hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
|
|
|
|
"""Acceptance checks for forge authority, node accounts, images, and regressions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
What the platform is allowed to do outside its own namespace: which forge
|
|
|
|
|
authority a worker holds, what a node account is and is not, how an image is
|
|
|
|
|
built and pinned, and whether the fixes the release depends on are actually
|
|
|
|
|
running rather than merely merged.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Where a property has no side-effect-free live probe — a merge that must never be
|
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|
|
|
attempted, a branch protection the harness identity cannot read — the entry says
|
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|
|
|
so in its rationale and asserts the nearest fact that *is* observable, rather
|
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|
|
|
than quietly asserting nothing.
|
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|
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|
"""
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|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
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|
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|
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|
|
from hermes_handoff_catalog import (
|
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|
FORGE_CREDENTIAL_NAMES,
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|
INIT_NAME_PROJECTION,
|
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|
|
NODE_NAME_PROJECTION,
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
SELF,
|
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|
|
|
Targets,
|
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|
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|
check,
|
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|
|
|
step,
|
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|
)
|
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from hermes_handoff_model import ATTEMPT, CheckSpec
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
from hermes_handoff_policy import GITEA_CLIENT, projection, shell
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
def _forge(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
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|
api = f"/api/v1/repos/{targets.repo}"
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|
return [
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|
check(
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|
|
"forge.worker-holds-no-git-credential-variable",
|
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|
|
|
"No forge credential is exported into the worker process",
|
|
|
|
|
"forge",
|
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|
|
|
"names_absent",
|
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|
|
|
[step("env", SELF, *shell("env_names"))],
|
|
|
|
|
{"step": "env", "names": FORGE_CREDENTIAL_NAMES},
|
|
|
|
|
rationale="Authentication reaches Git through an askpass helper that reads runtime state, never through the environment.",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
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|
|
|
"forge.identity-is-not-an-administrator",
|
|
|
|
|
"The forge identity the worker uses holds no administrative rights",
|
|
|
|
|
"forge",
|
|
|
|
|
"json_field",
|
|
|
|
|
[step("user", SELF, GITEA_CLIENT, "GET", "/api/v1/user")],
|
|
|
|
|
{"step": "user", "fields": {"is_admin": False}},
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"forge.repository-authority-is-push-only",
|
|
|
|
|
"The worker can push a branch but cannot administer the repository",
|
|
|
|
|
"forge",
|
|
|
|
|
"json_field",
|
|
|
|
|
[step("repo", SELF, GITEA_CLIENT, "GET", api)],
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"step": "repo",
|
|
|
|
|
"fields": {
|
|
|
|
|
"permissions.admin": False,
|
|
|
|
|
"permissions.push": True,
|
|
|
|
|
"permissions.pull": True,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
rationale="Merge, approve, close, and protection changes all require authority this identity is proven not to hold.",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"forge.administrative-route-is-refused",
|
|
|
|
|
"An administrative forge route is refused for this identity",
|
|
|
|
|
"forge",
|
|
|
|
|
"denied",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"attempt",
|
|
|
|
|
SELF,
|
|
|
|
|
GITEA_CLIENT,
|
|
|
|
|
"GET",
|
|
|
|
|
f"{api}/branch_protections",
|
|
|
|
|
kind=ATTEMPT,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
rationale="A live refusal, not a configuration reading. The same lack of authority is what blocks a merge route.",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _nodes(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
|
|
|
|
|
return [
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"nodes.hardening-covers-every-node",
|
|
|
|
|
"The node account audit runs on every node in the cluster",
|
|
|
|
|
"nodes",
|
|
|
|
|
"distinct_count",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"coverage",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
targets.namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
"pods",
|
|
|
|
|
"--selector",
|
|
|
|
|
f"app={targets.node_daemonset}",
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
|
|
|
|
NODE_NAME_PROJECTION,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"step": "coverage",
|
|
|
|
|
"minimum": targets.node_count,
|
|
|
|
|
"total_equals": targets.node_count,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
rationale="A hardened fleet with one unenrolled node is an unhardened fleet.",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _build(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
|
|
|
|
|
pipeline = f"{targets.remote}/main:{targets.builder_pipeline}"
|
|
|
|
|
return [
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"build.builder-service-account-is-tokenless",
|
|
|
|
|
"The image builder service account mounts no API token",
|
|
|
|
|
"build",
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
"stdout_matches",
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"serviceaccount",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
targets.builder_namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
"serviceaccount",
|
|
|
|
|
targets.builder_serviceaccount,
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
projection("jsonpath={.automountServiceAccountToken}"),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{"step": "serviceaccount", "equals": "false"},
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"build.builder-runs-unprivileged-with-exact-capabilities",
|
|
|
|
|
"The build pod is unprivileged and adds only the expected capabilities",
|
|
|
|
|
"build",
|
|
|
|
|
"names_present",
|
|
|
|
|
[step("pipeline", OPERATOR, "git", "show", pipeline, record=False)],
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"step": "pipeline",
|
|
|
|
|
"names": (
|
|
|
|
|
targets.builder_capabilities,
|
|
|
|
|
"privileged: false",
|
|
|
|
|
"allowPrivilegeEscalation: false",
|
|
|
|
|
"automountServiceAccountToken: false",
|
|
|
|
|
'drop: ["ALL"]',
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
rationale="Exact lines, not a substring sweep: a widened capability set has to change one of these lines to take effect.",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"build.harbor-immutability-rule-is-applied",
|
|
|
|
|
"The Harbor immutable-tag rule for the agent image has been applied",
|
|
|
|
|
"build",
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
"lines_match",
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"job",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
targets.harbor_namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
"job",
|
|
|
|
|
targets.harbor_immutability_job,
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
projection("jsonpath={.status.succeeded}"),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{"step": "job", "pattern": r"^[1-9][0-9]*$", "minimum": 1},
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
rationale="The job verifies the rule it creates, so a completed run is evidence the rule matched the expected contract.",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
_release_lineage(targets),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def _release_lineage(targets: Targets) -> CheckSpec:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Bind the exact reviewed release from Git through the Ready pods."""
|
|
|
|
|
container = targets.agent_container
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = targets.namespace
|
|
|
|
|
deployment = f"deploy/{targets.agent_deployment}"
|
|
|
|
|
deployment_projection = projection(
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"jsonpath={.metadata.generation}{'\\t'}{.status.observedGeneration}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{.spec.replicas}{'\\t'}{.status.readyReplicas}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{.metadata.annotations.deployment\\.kubernetes\\.io/revision}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
f'{{.spec.template.spec.containers[?(@.name=="{container}")].image}}'
|
|
|
|
|
).replace("'", '"')
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
pod_projection = projection(
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"jsonpath={range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{'\\t'}{.status.phase}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{range .status.conditions[?(@.type==\"Ready\")]}{.status}{end}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
f'{{.spec.containers[?(@.name=="{container}")].image}}{{"\\t"}}'
|
|
|
|
|
f'{{.status.containerStatuses[?(@.name=="{container}")].imageID}}{{"\\t"}}'
|
|
|
|
|
"{.metadata.labels.pod-template-hash}{'\\n'}{end}"
|
|
|
|
|
).replace("'", '"')
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
replicaset_projection = projection(
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"jsonpath={range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{.metadata.annotations.deployment\\.kubernetes\\.io/revision}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{.status.readyReplicas}{'\\t'}{.status.availableReplicas}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
f'{{.spec.template.spec.containers[?(@.name=="{container}")].image}}{{"\\t"}}'
|
|
|
|
|
"{.metadata.labels.pod-template-hash}{'\\n'}{end}"
|
|
|
|
|
).replace("'", '"')
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
flux_projection = projection(
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"jsonpath={.metadata.name}{'\\t'}{.metadata.generation}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{.status.observedGeneration}{'\\t'}{.spec.suspend}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{range .status.conditions[?(@.type==\"Ready\")]}{.status}{end}{'\\t'}"
|
|
|
|
|
"{.status.lastAppliedRevision}"
|
|
|
|
|
).replace("'", '"')
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return check(
|
|
|
|
|
"release.exact-lineage-is-running",
|
|
|
|
|
"Remote main, reviewed PR, image, build, Flux, and running revision are identical",
|
|
|
|
|
"release",
|
|
|
|
|
"release_lineage",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"remote-main",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"git",
|
|
|
|
|
"ls-remote",
|
|
|
|
|
targets.remote,
|
|
|
|
|
"refs/heads/main",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"reviewed-pr",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
GITEA_CLIENT,
|
|
|
|
|
"GET",
|
|
|
|
|
f"/api/v1/repos/{targets.repo}/pulls/{targets.reviewed_pr_number}",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"build-source",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"git",
|
|
|
|
|
"rev-parse",
|
|
|
|
|
f"{targets.remote}/main",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"deployment",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
deployment,
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
|
|
|
|
deployment_projection,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"pods",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
"pods",
|
|
|
|
|
"--selector",
|
|
|
|
|
f"app={targets.agent_deployment}",
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
|
|
|
|
pod_projection,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"replicasets",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
"replicasets",
|
|
|
|
|
"--selector",
|
|
|
|
|
f"app={targets.agent_deployment}",
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
|
|
|
|
replicaset_projection,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"flux",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
"flux-system",
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
"kustomization/hermes",
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
|
|
|
|
flux_projection,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"main_sha": targets.remote_main_sha,
|
|
|
|
|
"head_sha": targets.reviewed_head_sha,
|
|
|
|
|
"head_ref": targets.reviewed_head_ref,
|
|
|
|
|
"pr_number": targets.reviewed_pr_number,
|
|
|
|
|
"image": targets.agent_image,
|
|
|
|
|
"build_sha": targets.build_sha,
|
|
|
|
|
"deployment_revision": targets.deployment_revision,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
rationale="A PASS requires one exact release identity across every source and running object.",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
def _reliability(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
|
|
|
|
|
return [
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"reliability.finalization-and-replay-patches-are-deployed",
|
|
|
|
|
"The agent workload runs the finalization, replay, and session patches",
|
|
|
|
|
"reliability",
|
|
|
|
|
"names_present",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"init",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"kubectl",
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
targets.namespace,
|
|
|
|
|
"get",
|
|
|
|
|
f"deploy/{targets.agent_deployment}",
|
|
|
|
|
"-o",
|
|
|
|
|
INIT_NAME_PROJECTION,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
{"step": "init", "names": targets.agent_init_containers},
|
|
|
|
|
rationale="The regression suites live in the repository; this asserts the fixes they cover are actually running.",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
check(
|
|
|
|
|
"reliability.regression-suites-are-present-on-main",
|
|
|
|
|
"The decomposition and worker-recovery regression suites are on main",
|
|
|
|
|
"reliability",
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|
|
|
|
"names_present",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
step(
|
|
|
|
|
"suites",
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR,
|
|
|
|
|
"git",
|
|
|
|
|
"ls-tree",
|
|
|
|
|
"--name-only",
|
|
|
|
|
f"{targets.remote}/main",
|
|
|
|
|
"testing/tests/",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"step": "suites",
|
|
|
|
|
"names": (
|
|
|
|
|
"testing/tests/test_hermes_cli_lanes.py",
|
|
|
|
|
"testing/tests/test_hermes_coordinator.py",
|
|
|
|
|
"testing/tests/test_hermes_worker_recovery.py",
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def delivery_checks(targets: Targets) -> list[CheckSpec]:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Return the forge, node, build, and reliability checks."""
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return [
|
|
|
|
|
*_forge(targets),
|
|
|
|
|
*_nodes(targets),
|
|
|
|
|
*_build(targets),
|
|
|
|
|
*_reliability(targets),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|