hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
"""Contracts for the handoff harness result model, verdict, and rendering."""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import datetime as dt
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
from testing.tests.test_hermes_handoff_support import (
|
|
|
|
|
load_handoff_module,
|
|
|
|
|
outcome,
|
|
|
|
|
spec,
|
|
|
|
|
step,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
model = load_handoff_module("hermes_handoff_model")
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def result(
|
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|
|
|
status: str,
|
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|
|
|
identifier: str = "test.check",
|
|
|
|
|
mandatory: bool = True,
|
|
|
|
|
group: str = "g",
|
|
|
|
|
):
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return model.CheckResult(
|
|
|
|
|
spec=model.CheckSpec(
|
|
|
|
|
id=identifier, title="t", group=group, rule="allowed", mandatory=mandatory
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
status=status,
|
|
|
|
|
reason=f"{status} reason",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def report(*results, errors: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> model.Report:
|
|
|
|
|
return model.Report(
|
|
|
|
|
mode="read-only",
|
|
|
|
|
started_at="2026-08-17T00:00:00Z",
|
|
|
|
|
results=list(results),
|
|
|
|
|
harness_errors=list(errors),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
|
|
|
("status", "mandatory", "blocking"),
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
(model.PASS, True, False),
|
|
|
|
|
(model.NOT_APPLICABLE, True, False),
|
|
|
|
|
(model.FAIL, True, True),
|
|
|
|
|
(model.NOT_RUN, True, True),
|
|
|
|
|
(model.FAIL, False, False),
|
|
|
|
|
(model.NOT_RUN, False, False),
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_only_a_mandatory_failure_or_skip_blocks(status, mandatory, blocking) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
assert result(status, mandatory=mandatory).blocking is blocking
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_a_mandatory_skip_is_a_no_go_exactly_like_a_failure() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""The whole point of the four-valued classification."""
|
|
|
|
|
assert report(result(model.NOT_RUN)).decision == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert report(result(model.FAIL)).decision == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert report(result(model.PASS), result(model.NOT_APPLICABLE)).decision == model.GO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_a_harness_error_is_a_no_go_even_when_every_check_passed() -> None:
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
clean = report(
|
|
|
|
|
result(model.PASS), errors=("the two vantages are the same principal",)
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
assert clean.decision == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_a_zero_state_or_unknown_status_report_is_no_go() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Absence or an unrecognised classification can never round up to GO."""
|
|
|
|
|
assert report().decision == model.NO_GO
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
assert report(errors=("no checks were built",)).decision == model.NO_GO
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
unknown = result("MAYBE")
|
|
|
|
|
assert unknown.blocking is True
|
|
|
|
|
built = report(unknown)
|
|
|
|
|
assert built.decision == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert built.counts == dict.fromkeys(model.STATUSES, 0)
|
|
|
|
|
assert "groups:" in report(result(model.PASS)).render_summary()
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_blocking_results_are_ordered_failures_before_skips() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
ordered = report(
|
|
|
|
|
result(model.NOT_RUN, "b.skip"),
|
|
|
|
|
result(model.FAIL, "z.fail"),
|
|
|
|
|
result(model.PASS, "a.pass"),
|
|
|
|
|
).blocking
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert [item.spec.id for item in ordered] == ["z.fail", "b.skip"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_counts_and_group_summary_tally_every_status() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
built = report(
|
|
|
|
|
result(model.PASS, "a", group="alpha"),
|
|
|
|
|
result(model.FAIL, "b", group="alpha"),
|
|
|
|
|
result(model.NOT_RUN, "c", group="beta"),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert built.counts == {
|
|
|
|
|
model.PASS: 1,
|
|
|
|
|
model.FAIL: 1,
|
|
|
|
|
model.NOT_RUN: 1,
|
|
|
|
|
model.NOT_APPLICABLE: 0,
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
assert built.group_summary()["alpha"][model.PASS] == 1
|
|
|
|
|
assert built.group_summary()["beta"][model.NOT_RUN] == 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_serialised_report_carries_the_verdict_and_its_reasons() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
built = report(result(model.FAIL, "x.fail"), result(model.PASS, "y.pass"))
|
|
|
|
|
built.vantages = [
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
model.VantageRecord(
|
|
|
|
|
name="operator", description="d", identity="u", available=True
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
payload = built.as_dict()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert payload["decision"] == model.NO_GO
|
|
|
|
|
assert payload["blocking"] == ["x.fail"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert payload["harness"] == model.HARNESS
|
|
|
|
|
assert payload["schema_version"] == model.SCHEMA_VERSION
|
|
|
|
|
assert payload["vantages"][0]["identity"] == "u"
|
|
|
|
|
assert {check["id"] for check in payload["checks"]} == {"x.fail", "y.pass"}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_check_serialisation_screens_evidence_and_can_omit_commands() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
built = model.CheckResult(
|
|
|
|
|
spec=spec("allowed", identifier="x", steps=(step("a"),)),
|
|
|
|
|
status=model.PASS,
|
|
|
|
|
evidence={"token": "a-long-enough-secret", "count": 3},
|
|
|
|
|
outcomes=[outcome(stdout="fine")],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with_commands = built.as_dict()
|
|
|
|
|
without = built.as_dict(include_outcomes=False)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert with_commands["evidence"]["token"] == "[redacted]"
|
|
|
|
|
assert with_commands["evidence"]["count"] == 3
|
|
|
|
|
assert len(with_commands["commands"]) == 1
|
|
|
|
|
assert "commands" not in without
|
|
|
|
|
assert with_commands["vantages"] == ["self"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_rationale_is_carried_only_when_a_check_has_one() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
without = model.CheckResult(spec=spec("allowed"), status=model.PASS).as_dict()
|
|
|
|
|
assert "rationale" not in without
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
annotated = model.CheckSpec(
|
|
|
|
|
id="x", title="t", group="g", rule="allowed", rationale="because"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
with_reason = model.CheckResult(spec=annotated, status=model.PASS).as_dict()
|
|
|
|
|
assert with_reason["rationale"] == "because"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_distinct_vantages_are_reported_in_first_use_order() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
built = spec(
|
|
|
|
|
"allowed",
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
steps=(
|
|
|
|
|
step("a", vantage="operator"),
|
|
|
|
|
step("b", vantage="self"),
|
|
|
|
|
step("c", vantage="operator"),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert built.vantages == ("operator", "self")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_human_summary_names_the_verdict_vantages_and_blockers() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
built = report(result(model.FAIL, "x.fail", group="alpha"), errors=("collision",))
|
|
|
|
|
built.vantages = [
|
2026-08-17 13:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
model.VantageRecord(
|
|
|
|
|
name="operator", description="d", identity="u", available=True
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
hermes: add a fail-closed full-handoff acceptance harness
Decides whether the Hermes platform handoff is fit to release, and refuses
to round an absence of evidence up to a pass.
The harness is read-only by default and classifies 71 checks PASS / FAIL /
NOT_RUN / NOT_APPLICABLE. Any mandatory FAIL or NOT_RUN is NO_GO, and so is a
harness-level problem: an unreachable vantage, a catalog entry whose evidence
no longer exists, an expired deadline, or an evaluator that raised.
Evidence comes from two vantages that cannot cover for each other: an external
read-only operator kubeconfig, and the Hermes agent probing itself from inside
its own pod. Before any check runs, the harness asks each vantage who it is and
stops if they are the same principal, because dual-vantage evidence from one
identity is a restatement rather than a corroboration. `--as` is rejected for
every operator-side command and reachable only as the inner command of a
`kubectl exec`, so impersonation can never stand in for a real self-probe. A
deny check needs a live refused request, not only an authorization review.
Two safety properties are structural rather than conventional, enforced where
an argv becomes a subprocess: the default mode mutates nothing (mutating verbs
require a server dry run; there is deliberately no live TokenRequest probe,
because a successful one would mint a real credential), and no probe can pull a
credential value into a report (no vault/sops/curl, secrets readable only with
-o name, environment probes list names, shell only through frozen reviewed
templates). Captures are bounded before they are screened, and the rendered
report is re-screened before it is written.
Mutation lives behind a separate arming flag with an exact confirmation phrase,
a caller-supplied unique ref, a preflight that refuses a protected push target
before any network call, and a cleanup whose verification is itself mandatory.
A default run reports those four checks NOT_RUN.
The catalog is declarative so a reviewer reads what is asserted rather than how
it is plumbed, and so structural properties can be proven over every entry
before a run. Catalog drift surfaces as NOT_RUN, which stops the release.
docs/hermes_full_handoff_acceptance.md carries the merge order for PRs #14-#18
on top of the merged #13 baseline, the image build and Flux rollout, the
rollback point for each step, the go/no-go checklist, and the limits that are
asserted rather than exercised.
Validation: 295 handoff tests pass with 100% line coverage on all 15 new
modules; the full unit suite is 647 passed with two failures that reproduce
unchanged on origin/main; Ruff, py_compile, kustomize render, and a diff
credential screen are clean; a live read-only run against Atlas returns NO_GO
for the pre-merge cluster with no unscreened fields in the report.
2026-08-17 10:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
model.VantageRecord(name="self", description="d", available=False),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
summary = built.render_summary()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert summary.splitlines()[0] == f"{model.HARNESS}: {model.NO_GO}"
|
|
|
|
|
assert "vantage operator: available identity=u" in summary
|
|
|
|
|
assert "vantage self: unavailable identity=unknown" in summary
|
|
|
|
|
assert "harness error: collision" in summary
|
|
|
|
|
assert "x.fail" in summary
|
|
|
|
|
assert "alpha" in summary
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_utc_now_renders_a_zulu_timestamp_and_accepts_an_injected_clock() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
fixed = dt.datetime(2026, 8, 17, 9, 30, 15, 123456, tzinfo=dt.timezone.utc)
|
|
|
|
|
assert model.utc_now(lambda: fixed) == "2026-08-17T09:30:15Z"
|
|
|
|
|
assert model.utc_now().endswith("Z")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_unscreened_fields_walks_the_whole_payload() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
offenders = model.unscreened_fields(
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
"clean": "hermes",
|
|
|
|
|
"nested": {"leak": "token: ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV1234"},
|
|
|
|
|
"items": [1, "Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnop"],
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert offenders == ["$.nested.leak", "$.items[1]"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert model.unscreened_fields({"clean": "hermes"}) == []
|
|
|
|
|
assert model.unscreened_fields(None) == []
|