_token_in_separate_broker_only():
     client_source = CLIENT_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    assert "/runtime-access/gitea-token" in client_source
+    assert "scm_broker_client" in client_source
     assert "GITEA_TOKEN" not in client_source
 
     deployment = yaml.safe_load(
@@ -109,9 +111,7 @@ def test_flux_manifest_projects_runtime_vault_token_and_skill_only():
     )
     template = deployment["spec"]["template"]
     annotations = template["metadata"]["annotations"]
-    assert annotations["vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token"] == (
+    assert not any("gitea" in key.lower() for key in annotations)
-        "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea"
-    )
     runtime = next(
         volume
         for volume in template["spec"]["volumes"]
@@ -136,6 +136,17 @@ def test_flux_manifest_projects_runtime_vault_token_and_skill_only():
     kustomization = yaml.safe_load(
         (ROOT / "services/hermes/kustomization.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
     )
+    common = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    )
+    boundary = common["configMapGenerator"][0]
+    assert boundary["name"] == "hermes-scm-boundary"
+    assert "gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py" in boundary["files"]
+    assert "gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py" in boundary["files"]
+    assert "scm_broker_client.py=scripts/scm_broker_client.py" in boundary["files"]
+    assert not any("gitea_askpass" in item for item in boundary["files"])
     generator = next(
         item
         for item in kustomization["configMapGenerator"]
@@ -145,3 +156,19 @@ def test_flux_manifest_projects_runtime_vault_token_and_skill_only():
         "SKILL.md=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/SKILL.md",
         "openai.yaml=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/agents/openai.yaml",
     ]
+
+    broker = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    )
+    assert broker["metadata"]["namespace"] == "hermes-scm"
+    pod = broker["spec"]["template"]
+    assert pod["spec"]["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-scm-broker"
+    assert pod["metadata"]["annotations"][
+        "vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token"
+    ] == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea"
+    assert not any(
+        volume.get("hostPath") or volume.get("persistentVolumeClaim")
+        for volume in pod["spec"]["volumes"]
+    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_node_account_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+"""Contracts for the dedicated, unprivileged Hermes node SSH identity."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+SCRIPT = ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py"
+
+
+def _load():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("node_account_hardening_test", SCRIPT)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def _fixture(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_home = tmp_path / "home"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    host_home.mkdir()
+    originals = {
+        "passwd": (
+            "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n"
+            "atlas:x:2000:2000:Atlas:/home/atlas:/bin/bash\n"
+            "oceanus:x:2001:2001:Oceanus:/home/oceanus:/bin/bash\n"
+        ),
+        "group": (
+            "root:x:0:\n"
+            "atlas:x:2000:\n"
+            "oceanus:x:2001:\n"
+            "disk:x:6:atlas\n"
+            "sudo:x:27:oceanus\n"
+        ),
+        "shadow": (
+            "root:!:1:0:99999:7:::\n"
+            "atlas:!:1:0:99999:7:::\n"
+            "oceanus:!:1:0:99999:7:::\n"
+        ),
+        "gshadow": (
+            "root:!::\n"
+            "atlas:!::\n"
+            "oceanus:!::\n"
+            "disk:!::atlas\n"
+            "sudo:!::oceanus\n"
+        ),
+    }
+    for name, value in originals.items():
+        (host_etc / name).write_text(value, encoding="utf-8")
+    key = "ssh-ed25519 " + base64.b64encode(b"synthetic-hermes-key").decode()
+    other = "ssh-ed25519 " + base64.b64encode(b"human-operator-key").decode()
+    for user in ("atlas", "oceanus"):
+        ssh = host_home / user / ".ssh"
+        ssh.mkdir(parents=True)
+        (ssh / "authorized_keys").write_text(
+            f"{other} {user}\n{key}\n", encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    public_key = tmp_path / "public-key"
+    public_key.write_text(key + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_HOME", host_home)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_GID", os.getgid())
+    # ACL behavior has its own executable test below. These account-database
+    # tests must not depend on the host running pytest with CAP_FOWNER.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_deny_sensitive_roots", lambda: None)
+    return module, originals, key, other, public_key
+
+
+def test_reconciler_creates_locked_groupless_account_and_moves_only_exact_key(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, key, other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+    first = {
+        name: (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for name in originals
+    }
+    module.reconcile(public_key)
+    second = {
+        name: (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for name in originals
+    }
+
+    assert first == second
+    expected = module._expected_records()
+    for name, original in originals.items():
+        assert first[name] == original + ":".join(expected[name]) + "\n"
+        backup = module.HOST_ETC / f"{name}.hermes-boundary-backup"
+        assert backup.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == original
+    assert expected["shadow"][1] == "!"
+    assert expected["group"][-1] == ""
+    assert "disk:x:6:atlas\n" in first["group"]
+    assert "sudo:x:27:oceanus\n" in first["group"]
+
+    hermes_keys = (
+        module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert hermes_keys == key + "\n"
+    for user in module.LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        legacy = (
+            module.HOST_HOME / user / ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+        ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        assert legacy == f"{other} {user}\n"
+        backup = module.HOST_HOME / user / ".ssh/authorized_keys.hermes-boundary-backup"
+        assert backup.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == f"{other} {user}\n{key}\n"
+
+
+def test_identity_conflict_fails_closed_without_editing_account_databases(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, _key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    conflict = originals["passwd"] + (
+        f"unrelated:x:{module.ACCOUNT_UID}:{module.ACCOUNT_GID}:Other:/home/other:/bin/bash\n"
+    )
+    (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").write_text(conflict, encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="identity conflicts"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == conflict
+    for name in ("group", "shadow", "gshadow"):
+        assert (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") == originals[name]
+    assert not (module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT).exists()
+
+
+def test_malformed_account_file_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module, originals, _key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    (module.HOST_ETC / "group").write_text("malformed\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="invalid record"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    assert (module.HOST_ETC / "passwd").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == originals[
+        "passwd"
+    ]
+    assert (module.HOST_ETC / "group").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "malformed\n"
+
+
+def test_preexisting_home_fails_before_account_database_or_key_changes(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module, originals, _key, _other, public_key = _fixture(tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+    home = module.HOST_HOME / module.ACCOUNT
+    home.mkdir()
+    (home / "unrelated").write_text("preserve\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="home already exists"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+
+    for name, original in originals.items():
+        assert (module.HOST_ETC / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") == original
+        assert not (module.HOST_ETC / f"{name}.hermes-boundary-backup").exists()
+    assert (home / "unrelated").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "preserve\n"
+
+
+def test_flux_daemonset_reconciles_every_node_without_mutating_human_groups():
+    documents = list(
+        yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (ROOT / "services/hermes/node-ssh-access.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        )
+    )
+    daemonset = next(item for item in documents if item["kind"] == "DaemonSet")
+    spec = daemonset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    assert spec["tolerations"] == [{"operator": "Exists"}]
+    command = spec["containers"][0]["args"][0]
+    assert "/opt/node-hardener/node_account_hardening.py" in command
+    assert "sleep 300" in command
+    mounts = {item["name"]: item for item in spec["volumes"]}
+    assert mounts["host-home"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/home"
+    assert mounts["host-etc"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/etc"
+    assert mounts["host-k3s"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/var/lib/rancher/k3s"
+    assert mounts["host-kubelet"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/var/lib/kubelet"
+    assert mounts["host-run-k3s"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/run/k3s"
+    assert mounts["host-run-containerd"]["hostPath"]["path"] == "/run/containerd"
+    assert "usermod" not in command
+    assert "groupmod" not in command
+
+    policies = list(
+        yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (ROOT / "services/hermes/networkpolicy.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        )
+    )
+    isolation = next(
+        item
+        for item in policies
+        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access-isolation"
+    )
+    assert isolation["spec"]["ingress"] == []
+    assert isolation["spec"]["egress"] == []
+
+    source = SCRIPT.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "ACCOUNT = \"hermes-agent\"" in source
+    assert "ACCOUNT_UID = 1200" in source
+    assert "ACCOUNT_GID = 1200" in source
+    assert 'LEGACY_ACCOUNTS = ("atlas", "oceanus")' in source
+    assert "supplementary" not in source.lower()
+
+
+def test_sensitive_roots_get_explicit_zero_permission_acl_for_hermes(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module = _load()
+    sensitive = tmp_path / "k3s"
+    sensitive.mkdir(mode=0o755)
+    host_etc = tmp_path / "etc"
+    host_etc.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "ACCOUNT_UID", 1200)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ETC", host_etc)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_UID", os.getuid())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "HOST_ROOT_GID", os.getgid())
+    # Production requires uid 0. The test process owns its fixture but runs the
+    # real xattr/ACL implementation using the test owner's uid as that boundary.
+
+    module._deny_sensitive_root(sensitive)
+    first = module._read_acl(sensitive)
+    module._deny_sensitive_root(sensitive)
+    second = module._read_acl(sensitive)
+
+    assert first == second
+    entries = module._decode_acl(first, 0o755)
+    assert (module.ACL_USER, 0, 1200) in entries
+    assert (module.ACL_USER_OBJ, 0o7, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) in entries
+    assert (module.ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 0o5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) in entries
+    assert (module.ACL_OTHER, 0o5, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) in entries
+    backup = host_etc / "hermes-node-boundary/k3s.acl"
+    assert backup.read_bytes() == b"N"
+    assert backup.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
+
+
+def test_sensitive_root_rejects_non_directory_and_non_root_owner(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    module = _load()
+    regular = tmp_path / "not-a-directory"
+    regular.write_text("preserve", encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="unsafe sensitive directory"):
+        module._deny_sensitive_root(regular)
+
+    directory = tmp_path / "not-root-owned"
+    directory.mkdir()
+    if directory.stat().st_uid == 0:
+        pytest.skip("cannot construct a non-root-owned fixture as root")
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="not root-owned"):
+        module._deny_sensitive_root(directory)
+
+
+def test_acl_parser_rejects_malformed_or_incomplete_values():
+    module = _load()
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="malformed"):
+        module._decode_acl(b"too short", 0o755)
+    incomplete = module._encode_acl(
+        [(module.ACL_USER_OBJ, 0o7, module.ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)]
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="incomplete"):
+        module._decode_acl(incomplete, 0o755)
+
+
+def test_acl_failure_stops_before_installing_the_ssh_key(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    module = _load()
+    public_key = tmp_path / "public-key"
+    public_key.write_text(
+        "ssh-ed25519 " + base64.b64encode(b"synthetic-key").decode() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    moved = False
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_reconcile_databases", lambda: None)
+
+    def fail_acl():
+        raise module.HardeningError("ACL unavailable")
+
+    def move_key(_path):
+        nonlocal moved
+        moved = True
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_deny_sensitive_roots", fail_acl)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_move_key", move_key)
+
+    with pytest.raises(module.HardeningError, match="ACL unavailable"):
+        module.reconcile(public_key)
+    assert moved is False
+
+
+def test_runtime_ssh_config_forces_dedicated_account_for_every_titan():
+    stage = (
+        ROOT / "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert '"Host titan-*\\n  User hermes-agent\\n"' in stage
+    agent = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/agent-deployment.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )
+    assert "User atlas" not in yaml.safe_dump(agent)
+    assert "User oceanus" not in yaml.safe_dump(agent)

testing/tests/test_hermes_runtime_access.py

@@ -14,10 +14,16 @@ import yaml
 ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
 HERMES = ROOT / "services" / "hermes"
 SCRIPTS = HERMES / "scripts"
+SCM_SCRIPTS = HERMES / "scm-common" / "scripts"
+if str(SCRIPTS) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+if str(SCM_SCRIPTS) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(SCM_SCRIPTS))
 
 
 def _load(name: str):
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, SCRIPTS / f"{name}.py")
+    root = SCM_SCRIPTS if name == "gitea_api" else SCRIPTS
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, root / f"{name}.py")
     assert spec and spec.loader
     module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
     sys.modules[spec.name] = module
@@ -167,8 +173,6 @@ def test_agent_runtime_stage_keeps_credentials_in_memory(tmp_path: Path, monkeyp
     values = {
         "agent-api-key": "agent-key",
         "chat-relay-key": "relay-key",
-        "gitea-token": "gitea-key",
-        "gitea-username": "hermes-automation",
         "node-ssh-private-key": "private-key",
         "node-ssh-config": "host-config",
         "node-ssh-known-hosts": "known-hosts",
@@ -192,6 +196,10 @@ def test_agent_runtime_stage_keeps_credentials_in_memory(tmp_path: Path, monkeyp
     assert (runtime / "codex/skills").is_symlink()
     assert not (runtime / "claude/backups").exists()
     assert not (runtime / "codex/sessions").exists()
+    assert not (runtime / "gitea-token").exists()
+    assert not (runtime / "gitea-username").exists()
+    ssh_config = (runtime / "node-ssh-config").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert ssh_config.startswith("Host titan-*\n  User hermes-agent\n")
     auth = json.loads((runtime / "hermes-auth.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
     assert auth == {"version": 1, "providers": {}, "credential_pool": {}}
 
@@ -355,12 +363,12 @@ def test_manifests_never_seed_access_material_into_persistent_env():
     assert triage_annotations[
         "vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-triage-api-key"
     ] == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/triage-api"
-    askpass = (SCRIPTS / "gitea_askpass.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    gitea_api = (
-    assert "/runtime-access/gitea-token" in askpass
+        ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py"
-    assert "GITEA_TOKEN" not in askpass
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    gitea_api = (SCRIPTS / "gitea_api.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "scm_broker_client" in gitea_api
-    assert "/runtime-access/gitea-token" in gitea_api
     assert "GITEA_TOKEN" not in gitea_api
+    assert "gitea-token" not in annotations
 
 
 def test_chat_media_reads_one_raw_runtime_secret(tmp_path: Path):

testing/tests/test_hermes_scm_broker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+"""Executable contracts for the credential-isolated Hermes SCM broker."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import sys
+from email.message import Message
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+SCRIPTS = ROOT / "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+
+
+def _load(name: str):
+    path = SCRIPTS / f"{name}.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(f"test_{name}", path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+class Response:
+    def __init__(self, body: bytes, *, status: int = 200, content_type: str):
+        self.body = body
+        self.status = status
+        self.headers = Message()
+        self.headers["Content-Type"] = content_type
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, *_args):
+        return False
+
+    def read(self, limit=-1):
+        return self.body if limit < 0 else self.body[:limit]
+
+
+def _receive_command(old: bytes, new: bytes, ref: bytes) -> bytes:
+    command = old + b" " + new + b" " + ref + b"\x00report-status\n"
+    return f"{len(command) + 4:04x}".encode() + command + b"0000PACK"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "target",
+    [
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/merge",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/reviews",
+        "/api/v1/admin/users",
+        "/git/evil/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/hooks",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/git-receive-pack?force=true",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\nignored",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\tignored",
+        "/git/atlas/cassandra.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack#fragment",
+    ],
+)
+def test_broker_rejects_privileged_or_non_atlas_routes(target: str):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError):
+        broker._git_target(target)
+
+
+def test_broker_metadata_boundary_reuses_explicit_read_allowlist():
+    api = _load("gitea_api")
+
+    assert (
+        api.authorize_request("GET", "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1", None)
+        == "pull"
+    )
+    for path in (
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/merge",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/pulls/1/reviews",
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra/hooks",
+        "/api/v1/admin/users",
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(api.PolicyError):
+            api.authorize_request("GET", path, None)
+
+
+def test_receive_pack_allows_only_new_namespaced_feature_branch():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    zero = b"0" * 40
+    commit = b"1" * 40
+
+    broker._validate_receive_pack(
+        _receive_command(zero, commit, b"refs/heads/hermes/focused-fix"),
+        "runtime-sentinel",
+    )
+    for old, new, ref in (
+        (commit, b"2" * 40, b"refs/heads/hermes/focused-fix"),
+        (commit, zero, b"refs/heads/hermes/focused-fix"),
+        (zero, commit, b"refs/heads/main"),
+        (zero, commit, b"refs/heads/master"),
+        (zero, commit, b"refs/tags/release"),
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError):
+            broker._validate_receive_pack(
+                _receive_command(old, new, ref), "runtime-sentinel"
+            )
+
+
+def test_git_proxy_uses_fixed_origin_and_never_reflects_credential():
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    seen = []
+
+    def opener(request, timeout):
+        seen.append((request, timeout))
+        return Response(
+            b"git-result",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+        )
+
+    result = broker._upstream_git_request(
+        "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+        method="POST",
+        body=b"request",
+        content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+        expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+        token="runtime-sentinel",
+        opener=opener,
+    )
+
+    assert result == b"git-result"
+    request = seen[0][0]
+    assert request.full_url == (
+        "https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack"
+    )
+    assert b"runtime-sentinel" not in request.data
+    assert "runtime-sentinel" not in request.full_url
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b"runtime-sentinel",
+                content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            ),
+        )
+
+    encoded = broker._credential_forms("runtime-sentinel")[1]
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="credential material"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b"Authorization: Basic " + encoded,
+                content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            ),
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [201, 202, 204, 206, 301, 302, 307, 308])
+def test_git_proxy_requires_exact_http_200(status: int):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="unexpected HTTP status"):
+        broker._upstream_git_request(
+            "/atlas/cassandra.git/git-upload-pack",
+            method="POST",
+            body=b"request",
+            content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-request",
+            expected_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            token="runtime-sentinel",
+            opener=lambda *_a, **_k: Response(
+                b"result",
+                status=status,
+                content_type="application/x-git-upload-pack-result",
+            ),
+        )
+
+
+def test_agent_broker_client_sends_no_credential_or_authorization_header():
+    client = _load("scm_broker_client")
+    seen = []
+
+    def opener(request, timeout):
+        seen.append((request, timeout))
+        return Response(b"{}", content_type="application/json")
+
+    assert client.read(
+        "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra", opener=opener
+    ) == b"{}"
+    request = seen[0][0]
+    assert request.full_url == client.BROKER_ORIGIN + "/v1/metadata"
+    assert request.get_header("Authorization") is None
+    assert json.loads(request.data) == {
+        "path": "/api/v1/repos/atlas/cassandra"
+    }
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", ["", "01", "9" * 4000, "134217729", "１２"])
+def test_broker_content_length_is_canonical_and_bounded(raw: str):
+    broker = _load("scm_broker")
+    headers = Message()
+    headers["Content-Length"] = raw
+
+    with pytest.raises(broker.PolicyError, match="request length"):
+        broker._content_length(headers, broker.MAX_GIT_REQUEST)
+
+
+def _can_i(role: dict, api_group: str, resource: str, verb: str) -> bool:
+    return any(
+        (api_group in rule["apiGroups"] or "*" in rule["apiGroups"])
+        and (resource in rule["resources"] or "*" in rule["resources"])
+        and (verb in rule["verbs"] or "*" in rule["verbs"])
+        for rule in role["rules"]
+    )
+
+
+def test_agent_rbac_preserves_read_diagnostics_without_administrator_authority():
+    documents = list(
+        yaml.safe_load_all(
+            (ROOT / "services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml").read_text(
+                encoding="utf-8"
+            )
+        )
+    )
+    cluster_role, namespaced_role, binding = documents
+    assert binding["roleRef"]["name"] == "hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2"
+    assert _can_i(cluster_role, "", "nodes", "get")
+    assert _can_i(namespaced_role, "", "pods", "get")
+    assert _can_i(namespaced_role, "", "pods/log", "get")
+    assert _can_i(
+        namespaced_role,
+        "kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io",
+        "kustomizations",
+        "list",
+    )
+
+    denied = (
+        ("", "secrets", "get"),
+        ("", "serviceaccounts/token", "create"),
+        ("", "pods", "create"),
+        ("", "pods/exec", "create"),
+        ("", "pods/attach", "create"),
+        ("", "pods/portforward", "create"),
+        ("rbac.authorization.k8s.io", "clusterrolebindings", "create"),
+        ("authorization.k8s.io", "selfsubjectaccessreviews", "create"),
+        ("apps", "deployments", "patch"),
+    )
+    assert all(
+        not _can_i(role, *request)
+        for request in denied
+        for role in (cluster_role, namespaced_role)
+    )
+
+    bindings = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes-observer-rbac/rolebindings.yaml").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    )["items"]
+    namespaces = {item["metadata"]["namespace"] for item in bindings}
+    assert "hermes-scm" not in namespaces
+    assert {"cassandra", "flux-system", "hermes", "kube-system"} <= namespaces
+    assert all(item["roleRef"]["name"].endswith("namespaced-observer-v2") for item in bindings)
+
+
+def test_flux_boundary_keeps_broker_secret_and_network_separate_from_agent():
+    agent = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/agent-deployment.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )
+    annotations = agent["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"]
+    assert not any("gitea" in key.lower() for key in annotations)
+    assert "GIT_ASKPASS" not in json.dumps(agent)
+
+    broker = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    )
+    assert broker["metadata"]["namespace"] == "hermes-scm"
+    assert broker["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["serviceAccountName"] == (
+        "hermes-scm-broker"
+    )
+    assert "gitea-token" in json.dumps(broker)
+
+    policy = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes-scm-broker/networkpolicy.yaml").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+    )
+    ingress = policy["spec"]["ingress"]
+    assert ingress[0]["from"][0]["namespaceSelector"]["matchLabels"] == {
+        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "hermes"
+    }
+    assert ingress[0]["from"][0]["podSelector"]["matchLabels"] == {
+        "app": "hermes-agent"
+    }
+
+    vault = (
+        ROOT / "services/vault/scripts/vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'write_policy_and_role "hermes-scm-broker" "hermes-scm"' in vault
+    assert '"hermes/developer-gitea" ""' in vault
+    agent_start = vault.index('write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent"')
+    agent_end = vault.index("write_policy_and_role", agent_start + 1)
+    assert "developer-gitea" not in vault[agent_start:agent_end]
+
+
+def test_flux_bootstrap_has_no_agent_namespace_dependency_cycle():
+    hermes_resources = yaml.safe_load(
+        (ROOT / "services/hermes/kustomization.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )["resources"]
+    assert "namespace.yaml" in hermes_resources
+    assert "scm-common" in hermes_resources
+
+    applications = (
+        ROOT / "clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/kustomization.yaml"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "hermes-scm-agent-code" not in applications
+
+    broker_code = yaml.safe_load(
+        (
+            ROOT
+            / "clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml"
+        ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )
+    assert broker_code["spec"]["path"] == "./services/hermes/scm-common"
+    assert broker_code["spec"]["targetNamespace"] == "hermes-scm"
+    assert broker_code["spec"]["dependsOn"] == [{"name": "hermes-scm-namespace"}]
+
+
+def test_gitea_bootstrap_enforces_human_review_without_overwriting_drift():
+    script = (
+        ROOT / "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh"
+    ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert 'required_approvals\\\":1' in script
+    assert 'enable_push_whitelist\\\":true' in script
+    assert 'push_whitelist_usernames\\\":[\\\"${protected_reviewer}\\\"]' in script
+    assert 'enable_merge_whitelist\\\":true' in script
+    assert 'merge_whitelist_usernames\\\":[\\\"${protected_reviewer}\\\"]' in script
+    assert "protection differs from the human-review policy" in script
+    assert "api_request PATCH" not in script