hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
"""End-to-end contracts for the Hermes full-handoff acceptance harness CLI."""
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import json
|
|
|
|
|
import subprocess
|
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|
import pytest
|
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from testing.tests.test_hermes_handoff_support import FakeClock, load_handoff_module
|
|
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|
acceptance = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_acceptance")
|
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|
catalog = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_catalog")
|
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|
exec_module = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_exec")
|
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|
model = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_model")
|
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policy = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_policy")
|
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harness_run = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_run")
|
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def completed(stdout: str = "", stderr: str = "", returncode: int = 0):
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
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|
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
|
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|
args=[], returncode=returncode, stdout=stdout, stderr=stderr
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
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|
class ScriptedCluster:
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|
"""A ``subprocess.run`` stand-in that answers by command shape.
|
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|
Real runs issue a couple of hundred commands; scripting them positionally
|
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|
|
would make every test a brittle ordering puzzle. Matching on the command
|
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|
|
line keeps each test about the behaviour it is checking.
|
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|
|
|
"""
|
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|
def __init__(self, rules: list[tuple[str, object]], default=None) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
self.rules = rules
|
|
|
|
|
self.default = default or completed(stderr="not found", returncode=1)
|
|
|
|
|
self.calls: list[list[str]] = []
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def __call__(self, argv, **_kwargs):
|
|
|
|
|
self.calls.append(list(argv))
|
|
|
|
|
line = " ".join(argv)
|
|
|
|
|
for fragment, response in self.rules:
|
|
|
|
|
if fragment in line:
|
|
|
|
|
return response
|
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|
|
|
return self.default
|
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|
def whoami(username: str):
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return completed(stdout=username)
|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
REVIEWED = "8f005458282269ba5c07941814e4237f5d4cf3ac"
|
|
|
|
|
SHA = "1" * 40
|
|
|
|
|
VALID_ARGS = [
|
|
|
|
|
"--remote-main-sha",
|
|
|
|
|
SHA,
|
|
|
|
|
"--reviewed-head-sha",
|
|
|
|
|
REVIEWED,
|
|
|
|
|
"--agent-image",
|
|
|
|
|
f"registry.example/hermes:git-{'1' * 40}-build-7@sha256:{'2' * 64}",
|
|
|
|
|
"--build-sha",
|
|
|
|
|
SHA,
|
|
|
|
|
"--deployment-revision",
|
|
|
|
|
"1",
|
|
|
|
|
"--chat-config-revision",
|
|
|
|
|
"chat-rev",
|
|
|
|
|
*[
|
|
|
|
|
item
|
|
|
|
|
for number in catalog.Targets().dependency_pull_requests
|
|
|
|
|
for item in ("--dependency-head", f"{number}={SHA}")
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
HEALTHY_CLUSTER = [
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"exec --namespace hermes hermes-agent-1",
|
|
|
|
|
whoami("system:serviceaccount:hermes:hermes-agent"),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
("auth whoami", whoami("kubernetes-admin")),
|
|
|
|
|
("get pods --selector app=hermes-agent", completed(stdout="pod/hermes-agent-1\n")),
|
|
|
|
|
("get pods --selector", completed(stdout="pod/other-1\n")),
|
|
|
|
|
("get pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0", completed(stdout="pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0\n")),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def run_cli(monkeypatch, argv, rules):
|
|
|
|
|
cluster = ScriptedCluster(rules)
|
|
|
|
|
clock = FakeClock()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def build_runner(**kwargs):
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return exec_module.Runner(
|
|
|
|
|
clock=clock,
|
|
|
|
|
spawn=cluster,
|
|
|
|
|
environ={},
|
|
|
|
|
attestor=lambda command, _environment: exec_module.Attestation(
|
|
|
|
|
command, "a" * 64
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
**kwargs,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(acceptance, "Runner", build_runner)
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return (acceptance.main([*VALID_ARGS, *argv]), cluster)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def read_report(path):
|
|
|
|
|
return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_parser_exposes_the_documented_controls() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
arguments = acceptance.build_parser().parse_args(
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
"--namespace",
|
|
|
|
|
"hermes",
|
|
|
|
|
"--context",
|
|
|
|
|
"atlas-operator",
|
|
|
|
|
"--dependency-pr",
|
|
|
|
|
"14",
|
|
|
|
|
"--dependency-pr",
|
|
|
|
|
"15",
|
|
|
|
|
"--expected-suspension",
|
|
|
|
|
"flux-system/parked",
|
|
|
|
|
"--node-count",
|
|
|
|
|
"21",
|
|
|
|
|
"--pool-worker-env",
|
|
|
|
|
"HERMES_POOL_LEASE_SECONDS",
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
targets = acceptance.targets_from_args(arguments, None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert targets.dependency_pull_requests == (14, 15)
|
|
|
|
|
assert targets.expected_suspensions == ("flux-system/parked",)
|
|
|
|
|
assert targets.node_count == 21
|
|
|
|
|
assert targets.pool_worker_env == ("HERMES_POOL_LEASE_SECONDS",)
|
fix(hermes): close the zero-evidence fail-open in absence checks
evaluate_names_absent returned PASS when its step exited 0 with no output,
so five mandatory checks - the ones asserting that provider API keys, forge
credentials, a cluster-admin binding, and shared coordinator state are
absent - could report a pass on no evidence and turn a NO_GO into a GO.
Both name rules now resolve their step through one guard in _line_step, so
zero observations are NOT_RUN. Regressions pin all five real catalog specs
plus both reachable silence paths: a POSIX pipeline whose status comes from
its last stage, and a drifted kubectl -o jsonpath. The pool claim projection
emits one <volume>=<claim> line per template volume so a volume without a
PVC still counts as an observation rather than reading as drift.
Also closes the review's reachable hardening and evidence defects:
- pin Gitea paths to atlas/titan-iac on an exact segment boundary and
reject relative segments, including percent-encoded ones
- forbid impersonation structurally in every mode and vantage; the inner
command of kubectl exec is re-checked rather than exempted, and
validate_catalog no longer guards only the operator vantage
- drop flux and helm from the binary allowlist; they had no pinned release
digest, so no allowlisted binary can now be admitted that the executor
would refuse to attest
- remove the inert --concurrency and --expect-telegram-sessions flags and
the dead concurrency bound; Telegram continuity stays mandatory
- read the ephemeral pull index page by page, treat the create response as
an authoritative source for the pull number, close every number either
source names, and surface residue_ref plus exact manual_cleanup commands
when creation is uncertain
- keep executable_path and executable_sha256 on unrecorded bulk-evidence
steps so withholding bytes never withholds binary attestation
- revert the repo-wide hygiene legacy-exception mechanism; the contract
change here is purely additive and the four pre-existing over-cap files
are left to the canonical contract change in PR #14/#15
- correct the runbook ruff format scope so the documented command passes
Split hermes_handoff_arming.py out of hermes_handoff_ephemeral.py to keep
both modules under the 500-line cap. All 16 handoff modules hold at least
95% line and branch coverage; the mutation gate is 13/13.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 16:24:37 +00:00
|
|
|
assert not hasattr(arguments, "concurrency")
|
|
|
|
|
assert not hasattr(arguments, "expect_telegram_sessions")
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_defaults_fall_back_to_the_shipped_targets() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
arguments = acceptance.build_parser().parse_args([])
|
|
|
|
|
targets = acceptance.targets_from_args(arguments, None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert targets.dependency_pull_requests == catalog.Targets.dependency_pull_requests
|
|
|
|
|
assert targets.expected_suspensions == ()
|
|
|
|
|
assert targets.repo == catalog.Targets.repo
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["bad", "x=" + "1" * 40, "0=" + "1" * 40, "1=BAD"])
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dependency_heads_require_a_positive_pr_and_lowercase_sha(value: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(Exception):
|
|
|
|
|
acceptance.dependency_head(value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_a_default_run_is_read_only_and_never_pushes_or_posts(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
status, cluster = run_cli(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
report = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert report["mode"] == policy.READ_ONLY
|
|
|
|
|
assert not any("push" in call for call in cluster.calls)
|
|
|
|
|
assert not any("POST" in call for call in cluster.calls)
|
|
|
|
|
assert not any("DELETE" in call for call in cluster.calls)
|
|
|
|
|
writes = [
|
|
|
|
|
call
|
|
|
|
|
for call in cluster.calls
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if {"patch", "create", "delete", "apply", "replace"} & set(call)
|
|
|
|
|
and "can-i" not in call
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
]
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
assert writes == []
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_mutating_checks_report_not_run_until_the_mode_is_armed(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ephemeral = {
|
|
|
|
|
check["id"]: check
|
|
|
|
|
for check in read_report(output)["checks"]
|
|
|
|
|
if check["group"] == "ephemeral"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert len(ephemeral) == 4
|
|
|
|
|
for check in ephemeral.values():
|
|
|
|
|
assert check["status"] == model.NOT_RUN
|
|
|
|
|
assert check["mandatory"] is False
|
|
|
|
|
assert check["scope"] == model.EPHEMERAL
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_a_zero_state_cluster_is_no_go_with_every_check_accounted_for(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Nothing observed must never read as nothing wrong."""
|
|
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
status, _ = run_cli(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch,
|
|
|
|
|
["--output", str(output), "--json-only"],
|
|
|
|
|
[("auth whoami", whoami("kubernetes-admin"))],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
report = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert report["decision"] == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert report["counts"][model.PASS] == 0
|
|
|
|
|
assert sum(report["counts"].values()) == len(report["checks"])
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
assert any(
|
|
|
|
|
"in-pod Hermes vantage is unavailable" in error
|
|
|
|
|
for error in report["harness_errors"]
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_partial_failure_is_reported_per_check_rather_than_aborting(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
rules = [
|
|
|
|
|
*HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
|
|
|
|
|
("auth can-i", completed(stdout="no\n", returncode=1)),
|
|
|
|
|
("get namespaces", completed(stdout="namespace/hermes\n")),
|
|
|
|
|
("merge-base", completed()),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
status, _ = run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], rules)
|
|
|
|
|
report = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
statuses = {check["status"] for check in report["checks"]}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert model.PASS in statuses and model.NOT_RUN in statuses
|
|
|
|
|
assert report["blocking"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_a_vantage_collision_is_a_no_go_even_with_clean_checks(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
rules = [
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"exec --namespace hermes hermes-agent-1",
|
|
|
|
|
whoami("system:serviceaccount:hermes:hermes-agent"),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
("auth whoami", whoami("system:serviceaccount:hermes:hermes-agent")),
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"get pods --selector app=hermes-agent",
|
|
|
|
|
completed(stdout="pod/hermes-agent-1\n"),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
("get pods --selector", completed(stdout="pod/other-1\n")),
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"get pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0",
|
|
|
|
|
completed(stdout="pod/hermes-chat-tenant-0\n"),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
status, _ = run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], rules)
|
|
|
|
|
report = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert any("same principal" in error for error in report["harness_errors"])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_an_invalid_deadline_stops_before_any_subprocess(monkeypatch, tmp_path) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
status, _ = run_cli(
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
monkeypatch,
|
|
|
|
|
["--output", str(output), "--json-only", "--deadline", "0"],
|
|
|
|
|
HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
report = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_USAGE
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
assert report["counts"][model.NOT_RUN] > 0
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
assert any("invalid execution bound" in error for error in report["harness_errors"])
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_arming_with_a_wrong_confirmation_stops_before_anything_runs(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
status, cluster = run_cli(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch,
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
"--output",
|
|
|
|
|
str(output),
|
|
|
|
|
"--json-only",
|
|
|
|
|
"--arm-ephemeral-push",
|
|
|
|
|
"--confirm",
|
|
|
|
|
"please",
|
|
|
|
|
"--ephemeral-token",
|
|
|
|
|
"acceptance-20260817a",
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
report = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert "arming refused" in report["harness_errors"][0]
|
|
|
|
|
assert not any("push" in call for call in cluster.calls)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_arming_against_a_protected_push_target_is_refused(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
status, cluster = run_cli(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch,
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
"--output",
|
|
|
|
|
str(output),
|
|
|
|
|
"--json-only",
|
|
|
|
|
"--arm-ephemeral-push",
|
|
|
|
|
"--confirm",
|
|
|
|
|
acceptance.CONFIRMATION,
|
|
|
|
|
"--ephemeral-token",
|
|
|
|
|
"main",
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert "arming refused" in read_report(output)["harness_errors"][0]
|
|
|
|
|
assert not any("push" in call for call in cluster.calls)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_an_armed_run_does_not_mutate_until_read_only_acceptance_is_go(
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(acceptance, "preflight", lambda *_args: None)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
rules = [
|
|
|
|
|
("git ls-remote origin refs/heads/ephemeral", completed(stdout="")),
|
|
|
|
|
("git push", completed()),
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
(
|
2026-09-01 20:43:33 -03:00
|
|
|
"POST /api/v1/repos/titan/atlas-iac/pulls",
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
completed(stdout=json.dumps({"number": 9})),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
("PATCH", completed()),
|
|
|
|
|
("DELETE", completed()),
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
(
|
2026-09-01 20:43:33 -03:00
|
|
|
"read /api/v1/repos/titan/atlas-iac/pulls/9",
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
completed(stdout='{"state": "closed"}'),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
*HEALTHY_CLUSTER,
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
status, cluster = run_cli(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch,
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
"--output",
|
|
|
|
|
str(output),
|
|
|
|
|
"--json-only",
|
|
|
|
|
"--arm-ephemeral-push",
|
|
|
|
|
"--confirm",
|
|
|
|
|
acceptance.CONFIRMATION,
|
|
|
|
|
"--ephemeral-token",
|
|
|
|
|
"acceptance-20260817a",
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
rules,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
report = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
assert report["mode"] == policy.ARMED
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert any(
|
|
|
|
|
"read-only acceptance did not GO" in error for error in report["harness_errors"]
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pushes = [call for call in cluster.calls if "push" in call]
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
assert pushes == []
|
|
|
|
|
assert not any("DELETE" in call for call in cluster.calls)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_report_is_written_to_stdout_when_no_output_path_is_given(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, capsys
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
status, _ = run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER)
|
|
|
|
|
payload = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert payload["harness"] == model.HARNESS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_human_summary_accompanies_the_json_unless_suppressed(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, capsys, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
run_cli(monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output)], HEALTHY_CLUSTER)
|
|
|
|
|
captured = capsys.readouterr()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert model.HARNESS in captured.err
|
|
|
|
|
assert "vantage operator" in captured.err
|
|
|
|
|
assert captured.out == ""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_a_report_that_fails_its_own_screening_is_replaced_not_published(
|
|
|
|
|
tmp_path,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
"""The last barrier: never write an artifact nobody re-read."""
|
|
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
arguments = acceptance.build_parser().parse_args(
|
|
|
|
|
["--output", str(output), "--json-only"]
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
report = model.Report(mode="read-only", started_at="2026-08-17T00:00:00Z")
|
|
|
|
|
report.harness_errors = ["leaked ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV1234"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
monkey = report.as_dict
|
|
|
|
|
report.as_dict = lambda *_args, **_kwargs: { # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
|
|
|
|
**monkey(),
|
|
|
|
|
"leak": "token: ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV1234",
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
offenders = acceptance.emit(report, arguments)
|
|
|
|
|
payload = read_report(output)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert offenders == ["$.leak"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert payload["decision"] == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert "leak" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "failed its own credential screening" in payload["harness_errors"][0]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_a_screening_failure_forces_no_go_from_the_entry_point(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
"""The exit status must follow the refusal to publish, not the check tally."""
|
|
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
|
|
|
|
acceptance, "unscreened_fields", lambda _payload: ["$.checks[0].stdout"]
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(acceptance, "build_catalog", lambda _targets: [])
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(harness_run, "vantage_problems", lambda _records: [])
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
status, _ = run_cli(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, ["--output", str(output), "--json-only"], HEALTHY_CLUSTER
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == acceptance.EXIT_NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert read_report(output)["decision"] == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_no_recorded_command_output_carries_a_credential_shape(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch, tmp_path
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
|
|
|
|
|
leaky = completed(stdout="ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz\n")
|
|
|
|
|
run_cli(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch,
|
|
|
|
|
["--output", str(output), "--json-only"],
|
|
|
|
|
[*HEALTHY_CLUSTER, ("exec", leaky)],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert model.unscreened_fields(read_report(output)) == []
|
|
|
|
|
assert "sk-ant-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" not in output.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("flag", ["--help"])
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_help_text_describes_the_read_only_default(flag: str, capsys) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(SystemExit):
|
|
|
|
|
acceptance.main([flag])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert "Read-only by default" in capsys.readouterr().out
|