Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fix/hermes-result-decomposition-reliability' into feature/hermes-cli-auto-quota-routing

# Conflicts:
#	services/hermes/networkpolicy.yaml
#	testing/quality_contract.json
#	testing/tests/test_hermes_agent_security.py

ci/Jenkinsfile.hermes-agent-image

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+pipeline {
+  agent {
+    kubernetes {
+      defaultContainer 'python'
+      yaml """
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    atlas.bstein.dev/workload: hermes-agent-image-builder
+spec:
+  serviceAccountName: hermes-image-builder
+  automountServiceAccountToken: false
+  enableServiceLinks: false
+  restartPolicy: Never
+  securityContext:
+    fsGroup: 1000
+    fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+  nodeSelector:
+    kubernetes.io/arch: arm64
+    node-role.kubernetes.io/worker: "true"
+  affinity:
+    nodeAffinity:
+      requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+        nodeSelectorTerms:
+          - matchExpressions:
+              - key: kubernetes.io/hostname
+                operator: NotIn
+                values:
+                  - titan-04
+                  - titan-14
+                  - titan-18
+                  - titan-19
+                  - titan-22
+                  - titan-24
+      preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+        - weight: 100
+          preference:
+            matchExpressions:
+              - key: hardware
+                operator: In
+                values:
+                  - rpi5
+  imagePullSecrets:
+    - name: harbor-bstein-robot
+  containers:
+    - name: jnlp
+      image: jenkins/inbound-agent@sha256:8eda4fe2a66bcf6a5e43436d9918fc14c306204dc8fcd75f4e15e0e6e5dc759a
+      securityContext:
+        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+        capabilities:
+          drop: ["ALL"]
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      resources:
+        requests:
+          cpu: 25m
+          memory: 256Mi
+        limits:
+          cpu: 500m
+          memory: 512Mi
+    - name: python
+      image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/python@sha256:269541d3387baae008df4608ead893dba2b5cdaad1a5a380731a88992d34b808
+      command: ["sleep"]
+      args: ["99d"]
+      tty: true
+      securityContext:
+        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+        capabilities:
+          drop: ["ALL"]
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      resources:
+        requests:
+          cpu: 25m
+          memory: 64Mi
+        limits:
+          cpu: 250m
+          memory: 256Mi
+    - name: kaniko
+      image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor@sha256:c3109d5926a997b100c4343944e06c6b30a6804b2f9abe0994d3de6ef92b028e
+      command: ["/busybox/sh", "-c"]
+      args: ["/busybox/sleep 99d"]
+      tty: true
+      securityContext:
+        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+        capabilities:
+          drop: ["ALL"]
+          add: ["CHOWN", "FOWNER", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "SETGID", "SETUID"]
+        privileged: false
+        runAsUser: 0
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      resources:
+        requests:
+          cpu: 250m
+          memory: 1Gi
+        limits:
+          cpu: "2"
+          memory: 4Gi
+"""
+    }
+  }
+  parameters {
+    booleanParam(
+      name: 'PUBLISH_IMAGE',
+      defaultValue: false,
+      description: 'Publish the reviewed main revision to Harbor.'
+    )
+    string(
+      name: 'EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION',
+      defaultValue: '',
+      description: 'Exact 40-character commit on atlas/titan-iac main.'
+    )
+    string(
+      name: 'CONFIRM_PUBLISH',
+      defaultValue: '',
+      description: 'Enter PUBLISH HERMES AGENT to confirm the release.'
+    )
+  }
+  environment {
+    HERMES_IMAGE = 'registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent'
+  }
+  options {
+    disableConcurrentBuilds()
+    buildDiscarder(logRotator(daysToKeepStr: '30', numToKeepStr: '100', artifactDaysToKeepStr: '30', artifactNumToKeepStr: '100'))
+    skipDefaultCheckout(true)
+    timeout(time: 90, unit: 'MINUTES')
+  }
+  stages {
+    stage('Checkout reviewed source') {
+      steps {
+        checkout scm
+      }
+    }
+    stage('Enforce release boundary') {
+      steps {
+        sh '''
+          set -eu
+          mkdir -p build
+          test "${PUBLISH_IMAGE}" = "true"
+          test "${CONFIRM_PUBLISH}" = "PUBLISH HERMES AGENT"
+          case "${EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION}" in
+            *[!0-9a-f]*|'')
+              echo "EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION must be a lowercase full commit" >&2
+              exit 2
+              ;;
+          esac
+          test "${#EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION}" -eq 40
+          actual_revision="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
+          test "${actual_revision}" = "${EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION}"
+          test "${actual_revision}" = "$(git rev-parse origin/main)"
+          test -z "$(git status --porcelain)"
+          test -f dockerfiles/Dockerfile.hermes-agent
+          case "${BUILD_NUMBER}" in
+            ''|0*|*[!0-9]*)
+              echo "BUILD_NUMBER must be a positive decimal integer" >&2
+              exit 2
+              ;;
+          esac
+          printf '%s\n' \
+            "${HERMES_IMAGE}:git-${actual_revision}-build-${BUILD_NUMBER}" \
+            > build/hermes-agent.destination
+        '''
+      }
+    }
+    stage('Reject replay before publish') {
+      steps {
+        withCredentials([usernamePassword(
+          credentialsId: 'harbor-robot',
+          usernameVariable: 'HARBOR_USER',
+          passwordVariable: 'HARBOR_PASSWORD'
+        )]) {
+          sh '''
+            set -eu
+            set +x
+            destination="$(cat build/hermes-agent.destination)"
+            python3 ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py assert-absent \
+              --source-revision "${EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION}" \
+              --build-number "${BUILD_NUMBER}" \
+              --destination "${destination}"
+          '''
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    stage('Build and publish without a daemon') {
+      steps {
+        container('kaniko') {
+          withCredentials([usernamePassword(
+            credentialsId: 'harbor-robot',
+            usernameVariable: 'HARBOR_USER',
+            passwordVariable: 'HARBOR_PASSWORD'
+          )]) {
+            sh '''#!/busybox/sh
+              set -eu
+              set +x
+              config_path=/kaniko/.docker/config.json
+              destination="$(cat build/hermes-agent.destination)"
+              umask 077
+              auth="$(printf '%s:%s' "${HARBOR_USER}" "${HARBOR_PASSWORD}" | /busybox/base64 | /busybox/tr -d '\n')"
+              /busybox/mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+              /busybox/printf '{"auths":{"registry.bstein.dev":{"auth":"%s"}}}\n' "${auth}" > "${config_path}"
+              unset HARBOR_USER HARBOR_PASSWORD auth
+              trap '/busybox/rm -f "${config_path}"' EXIT HUP INT TERM
+              /kaniko/executor \
+                --context="dir://${WORKSPACE}" \
+                --dockerfile="${WORKSPACE}/dockerfiles/Dockerfile.hermes-agent" \
+                --destination="${destination}" \
+                --digest-file="${WORKSPACE}/build/hermes-agent.digest" \
+                --image-name-tag-with-digest-file="${WORKSPACE}/build/hermes-agent.image" \
+                --build-arg=HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT=1 \
+                --label="org.opencontainers.image.revision=${EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION}" \
+                --cleanup \
+                --push-retry=3
+            '''
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    stage('Render reviewed Flux handoff') {
+      steps {
+        withCredentials([usernamePassword(
+          credentialsId: 'harbor-robot',
+          usernameVariable: 'HARBOR_USER',
+          passwordVariable: 'HARBOR_PASSWORD'
+        )]) {
+          sh '''
+            set -eu
+            set +x
+            destination="$(cat build/hermes-agent.destination)"
+            python3 ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py render \
+              --digest-file build/hermes-agent.digest \
+              --image-file build/hermes-agent.image \
+              --source-revision "${EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION}" \
+              --build-number "${BUILD_NUMBER}" \
+              --destination "${destination}" \
+              --kustomization services/hermes/kustomization.yaml \
+              --output-dir build/hermes-agent-release
+            test -s build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-image-update.patch
+            test -s build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-agent-image.json
+          '''
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  post {
+    success {
+      sh '''
+        set -eu
+        expected_files="$(printf '%s\n' \
+          build/hermes-agent.destination \
+          build/hermes-agent.digest \
+          build/hermes-agent.image \
+          build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-agent-image.json \
+          build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-image-update.patch \
+          build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-kustomization.yaml \
+          | LC_ALL=C sort)"
+        actual_files="$(find build -type f -print | LC_ALL=C sort)"
+        test "${actual_files}" = "${expected_files}"
+        destination="$(cat build/hermes-agent.destination)"
+        python3 ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py verify-evidence \
+          --digest-file build/hermes-agent.digest \
+          --image-file build/hermes-agent.image \
+          --source-revision "${EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION}" \
+          --build-number "${BUILD_NUMBER}" \
+          --destination "${destination}" \
+          --kustomization services/hermes/kustomization.yaml \
+          --output-dir build/hermes-agent-release
+      '''
+      archiveArtifacts(
+        artifacts: 'build/hermes-agent.destination,build/hermes-agent.digest,build/hermes-agent.image,build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-agent-image.json,build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-image-update.patch,build/hermes-agent-release/hermes-kustomization.yaml',
+        allowEmptyArchive: false,
+        fingerprint: true
+      )
+    }
+    cleanup {
+      container('kaniko') {
+        sh '''#!/busybox/sh
+          /busybox/rm -f /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+        '''
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py

@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Verify and render a reviewable Hermes agent image release."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import difflib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+
+DEFAULT_IMAGE = "registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent"
+HARBOR_API_ORIGIN = "https://registry.bstein.dev/api/v2.0"
+HARBOR_PROJECT = "bstein"
+HARBOR_REPOSITORY = "hermes-agent"
+IMMUTABLE_REPOSITORY_PATTERN = "hermes-agent"
+IMMUTABLE_TAG_PATTERN = "git-*-build-*"
+DIGEST_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+REVISION_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+BUILD_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[1-9][0-9]*$")
+DESTINATION_PATTERN = re.compile(
+    r"^registry\.bstein\.dev/bstein/hermes-agent:"
+    r"git-([0-9a-f]{40})-build-([1-9][0-9]*)$"
+)
+
+
+class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Never send registry credentials to a redirect target."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, _request, _file, _code, _message, _headers, _url):
+        return None
+
+
+def _validated(value: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str], label: str) -> str:
+    """Return a normalized value when it matches the release contract."""
+    normalized = value.strip()
+    if not pattern.fullmatch(normalized):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {label}: expected {pattern.pattern}")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def validate_destination(
+    destination: str, source_revision: str, build_number: str
+) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Bind one unique build tag to the reviewed revision and Jenkins build."""
+    revision = _validated(source_revision, REVISION_PATTERN, "source revision")
+    build = _validated(build_number, BUILD_PATTERN, "build number")
+    match = DESTINATION_PATTERN.fullmatch(destination.strip())
+    if not match or match.groups() != (revision, build):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "destination must bind the reviewed revision and unique Jenkins build"
+        )
+    return revision, build
+
+
+def validate_kaniko_evidence(
+    *, digest_text: str, image_text: str, destination: str
+) -> str:
+    """Cross-check both independent Kaniko output files against the destination."""
+    digest_lines = digest_text.splitlines()
+    image_lines = image_text.splitlines()
+    if len(digest_lines) != 1:
+        raise ValueError("Kaniko digest evidence must contain exactly one line")
+    if len(image_lines) != 1:
+        raise ValueError("Kaniko image evidence must contain exactly one line")
+    digest = _validated(digest_lines[0], DIGEST_PATTERN, "image digest")
+    if image_lines[0].strip() != f"{destination}@{digest}":
+        raise ValueError("Kaniko image evidence does not match destination and digest")
+    return digest
+
+
+def _registry_request(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int) -> Any:
+    """Make a registry request without following redirects."""
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirect())
+    try:
+        return opener.open(request, timeout=timeout)
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        return exc
+
+
+def _artifact_response(
+    destination: str,
+    *,
+    username: str,
+    password: str,
+    opener: Callable[[urllib.request.Request, int], Any] = _registry_request,
+) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
+    """Read one exact Harbor artifact by tag with bounded response size."""
+    match = DESTINATION_PATTERN.fullmatch(destination)
+    if not match:
+        raise ValueError("invalid destination")
+    if not username or not password:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor credentials are empty")
+    tag = destination.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
+    encoded_tag = urllib.parse.quote(tag, safe="")
+    auth = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        f"{HARBOR_API_ORIGIN}/projects/{HARBOR_PROJECT}/repositories/"
+        f"{HARBOR_REPOSITORY}/artifacts/{encoded_tag}"
+        "?with_immutable_status=true",
+        headers={"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"Basic {auth}"},
+        method="GET",
+    )
+    with opener(request, 20) as response:
+        body = response.read(1_048_577)
+        if len(body) > 1_048_576:
+            raise RuntimeError("Harbor artifact response exceeded the size limit")
+        return int(response.status), body
+
+
+def _immutable_rules_response(
+    *,
+    username: str,
+    password: str,
+    opener: Callable[[urllib.request.Request, int], Any] = _registry_request,
+) -> tuple[int, bytes, dict[str, str]]:
+    """Read the project policy with the same least-privilege publish identity."""
+    if not username or not password:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor credentials are empty")
+    auth = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        f"{HARBOR_API_ORIGIN}/projects/{HARBOR_PROJECT}/immutabletagrules"
+        "?page=1&page_size=100",
+        headers={"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"Basic {auth}"},
+        method="GET",
+    )
+    with opener(request, 20) as response:
+        body = response.read(1_048_577)
+        if len(body) > 1_048_576:
+            raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable rule response exceeded the size limit")
+        return int(response.status), body, dict(response.headers)
+
+
+def _require_complete_rule_page(
+    rules: list[dict[str, Any]], headers: dict[str, str]
+) -> None:
+    """Require proof that the bounded first page contains every rule."""
+    raw_total = next(
+        (value for key, value in headers.items() if key.lower() == "x-total-count"),
+        None,
+    )
+    if raw_total is None or not str(raw_total).isdecimal():
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable rule list omitted a valid total count")
+    if int(raw_total) != len(rules):
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable rule list was truncated")
+
+
+def _normalized_immutable_rule(rule: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Select only fields that bind the server-side build-tag policy."""
+    return {
+        "disabled": bool(rule.get("disabled", False)),
+        "action": rule.get("action"),
+        "template": rule.get("template"),
+        "tag_selectors": [
+            {
+                "kind": item.get("kind"),
+                "decoration": item.get("decoration"),
+                "pattern": item.get("pattern"),
+            }
+            for item in rule.get("tag_selectors") or []
+            if isinstance(item, dict)
+        ],
+        "scope_selectors": {
+            "repository": [
+                {
+                    "kind": item.get("kind"),
+                    "decoration": item.get("decoration"),
+                    "pattern": item.get("pattern"),
+                }
+                for item in (rule.get("scope_selectors") or {}).get(
+                    "repository", []
+                )
+                if isinstance(item, dict)
+            ]
+        },
+    }
+
+
+def verify_immutable_policy(
+    *,
+    username: str,
+    password: str,
+    opener: Callable[[urllib.request.Request, int], Any] = _registry_request,
+) -> None:
+    """Fail closed before build unless the exact Harbor rule is active."""
+    status, body, headers = _immutable_rules_response(
+        username=username, password=password, opener=opener
+    )
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor immutable policy preflight returned HTTP {status}")
+    try:
+        rules = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor returned invalid immutable rule JSON") from exc
+    if not isinstance(rules, list) or not all(isinstance(item, dict) for item in rules):
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable rule list has an invalid shape")
+    _require_complete_rule_page(rules, headers)
+    expected = {
+        "disabled": False,
+        "action": "immutable",
+        "template": "immutable_template",
+        "tag_selectors": [
+            {
+                "kind": "doublestar",
+                "decoration": "matches",
+                "pattern": IMMUTABLE_TAG_PATTERN,
+            }
+        ],
+        "scope_selectors": {
+            "repository": [
+                {
+                    "kind": "doublestar",
+                    "decoration": "repoMatches",
+                    "pattern": IMMUTABLE_REPOSITORY_PATTERN,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+    }
+    matches = [
+        _normalized_immutable_rule(item)
+        for item in rules
+        if _normalized_immutable_rule(item)["tag_selectors"]
+        == expected["tag_selectors"]
+        and _normalized_immutable_rule(item)["scope_selectors"]
+        == expected["scope_selectors"]
+    ]
+    if matches != [expected]:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable build-tag policy is absent or not exact")
+
+
+def assert_tag_absent(
+    destination: str,
+    *,
+    username: str,
+    password: str,
+    opener: Callable[[urllib.request.Request, int], Any] = _registry_request,
+) -> None:
+    """Reject replay before Kaniko can push an already-used immutable identity."""
+    status, _body = _artifact_response(
+        destination, username=username, password=password, opener=opener
+    )
+    if status == 404:
+        return
+    if status == 200:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor destination tag already exists; refusing overwrite")
+    raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor destination preflight returned HTTP {status}")
+
+
+def verify_registry_digest(
+    destination: str,
+    digest: str,
+    *,
+    username: str,
+    password: str,
+    opener: Callable[[urllib.request.Request, int], Any] = _registry_request,
+) -> None:
+    """Verify Harbor independently resolves the pushed tag to Kaniko's digest."""
+    digest = _validated(digest, DIGEST_PATTERN, "image digest")
+    status, body = _artifact_response(
+        destination, username=username, password=password, opener=opener
+    )
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor manifest verification returned HTTP {status}")
+    try:
+        artifact = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor returned invalid artifact JSON") from exc
+    harbor_digest = str(artifact.get("digest") or "").strip()
+    if not DIGEST_PATTERN.fullmatch(harbor_digest):
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor response omitted a valid artifact digest")
+    if harbor_digest != digest:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor digest does not match Kaniko evidence")
+    expected_tag = destination.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
+    matching_tags = [
+        item
+        for item in artifact.get("tags") or []
+        if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get("name") == expected_tag
+    ]
+    if len(matching_tags) != 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor artifact does not contain the expected tag")
+    if matching_tags[0].get("immutable") is not True:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor did not enforce the expected tag as immutable")
+
+
+def render_kustomization(source: str, digest: str, image: str = DEFAULT_IMAGE) -> str:
+    """Replace exactly one matching Kustomize image digest without reformatting."""
+    digest = _validated(digest, DIGEST_PATTERN, "image digest")
+    lines = source.splitlines(keepends=True)
+    matches: list[int] = []
+
+    for index, line in enumerate(lines):
+        if line.strip() != f"- name: {image}":
+            continue
+        name_indent = len(line) - len(line.lstrip())
+        for candidate_index in range(index + 1, len(lines)):
+            candidate = lines[candidate_index]
+            stripped = candidate.strip()
+            candidate_indent = len(candidate) - len(candidate.lstrip())
+            if stripped.startswith("- name:") and candidate_indent == name_indent:
+                break
+            if stripped.startswith("digest:") and candidate_indent > name_indent:
+                matches.append(candidate_index)
+                break
+
+    if len(matches) != 1:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"expected exactly one digest for image {image!r}; found {len(matches)}"
+        )
+
+    index = matches[0]
+    newline = "\n" if lines[index].endswith("\n") else ""
+    prefix = lines[index][: len(lines[index]) - len(lines[index].lstrip())]
+    lines[index] = f"{prefix}digest: {digest}{newline}"
+    return "".join(lines)
+
+
+def write_release_artifacts(
+    *,
+    digest: str,
+    source_revision: str,
+    build_number: str,
+    destination: str,
+    kustomization: Path,
+    output_dir: Path,
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Write a rendered manifest, patch, and credential-free release metadata."""
+    digest = _validated(digest, DIGEST_PATTERN, "image digest")
+    source_revision, build_number = validate_destination(
+        destination, source_revision, build_number
+    )
+    source = kustomization.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    rendered = render_kustomization(source, digest)
+    relative_name = kustomization.name
+    patch = "".join(
+        difflib.unified_diff(
+            source.splitlines(keepends=True),
+            rendered.splitlines(keepends=True),
+            fromfile=f"a/services/hermes/{relative_name}",
+            tofile=f"b/services/hermes/{relative_name}",
+        )
+    )
+    if not patch:
+        raise ValueError("published digest already matches the Flux manifest")
+    output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    (output_dir / "hermes-kustomization.yaml").write_text(rendered, encoding="utf-8")
+    (output_dir / "hermes-image-update.patch").write_text(patch, encoding="utf-8")
+    metadata = {
+        "build_number": build_number,
+        "digest": digest,
+        "flux_image": f"{DEFAULT_IMAGE}@{digest}",
+        "image": DEFAULT_IMAGE,
+        "published_tag": destination,
+        "source_revision": source_revision,
+    }
+    (output_dir / "hermes-agent-image.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps(metadata, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    return metadata
+
+
+def validate_release_artifacts(
+    *,
+    digest_file: Path,
+    image_file: Path,
+    source_revision: str,
+    build_number: str,
+    destination: str,
+    kustomization: Path,
+    output_dir: Path,
+) -> None:
+    """Revalidate the exact successful-build evidence without rewriting it."""
+    digest = validate_kaniko_evidence(
+        digest_text=digest_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+        image_text=image_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+        destination=destination,
+    )
+    source_revision, build_number = validate_destination(
+        destination, source_revision, build_number
+    )
+    expected_names = {
+        "hermes-agent-image.json",
+        "hermes-image-update.patch",
+        "hermes-kustomization.yaml",
+    }
+    entries = list(output_dir.iterdir())
+    if {entry.name for entry in entries} != expected_names or not all(
+        entry.is_file() and not entry.is_symlink() for entry in entries
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("release output must contain exactly three evidence files")
+    source = kustomization.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    rendered = render_kustomization(source, digest)
+    relative_name = kustomization.name
+    patch = "".join(
+        difflib.unified_diff(
+            source.splitlines(keepends=True),
+            rendered.splitlines(keepends=True),
+            fromfile=f"a/services/hermes/{relative_name}",
+            tofile=f"b/services/hermes/{relative_name}",
+        )
+    )
+    metadata = {
+        "build_number": build_number,
+        "digest": digest,
+        "flux_image": f"{DEFAULT_IMAGE}@{digest}",
+        "image": DEFAULT_IMAGE,
+        "published_tag": destination,
+        "source_revision": source_revision,
+    }
+    expected = {
+        "hermes-agent-image.json": json.dumps(metadata, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
+        "hermes-image-update.patch": patch,
+        "hermes-kustomization.yaml": rendered,
+    }
+    for name, expected_text in expected.items():
+        if (output_dir / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") != expected_text:
+            raise ValueError(f"release evidence is incomplete or mismatched: {name}")
+
+
+def _credentials() -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Read the masked, runtime-only Jenkins credential environment."""
+    username = os.environ.get("HARBOR_USER", "")
+    password = os.environ.get("HARBOR_PASSWORD", "")
+    if not username or not password:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor credentials are unavailable")
+    return username, password
+
+
+def _common_arguments(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
+    parser.add_argument("--source-revision", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--build-number", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--destination", required=True)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    """Fail closed around the unique tag, then verify and render after push."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    commands = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+    absent = commands.add_parser("assert-absent")
+    _common_arguments(absent)
+    render = commands.add_parser("render")
+    _common_arguments(render)
+    render.add_argument("--digest-file", required=True, type=Path)
+    render.add_argument("--image-file", required=True, type=Path)
+    render.add_argument("--kustomization", required=True, type=Path)
+    render.add_argument("--output-dir", required=True, type=Path)
+    verify = commands.add_parser("verify-evidence")
+    _common_arguments(verify)
+    verify.add_argument("--digest-file", required=True, type=Path)
+    verify.add_argument("--image-file", required=True, type=Path)
+    verify.add_argument("--kustomization", required=True, type=Path)
+    verify.add_argument("--output-dir", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    validate_destination(args.destination, args.source_revision, args.build_number)
+    if args.command == "verify-evidence":
+        validate_release_artifacts(
+            digest_file=args.digest_file,
+            image_file=args.image_file,
+            source_revision=args.source_revision,
+            build_number=args.build_number,
+            destination=args.destination,
+            kustomization=args.kustomization,
+            output_dir=args.output_dir,
+        )
+        return 0
+
+    username, password = _credentials()
+    if args.command == "assert-absent":
+        verify_immutable_policy(username=username, password=password)
+        assert_tag_absent(args.destination, username=username, password=password)
+        return 0
+
+    digest = validate_kaniko_evidence(
+        digest_text=args.digest_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+        image_text=args.image_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+        destination=args.destination,
+    )
+    verify_registry_digest(
+        args.destination, digest, username=username, password=password
+    )
+    write_release_artifacts(
+        digest=digest,
+        source_revision=args.source_revision,
+        build_number=args.build_number,
+        destination=args.destination,
+        kustomization=args.kustomization,
+        output_dir=args.output_dir,
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - exercised through main()
+    raise SystemExit(main())

ci/scripts/semgrep_report.py

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ def _sonar_issue_from_finding(finding: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     start = finding.get("start") if isinstance(finding.get("start"), dict) else {}
     end = finding.get("end") if isinstance(finding.get("end"), dict) else {}
     start_line = _line_number(start.get("line") if isinstance(start, dict) else None)
-    # _line_number never returns below its default, so end_line >= start_line.
+    # _line_number floors the end line at start_line, so the range never inverts.
     end_line = _line_number(end.get("line") if isinstance(end, dict) else None, start_line)
     return {
         "engineId": "semgrep",

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/harbor/kustomization.yaml

@@ -15,7 +15,13 @@ spec:
     kind: GitRepository
     name: flux-system
     namespace: flux-system
-  wait: false
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 10m
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: batch/v1
+      kind: Job
+      name: harbor-hermes-agent-immutability-ensure-1
+      namespace: harbor
   dependsOn:
     - name: core
     - name: longhorn

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-observer-bindings
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-observer-bindings
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: hermes
+    - name: hermes-observer-rbac

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-observer-rbac
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-observer-rbac
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker-code
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes/scm-common
+  targetNamespace: hermes-scm
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: hermes-scm-namespace

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-scm-broker
+  targetNamespace: hermes-scm
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 10m
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: apps/v1
+      kind: Deployment
+      name: hermes-scm-broker
+      namespace: hermes-scm
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: vault
+    - name: gitea
+    - name: hermes-scm-namespace
+    - name: hermes-scm-broker-code

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-namespace
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./services/hermes-scm-namespace
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/hermes/kustomization.yaml

@@ -60,3 +60,6 @@ spec:
     - name: keycloak
     - name: longhorn
     - name: vault
+    - name: jenkins
+    - name: hermes-scm-broker
+    - name: hermes-observer-rbac

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/jenkins/kustomization.yaml

@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ metadata:
   namespace: flux-system
   annotations:
     kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/ssa: IfNotPresent
-    atlas.bstein.dev/suspend-reason: "CI controller changes are applied only during planned maintenance."
 spec:
   interval: 10m
-  suspend: true
+  suspend: false
   path: ./services/jenkins
   prune: true
   sourceRef:
@@ -18,6 +17,8 @@ spec:
   targetNamespace: jenkins
   dependsOn:
     - name: helm
+    - name: harbor
+    - name: vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed
   healthChecks:
     - apiVersion: apps/v1
       kind: Deployment

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/kustomization.yaml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ kind: Kustomization
 resources:
   - gitea/kustomization.yaml
   - vault/kustomization.yaml
+  - vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/kustomization.yaml
   - vaultwarden/kustomization.yaml
   - comms/kustomization.yaml
   - crypto/kustomization.yaml
@@ -27,7 +28,12 @@ resources:
   - jenkins/kustomization.yaml
   - ai-llm/kustomization.yaml
   - openclaw/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-broker-code/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml
+  - hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes-chat/kustomization.yaml
   - hermes-triage-demo/kustomization.yaml
   - game-stream/kustomization.yaml

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed
+  namespace: flux-system
+  annotations:
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/ssa: IfNotPresent
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+    namespace: flux-system
+  path: ./services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed
+  targetNamespace: vault
+  prune: true
+  wait: true
+  timeout: 5m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: vault
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: batch/v1
+      kind: Job
+      name: vault-hermes-jenkins-build-token-seed-2
+      namespace: vault

clusters/atlas/flux-system/applications/vault/kustomization.yaml

@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ spec:
   targetNamespace: vault
   prune: true
   wait: true
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: batch/v1
+      kind: Job
+      name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-10
+      namespace: vault
   dependsOn:
     - name: longhorn
     - name: helm

dockerfiles/Dockerfile.hermes-agent

@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ RUN apt-get update \
 # Paid/provider-backed search remains selectable through normal Hermes config.
 RUN uv pip install --python /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python ddgs==9.14.4
 
+ARG HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT=0
+COPY dockerfiles/Dockerfile.hermes-agent /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile
+COPY dockerfiles/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py
+
 # Keep dashboard chat sockets tied to the intended React mount and conversation.
 # A resumed conversation needs a different PTY attachment key from a fresh chat;
 # reconnects to that same conversation must keep using the same key.
@@ -252,6 +256,7 @@ for (const [before, after, label] of [
 }
 fs.writeFileSync(sidebarPath, sidebar);
 NODE
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 1 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 # The upstream OIDC gate authenticates users but deliberately treats the
 # dashboard as one shared workstation. Allow a deployment to narrow that
@@ -324,6 +329,7 @@ for before, after, label in (
     source = source.replace(before, after, 1)
 path.write_text(source)
 PY
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 2 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 # Give trusted plugins a pre-turn routing hook. It runs after fallback runtime
 # restoration but before Hermes builds its provider-specific system prompt.
@@ -493,6 +499,7 @@ if oneshot.count(oneshot_before) != 1:
     )
 oneshot_path.write_text(oneshot.replace(oneshot_before, oneshot_after, 1))
 PY
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 3 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 # Hermes WebUI sends its model/provider/reasoning selection on /v1/runs.
 # Upstream currently applies only statically declared model_routes there, so
@@ -628,6 +635,7 @@ runs_source = runs_source.replace(runs_agent_before, runs_agent_after, 1)
 source = source[:runs_start] + runs_source
 path.write_text(source)
 PY
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 4 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 # ``create_task(initial_status="blocked")`` is an explicit operator park, but
 # upstream only treats later block_task() events as sticky. Recognize the
@@ -779,6 +787,7 @@ if cli_source.count(help_before) != 1:
     )
 cli_path.write_text(cli_source.replace(help_before, help_after, 1))
 PY
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 5 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 COPY dockerfiles/hermes-kanban-blocked-regression.py /tmp/hermes-kanban-blocked-regression.py
 RUN /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python /tmp/hermes-kanban-blocked-regression.py \
@@ -816,6 +825,7 @@ if source.count(before) != 1:
     )
 path.write_text(source.replace(before, after, 1))
 PY
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 6 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 # Keep the dashboard's account cards aligned with the managed provider lanes.
 # Switchyard receives Claude Code subscription OAuth through the environment;
@@ -882,6 +892,7 @@ for before, after, label in replacements:
 
 path.write_text(source)
 PY
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 7 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 # Make parent-linked API workers first-class live dashboard sessions. They stay
 # active until the API runner closes them, even during a long final model call;
@@ -975,6 +986,7 @@ source = source.replace(row_before, row_after)
 
 path.write_text(source)
 PY
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 8 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 # Keep the browser terminal reliable across GPU context loss, make durable
 # worker lineage visible, expose an accessible API-worker transcript, and
@@ -1543,6 +1555,7 @@ function RootRedirect() {
   fs.writeFileSync(path, source);
 }
 NODE
+RUN case "${HERMES_KANIKO_HEREDOC_COMPAT}" in 0) ;; 1) python /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py --dockerfile /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile --block-index 9 ;; *) exit 2 ;; esac
 
 COPY dockerfiles/patch-hermes-execution-safety.py /tmp/patch-hermes-execution-safety.py
 COPY dockerfiles/hermes-execution-safety-regression.py /tmp/hermes-execution-safety-regression.py
@@ -1576,6 +1589,8 @@ RUN HERMES_CLI_LANE_SOURCE=/tmp/hermes-lane-regression \
 
 COPY dockerfiles/hermes-session-migrate.py /opt/hermes/bin/hermes-session-migrate
 
+RUN rm -f /tmp/hermes-agent.Dockerfile /tmp/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py
+
 RUN cd /opt/hermes/web \
     && npm run build \
     && grep -Fq 'await api.getSessions(1, 0' src/pages/ChatPage.tsx \

dockerfiles/Dockerfile.hermes-agent.dockerignore

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
 !dockerfiles/hermes-public-extract/**
 !dockerfiles/hermes-session-activity-panel.tsx
 !dockerfiles/hermes-session-migrate.py
+!dockerfiles/Dockerfile.hermes-agent
+!dockerfiles/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py
 !dockerfiles/patch-hermes-execution-safety.py
 !dockerfiles/hermes-execution-safety-regression.py
 !dockerfiles/hermes_execution_patch_support.py

dockerfiles/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Replay the reviewed Hermes Dockerfile heredocs for pinned Kaniko v1.23.2.
+
+Kaniko v1.23.2 parses shell heredoc bodies into ``RunCommand.Files`` but its RUN
+implementation executes only ``CmdLine``. The interpreters therefore receive
+empty stdin and exit successfully. Docker and BuildKit execute these blocks
+normally, so this compatibility runner is enabled only by the Kaniko pipeline.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import re
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+MAX_DOCKERFILE_BYTES = 2_000_000
+BLOCKS = (
+    ("RUN node <<'NODE'", "NODE", ("node",)),
+    ("RUN python - <<'PY'", "PY", ("python", "-")),
+)
+EXPECTED_COMMANDS = ("node", *("python",) * 7, "node")
+PARSER_DIRECTIVE = re.compile(
+    r"^\s*#\s*([a-z]+)\s*=\s*(.*?)\s*$", re.IGNORECASE
+)
+
+
+def _escape_character(lines: list[str]) -> str:
+    """Return the one Dockerfile parser escape directive, or its default."""
+    escape = "\\"
+    directives: set[str] = set()
+    for line in lines:
+        if not line.strip():
+            break
+        match = PARSER_DIRECTIVE.fullmatch(line)
+        if not match:
+            break
+        name, value = match.group(1).lower(), match.group(2)
+        if name in directives:
+            raise ValueError(f"multiple Dockerfile {name} directives")
+        directives.add(name)
+        if name == "escape":
+            if value not in {"\\", "`"}:
+                raise ValueError("unsupported Dockerfile escape directive")
+            escape = value
+    return escape
+
+
+def _continued(line: str, escape: str) -> bool:
+    """Match Docker's unescaped continuation marker at physical line end."""
+    stripped = line.rstrip()
+    count = len(stripped) - len(stripped.rstrip(escape))
+    return count % 2 == 1
+
+
+def _logical_instruction(
+    lines: list[str], index: int, escape: str
+) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    """Normalize escape-newline pairs, including split opcodes/operators."""
+    logical = lines[index]
+    while _continued(logical.split("\n")[-1], escape):
+        logical = logical.rstrip()
+        logical = logical[:-1]
+        index += 1
+        while index < len(lines) and lines[index].lstrip().startswith("#"):
+            index += 1
+        if index >= len(lines) or not lines[index].strip():
+            raise ValueError("unterminated Dockerfile line continuation")
+        logical += lines[index].lstrip()
+    return logical, index
+
+
+def extract_blocks(source: str) -> list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], str]]:
+    """Inventory every RUN heredoc, then return only the reviewed contract."""
+    markers = {start: (end, command) for start, end, command in BLOCKS}
+    lines = source.splitlines()
+    escape = _escape_character(lines)
+    blocks: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], str]] = []
+    index = 0
+    while index < len(lines):
+        marker = markers.get(lines[index])
+        if marker is None:
+            if not lines[index].strip() or lines[index].lstrip().startswith("#"):
+                index += 1
+                continue
+            logical, index = _logical_instruction(lines, index, escape)
+            stripped = logical.lstrip()
+            if (
+                stripped[:3].upper() == "RUN"
+                and (len(stripped) == 3 or stripped[3].isspace())
+                and "<<" in stripped
+            ):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    "unsupported RUN heredoc outside the exact reviewed contract"
+                )
+            index += 1
+            continue
+        end, command = marker
+        body_start = index + 1
+        index = body_start
+        while index < len(lines) and lines[index] != end:
+            index += 1
+        if index == len(lines):
+            raise ValueError(f"unterminated {command[0]} heredoc")
+        body = "\n".join(lines[body_start:index]) + "\n"
+        if not body.strip():
+            raise ValueError(f"empty {command[0]} heredoc")
+        blocks.append((command, body))
+        index += 1
+
+    commands = tuple(command[0] for command, _body in blocks)
+    if commands != EXPECTED_COMMANDS:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Hermes Dockerfile heredoc contract changed: "
+            f"expected {EXPECTED_COMMANDS!r}, received {commands!r}"
+        )
+    return blocks
+
+
+def replay(dockerfile: Path, block_index: int) -> None:
+    """Execute one exact heredoc after inventorying the complete Dockerfile."""
+    size = dockerfile.stat().st_size
+    if size < 1 or size > MAX_DOCKERFILE_BYTES:
+        raise ValueError("Hermes Dockerfile size is outside the reviewed boundary")
+    source = dockerfile.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    blocks = extract_blocks(source)
+    if block_index < 1 or block_index > len(blocks):
+        raise ValueError("heredoc block index is outside the reviewed contract")
+    command, body = blocks[block_index - 1]
+    print(f"replaying reviewed Dockerfile heredoc {block_index}/{len(blocks)}")
+    subprocess.run(command, input=body, text=True, check=True)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    """Parse the one explicit Dockerfile path and replay its reviewed patches."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--dockerfile", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--block-index", required=True, type=int)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    replay(args.dockerfile, args.block_index)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

scripts/tests/test_mailu_sync.py

@@ -232,6 +232,24 @@ def test_retry_db_connect_reraises_final_error(monkeypatch):
         sync.retry_db_connect(attempts=1)
 
 
+def test_retry_helpers_return_none_without_attempts(monkeypatch):
+    sync = load_sync_module(monkeypatch)
+
+    assert sync.retry_request("request", lambda: "never", attempts=0) is None
+    assert sync.retry_db_connect(attempts=0) is None
+
+
+def test_kc_update_attributes_replaces_non_dict_attributes(monkeypatch):
+    sync = load_sync_module(monkeypatch)
+    current_resp = _FakeResponse({"attributes": "not-a-dict"})
+    ok_resp = _FakeResponse({"attributes": {"mailu_app_password": ["abc"]}})
+    sync.SESSION = _FakeSession(_FakeResponse({}), [current_resp, ok_resp])
+
+    sync.kc_update_attributes("token", {"id": "u1", "username": "u1"}, {"mailu_app_password": "abc"})
+
+    assert sync.SESSION.put_called
+
+
 def test_ensure_mailu_user_skips_foreign_domain(monkeypatch):
     sync = load_sync_module(monkeypatch)
     executed = []
@@ -405,3 +423,62 @@ def test_main_generates_password_and_upserts(monkeypatch):
     # Only mail-enabled users (or legacy users with a mailbox) are synced and backfilled.
     assert len(updated) == 3
     assert conns and len(conns[0]._cursor.executions) == 3
+
+
+def test_main_skips_disabled_users_and_provisioned_users_without_update(monkeypatch):
+    sync = load_sync_module(monkeypatch)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sync.bcrypt_sha256, "hash", lambda password: f"hash:{password}")
+    users = [
+        {
+            "id": "u1",
+            "username": "disabled",
+            "email": "disabled@example.com",
+            "enabled": False,
+            "attributes": {"mailu_enabled": ["true"]},
+        },
+        {
+            "id": "u2",
+            "username": "settled",
+            "email": "settled@example.com",
+            "attributes": {
+                "mailu_enabled": ["true"],
+                "mailu_email": ["settled@example.com"],
+                "mailu_app_password": ["existing"],
+            },
+        },
+    ]
+    updated = []
+
+    class _Cursor:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.executions = []
+
+        def execute(self, sql, params):
+            self.executions.append(params)
+
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    class _Conn:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.autocommit = False
+            self._cursor = _Cursor()
+
+        def cursor(self, cursor_factory=None):
+            return self._cursor
+
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    conn = _Conn()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sync, "get_kc_token", lambda: "tok")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sync, "kc_get_users", lambda token: users)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sync, "kc_update_attributes", lambda token, user, attrs: updated.append(user["id"]))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sync.psycopg2, "connect", lambda **kwargs: conn)
+
+    sync.main()
+
+    # The already-provisioned user is synced without a Keycloak write; the
+    # disabled user never reaches the mailbox upsert.
+    assert updated == []
+    assert len(conn._cursor.executions) == 1

scripts/tests/test_mailu_sync_listener.py

@@ -127,6 +127,18 @@ def test_listener_post_wait_keeps_running_request_successful(monkeypatch):
     assert handler.responses == [200]
 
 
+def test_listener_post_treats_non_object_json_as_plain_trigger(monkeypatch):
+    listener = load_listener_module(monkeypatch)
+    called = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(listener, "_trigger_sync_async", lambda force=False: called.append(force) or True)
+    handler = _handler_for(listener, "[1, 2]")
+
+    handler.do_POST()
+
+    assert called == [False]
+    assert handler.responses == [202]
+
+
 def test_listener_log_message_is_quiet(monkeypatch):
     listener = load_listener_module(monkeypatch)
     handler = listener.Handler.__new__(listener.Handler)

services/gitea/atlas-identity-bootstrap-job.yaml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 apiVersion: batch/v1
 kind: Job
 metadata:
-  name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap-3
+  name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap-5
   namespace: gitea
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
@@ -34,6 +34,20 @@ spec:
       nodeSelector:
         node-role.kubernetes.io/worker: "true"
         hardware: rpi5
+      initContainers:
+        - name: python-runtime
+          image: python@sha256:6d43704baacd1bfbe7c295d7f13079d5d8104ed33568873133f8fc69980419df
+          command: [/bin/sh, -ec]
+          args: ["cp -R /usr/local/. /python/"]
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities: {drop: [ALL]}
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 1000
+            runAsGroup: 1000
+          volumeMounts:
+            - {name: python-runtime, mountPath: /python}
       containers:
         - name: bootstrap
           image: gitea/gitea:1.23
@@ -80,6 +94,7 @@ spec:
             - name: bootstrap
               mountPath: /opt/bootstrap
               readOnly: true
+            - {name: python-runtime, mountPath: /opt/python, readOnly: true}
       volumes:
         - name: data
           persistentVolumeClaim:
@@ -88,3 +103,6 @@ spec:
           configMap:
             name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap
             defaultMode: 0555
+        - name: python-runtime
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 128Mi

services/gitea/kustomization.yaml

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ configMapGenerator:
   - name: gitea-atlas-identity-bootstrap
     files:
       - gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh=scripts/gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh
+      - gitea_branch_protection_check.py=scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py
 
 generatorOptions:
   disableNameSuffixHash: true

services/gitea/scripts/gitea_atlas_identity_ensure.sh

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ source_owner="${GITEA_SOURCE_OWNER:-bstein}"
 managed_repositories="${GITEA_MANAGED_REPOSITORIES:-hermes-code-demo cassandra soteria pegasus metis ananke ariadne typhon titan-iac}"
 contributor_team=Contributors
 contributor_units='["repo.actions","repo.packages","repo.code","repo.issues","repo.wiki","repo.pulls","repo.releases","repo.projects"]'
+protected_reviewer=bstein
 
 die() {
   echo "Gitea Atlas identity bootstrap failed: $*" >&2
@@ -272,6 +273,46 @@ transfer_managed_repositories() {
   trap - EXIT HUP INT TERM
 }
 
+ensure_default_branch_protection() {
+  repository=$1
+  repo_file=$(mktemp)
+  protections_file=$(mktemp)
+  response_file=$(mktemp)
+
+  status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}" '' "${repo_file}")
+  expect_status "${status}" 200 "read ${repository} metadata for branch protection"
+  default_branch=$(sed -n 's/.*"default_branch":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "${repo_file}")
+  case "${default_branch}" in
+    main|master) ;;
+    *) die "${repository} has unsupported default branch ${default_branch:-missing}" ;;
+  esac
+
+  status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" '' "${protections_file}")
+  expect_status "${status}" 200 "list ${repository} branch protections"
+  if ! protection_state=$(
+    /opt/python/bin/python3 /opt/bootstrap/gitea_branch_protection_check.py \
+      "${protections_file}" "${default_branch}" "${protected_reviewer}"
+  ); then
+    die "${repository} ${default_branch} protection differs from the human-review policy"
+  fi
+
+  if [ "${protection_state}" = ABSENT ]; then
+    payload="{\"rule_name\":\"${default_branch}\",\"enable_push\":true,\"enable_push_whitelist\":true,\"push_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"push_whitelist_teams\":[],\"push_whitelist_deploy_keys\":false,\"enable_force_push\":false,\"enable_force_push_allowlist\":false,\"force_push_allowlist_usernames\":[],\"force_push_allowlist_teams\":[],\"force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys\":false,\"enable_merge_whitelist\":true,\"merge_whitelist_usernames\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"merge_whitelist_teams\":[],\"enable_approvals_whitelist\":true,\"approvals_whitelist_username\":[\"${protected_reviewer}\"],\"approvals_whitelist_teams\":[],\"required_approvals\":1,\"block_on_rejected_reviews\":true,\"block_on_outdated_branch\":true,\"dismiss_stale_approvals\":true,\"block_admin_merge_override\":true}"
+    status=$(api_request POST "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" "${payload}" "${response_file}")
+    expect_status "${status}" 201 "protect ${repository} ${default_branch}"
+    status=$(api_request GET "/repos/${organization}/${repository}/branch_protections" '' "${protections_file}")
+    expect_status "${status}" 200 "read back ${repository} branch protections"
+    protection_state=$(
+      /opt/python/bin/python3 /opt/bootstrap/gitea_branch_protection_check.py \
+        "${protections_file}" "${default_branch}" "${protected_reviewer}"
+    ) || die "${repository} ${default_branch} protection differs from the human-review policy"
+  fi
+  [ "${protection_state}" = PRESENT ] || \
+    die "${repository} ${default_branch} protection did not become effective"
+
+  rm -f "${repo_file}" "${protections_file}" "${response_file}"
+}
+
 wait_for_gitea
 ensure_user "${reconciler_user}" "${reconciler_email}" true
 ensure_user "${hermes_user}" "${hermes_email}" false
@@ -318,6 +359,10 @@ expect_status "${status}" 204 "add Hermes to Atlas contributors"
 
 transfer_managed_repositories
 
+for repository in ${managed_repositories}; do
+  ensure_default_branch_protection "${repository}"
+done
+
 vault_write gitea/atlas-reconciler "{\"data\":{\"username\":\"${reconciler_user}\",\"token\":\"${reconciler_token}\",\"base_url\":\"${public_url}\"}}"
 vault_write hermes/developer-gitea "{\"data\":{\"username\":\"${hermes_user}\",\"email\":\"${hermes_email}\",\"token\":\"${hermes_token}\",\"base_url\":\"${public_url}\"}}"
 

services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Validate the first effective Gitea protection for an Atlas primary branch."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import stat
+from pathlib import Path
+
+MAX_INPUT = 1024 * 1024
+MAX_RULES = 100
+MAX_RULE_NAME = 255
+SPECIAL = frozenset("*?\\[]{}")
+
+
+class PolicyError(RuntimeError):
+    """The protection response is ambiguous or violates human review policy."""
+
+
+def _read_bounded(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    descriptor = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0))
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) or metadata.st_size > MAX_INPUT:
+            raise PolicyError("branch protection response exceeds the safe limit")
+        value = os.read(descriptor, MAX_INPUT + 1)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    if len(value) != metadata.st_size:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection response changed while reading")
+    return value
+
+
+def _is_plain(pattern: str) -> bool:
+    return not any(character in SPECIAL for character in pattern)
+
+
+def _literal_rule(pattern: str) -> str:
+    """Return one exact rule name or reject Gitea glob interpretation.
+
+    Gitea 1.23.8 delegates matching to gobwas/glob.  Reimplementing that
+    grammar and its error quoting rules here would create a second policy
+    engine.  The reconciler instead accepts only plain ASCII literals.  This
+    deliberately rejects braces, ranges, escapes, malformed globs, and even
+    special rules that appear unrelated: an operator must remove ambiguity
+    before this job may attest the primary-branch boundary.
+    """
+    if not pattern.isascii() or not 1 <= len(pattern) <= MAX_RULE_NAME:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection rule name is invalid")
+    if not _is_plain(pattern):
+        raise PolicyError("glob branch protection rules require human review")
+    return pattern
+
+
+def _created(value: object) -> datetime.datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) > 64:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection creation time is invalid")
+    try:
+        result = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection creation time is invalid") from exc
+    if result.tzinfo is None:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection creation time is invalid")
+    return result
+
+
+def _required(reviewer: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return {
+        "enable_push": True,
+        "enable_push_whitelist": True,
+        "push_whitelist_usernames": [reviewer],
+        "push_whitelist_deploy_keys": False,
+        "enable_force_push": False,
+        "enable_merge_whitelist": True,
+        "merge_whitelist_usernames": [reviewer],
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist": True,
+        "approvals_whitelist_username": [reviewer],
+        "required_approvals": 1,
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews": True,
+        "block_on_outdated_branch": True,
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals": True,
+        "block_admin_merge_override": True,
+    }
+
+
+def evaluate(value: bytes, branch: str, reviewer: str) -> str:
+    """Return PRESENT/ABSENT or fail on ambiguous/effective policy drift."""
+    if len(value) > MAX_INPUT or branch not in {"main", "master"}:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection input is invalid")
+    data = json.loads(value)
+    if not isinstance(data, list) or len(data) > MAX_RULES:
+        raise PolicyError("branch protection response is invalid")
+    ordered: list[tuple[int, datetime.datetime, int, dict[str, object]]] = []
+    for index, raw in enumerate(data):
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise PolicyError("branch protection entry is invalid")
+        priority = raw.get("priority")
+        rule_name = raw.get("rule_name")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(priority, int)
+            or isinstance(priority, bool)
+            or not 0 <= priority <= 1_000_000
+            or not isinstance(rule_name, str)
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError("branch protection priority is ambiguous")
+        created = _created(raw.get("created_at"))
+        literal = _literal_rule(rule_name)
+        if literal == branch:
+            # With every rule constrained to a plain literal, Gitea's glob
+            # comparator cannot affect this result.  Preserve API ordering:
+            # priority first (including legacy zero), creation time, then the
+            # stable response order for an otherwise exact tie.
+            ordered.append((priority, created, index, raw))
+    if not ordered:
+        return "ABSENT"
+    if len(ordered) != 1:
+        raise PolicyError("duplicate primary-branch protections are ambiguous")
+    effective = ordered[0][3]
+    for key, expected in _required(reviewer).items():
+        if effective.get(key) != expected:
+            raise PolicyError(
+                f"effective {branch} protection differs from human-review policy"
+            )
+    return "PRESENT"
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("response", type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("branch", choices=("main", "master"))
+    parser.add_argument("reviewer")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        value = _read_bounded(args.response)
+        print(evaluate(value, args.branch, args.reviewer))
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, PolicyError) as exc:
+        print(f"branch protection check failed: {exc}", file=__import__("sys").stderr)
+        return 1
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/harbor/hermes-agent-immutability-job.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# services/harbor/hermes-agent-immutability-job.yaml
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: harbor-hermes-agent-immutability-ensure-1
+  namespace: harbor
+spec:
+  backoffLimit: 2
+  activeDeadlineSeconds: 600
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      annotations:
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-pre-populate-only: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-run-as-user: "65532"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-run-as-group: "65532"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/role: harbor-policy-bootstrap
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-harbor-admin-password: kv/data/atlas/harbor/harbor-core
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-harbor-admin-password: |
+          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/harbor/harbor-core" -}}
+          {{ .Data.data.harbor_admin_password }}
+          {{- end -}}
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: harbor-policy-bootstrap
+      enableServiceLinks: false
+      restartPolicy: Never
+      nodeSelector:
+        hardware: rpi5
+        kubernetes.io/arch: arm64
+        node-role.kubernetes.io/worker: "true"
+      affinity:
+        nodeAffinity:
+          requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            nodeSelectorTerms:
+              - matchExpressions:
+                  - key: kubernetes.io/hostname
+                    operator: NotIn
+                    values: [titan-04, titan-14, titan-18, titan-19, titan-24]
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 65532
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: ensure
+          image: docker.io/library/python@sha256:efcdfa6a6b2fd2afb9c7dfa9a5b288a6f68338b5cfdebe6b637d986067d85757
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command: [python3, /scripts/harbor_hermes_agent_immutability_ensure.py]
+          env:
+            - name: HARBOR_API_ORIGIN
+              value: https://registry.bstein.dev/api/v2.0
+            - name: HARBOR_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE
+              value: /vault/secrets/harbor-admin-password
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsGroup: 65532
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65532
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: scripts
+              mountPath: /scripts
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+          resources:
+            requests: {cpu: 25m, memory: 32Mi}
+            limits: {cpu: 250m, memory: 128Mi}
+      volumes:
+        - name: scripts
+          configMap:
+            name: harbor-hermes-agent-immutability-script
+            defaultMode: 0555
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir: {}

services/harbor/kustomization.yaml

@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@ resources:
   - certificate.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml
   - vault-sync-deployment.yaml
+  - policy-bootstrap-serviceaccount.yaml
+  - hermes-agent-immutability-job.yaml
   - bootstrap-jobs/cassandra-registry-ensure-job.yaml
   - image.yaml
 configMapGenerator:
   - name: harbor-vault-entrypoint
     files:
       - scripts/vault-entrypoint.sh
+  - name: harbor-hermes-agent-immutability-script
+    files:
+      - harbor_hermes_agent_immutability_ensure.py=scripts/harbor_hermes_agent_immutability_ensure.py

services/harbor/policy-bootstrap-serviceaccount.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# services/harbor/policy-bootstrap-serviceaccount.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: harbor-policy-bootstrap
+  namespace: harbor
+automountServiceAccountToken: true

services/harbor/scripts/harbor_hermes_agent_immutability_ensure.py

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Create and verify the narrowly scoped Hermes agent immutable-tag rule."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import os
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+PROJECT = "bstein"
+REPOSITORY_PATTERN = "hermes-agent"
+TAG_PATTERN = "git-*-build-*"
+PUBLISH_ROBOT = "robot$jenkins-pipelines"
+EXPECTED_ORIGIN = "https://registry.bstein.dev/api/v2.0"
+MAX_RESPONSE = 1_048_576
+TRANSIENT_STATUSES = {429, 502, 503, 504}
+EXPECTED_RULE = {
+    "disabled": False,
+    "action": "immutable",
+    "template": "immutable_template",
+    "tag_selectors": [
+        {
+            "kind": "doublestar",
+            "decoration": "matches",
+            "pattern": TAG_PATTERN,
+        }
+    ],
+    "scope_selectors": {
+        "repository": [
+            {
+                "kind": "doublestar",
+                "decoration": "repoMatches",
+                "pattern": REPOSITORY_PATTERN,
+            }
+        ]
+    },
+}
+
+
+class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Prevent Basic credentials from following an unexpected redirect."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, _request, _file, _code, _message, _headers, _url):
+        return None
+
+
+class HarborUnavailable(RuntimeError):
+    """Harbor is not ready yet, rather than returning a policy decision."""
+
+
+def normalized_rule(rule: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return only the immutable contract fields Harbor must preserve."""
+    return {
+        "disabled": bool(rule.get("disabled", False)),
+        "action": rule.get("action"),
+        "template": rule.get("template"),
+        "tag_selectors": [
+            {
+                "kind": selector.get("kind"),
+                "decoration": selector.get("decoration"),
+                "pattern": selector.get("pattern"),
+            }
+            for selector in rule.get("tag_selectors") or []
+            if isinstance(selector, dict)
+        ],
+        "scope_selectors": {
+            "repository": [
+                {
+                    "kind": selector.get("kind"),
+                    "decoration": selector.get("decoration"),
+                    "pattern": selector.get("pattern"),
+                }
+                for selector in (rule.get("scope_selectors") or {}).get(
+                    "repository", []
+                )
+                if isinstance(selector, dict)
+            ]
+        },
+    }
+
+
+def targets_hermes_builds(rule: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    """Detect a rule that claims this exact repository and tag selector."""
+    normalized = normalized_rule(rule)
+    return (
+        normalized["tag_selectors"] == EXPECTED_RULE["tag_selectors"]
+        and normalized["scope_selectors"] == EXPECTED_RULE["scope_selectors"]
+    )
+
+
+class HarborClient:
+    """Bounded same-origin client for Harbor's immutable-tag API."""
+
+    def __init__(self, origin: str, username: str, password: str) -> None:
+        normalized_origin = origin.rstrip("/")
+        if normalized_origin != EXPECTED_ORIGIN:
+            raise ValueError("Harbor API origin is not the pinned production API")
+        self.origin = normalized_origin
+        token = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+        self.headers = {"Authorization": f"Basic {token}"}
+        self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect())
+
+    def request(
+        self, method: str, path: str, payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+    ) -> tuple[int, bytes, dict[str, str]]:
+        """Issue one request, returning even non-2xx responses for strict checks."""
+        data = None
+        headers = dict(self.headers)
+        if payload is not None:
+            data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            f"{self.origin}{path}", data=data, headers=headers, method=method
+        )
+        try:
+            response = self.opener.open(request, timeout=20)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            response = exc
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise HarborUnavailable("Harbor policy API is unavailable") from exc
+        with response:
+            body = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE + 1)
+            if len(body) > MAX_RESPONSE:
+                raise RuntimeError("Harbor response exceeded the size limit")
+            return int(response.status), body, dict(response.headers)
+
+
+def list_rules(client: HarborClient) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Read and validate the complete small rule set for the project."""
+    path = f"/projects/{PROJECT}/immutabletagrules?page=1&page_size=100"
+    status, body, headers = client.request("GET", path)
+    if status in TRANSIENT_STATUSES:
+        raise HarborUnavailable(f"Harbor immutable rule list returned HTTP {status}")
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor immutable rule list returned HTTP {status}")
+    values = _json_list(body, "immutable rule")
+    _require_complete_page(values, headers, "immutable rule")
+    return values
+
+
+def _json_list(body: bytes, label: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Decode one bounded Harbor list without accepting a partial shape."""
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor returned invalid {label} JSON") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, list) or not all(isinstance(item, dict) for item in value):
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor {label} list has an invalid shape")
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_complete_page(
+    values: list[dict[str, Any]], headers: dict[str, str], label: str
+) -> None:
+    """Reject a truncated first page or a proxy that strips count evidence."""
+    raw_total = next(
+        (value for key, value in headers.items() if key.lower() == "x-total-count"),
+        None,
+    )
+    if raw_total is None or not str(raw_total).isdecimal():
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor {label} list omitted a valid total count")
+    if int(raw_total) != len(values):
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor {label} list was truncated")
+
+
+def _allowed(access: dict[str, Any], resource: str, action: str) -> bool:
+    """Match one positive robot permission, accepting Harbor's default effect."""
+    return (
+        access.get("resource") == resource
+        and access.get("action") == action
+        and access.get("effect") in (None, "", "allow")
+    )
+
+
+def _publisher_scope(robot: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], list[dict[str, Any]]]:
+    """Return the existing bstein scope after validating its push boundary."""
+    permissions = robot.get("permissions")
+    if not isinstance(permissions, list) or not all(
+        isinstance(item, dict) for item in permissions
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot permissions have an invalid shape")
+    matches = [
+        item
+        for item in permissions
+        if item.get("kind") == "project" and item.get("namespace") == PROJECT
+    ]
+    if len(matches) != 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot must have one existing bstein scope")
+    access = matches[0].get("access")
+    if not isinstance(access, list) or not all(isinstance(item, dict) for item in access):
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot bstein access has an invalid shape")
+    for required in (("repository", "pull"), ("repository", "push")):
+        if not any(_allowed(item, *required) for item in access):
+            raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot lacks its existing pull/push boundary")
+    immutable_access = [
+        item for item in access if item.get("resource") == "immutable-tag"
+    ]
+    if immutable_access and not (
+        len(immutable_access) == 1
+        and _allowed(immutable_access[0], "immutable-tag", "list")
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot has broader immutable-tag access")
+    return matches[0], access
+
+
+def _verified_publisher(robot: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    """Check the exact identity and least-privilege policy after persistence."""
+    if (
+        robot.get("name") != PUBLISH_ROBOT
+        or robot.get("level") != "system"
+        or robot.get("editable") is not True
+        or robot.get("disable") is not False
+    ):
+        return False
+    try:
+        _scope, access = _publisher_scope(robot)
+    except RuntimeError:
+        return False
+    return any(_allowed(item, "immutable-tag", "list") for item in access)
+
+
+def ensure_publisher_can_read_rule(client: HarborClient) -> int:
+    """Grant only immutable-tag:list to the existing Jenkins push robot."""
+    status, body, headers = client.request("GET", "/robots?page=1&page_size=100")
+    if status in TRANSIENT_STATUSES:
+        raise HarborUnavailable(f"Harbor robot list returned HTTP {status}")
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor robot list returned HTTP {status}")
+    robots = _json_list(body, "robot")
+    _require_complete_page(robots, headers, "robot")
+    matches = [
+        item
+        for item in robots
+        if item.get("name") == PUBLISH_ROBOT
+    ]
+    if len(matches) != 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("expected exactly one Jenkins Harbor publisher robot")
+    robot_id = matches[0].get("id")
+    if not isinstance(robot_id, int) or robot_id < 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot omitted a valid ID")
+    status, body, _headers = client.request("GET", f"/robots/{robot_id}")
+    if status in TRANSIENT_STATUSES:
+        raise HarborUnavailable(f"Harbor robot read returned HTTP {status}")
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor robot read returned HTTP {status}")
+    try:
+        robot = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor returned invalid robot JSON") from exc
+    if not isinstance(robot, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor robot response has an invalid shape")
+    if (
+        robot.get("name") != PUBLISH_ROBOT
+        or robot.get("level") != "system"
+        or robot.get("editable") is not True
+        or robot.get("disable") is not False
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor publisher identity is not active and exact")
+    scope, access = _publisher_scope(robot)
+    if any(_allowed(item, "immutable-tag", "list") for item in access):
+        return robot_id
+
+    # Harbor updates permissions through PUT /robots/{id}; its separate PATCH
+    # endpoint is the only secret-rotation operation. Preserve every current
+    # scope and field while adding the one read-only action.
+    access.append({"resource": "immutable-tag", "action": "list"})
+    payload = {
+        "name": robot["name"],
+        "description": robot.get("description") or "",
+        "level": robot["level"],
+        "disable": robot["disable"],
+        "permissions": robot["permissions"],
+    }
+    duration = robot.get("duration")
+    if duration is not None:
+        if not isinstance(duration, int):
+            raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot duration has an invalid shape")
+        payload["duration"] = duration
+    # Keep the validated object reference live in the preserved permission list.
+    if scope.get("access") is not access:
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot permission normalization drifted")
+    status, _body, _headers = client.request(
+        "PUT", f"/robots/{robot_id}", payload
+    )
+    if status in TRANSIENT_STATUSES:
+        raise HarborUnavailable(f"Harbor robot update returned HTTP {status}")
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor robot policy update returned HTTP {status}")
+
+    for attempt in range(1, 6):
+        status, body, _headers = client.request("GET", f"/robots/{robot_id}")
+        if status == 200:
+            try:
+                persisted = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8"))
+            except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                persisted = None
+            if isinstance(persisted, dict) and _verified_publisher(persisted):
+                return robot_id
+        if attempt < 5:
+            time.sleep(attempt)
+    raise RuntimeError("Jenkins Harbor robot policy did not verify exactly")
+
+
+def ensure_rule(client: HarborClient) -> int:
+    """Create once, or validate the one exact enabled rule already present."""
+    rules = list_rules(client)
+    matches = [rule for rule in rules if targets_hermes_builds(rule)]
+    if len(matches) > 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("multiple Hermes agent immutable rules exist")
+    if matches:
+        if normalized_rule(matches[0]) != EXPECTED_RULE:
+            raise RuntimeError("Hermes agent immutable rule exists but is not enabled/exact")
+        rule_id = matches[0].get("id")
+        if not isinstance(rule_id, int) or rule_id < 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable rule omitted a valid ID")
+        return rule_id
+
+    path = f"/projects/{PROJECT}/immutabletagrules"
+    status, _body, headers = client.request("POST", path, EXPECTED_RULE)
+    if status in TRANSIENT_STATUSES:
+        raise HarborUnavailable(f"Harbor immutable rule create returned HTTP {status}")
+    if status != 201:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Harbor immutable rule create returned HTTP {status}")
+    location = headers.get("Location") or headers.get("location") or ""
+    api_path = urllib.parse.urlsplit(client.origin).path.rstrip("/")
+    expected_prefix = f"{api_path}{path}/"
+    if not location.startswith(expected_prefix):
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable rule create omitted the exact Location")
+    suffix = location[len(expected_prefix) :]
+    if not suffix.isdecimal() or int(suffix) < 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor immutable rule Location has an invalid ID")
+
+    # Harbor persists synchronously, but bounded retries distinguish a stale
+    # read from accepting an unverified policy.
+    for attempt in range(1, 6):
+        matches = [rule for rule in list_rules(client) if targets_hermes_builds(rule)]
+        if len(matches) == 1 and normalized_rule(matches[0]) == EXPECTED_RULE:
+            rule_id = matches[0].get("id")
+            if rule_id == int(suffix):
+                return rule_id
+        if attempt < 5:
+            time.sleep(attempt)
+    raise RuntimeError("created Harbor immutable rule did not verify exactly")
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    """Load the runtime-only admin credential and enforce the tracked policy."""
+    origin = os.environ.get("HARBOR_API_ORIGIN", "")
+    password_file = Path(os.environ.get("HARBOR_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE", ""))
+    password = password_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if not password:
+        raise RuntimeError("Harbor admin password is empty")
+    client = HarborClient(origin, "admin", password)
+    for attempt in range(1, 13):
+        try:
+            rule_id = ensure_rule(client)
+            robot_id = ensure_publisher_can_read_rule(client)
+            break
+        except HarborUnavailable:
+            if attempt == 12:
+                raise
+            time.sleep(min(attempt * 2, 15))
+    print(
+        "Hermes agent immutable build-tag rule is active "
+        f"(id={rule_id}); publisher preflight access is active (robot={robot_id})"
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - exercised through main()
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-bindings/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - rolebindings.yaml

services/hermes-observer-bindings/rolebindings.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-bindings/rolebindings.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: List
+items:
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: ai}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: bstein-dev-home}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: cassandra}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: cert-manager}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: climate}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: comms}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: crypto}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: default}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: finance}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: flux-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: game-stream}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: gitea}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: harbor}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: health}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes-chat}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: hermes-triage-demo}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: jellyfin}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: jenkins}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-node-lease}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-public}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: kube-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: logging}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: longhorn-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: mailu-mailserver}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: maintenance}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: metallb-system}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: monitoring}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: nextcloud}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: openclaw}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: outline}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: planka}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: postgres}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: quality}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: sso}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: sui-metrics}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: traefik}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: vault}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: vaultwarden}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}
+  - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+    kind: RoleBinding
+    metadata: {name: hermes-agent-observer, namespace: veles}
+    subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: hermes-agent, namespace: hermes}]
+    roleRef: {apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io, kind: ClusterRole, name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2}

services/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-rbac/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - rbac.yaml

services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# services/hermes-observer-rbac/rbac.yaml
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources:
+      - namespaces
+      - nodes
+      - persistentvolumes
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["ingressclasses"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["storage.k8s.io"]
+    resources:
+      - csidrivers
+      - csinodes
+      - storageclasses
+      - volumeattachments
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["metrics.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["nodes"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-namespaced-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources:
+      - configmaps
+      - endpoints
+      - events
+      - persistentvolumeclaims
+      - pods
+      - pods/log
+      - replicationcontrollers
+      - resourcequotas
+      - services
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["apps"]
+    resources:
+      - controllerrevisions
+      - daemonsets
+      - deployments
+      - replicasets
+      - statefulsets
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["batch"]
+    resources: ["cronjobs", "jobs"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["autoscaling"]
+    resources: ["horizontalpodautoscalers"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["ingresses", "networkpolicies"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["discovery.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["endpointslices"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["policy"]
+    resources: ["poddisruptionbudgets"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["storage.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["csistoragecapacities"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["metrics.k8s.io"]
+    resources: ["pods"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list"]
+  - apiGroups:
+      - helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - image.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - notification.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+      - source.toolkit.fluxcd.io
+    resources: ["*"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  - apiGroups: ["longhorn.io"]
+    resources:
+      - backingimages
+      - engines
+      - instancemanagers
+      - nodes
+      - replicas
+      - settings
+      - volumes
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: hermes-agent
+    namespace: hermes
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: hermes-agent-cluster-observer-v2

services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/deployment.yaml
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+  labels:
+    app: hermes-scm-broker
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  revisionHistoryLimit: 2
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-scm-broker
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: hermes-scm-broker
+      annotations:
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/role: hermes-scm-broker
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-token: |
+          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
+          {{ .Data.data.token }}
+          {{- end }}
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-pre-populate-only: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-init-first: "true"
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-requests-cpu: 10m
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-requests-mem: 32Mi
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-limits-cpu: 50m
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-limits-mem: 64Mi
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: hermes-scm-broker
+      automountServiceAccountToken: true
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 10000
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      affinity:
+        nodeAffinity:
+          requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            nodeSelectorTerms:
+              - matchExpressions:
+                  - key: kubernetes.io/arch
+                    operator: In
+                    values: [arm64]
+                  - key: node-role.kubernetes.io/worker
+                    operator: In
+                    values: ["true"]
+          preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            - weight: 100
+              preference:
+                matchExpressions:
+                  - key: hardware
+                    operator: In
+                    values: [rpi5]
+      containers:
+        - name: broker
+          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command:
+            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python
+            - /opt/broker/scm_broker.py
+          ports:
+            - {name: http, containerPort: 9081, protocol: TCP}
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet: {path: /healthz, port: http}
+            initialDelaySeconds: 3
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet: {path: /healthz, port: http}
+            initialDelaySeconds: 15
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            failureThreshold: 10
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: [ALL]
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 10000
+            runAsGroup: 10000
+          volumeMounts:
+            - {name: broker-code, mountPath: /opt/broker, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
+          resources:
+            requests: {cpu: 50m, memory: 128Mi}
+            limits: {cpu: "1", memory: 768Mi}
+      volumes:
+        - name: broker-code
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-scm-boundary
+            defaultMode: 0555
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 1Gi

services/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: hermes-scm
+resources:
+  - service.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - networkpolicy.yaml
+images:
+  - name: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent
+    digest: sha256:37ebf720c783ae908a602916ffccf88d43d205a157957f5dc4b487867aee45e7

services/hermes-scm-broker/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/networkpolicy.yaml
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker-isolation
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-scm-broker
+  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
+  ingress:
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: hermes
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: hermes-agent
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 9081}
+  egress:
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              k8s-app: kube-dns
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: vault
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: vault
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 8200}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 192.168.22.9/32
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 443}

services/hermes-scm-broker/service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-broker/service.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app: hermes-scm-broker
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 9081
+      targetPort: http

services/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-namespace/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml

services/hermes-scm-namespace/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# services/hermes-scm-namespace/namespace.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-scm-broker
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-scm-broker
+  namespace: hermes-scm
+automountServiceAccountToken: true

services/hermes/NOTES.md

@@ -102,6 +102,110 @@ console tails and named artifact contents in its deterministic bundle. A report
 must say `retained Ariadne evidence` when that fallback is used; it must not
 pretend direct Jenkins access succeeded.
 
+## Publishing an agent image after review
+
+The `hermes-agent-image` Jenkins job is the only supported agent image builder.
+It runs daemonless Kaniko v1.23.2 under the unbound `hermes-image-builder`
+ServiceAccount without a service-account token, host socket,
+privileged container, or writable Git credential. It accepts only an exact
+40-character revision that is both the checked-out commit and current
+`atlas/titan-iac` `main`, so a human must merge the source PR first.
+
+The build pod requires an ARM64 worker and gives `hardware=rpi5` the maximum
+scheduler preference. Healthy rpi4 workers remain valid fallback capacity when
+the rpi5 pool cannot fit the full request. Cordoned, unhealthy, amd64, and
+reserved last-resort nodes remain excluded by the required placement boundary.
+
+Kaniko runs as UID 0 because it must unpack an image root filesystem and enter
+that filesystem for Dockerfile `RUN` instructions. Its capability set is the
+minimum proven by an exact ARM64 no-push build of this Dockerfile:
+`CHOWN`, `FOWNER`, `DAC_OVERRIDE`, `SETGID`, and `SETUID`. `SETGID` is required
+because pinned Kaniko applies the base image's supplementary group list before
+each Dockerfile `RUN`; `SETUID` lets apt drop privileges to its `_apt` account
+while downloading package indexes. It still has no privilege
+escalation, service-account token, host path, daemon socket, or Docker/BuildKit
+TCP endpoint and uses the runtime-default seccomp profile. This is residual
+root-in-the-build-pod risk, bounded to disposable `emptyDir` storage and a
+human-reviewed `main` revision; Dockerfile changes require the same scrutiny as
+executable cluster code.
+
+Pinned Kaniko v1.23.2 parses Dockerfile `RUN` heredocs but does not materialize
+their inline files when executing a command. The Jenkins lane therefore enables
+a bounded compatibility replay after copying the reviewed Dockerfile and runner
+from the same checked-out commit. Before every replay, the runner inventories
+the entire Dockerfile as logical instructions, including split opcodes,
+operators, and either Dockerfile escape character. It rejects every heredoc
+form outside the exact nine Node/Python blocks before launching an interpreter.
+Each accepted body is then replayed immediately after its corresponding Kaniko
+`RUN`, preserving source order before any dependent regression. Docker and
+BuildKit keep their native behavior because the compatibility argument defaults
+off. The final TypeScript build, Python compile, and source assertions remain
+mandatory, so an omitted or drifted replay fails before any image can pass
+release verification.
+
+From agent.hermes, trigger that one fixed job with:
+
+```sh
+jenkins_image_build_trigger.py '<reviewed full main commit>'
+```
+
+The helper has no general Jenkins credential or caller-selectable job name. Its
+Vault-projected token is bound by Jenkins only to `hermes-agent-image`. The job
+also requires its fixed publish confirmation. Each run claims the unique tag
+`git-<reviewed-sha>-build-<jenkins-build-number>` and refuses to overwrite an
+existing tag. It cross-checks Kaniko's digest and tagged-image evidence, then
+independently reads the pushed tag from Harbor before archiving a JSON record
+and Flux digest patch. A successful post-condition then revalidates the exact
+six-file evidence set and archives those six explicit paths with empty archives
+forbidden. Apply that patch on a new branch and submit it for human review; the
+build never changes Git, reconciles Flux, or deploys by itself.
+The helper posts only to the fixed HTTPS Build Token Root endpoint and accepts
+only its real queue responses: HTTP 201 or a non-followed HTTP 303 with an exact
+same-origin `/queue/item/<number>/` location. An unauthenticated request is
+denied, and the token cannot select, configure, read, or administer another
+Jenkins job. The pipeline independently rejects any commit that is not the
+current `origin/main`, preserving the human merge/review boundary.
+
+Harbor independently enforces an enabled immutable-tag rule scoped to only the
+`bstein/hermes-agent` repository and `git-*-build-*` tags. A second manifest PUT,
+retag, or deletion is rejected by Harbor even if a caller bypasses the Jenkins
+preflight. A revisioned, Flux-tracked policy Job creates or verifies that exact
+rule with a runtime-only Vault credential; it refuses to alter a conflicting
+rule and retries only explicit transport/readiness failures while Harbor
+starts. The same Job grants the existing Jenkins publisher only
+`immutable-tag:list` on `bstein`, preserving its other project scopes and never
+calling Harbor's separate secret-rotation endpoint. The pipeline uses that
+read-only permission to require the exact enabled rule before Kaniko starts.
+That check also makes an already-running Jenkins controller fail closed during
+rollout; Jenkins cannot become Ready on the new revision before the policy Job
+succeeds.
+
+The tracked rollout order is deliberate: the revisioned Vault role Job must
+complete before the Vault Kustomization becomes Ready. A separate Flux
+Kustomization then runs the seed Job under the dedicated
+`hermes-jenkins-token-seed` identity, which can only create/read the exact
+`kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins` path and request random bytes. Jenkins
+depends on both that seed and the Harbor policy Job; Hermes depends on Jenkins.
+The seeder uses KV-v2 CAS create-only semantics. It never changes an existing
+token, never fills a missing field in an existing secret, and fails closed when
+it cannot distinguish absence from a read error. The recurring Vault
+configuration job reconciles the same narrow role and policy.
+
+Rotate this fixed-job token only as a coordinated operator action:
+
+1. Stop new `hermes-agent-image` triggers and wait for its queue and executor to
+   drain.
+2. Read the current KV-v2 metadata version for
+   `kv/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins`.
+3. Generate a fresh value from Vault and patch only `build_token` with
+   `vault kv patch -cas=<current-version>`. Keep the value in a mode-0600
+   temporary file or standard input, never a command argument or log.
+4. Roll Jenkins first and wait until it is Ready, then roll `hermes-agent` and
+   wait until it is Ready. Do not resume triggers between those two consumers.
+5. Run one reviewed-main canary. If rollback is required, repeat the CAS patch
+   with the previous value as another coordinated rotation; never delete the
+   secret to make the seeder recreate it.
+
 ## The actual supervised triage algorithm
 
 1. Classify the request as test/build triage, service health, or alert tuning.

services/hermes/agent-configmap.yaml

@@ -197,9 +197,9 @@ data:
     not replace these coordinator-wide rules. Never call `kanban_show` without
     a known, non-empty task ID. Ad-hoc inspection and acceptance checks do not
     need a synthetic Kanban lookup, and must load a skill only when its workflow
-    materially applies. Atlas HTTPS Git authentication is already supplied by
-    the runtime-only `GIT_ASKPASS`; use it without reading or exposing the
-    credential. Coordinator guidance lives at
+    materially applies. Atlas Git access is supplied by the isolated SCM
+    broker; no repository token is present in this pod. Use only configured
+    broker remotes and clients. Coordinator guidance lives at
     `/opt/data/workspace/AGENTS.md` when more detail is needed.
 
     The Jetson classifier is mandatory for AUTO selection. Switchyard may use
@@ -303,70 +303,75 @@ data:
     objective's difficulty warrants it; otherwise synthesize at the original
     effort.
 
-    This owner-only pod has cluster-admin access across Atlas, including logs,
-    Secrets, exec, port-forwarding, rollout operations, and Flux reconciliation.
-    Prefer the titan-iac Git/Flux workflow for every durable cluster change;
-    direct operations are available for explicit operator requests, incident
-    recovery, and verification, and must be followed by a matching source-of-
-    truth change when they alter desired state. Never expose credentials in
-    chat or logs. Triage belongs at triage.hermes.bstein.dev.
+    This owner-only pod has scoped read-only Kubernetes diagnostics across
+    Atlas, including resource status, events, logs, and Flux/Helm evidence. It
+    cannot read Secrets, exec or attach to pods, create service-account tokens,
+    mutate workloads or RBAC, or reconcile Flux. Put every durable cluster
+    change on a reviewed titan-iac branch. Never expose credentials in chat or
+    logs. Triage belongs at triage.hermes.bstein.dev.
 
     ## Atlas engineering access
 
     The Atlas organization has private visibility. Repository visibility is
     preserved per project and may be public or private; do not infer a
     repository's visibility from the organization setting. Repositories are
-    canonical at `https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/<repo>.git`. HTTPS Git
-    authentication is already supplied through `GIT_ASKPASS`. Verify the remote
+    canonical at `https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/<repo>.git`; worker Git traffic
+    uses `http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081/git/atlas/<repo>.git`.
+    Verify the broker remote
     and cleanly separate pre-existing changes, create a task branch, run the
     repository's tests, use `git push --dry-run` when proving access, and push a
     real branch only when the requested implementation is review-ready. Never
     force-push.
 
-    `scm.bstein.dev` is Gitea, not GitHub. Never load or follow a GitHub/`gh`
-    skill for an Atlas remote, and do not interpret an unauthenticated Gitea
-    HTTP 404 as a missing private repository. Use authenticated Git for clone,
-    fetch, and push. For pull-request metadata, comments, and merges, call
-    `/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py METHOD /api/v1/...`; it injects the runtime
-    Vault token without exposing it to the command line, environment, output,
-    or transcript. Before a consequential merge, independently verify the
-    exact base/head ancestry and diff, run the relevant tests, and confirm the
-    candidate Jenkins result. Prefer the internal endpoint in
-    `JENKINS_BASE_URL`; when Jenkins API authorization prevents a read, use the
-    existing cluster access to inspect the controller's job/build files and
-    logs rather than guessing a public hostname. The preferred read-only path
-    is `/opt/coordinator/jenkins_build_evidence.py JOB [--branch BRANCH]
-    [--commit SHA] --wait`; it distinguishes a genuinely terminal build from
-    nested Jenkins execution metadata and returns bounded JSON/log evidence.
-    With a branch, the helper also tries the conventional `JOB-branches`
-    multibranch name. For JSON Gitea mutations, prefer repeatable shell-safe
-    `--field KEY=VALUE` arguments over hand-quoted JSON.
-    After merging, observe the default-branch build to a terminal result and
-    report exact commit, build, and test evidence.
+    `scm.bstein.dev` is Forgejo/Gitea, not GitHub. Never load or follow a
+    GitHub/`gh` skill for an Atlas remote, and do not interpret an
+    unauthenticated Gitea HTTP 404 as a missing private repository. Use
+    brokered Git for clone, fetch, and creation of a new namespaced feature
+    branch. Existing-ref updates, protected refs, deletion, and force-push are
+    rejected. The broker inflates and scans every pushed object, so thin
+    packs are rejected; always push with `git push --no-thin` so the pack
+    is self-contained. For bounded
+    repository/pull-request evidence or to create a review-ready draft PR, load
+    `$manage-atlas-pull-requests` and use `/opt/scm/gitea_api.py`. The
+    client carries no repository credential; a separate least-authority
+    workload performs the allowed operation. It permits only Atlas-scoped
+    metadata reads and verified same-repository draft creation. Updates, merge,
+    approve, close, delete, comments, repository administration, and force-push
+    are unavailable; never bypass the client with raw HTTP. Leave every PR
+    unmerged for Brad's review. Independently
+    verify the exact base/head ancestry and diff, run the relevant tests, and
+    confirm the candidate Jenkins result before presenting a handoff. Prefer
+    the internal endpoint in
+    `JENKINS_BASE_URL`; when Jenkins API authorization prevents a read, use
+    Kubernetes pod logs and status evidence without exec or secret access.
+    Do not bypass the boundary to inspect controller files. If Brad separately
+    reports that he merged the PR, observe
+    the default-branch build to a terminal result and report exact commit,
+    build, and test evidence.
 
     The workspace already has a non-secret Hermes Git author identity. Do not
     use `git reset --hard`, even in a fresh clone; use a detached worktree or a
     clean branch switch when comparing revisions, and preserve any unexpected
-    file as user state. Use the Gitea pull-request merge endpoint for an open
-    PR so both Git history and PR state remain auditable. If an authorized
-    manual merge already reached the base branch, reconcile the open PR with
-    `Do=manually-merged` and its exact merge commit instead of leaving stale
-    review state.
+    file as user state. PR publication ends at the verified open draft; Brad
+    owns review and merge authority.
 
     The terminal PATH contains the pinned operator tools. Start cluster work
     with `kubectl config current-context`, read-only status/events/logs, and the
-    relevant `titan-iac` manifests. Put durable desired-state changes on a
-    reviewable `titan-iac` branch, validate Kustomize and client dry-run, then
-    use Flux reconciliation after the tracked change is published. Direct
-    `kubectl` mutations are for explicit incident recovery or ephemeral
-    verification, not ordinary delivery.
+    relevant `titan-iac` manifests. The broker namespace is deliberately
+    excluded from agent RBAC. Kubernetes cannot express a deny on one namespace
+    inside an all-namespace list, so enumerate namespaces and run namespaced
+    diagnostics instead of relying on `kubectl ... --all-namespaces`. Put
+    durable desired-state changes on a
+    reviewable `titan-iac` branch and validate Kustomize and client dry-run.
+    Brad owns merge and Flux reconciliation. Direct `kubectl` mutation is not
+    available to the agent; hand an explicit incident mutation back to Brad.
 
-    Node SSH uses a dedicated audited Hermes identity: `ssh titan-04` (or any
-    current Kubernetes node name). Host keys are pinned and password fallback
-    is disabled. Use SSH only for host-level evidence or repairs that cannot be
-    performed through Kubernetes. Read first, identify the exact node and
-    impact, avoid fleet-wide destructive commands, and reflect persistent host
-    configuration in the appropriate tracked provisioning source.
+    Node SSH uses the dedicated locked-password `hermes-agent` OS account:
+    `ssh titan-04` (or any current Kubernetes node name). Host keys are pinned,
+    password fallback is disabled, and the account has no sudo, disk, runtime,
+    or Kubernetes-storage authority. Use it for unprivileged host evidence;
+    hand privileged host repair back to Brad and reflect persistent changes in
+    the tracked provisioning source.
 
     Treat every credential, SSH identity, host-trust record, and
     credential-bearing access-client state as runtime-only Vault data. Keep
@@ -403,7 +408,7 @@ data:
     <low|medium|high|xhigh> [model]` for a persistent override. The first native
     Codex worker requires one device-code login; refreshed provider credentials
     persist through Vault while client caches remain disposable. The owner
-    workspace includes cluster-admin Kubernetes
-    access plus `kubectl`, `flux`, `helm`, `kustomize`, `vault`, `sops`, `age`,
+    workspace includes scoped read-only Kubernetes diagnostics plus `kubectl`,
+    `flux`, `helm`, `kustomize`, `vault`, `sops`, `age`,
     `terraform`, `k9s`, `jq`, `yq`, `gh`, Git, SSH, Python, Node, the
     browser/computer tools, and the native provider CLIs.

services/hermes/agent-deployment.yaml

@@ -46,15 +46,10 @@ spec:
           {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/agent-tokens" -}}
           {{ .Data.data.codex_auth_json }}
           {{- end }}
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-token: |
-          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
-          {{ .Data.data.token }}
-          {{- end }}
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-username: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea
-        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-username: |
-          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-gitea" -}}
-          {{ .Data.data.username }}
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-jenkins-image-build-token: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins
+        vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-jenkins-image-build-token: |
+          {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins" -}}
+          {{ .Data.data.build_token }}
           {{- end }}
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-private-key: kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-node-ssh-private-key: |
@@ -186,9 +181,8 @@ spec:
                 chmod 0600 "${profile_env}"
                 chown 10000:10000 "${profile_env}"
               done
-              upsert_env GIT_ASKPASS /opt/coordinator/gitea_askpass.sh
               upsert_env GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT 0
-              upsert_env GITEA_BASE_URL https://scm.bstein.dev
+              upsert_env HERMES_SCM_BROKER_URL http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081
               upsert_env JENKINS_BASE_URL http://jenkins.jenkins.svc.cluster.local:8080
               upsert_env ARIADNE_BASE_URL http://ariadne.maintenance.svc.cluster.local
               upsert_env VICTORIA_METRICS_URL http://victoria-metrics-single-server.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:8428
@@ -663,6 +657,8 @@ spec:
             - {name: subprocess-secret-patch, mountPath: /opt/hermes/tools/process_registry.py, subPath: process_registry.py}
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: routing-catalog, mountPath: /routing-catalog, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
           startupProbe:
@@ -826,6 +822,8 @@ spec:
             - {name: subprocess-secret-patch, mountPath: /opt/hermes/tools/process_registry.py, subPath: process_registry.py}
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: routing-catalog, mountPath: /routing-catalog, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
             - {name: ttyd-index, mountPath: /ttyd-index, readOnly: true}
@@ -899,6 +897,8 @@ spec:
             - {name: auth-patch, mountPath: /opt/hermes/hermes_cli/auth.py, subPath: auth.py}
             - {name: kubeconfig, mountPath: /opt/data/home/.kube/config, subPath: config, readOnly: true}
             - {name: auto-router-plugin, mountPath: /opt/data/plugins/auto-router, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: atlas-pr-skill, mountPath: /opt/data/workspace/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests, readOnly: true}
+            - {name: scm-boundary, mountPath: /opt/scm, readOnly: true}
             - {name: tmp, mountPath: /tmp}
           readinessProbe:
             exec:
@@ -907,8 +907,8 @@ spec:
                 - /opt/coordinator/cli_lane_capabilities.py
             initialDelaySeconds: 2
             periodSeconds: 5
-            timeoutSeconds: 2
-            failureThreshold: 1
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+            failureThreshold: 3
           resources:
             requests: {cpu: 100m, memory: 256Mi}
             limits: {cpu: "2", memory: 6Gi}
@@ -1202,6 +1202,16 @@ spec:
               - {key: dashboard-api.py, path: dashboard/plugin_api.py}
               - {key: dashboard-index.js, path: dashboard/dist/index.js}
               - {key: dashboard-style.css, path: dashboard/dist/style.css}
+        - name: atlas-pr-skill
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-atlas-pr-skill
+            items:
+              - {key: SKILL.md, path: SKILL.md}
+              - {key: openai.yaml, path: agents/openai.yaml}
+        - name: scm-boundary
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-scm-boundary
+            defaultMode: 0555
         - name: image-policy
           configMap:
             name: hermes-image-policy

services/hermes/agent-kubeconfig.yaml

@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ users:
     user:
       tokenFile: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
 contexts:
-  - name: atlas-owner
+  - name: atlas-observer
     context:
       cluster: atlas
       user: hermes-agent
       namespace: default
-current-context: atlas-owner
+current-context: atlas-observer

services/hermes/agent-rbac.yaml

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# services/hermes/agent-rbac.yaml
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: ClusterRoleBinding
-metadata:
-  name: hermes-agent-cluster-admin
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: hermes-agent
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: hermes
-subjects:
-  - kind: ServiceAccount
-    name: hermes-agent
-    namespace: hermes
-roleRef:
-  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-  kind: ClusterRole
-  name: cluster-admin

services/hermes/kustomization.yaml

@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ images:
     digest: sha256:37ebf720c783ae908a602916ffccf88d43d205a157957f5dc4b487867aee45e7
 resources:
   - namespace.yaml
+  - scm-common
   - vault-serviceaccount.yaml
   - configmap.yaml
   - agent-configmap.yaml
   - chat-configmap.yaml
   - switchyard-configmap.yaml
   - rbac.yaml
-  - agent-rbac.yaml
   - node-ssh-access.yaml
   - pvc.yaml
   - switchyard-pvc.yaml
@@ -84,14 +84,13 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - classifier_broker.py=scripts/classifier_broker.py
       - claude_oauth_broker.py=scripts/claude_oauth_broker.py
       - worker_route_broker.py=scripts/worker_route_broker.py
-      - gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
-      - gitea_askpass.sh=scripts/gitea_askpass.sh
       - hermes_coordinator.py=scripts/hermes_coordinator.py
       - hermes_model_routing.py=scripts/hermes_model_routing.py
       - hermes_stt_client.py=scripts/hermes_stt_client.py
       - image_broker.py=scripts/image_broker.py
       - install_agent_tools.sh=scripts/install_agent_tools.sh
       - jenkins_build_evidence.py=scripts/jenkins_build_evidence.py
+      - jenkins_image_build_trigger.py=scripts/jenkins_image_build_trigger.py
       - kanban_status_recovery.py=scripts/kanban_status_recovery.py
       - migrate_herdr_state.py=scripts/migrate_herdr_state.py
       - migrate_api_session_lineage.py=scripts/migrate_api_session_lineage.py
@@ -119,6 +118,15 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - config=agent-kubeconfig.yaml
     options:
       disableNameSuffixHash: true
+  - name: hermes-node-account-hardener
+    namespace: hermes
+    files:
+      - node_account_hardening.py=scripts/node_account_hardening.py
+      - node_account_audit.py=scripts/node_account_audit.py
+      - node_account_io.py=scripts/node_account_io.py
+      - node_polkit_audit.py=scripts/node_polkit_audit.py
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true
   - name: hermes-auto-router-plugin
     namespace: hermes
     files:
@@ -173,3 +181,10 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - alert-review.md=skills/tune-atlas-alerts/references/alert-review.md
     options:
       disableNameSuffixHash: true
+  - name: hermes-atlas-pr-skill
+    namespace: hermes
+    files:
+      - SKILL.md=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/SKILL.md
+      - openai.yaml=skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/agents/openai.yaml
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true

services/hermes/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -120,11 +120,65 @@ spec:
       ports:
         - {protocol: TCP, port: 9010}
         - {protocol: TCP, port: 9011}
-  # agent.hermes.bstein.dev is an owner-only engineering workstation. The
-  # browser boundary remains OAuth-protected, while its workers need to reach
-  # every cluster namespace, Atlas LAN service, and hosted provider endpoint.
   egress:
-    - {}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              k8s-app: kube-dns
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchExpressions:
+              - key: kubernetes.io/metadata.name
+                operator: NotIn
+                values: [gitea, hermes-scm]
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: hermes-scm
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: hermes-scm-broker
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 9081}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 10.43.0.1/32
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 443}
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 192.168.0.0/16
+            except:
+              - 192.168.22.9/32
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
+            except:
+              - 10.0.0.0/8
+              - 100.64.0.0/10
+              - 127.0.0.0/8
+              - 169.254.0.0/16
+              - 172.16.0.0/12
+              - 192.168.0.0/16
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-node-ssh-access-isolation
+  namespace: hermes
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hermes-node-ssh-access
+  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
+  ingress: []
+  egress: []
 ---
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: NetworkPolicy

services/hermes/node-ssh-access.yaml

@@ -45,32 +45,16 @@ spec:
         - operator: Exists
       containers:
         - name: key-reconciler
-          image: busybox:1.37
+          # The pinned index supports the cluster's amd64 and arm64 nodes.
+          image: python@sha256:6d43704baacd1bfbe7c295d7f13079d5d8104ed33568873133f8fc69980419df
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           command: [/bin/sh, -ec]
           args:
             - |
-              reconcile() {
-                key="$(cat /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key)"
-                found=0
-                for user in atlas oceanus; do
-                  home="/host-home/${user}"
-                  [ -d "${home}" ] || continue
-                  found=1
-                  identity="$(awk -F: -v name="${user}" '$1 == name {print $3 ":" $4; exit}' /host-etc/passwd)"
-                  [ -n "${identity}" ] || identity="$(stat -c %u:%g "${home}")"
-                  uid="${identity%%:*}"
-                  gid="${identity##*:}"
-                  install -d -m 0700 -o "${uid}" -g "${gid}" "${home}/.ssh"
-                  touch "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  grep -qxF "${key}" "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys" || printf '%s\n' "${key}" >> "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  chown "${uid}:${gid}" "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                  chmod 0600 "${home}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-                done
-                [ "${found}" = 1 ] || { echo "no supported node SSH account found" >&2; return 1; }
-              }
               while true; do
-                reconcile
+                /usr/local/bin/python \
+                  /opt/node-hardener/node_account_hardening.py \
+                  --public-key-file /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key
                 sleep 300
               done
           securityContext:
@@ -83,8 +67,21 @@ spec:
           volumeMounts:
             - name: host-home
               mountPath: /host-home
-            - name: host-passwd
-              mountPath: /host-etc/passwd
+            - name: host-etc
+              mountPath: /host-etc
+            - name: host-polkit-share
+              mountPath: /host-polkit-share
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: host-k3s
+              mountPath: /host-k3s
+            - name: host-kubelet
+              mountPath: /host-kubelet
+            - name: host-run-k3s
+              mountPath: /host-run-k3s
+            - name: host-run-containerd
+              mountPath: /host-run-containerd
+            - name: coordinator
+              mountPath: /opt/node-hardener
               readOnly: true
             - name: vault-secrets
               mountPath: /vault/secrets
@@ -94,19 +91,43 @@ spec:
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 5m
-              memory: 8Mi
+              memory: 32Mi
             limits:
               cpu: 50m
-              memory: 32Mi
+              memory: 128Mi
       volumes:
         - name: host-home
           hostPath:
             path: /home
             type: Directory
-        - name: host-passwd
+        - name: host-etc
           hostPath:
-            path: /etc/passwd
-            type: File
+            path: /etc
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-polkit-share
+          hostPath:
+            path: /usr/share/polkit-1
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-k3s
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/rancher/k3s
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-kubelet
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/kubelet
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-run-k3s
+          hostPath:
+            path: /run/k3s
+            type: Directory
+        - name: host-run-containerd
+          hostPath:
+            path: /run/containerd
+            type: Directory
+        - name: coordinator
+          configMap:
+            name: hermes-node-account-hardener
+            defaultMode: 0555
         - name: vault-secrets
           csi:
             driver: secrets-store.csi.k8s.io

services/hermes/oauth2-proxy.yaml

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ metadata:
 spec:
   selector:
     app: hermes-agent
+  # The agent dashboard and terminal must stay reachable while the
+  # cli-lane-runner readiness probe holds the shared pod NotReady.
+  publishNotReadyAddresses: true
   ports:
     - {name: http, port: 80, targetPort: auth-http}
 ---

services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# services/hermes/scm-common/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+configMapGenerator:
+  - name: hermes-scm-boundary
+    files:
+      - deadline_http.py=scripts/deadline_http.py
+      - git_pack_objects.py=scripts/git_pack_objects.py
+      - gitea_api.py=scripts/gitea_api.py
+      - gitea_api_policy.py=scripts/gitea_api_policy.py
+      - receive_pack_scan.py=scripts/receive_pack_scan.py
+      - scm_broker.py=scripts/scm_broker.py
+      - scm_broker_io.py=scripts/scm_broker_io.py
+      - scm_broker_server.py=scripts/scm_broker_server.py
+      - scm_broker_client.py=scripts/scm_broker_client.py
+    options:
+      disableNameSuffixHash: true

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/deadline_http.py

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Absolute wall-clock deadlines for every outbound Hermes HTTP exchange.
+
+Small control exchanges run inside a killable helper process, so connect,
+send, read, and DNS all share one hard bound that no blocking socket state
+can outlive.  Large streaming Git exchanges cannot cross a process boundary;
+they instead register their connection with a watchdog that force-closes the
+socket when the same kind of absolute deadline expires.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import email.message
+import http.client
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import signal
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+MAX_CONTROL_BYTES = 128 * 1024
+MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_STREAM_SECONDS = 900.0
+READ_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
+
+
+class _RejectRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        raise urllib.error.URLError("redirect rejected")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Result:
+    """Minimal HTTP evidence returned across the process boundary."""
+
+    status: int
+    content_type: str
+    body: bytes
+
+
+def _read_response(response, maximum: int, deadline: float) -> bytes:
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    total = 0
+    while True:
+        remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if remaining <= 0:
+            raise TimeoutError
+        raw = getattr(getattr(response, "fp", None), "raw", None)
+        sock = getattr(raw, "_sock", raw)
+        if hasattr(sock, "settimeout"):
+            sock.settimeout(remaining)
+        chunk = response.read(min(READ_CHUNK, maximum + 1 - total))
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        chunks.append(chunk)
+        total += len(chunk)
+        if total > maximum:
+            raise ValueError("response too large")
+    return b"".join(chunks)
+
+
+def _child_exchange(control: dict[str, object]) -> Result:
+    url = control.get("url")
+    method = control.get("method")
+    headers = control.get("headers")
+    encoded = control.get("body")
+    maximum = control.get("maximum")
+    timeout = control.get("timeout")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(url, str)
+        or not isinstance(method, str)
+        or not isinstance(headers, dict)
+        or not all(isinstance(key, str) and isinstance(value, str) for key, value in headers.items())
+        or not isinstance(encoded, str)
+        or not isinstance(maximum, int)
+        or not 0 <= maximum <= 2 * 1024 * 1024
+        or not isinstance(timeout, (int, float))
+        or not 0 < timeout <= 120
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("invalid control")
+    body = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True) if encoded else None
+    if body is not None and len(body) > MAX_CONTROL_BYTES:
+        raise ValueError("request too large")
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + float(timeout)
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        url, data=body, method=method, headers=headers  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_RejectRedirect())
+    try:
+        response = opener.open(request, timeout=max(deadline - time.monotonic(), 0.001))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+        response = error
+    with response:
+        status = getattr(response, "status", response.getcode())
+        content_type = response.headers.get_content_type()
+        value = _read_response(response, maximum, deadline)
+    return Result(int(status), str(content_type), value)
+
+
+def _child_main() -> int:
+    try:
+        raw = sys.stdin.buffer.read(MAX_CONTROL_BYTES + 1)
+        if len(raw) > MAX_CONTROL_BYTES:
+            raise ValueError("control too large")
+        control = json.loads(raw)
+        if not isinstance(control, dict):
+            raise ValueError("invalid control")
+        result = _child_exchange(control)
+        output = {
+            "ok": True,
+            "status": result.status,
+            "content_type": result.content_type,
+            "body": base64.b64encode(result.body).decode("ascii"),
+        }
+    except Exception:
+        output = {"ok": False}
+    sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(output, separators=(",", ":")))
+    return 0 if output["ok"] else 1
+
+
+def _terminate(process: subprocess.Popen[bytes]) -> None:
+    with contextlib.suppress(ProcessLookupError):
+        os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+    process.communicate()
+
+
+def exchange(
+    request: urllib.request.Request,
+    *,
+    maximum: int,
+    timeout: float,
+    popen=subprocess.Popen,
+) -> Result:
+    """Execute a whole request under one monotonic deadline and size limit."""
+    if not 0 < timeout <= 120 or not 0 <= maximum <= 2 * 1024 * 1024:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request bounds are invalid")
+    body = request.data or b""
+    if not isinstance(body, bytes) or len(body) > MAX_CONTROL_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    control = json.dumps(
+        {
+            "url": request.full_url,
+            "method": request.get_method(),
+            "headers": dict(request.header_items()),
+            "body": base64.b64encode(body).decode("ascii"),
+            "maximum": maximum,
+            "timeout": timeout,
+        },
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode()
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    process = popen(
+        [sys.executable, os.path.realpath(__file__), "--child"],
+        stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        start_new_session=True,
+        env={"LANG": "C.UTF-8", "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"},
+    )
+    try:
+        remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if remaining <= 0:
+            raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(process.args, timeout)
+        output, _error = process.communicate(control, timeout=remaining)
+    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
+        _terminate(process)
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request deadline exceeded") from exc
+    if process.returncode != 0 or len(output) > MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control request failed")
+    try:
+        result = json.loads(output)
+        if not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("ok") is not True:
+            raise ValueError
+        status = result["status"]
+        content_type = result["content_type"]
+        encoded = result["body"]
+        if not isinstance(status, int) or not isinstance(content_type, str) or not isinstance(encoded, str):
+            raise ValueError
+        value = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
+    except (KeyError, ValueError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control helper returned invalid evidence") from exc
+    if len(value) > maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP control response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    return Result(status, content_type, value)
+
+
+class _AdaptedResponse:
+    """Present one finished exchange through the urlopen reader interface."""
+
+    def __init__(self, result: Result):
+        self.status = result.status
+        self.headers = email.message.Message()
+        self.headers["Content-Type"] = result.content_type
+        self._stream = io.BytesIO(result.body)
+
+    def read(self, limit: int = -1) -> bytes:
+        return self._stream.read(limit)
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, *_excinfo: object) -> bool:
+        return False
+
+
+def open_bounded(
+    request: urllib.request.Request,
+    *,
+    maximum: int,
+    timeout: float,
+    popen=subprocess.Popen,
+) -> _AdaptedResponse:
+    """Open one control exchange whose whole lifetime shares one deadline."""
+    return _AdaptedResponse(
+        exchange(request, maximum=maximum, timeout=timeout, popen=popen)
+    )
+
+
+def _resolve_within(host: str, port: int, timeout: float) -> None:
+    """Resolve one host under a hard timeout the socket layer never covers.
+
+    ``getaddrinfo`` ignores socket timeouts and runs before any socket
+    exists, so a slow or hostile resolver would otherwise outlive the whole
+    stream deadline.  Running it in a joinable worker bounds resolution by the
+    same wall clock; a stuck lookup leaks only one daemon thread.
+    """
+    outcome: dict[str, object] = {}
+
+    def run() -> None:
+        try:
+            outcome["value"] = socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, type=socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            outcome["error"] = exc
+
+    worker = threading.Thread(target=run, daemon=True)
+    worker.start()
+    worker.join(timeout)
+    if worker.is_alive():
+        raise PolicyError("HTTP stream DNS resolution deadline exceeded")
+    if "error" in outcome:
+        raise outcome["error"]  # type: ignore[misc]
+
+
+class StreamDeadline:
+    """Force-close tracked connections once an absolute deadline passes."""
+
+    def __init__(self, timeout: float, *, timer=threading.Timer):
+        if not 0 < timeout <= MAX_STREAM_SECONDS:
+            raise PolicyError("HTTP stream deadline bounds are invalid")
+        self._deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._connections: list[http.client.HTTPConnection] = []
+        self.expired = False
+        self._timer = timer(timeout, self._expire)
+        self._timer.daemon = True
+        self._timer.start()
+
+    def remaining(self) -> float:
+        value = self._deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if value <= 0 or self.expired:
+            raise PolicyError("HTTP stream deadline exceeded")
+        return value
+
+    def _expire(self) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.expired = True
+            connections = list(self._connections)
+        for connection in connections:
+            # Shut the raw socket down first so a blocked send or recv wakes
+            # immediately; close alone leaves peers waiting on the old fd.
+            sock = getattr(connection, "sock", None)
+            if sock is not None:
+                with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
+                    sock.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
+            connection.close()
+
+    def _track(self, connection: http.client.HTTPConnection):
+        with self._lock:
+            expired = self.expired
+            if not expired:
+                self._connections.append(connection)
+        if expired:
+            connection.close()
+            raise PolicyError("HTTP stream deadline exceeded")
+        return connection
+
+    def _bounded_connection(self, connection: http.client.HTTPConnection):
+        """Register one connection and bound its DNS phase by the deadline.
+
+        The watchdog can only close a live socket, but ``connect`` resolves
+        the host before any socket exists.  Wrapping ``connect`` runs that
+        resolution under the same absolute deadline first, then hands off to
+        the real connect for the socket phases the watchdog already covers.
+        """
+        original_connect = connection.connect
+
+        def connect() -> None:
+            _resolve_within(connection.host, connection.port, self.remaining())
+            original_connect()
+
+        connection.connect = connect  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        return self._track(connection)
+
+    def cancel(self) -> None:
+        self._timer.cancel()
+
+    def handlers(self) -> tuple[urllib.request.BaseHandler, ...]:
+        """Build urllib handlers whose connections obey this deadline."""
+        deadline = self
+
+        class GuardedHTTPHandler(urllib.request.HTTPHandler):
+            def http_open(self, req):
+                return self.do_open(
+                    lambda host, **kwargs: deadline._bounded_connection(
+                        http.client.HTTPConnection(host, **kwargs)
+                    ),
+                    req,
+                )
+
+        class GuardedHTTPSHandler(urllib.request.HTTPSHandler):
+            def https_open(self, req):
+                return self.do_open(
+                    lambda host, **kwargs: deadline._bounded_connection(
+                        http.client.HTTPSConnection(host, **kwargs)
+                    ),
+                    req,
+                )
+
+        return (GuardedHTTPHandler(), GuardedHTTPSHandler())
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(_child_main() if sys.argv[1:] == ["--child"] else 2)

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/git_pack_objects.py

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Bounded Git pack inflation and delta resolution for quarantine scanning.
+
+Pushed objects arrive zlib-compressed inside a packfile, so any content
+screening must inflate the real payloads first.  This module unpacks one
+self-contained pack under explicit object, size, and checksum bounds and
+resolves every delta against bases inside the same pack.  Thin packs are
+rejected outright: a delta against a base the broker cannot see would leave
+part of the pushed content unscanned.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import tempfile
+import zlib
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES = {1: b"commit", 2: b"tree", 3: b"blob", 4: b"tag"}
+OFS_DELTA = 6
+REF_DELTA = 7
+MAX_PACK_OBJECTS = 50_000
+MAX_OBJECT_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 256 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_RESOLVE_PASSES = 64
+SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT = 256 * 1024
+READ_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
+
+
+def _read_exact(stream: BinaryIO, size: int) -> bytes:
+    value = stream.read(size)
+    if len(value) != size:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack data ended early")
+    return value
+
+
+def _object_header(stream: BinaryIO) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    """Parse one object's type and declared inflated size."""
+    byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+    type_code = (byte >> 4) & 0x7
+    size = byte & 0x0F
+    shift = 4
+    while byte & 0x80:
+        if shift > 60:
+            raise PolicyError("Git object header is invalid")
+        byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+        size |= (byte & 0x7F) << shift
+        shift += 7
+    return type_code, size
+
+
+def _delta_distance(stream: BinaryIO) -> int:
+    """Parse one ofs-delta base distance."""
+    byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+    value = byte & 0x7F
+    while byte & 0x80:
+        byte = _read_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+        value = ((value + 1) << 7) | (byte & 0x7F)
+        if value > 1 << 48:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta base distance is invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _inflate(stream: BinaryIO, declared: int) -> BinaryIO:
+    """Inflate one object into a quarantine spool, bounded by its header."""
+    spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - caller owns returned spool
+        max_size=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT, dir="/tmp"
+    )
+    decompressor = zlib.decompressobj()
+    produced = 0
+    try:
+        while not decompressor.eof:
+            data = stream.read(READ_CHUNK)
+            if not data:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack object data ended early")
+            while True:
+                value = decompressor.decompress(data, READ_CHUNK)
+                produced += len(value)
+                if produced > declared:
+                    raise PolicyError("Git object size does not match its header")
+                spool.write(value)
+                data = decompressor.unconsumed_tail
+                if decompressor.eof or not data:
+                    break
+        if decompressor.unused_data:
+            stream.seek(-len(decompressor.unused_data), 1)
+        if produced != declared:
+            raise PolicyError("Git object size does not match its header")
+        spool.seek(0)
+        return spool
+    except zlib.error as exc:
+        spool.close()
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack object data is corrupt") from exc
+    except Exception:
+        spool.close()
+        raise
+
+
+def _delta_size(delta: bytes, position: int) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    size = 0
+    shift = 0
+    while True:
+        if position >= len(delta) or shift > 60:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta header is invalid")
+        byte = delta[position]
+        position += 1
+        size |= (byte & 0x7F) << shift
+        shift += 7
+        if not byte & 0x80:
+            return size, position
+
+
+def _apply_delta(base: bytes, delta: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """Apply one Git delta and require exact declared sizes throughout."""
+    source_size, position = _delta_size(delta, 0)
+    target_size, position = _delta_size(delta, position)
+    if source_size != len(base) or target_size > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Git delta sizes are invalid")
+    parts: list[bytes] = []
+    produced = 0
+    while position < len(delta):
+        opcode = delta[position]
+        position += 1
+        if opcode & 0x80:
+            operands = [bit for bit in (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64) if opcode & bit]
+            if position + len(operands) > len(delta):
+                raise PolicyError("Git delta copy is truncated")
+            offset = 0
+            size = 0
+            for shift, bit in enumerate((1, 2, 4, 8)):
+                if opcode & bit:
+                    offset |= delta[position] << (8 * shift)
+                    position += 1
+            for shift, bit in enumerate((16, 32, 64)):
+                if opcode & bit:
+                    size |= delta[position] << (8 * shift)
+                    position += 1
+            size = size or 0x10000
+            if offset + size > len(base):
+                raise PolicyError("Git delta copy is out of bounds")
+            parts.append(base[offset : offset + size])
+            produced += size
+        elif opcode:
+            if position + opcode > len(delta):
+                raise PolicyError("Git delta insert is truncated")
+            parts.append(delta[position : position + opcode])
+            position += opcode
+            produced += opcode
+        else:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta instruction is invalid")
+        if produced > target_size:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta result exceeds its declared size")
+    if produced != target_size:
+        raise PolicyError("Git delta result size is invalid")
+    return b"".join(parts)
+
+
+def _payload_sha(type_code: int, payload: BinaryIO, size: int) -> bytes:
+    digest = hashlib.sha1(OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES[type_code] + b" %d\x00" % size)
+    payload.seek(0)
+    while True:
+        chunk = payload.read(READ_CHUNK)
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        digest.update(chunk)
+    payload.seek(0)
+    return digest.digest()
+
+
+def _verify_checksum(stream: BinaryIO, start: int, end: int) -> None:
+    trailer = _read_exact(stream, 20)
+    stream.seek(start)
+    digest = hashlib.sha1()
+    remaining = end - start
+    while remaining:
+        chunk = stream.read(min(READ_CHUNK, remaining))
+        digest.update(chunk)
+        remaining -= len(chunk)
+    if digest.digest() != trailer:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack checksum is invalid")
+    stream.seek(end + 20)
+
+
+class _Entry:
+    """One pack entry: either resolved content or an unresolved delta."""
+
+    def __init__(self, type_code: int, payload: BinaryIO, size: int, base):
+        self.type_code = type_code
+        self.payload = payload
+        self.size = size
+        self.base = base
+
+
+def _resolve(entries: dict[int, _Entry], total: list[int]) -> None:
+    """Resolve every delta against in-pack bases only, to a fixed point."""
+    by_sha: dict[bytes, int] = {}
+    for offset, entry in entries.items():
+        if entry.base is None:
+            by_sha.setdefault(
+                _payload_sha(entry.type_code, entry.payload, entry.size), offset
+            )
+    for _ in range(MAX_RESOLVE_PASSES):
+        pending = [item for item in entries.items() if item[1].base is not None]
+        if not pending:
+            return
+        progressed = False
+        for offset, entry in pending:
+            base_key = entry.base
+            base_offset = base_key if isinstance(base_key, int) else by_sha.get(base_key)
+            base = entries.get(base_offset) if base_offset is not None else None
+            if base is None or base.base is not None:
+                if isinstance(base_key, int) and base is None:
+                    raise PolicyError("Git delta base offset is invalid")
+                continue
+            base.payload.seek(0)
+            entry.payload.seek(0)
+            value = _apply_delta(base.payload.read(), entry.payload.read())
+            total[0] += len(value)
+            if total[0] > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack contents exceed the safe size limit")
+            entry.payload.close()
+            spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - entry owns spool
+                max_size=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT, dir="/tmp"
+            )
+            spool.write(value)
+            spool.seek(0)
+            entry.type_code = base.type_code
+            entry.payload = spool
+            entry.size = len(value)
+            entry.base = None
+            by_sha.setdefault(_payload_sha(entry.type_code, spool, entry.size), offset)
+            progressed = True
+        if not progressed:
+            raise PolicyError("Git delta base is outside the pack; push full packs")
+    raise PolicyError("Git delta chains exceed the safe resolution limit")
+
+
+def unpack_objects(stream: BinaryIO) -> list[tuple[int, BinaryIO]]:
+    """Inflate one self-contained pack and return every resolved payload."""
+    start = stream.tell()
+    header = _read_exact(stream, 12)
+    version = int.from_bytes(header[4:8], "big")
+    count = int.from_bytes(header[8:12], "big")
+    if header[:4] != b"PACK" or version not in {2, 3}:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack header is invalid")
+    if count > MAX_PACK_OBJECTS:
+        raise PolicyError("Git pack contains too many objects")
+    entries: dict[int, _Entry] = {}
+    total = [0]
+    try:
+        for _ in range(count):
+            offset = stream.tell() - start
+            type_code, declared = _object_header(stream)
+            if declared > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git object exceeds the safe size limit")
+            total[0] += declared
+            if total[0] > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack contents exceed the safe size limit")
+            base: int | bytes | None = None
+            if type_code == OFS_DELTA:
+                distance = _delta_distance(stream)
+                base = offset - distance
+                if base < 0:
+                    raise PolicyError("Git delta base offset is invalid")
+            elif type_code == REF_DELTA:
+                base = _read_exact(stream, 20)
+            elif type_code not in OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES:
+                raise PolicyError("Git pack object type is invalid")
+            entries[offset] = _Entry(type_code, _inflate(stream, declared), declared, base)
+        _verify_checksum(stream, start, stream.tell())
+        _resolve(entries, total)
+    except Exception:
+        for entry in entries.values():
+            entry.payload.close()
+        raise
+    for entry in entries.values():
+        entry.payload.seek(0)
+    return [
+        (entries[offset].type_code, entries[offset].payload)
+        for offset in sorted(entries)
+    ]
+
+
+def parse_loose_object(value: bytes) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
+    """Inflate one quarantined loose object and return its typed payload."""
+    if len(value) > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Git object exceeds the safe size limit")
+    decompressor = zlib.decompressobj()
+    try:
+        inflated = decompressor.decompress(value, MAX_OBJECT_BYTES + 1)
+    except zlib.error as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("Git loose object data is corrupt") from exc
+    if not decompressor.eof or decompressor.unused_data or len(inflated) > MAX_OBJECT_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Git loose object framing is invalid")
+    kind, separator, remainder = inflated.partition(b"\x00")
+    name, space, size = kind.partition(b" ")
+    types = {label: code for code, label in OBJECT_TYPE_NAMES.items()}
+    if (
+        not separator
+        or not space
+        or name not in types
+        or not size.isdigit()
+        or int(size) != len(remainder)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Git loose object header is invalid")
+    return types[name], remainder

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Use the private Atlas Forgejo API through a least-authority PR boundary."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import deadline_http
+from gitea_api_policy import (
+    PolicyError,
+    _draft_title,
+    _reject_forbidden,
+    _validate_body,
+    _validate_pr_number,
+    _validate_pr_number_segment,
+    _validate_query,
+    _validate_ref,
+    _validate_ref_bounds,
+    _validate_repo,
+    _validate_sha,
+)
+
+CANONICAL_BASE_URL = "https://scm.bstein.dev"
+ALLOWED_OWNER = "atlas"
+DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/vault/secrets/gitea-token")
+CREATE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/api/v1/repos/atlas/([^/]+)/pulls\Z")
+MAX_ERROR_BYTES = 8192
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH = 768
+MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH = 512
+RAW_API_TARGET_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9/_.?&=-]+\Z")
+
+
+def _safe_urlopen(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int):
+    """Open one exchange under a killable absolute wall-clock deadline.
+
+    The helper process rejects redirects before urllib can copy
+    authentication headers, and its whole connect/send/read lifetime
+    shares one hard deadline.
+    """
+    return deadline_http.open_bounded(
+        request, maximum=MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, timeout=timeout
+    )
+
+
+def read_token(path: Path = DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE) -> str:
+    """Read the token from the pod-lifetime Vault projection."""
+    token = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if not token:
+        raise ValueError(f"runtime credential is empty: {path}")
+    return token
+
+
+def configured_base_url() -> str:
+    """Reject attempts to redirect credentials away from the canonical origin."""
+    configured = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", CANONICAL_BASE_URL)
+    if configured != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
+    return configured
+
+
+def _split_api_path(path: str) -> urllib.parse.SplitResult:
+    if not isinstance(path, str) or len(path) > MAX_API_TARGET_LENGTH:
+        raise PolicyError("API target exceeds the safe size limit")
+    if (
+        not path.isascii()
+        or any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in path)
+        or "\\" in path
+        or not RAW_API_TARGET_RE.fullmatch(path)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API target contains non-canonical raw characters")
+    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)
+    canonical = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(("", "", target.path, target.query, ""))
+    if canonical != path:
+        raise PolicyError("API target is not in exact canonical form")
+    if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
+        raise PolicyError("API path must be relative to the Atlas SCM origin")
+    if not target.path.startswith("/api/v1/"):
+        raise PolicyError("API path must start with /api/v1/")
+    if len(target.path) > MAX_API_PATH_LENGTH:
+        raise PolicyError("API path exceeds the safe size limit")
+    segments = target.path.split("/")
+    if "//" in target.path or any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in segments):
+        raise PolicyError("encoded or non-canonical API paths are not allowed")
+    return target
+
+
+def _authorize_read(
+    target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Allow only repository, PR, branch, commit, and status metadata reads."""
+    prefix = "/api/v1/repos/atlas/"
+    remainder = target.path.removeprefix(prefix)
+    if remainder == target.path:
+        raise PolicyError("reads are limited to explicit Atlas repository metadata")
+    repo, separator, suffix = remainder.partition("/")
+    _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", forbidden)
+    _validate_repo(repo)
+
+    if not separator:
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "repository"
+    if suffix == "pulls":
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit", "state"})
+        return "pull-list"
+    content_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)\.(?:patch|diff)", suffix)
+    if content_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(content_match.group(1))
+        raise PolicyError("repository API route is outside the metadata read allowlist")
+    pull_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)", suffix)
+    if pull_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(pull_match.group(1))
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "pull"
+    evidence_match = re.fullmatch(r"pulls/([^/]+)/(?:commits|files)", suffix)
+    if evidence_match:
+        _validate_pr_number_segment(evidence_match.group(1))
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "pull-evidence"
+    if suffix == "branches":
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "branch-list"
+    branch_match = re.fullmatch(r"branches/([^/]+)", suffix)
+    if branch_match:
+        _validate_ref(branch_match.group(1), "branch")
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "branch"
+    if suffix == "commits":
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "commit-list"
+    if re.fullmatch(r"git/commits/[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", suffix):
+        _validate_query(target, set())
+        return "commit"
+    if re.fullmatch(
+        r"(?:commits/[0-9a-fA-F]{40}/status|commits/[0-9a-fA-F]{40}/statuses|statuses/[0-9a-fA-F]{40})",
+        suffix,
+    ):
+        _validate_query(target, {"page", "limit"})
+        return "status"
+    raise PolicyError("repository API route is outside the metadata read allowlist")
+
+
+def api_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
+    """Return a canonical same-origin URL without forwarding credentials."""
+    if base_url != CANONICAL_BASE_URL:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo origin is fixed to the private Atlas SCM service")
+    target = _split_api_path(path)
+    return urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
+        ("https", "scm.bstein.dev", target.path, target.query, "")
+    )
+
+
+def authorize_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    data: object | None,
+    *,
+    forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+) -> str:
+    """Validate one request and return its bounded operation name."""
+    normalized_method = method.upper()
+    target = _split_api_path(path)
+    if normalized_method == "GET":
+        if data is not None:
+            raise PolicyError("read operations cannot include a request body")
+        return _authorize_read(target, forbidden=forbidden)
+    if target.query:
+        raise PolicyError("mutating operations cannot include query parameters")
+    if normalized_method != "POST":
+        raise PolicyError("only read and create-draft operations are available")
+    match = CREATE_PATH_RE.fullmatch(target.path)
+    if not match:
+        raise PolicyError("POST is limited to creating an Atlas draft pull request")
+    _reject_forbidden(match.group(1), "repository", forbidden)
+    _validate_repo(match.group(1))
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) != {"base", "body", "head", "title"}:
+        raise PolicyError("draft creation accepts only base, body, head, and title")
+    if data["title"] != _draft_title(data["title"], forbidden=forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError("new pull requests must use the Gitea draft-title prefix")
+    _validate_body(data["body"], forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(data["base"], "base", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(data["head"], "head", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref(data["base"], "base", forbidden=forbidden)
+    _validate_ref(data["head"], "head", forbidden=forbidden)
+    return "create-draft"
+
+
+def build_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    base_url: str,
+    token: str,
+    data: object | None = None,
+) -> urllib.request.Request:
+    """Build an authorized request without putting the token in its URL or body."""
+    authorize_request(method, path, data, forbidden=(token,))
+    return _build_request(method, path, base_url=base_url, token=token, data=data)
+
+
+def _build_request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    base_url: str,
+    token: str,
+    data: object | None = None,
+) -> urllib.request.Request:
+    """Build one already-authorized upstream request."""
+    payload = None
+    if data is not None:
+        payload = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    return urllib.request.Request(
+        api_url(base_url, path),
+        data=payload,
+        method=method.upper(),
+        headers={
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "Authorization": f"token {token}",
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": "hermes-atlas-pr-client/2",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def redact_bytes(value: bytes, token: str) -> bytes:
+    """Remove exact runtime-token and authorization-header values from output."""
+    redacted = value.replace(token.encode("utf-8"), b"[REDACTED]")
+    return re.sub(
+        rb"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:token|bearer)?\s*[^\s,;\"}]+",
+        rb"\1[REDACTED]",
+        redacted,
+    )
+
+
+def _reject_response_credential(value: bytes, token: str) -> None:
+    """Fail closed if an upstream body reflects any ordinary token encoding."""
+    raw = token.encode("utf-8")
+    forms = {
+        raw,
+        base64.b64encode(raw),
+        base64.b64encode(b"hermes-automation:" + raw),
+        urllib.parse.quote(token, safe="").encode("ascii"),
+    }
+    if any(form and form in value for form in forms):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo response contains runtime credential material")
+
+
+def _request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    data: object | None,
+    *,
+    token: str,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen,
+    authorized: bool = False,
+    expected_status: int,
+) -> bytes:
+    builder = _build_request if authorized else build_request
+    request = builder(method, path, base_url=configured_base_url(), token=token, data=data)
+    with opener(request, timeout=30) as response:  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        status = getattr(response, "status", None)
+        if status is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+            status = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if status != expected_status:
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+        if response.headers.get_content_type() != "application/json":  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned an unexpected response type")
+        body = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if len(body) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    _reject_response_credential(body, token)
+    return redact_bytes(body, token)
+
+
+def read(
+    path: str, *, token: str, opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen
+) -> bytes:
+    """Read one explicitly allowed Atlas repository metadata resource."""
+    return _request(
+        "GET", path, None, token=token, opener=opener, expected_status=200
+    )
+
+
+def _nested(document: dict[str, object], *keys: str) -> object:
+    value: object = document
+    for key in keys:
+        if not isinstance(value, dict) or key not in value:
+            raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted required pull-request evidence")
+        value = value[key]
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_create_response(
+    value: bytes,
+    *,
+    repo: str,
+    base: str,
+    head: str,
+    head_sha: str,
+    title: str,
+    body: str,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Require exact server evidence for the intended open draft handoff."""
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(value)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata") from exc
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo returned invalid pull-request metadata")
+    number = _validate_pr_number(document.get("number"))
+    full_name = f"{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}"
+    expected_html = f"{CANONICAL_BASE_URL}/{full_name}/pulls/{number}"
+    checks = (
+        document.get("state") == "open",
+        document.get("draft") is True,
+        document.get("merged") is False,
+        document.get("html_url") == expected_html,
+        document.get("url") == expected_html,
+        document.get("title") == title,
+        document.get("body") == body,
+        _nested(document, "base", "ref") == base,
+        _nested(document, "base", "repo", "full_name") == full_name,
+        _nested(document, "head", "ref") == head,
+        _nested(document, "head", "sha") == head_sha,
+        _nested(document, "head", "repo", "full_name") == full_name,
+    )
+    if not all(checks):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo did not confirm the exact draft pull-request state")
+    return document
+
+
+def create_draft(
+    repo: str,
+    *,
+    base: str,
+    head: str,
+    head_sha: str,
+    title: str,
+    body: str,
+    token: str,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _safe_urlopen,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Create and verify a same-repository draft pull request for human review."""
+    _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+    repo = _validate_repo(repo)
+    title = _draft_title(title, forbidden=(token,))
+    body = _validate_body(body, forbidden=(token,))
+    head_sha = _validate_sha(head_sha)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(base, "base", forbidden=(token,))
+    _validate_ref_bounds(head, "head", forbidden=(token,))
+    base = _validate_ref(base, "base", forbidden=(token,))
+    head = _validate_ref(head, "head", forbidden=(token,))
+    data = {"base": base, "body": body, "head": head, "title": title}
+    result = _request(
+        "POST",
+        f"/api/v1/repos/{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}/pulls",
+        data,
+        token=token,
+        opener=opener,
+        authorized=True,
+        expected_status=201,
+    )
+    _require_create_response(
+        result,
+        repo=repo,
+        base=base,
+        head=head,
+        head_sha=head_sha,
+        title=title,
+        body=body,
+    )
+    return result
+
+
+def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
+    """Parse the intentionally narrow read and create-draft operations."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--dry-run",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="validate and describe the request without reading a token or using the network",
+    )
+    subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="operation", required=True)
+    read_parser = subparsers.add_parser("read", help="read allowed Atlas metadata")
+    read_parser.add_argument("path")
+    create_parser = subparsers.add_parser(
+        "create-draft", help="create a same-repository draft pull request"
+    )
+    create_parser.add_argument("repo")
+    create_parser.add_argument("--base", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--head", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--head-sha", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--title", required=True)
+    create_parser.add_argument("--body", default="")
+    return parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+
+def _operation(
+    args: argparse.Namespace, *, validate_refs: bool = True
+) -> tuple[str, str, object | None]:
+    if args.operation == "read":
+        return "GET", args.path, None
+    repo = _validate_repo(args.repo)
+    _validate_sha(args.head_sha)
+    body = _validate_body(args.body)
+    title = _draft_title(args.title)
+    _validate_ref_bounds(args.base, "base")
+    _validate_ref_bounds(args.head, "head")
+    base = _validate_ref(args.base, "base") if validate_refs else args.base
+    head = _validate_ref(args.head, "head") if validate_refs else args.head
+    data = {
+        "base": base,
+        "body": body,
+        "head": head,
+        "title": title,
+    }
+    return "POST", f"/api/v1/repos/{ALLOWED_OWNER}/{repo}/pulls", data
+
+
+def _write_body(body: bytes) -> None:
+    if body:
+        sys.stdout.buffer.write(body)
+        if not body.endswith(b"\n"):
+            sys.stdout.buffer.write(b"\n")
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    """Validate, optionally describe, and execute one safe Forgejo operation."""
+    try:
+        args = parse_args(argv)
+        if args.dry_run:
+            method, path, data = _operation(args, validate_refs=False)
+            operation = authorize_request(method, path, data)
+            print(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {
+                        "dry_run": True,
+                        "host": "scm.bstein.dev",
+                        "operation": operation,
+                        "owner": ALLOWED_OWNER,
+                        "path": path,
+                        "request_fields": sorted(data)
+                        if isinstance(data, dict)
+                        else [],
+                    },
+                    sort_keys=True,
+                )
+            )
+            return 0
+        method, path, data = _operation(args, validate_refs=False)
+        from scm_broker_client import create_draft as broker_create_draft
+        from scm_broker_client import read as broker_read
+
+        if args.operation == "read":
+            body = broker_read(path)
+        else:
+            assert isinstance(data, dict)
+            body = broker_create_draft(
+                args.repo,
+                base=str(data["base"]),
+                head=str(data["head"]),
+                head_sha=args.head_sha,
+                title=str(data["title"]),
+                body=str(data["body"]),
+            )
+        _write_body(body)
+        return 0
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        exc.read(MAX_ERROR_BYTES)
+        print(f"SCM broker request failed with HTTP {exc.code}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    except (OSError, PolicyError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        print(
+            "Forgejo request rejected or unavailable; no credential was disclosed",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+"""Validation policy for Hermes' least-authority Atlas Forgejo client.
+
+The screening catches structured credential assignments, known token formats,
+and long high-entropy values. It is a fail-closed accident barrier, not proof
+that text is secret-free: a short or multiword secret under an innocuous key is
+not reliably distinguishable from prose and must never be supplied by callers.
+JSON depth/nodes/documents and multiline gaps are deliberately bounded; large
+or unusual configuration blobs are not a supported pull-request field format.
+"""
+
+# ruff: noqa: SIM905
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+import subprocess
+import urllib.parse
+from collections import Counter
+from math import log2
+
+REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\Z")
+DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX = "WIP: "
+GIT_BIN = "/usr/bin/git"
+MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 128
+MAX_QUERY_ITEMS = 3
+MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH = 16
+MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH = 16
+MAX_PAGE = 10_000
+MAX_LIMIT = 50
+MAX_PR_NUMBER = 2_147_483_647
+MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS = 10
+MAX_REF_CHARACTERS = 200
+MAX_REF_UTF8_BYTES = 255
+MAX_TITLE_UTF8_BYTES = 512
+MAX_BODY_UTF8_BYTES = 32_768
+MAX_JSON_DOCUMENTS = 32
+MAX_JSON_NODES = 2_048
+MAX_JSON_DEPTH = 32
+CANONICAL_QUERY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_=&-]*\Z")
+ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(
+    r"""(?mx)
+    (?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])
+    (?P<key_quote>[\"']?)
+    (?P<key>\.?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127})
+    (?P=key_quote)
+    [ \t]*(?P<separator>[:=])[ \t]*
+    (?P<value>
+      \"(?:\\.|[^\"\\\r\n])*\" |
+      '(?:\\.|[^'\\\r\n])*' |
+      [^\r\n,;}&]{0,2048}
+    )
+    """
+)
+JSON_KEY_RE = re.compile(r'"(?P<key>[^"]{1,512})"(?P<spacing>[\x00-\x20\x7f]{0,256}):')
+MULTILINE_ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(
+    r"""(?mx)
+    (?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])
+    (?P<key_quote>["']?)
+    (?P<key>\.?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127})
+    (?P=key_quote)
+    [ \t]{0,64}(?:\r?\n[ \t]{0,64}){0,4}
+    (?P<separator>[:=])
+    [ \t]{0,64}(?:\r?\n[ \t]{0,64}){1,4}
+    (?P<value>[^\r\n,;}&]{1,2048})
+    """
+)
+CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE = re.compile(r"(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])|(?<=[A-Z])(?=[A-Z][a-z])")
+CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic|token)\s+"
+    r"(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}\b)(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]*[0-9+/_=.-])"
+    r"[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}"
+)
+STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE)
+    for pattern in (
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])sk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])[rs]k_(?:test|live)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])whsec_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:gta|gto|gitea|forgejo)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])ya29\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])oy2[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])SK[0-9a-f]{32}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])",
+        r"-----BEGIN\s+[A-Z0-9 ][A-Z0-9 -]{1,62}-----",
+        r"\bssh-(?:rsa|ed25519|dss|ecdsa-[A-Za-z0-9-]+)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}",
+        r"https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Za-z0-9/_-]{20,}",
+        r"https://(?:discord(?:app)?\.com)/api/webhooks/[0-9]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,}",
+        r"https://[^\s/]*webhook\.office\.com/[^\s]{20,}",
+    )
+)
+HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])[A-Za-z0-9+/_=-]{48,16384}(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"
+)
+PROSE_LEAD_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "add allow change check describe document ensure explain fix handle keep preserve "
+    "prevent reject remove review support test validate".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "auth authentication authorization auths basic bearer credential credentials "
+    "passwd password pat private sas secret secrets sig signature signing token tokens "
+    "webhook".split()
+)
+KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS = frozenset(
+    "access account api auth client encryption identity private registry secret service "
+    "session signing ssh".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS = frozenset(
+    "accessid accesskeyid accountkey clientemail clientid connectionstring "
+    "dockerconfigjson privatekeyid serviceaccountkey sharedaccesssignature".split()
+)
+SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES = tuple(
+    "accesskey accesskeyid accountkey apikey authkey clientemail clientid clientkey "
+    "connectionstring credential credentials encryptionkey identitykey password passwd "
+    "privatekeyid privatekey secret secretkey servicekey sessionkey signature signingkey "
+    "sshkey token webhook".split()
+)
+
+
+class PolicyError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a requested Forgejo operation exceeds the safe boundary."""
+
+
+def _validate_repo(repo: str) -> str:
+    if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo) or repo in {".", ".."}:
+        raise PolicyError("repository name is outside the Atlas allowlist")
+    return repo
+
+
+def _reject_forbidden(value: object, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    """Reject exact runtime credentials before invoking helpers or the network."""
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} contains runtime credential material")
+
+
+def _validate_ref_bounds(
+    value: object, name: str, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Reject oversized or non-encodable refs before invoking Git."""
+    _reject_forbidden(value, name, forbidden)
+    if not value or len(value) > MAX_REF_CHARACTERS:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe branch-name limit")
+    try:
+        encoded = value.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} is not valid UTF-8 text") from exc
+    if len(encoded) > MAX_REF_UTF8_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe UTF-8 branch-name limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_ref(
+    value: object, name: str, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> str:
+    """Validate the complete Git ref grammar using Git itself."""
+    value = _validate_ref_bounds(value, name, forbidden=forbidden)
+    if value.startswith("-"):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a same-repository branch name")
+    if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [GIT_BIN, "check-ref-format", f"refs/heads/{value}"],
+        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a safe same-repository branch name")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_sha(value: object, name: str = "head SHA") -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be a full Git SHA-1")
+    return value.lower()
+
+
+def _validate_pr_number_segment(value: object) -> int:
+    """Validate a canonical bounded pull-request number from an API path."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, str)
+        or len(value) > MAX_PR_NUMBER_DIGITS
+        or not re.fullmatch(r"[1-9][0-9]*", value)
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request number must use bounded canonical ASCII digits")
+    number = int(value)
+    if number > MAX_PR_NUMBER:
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request number is outside its allowed range")
+    return number
+
+
+def _validate_pr_number(value: object) -> int:
+    """Validate a bounded pull-request number returned by Forgejo."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, int)
+        or isinstance(value, bool)
+        or not 1 <= value <= MAX_PR_NUMBER
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Forgejo omitted a valid pull-request number")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_text(
+    value: object,
+    name: str,
+    maximum: int,
+    maximum_bytes: int,
+    *,
+    required: bool,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must be text")
+    if required and not value.strip():
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} must not be empty")
+    try:
+        encoded = value.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} is not valid UTF-8 text") from exc
+    if len(value) > maximum or len(encoded) > maximum_bytes or "\x00" in value:
+        raise PolicyError(f"{name} exceeds the safe request limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _normalized_key(value: str) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], str]:
+    """Split camelCase and separator-based assignment keys into semantics."""
+    separated = CAMEL_BOUNDARY_RE.sub(" ", value.strip(".\"'"))
+    words = tuple(re.findall(r"[A-Za-z0-9]+", separated.lower()))
+    return words, "".join(words)
+
+
+def _is_sensitive_key(value: str) -> bool:
+    words, compact = _normalized_key(value)
+    word_set = set(words)
+    if word_set & SENSITIVE_KEY_WORDS:
+        return True
+    if compact in SENSITIVE_COMPACT_KEYS:
+        return True
+    if compact.endswith(SENSITIVE_COMPACT_SUFFIXES):
+        return True
+    if "key" in word_set and word_set & KEY_MODIFIER_WORDS:
+        return True
+    if {"client", "email"} <= word_set or {"client", "id"} <= word_set:
+        return True
+    if {"access", "id"} <= word_set or {"connection", "string"} <= word_set:
+        return True
+    return compact.endswith("configjson")
+
+
+def _strip_assignment_value(value: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    stripped = value.strip()
+    quoted = (
+        len(stripped) >= 2 and stripped[0] in {'"', "'"} and stripped[-1] == stripped[0]
+    )
+    if quoted:
+        stripped = stripped[1:-1].strip()
+    return stripped, quoted
+
+
+def _looks_like_prose(value: str) -> bool:
+    words = re.findall(r"[A-Za-z]+(?:[-'][A-Za-z]+)?", value)
+    if len(words) < 2:
+        return False
+    if re.search(r"[$`{}\[\]\\@/:=+_]", value):
+        return False
+    return words[0].lower() in PROSE_LEAD_WORDS
+
+
+def _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(value: str) -> bool:
+    stripped, quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
+    if not stripped:
+        return False
+    if quoted or stripped.startswith(("{", "[", "|", ">", "!!", "&", "*")):
+        return True
+    if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(stripped):
+        return True
+    if any(pattern.search(stripped) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+        return True
+    if re.search(r"(?:https?://|[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+)", stripped):
+        return True
+    if re.search(r"(?:\$\{|\$\(|\\[nrt]|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,3}\Z)", stripped):
+        return True
+    return not _looks_like_prose(stripped)
+
+
+def _is_structural_credential_assignment(key: str, value: str) -> bool:
+    words, compact_key = _normalized_key(key)
+    stripped, _quoted = _strip_assignment_value(value)
+    _value_words, compact_value = _normalized_key(stripped)
+    return (
+        compact_key == "type" and compact_value in {"serviceaccount", "credential"}
+    ) or ("service" in words and "account" in words and bool(stripped))
+
+
+def _decode_json_key(raw: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    """Decode one bounded JSON key without silently accepting bad escapes."""
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(f'"{raw}"')
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeError):
+        approximate = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+", "_", raw.replace("\\", ""))
+        return approximate, False
+    return decoded if isinstance(decoded, str) else "", True
+
+
+def _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(
+    value: object, *, depth: int = 0, nodes: list[int] | None = None
+) -> bool:
+    """Walk one decoded JSON value with explicit depth and node ceilings."""
+    if nodes is None:
+        nodes = [0]
+    nodes[0] += 1
+    if nodes[0] > MAX_JSON_NODES or depth > MAX_JSON_DEPTH:
+        raise PolicyError("structured pull-request text exceeds the scan limit")
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        for key, assigned in value.items():
+            if not isinstance(key, str):
+                continue
+            if _is_sensitive_key(key):
+                return True
+            assigned_text = assigned if isinstance(assigned, str) else ""
+            if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned_text):
+                return True
+            if _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(
+                assigned, depth=depth + 1, nodes=nodes
+            ):
+                return True
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        return any(
+            _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(item, depth=depth + 1, nodes=nodes)
+            for item in value
+        )
+    return False
+
+
+def _decoded_json_documents(value: str):
+    """Yield bounded embedded JSON object or array fragments."""
+    decoder = json.JSONDecoder()
+    index = 0
+    attempts = 0
+    while attempts < MAX_JSON_DOCUMENTS:
+        positions = [
+            position for token in "{[" if (position := value.find(token, index)) >= 0
+        ]
+        if not positions:
+            return
+        start = min(positions)
+        attempts += 1
+        try:
+            document, end = decoder.raw_decode(value, start)
+        except (json.JSONDecodeError, RecursionError, ValueError):
+            index = start + 1
+            continue
+        yield document
+        index = max(end, start + 1)
+    if "{" in value[index:] or "[" in value[index:]:
+        raise PolicyError("structured pull-request text exceeds the scan limit")
+
+
+def _has_structured_sensitive_assignment(value: str) -> bool:
+    """Detect bounded JSON and multiline YAML/env credential assignments."""
+    for candidate in JSON_KEY_RE.finditer(value):
+        decoded, valid = _decode_json_key(candidate.group("key"))
+        if _is_sensitive_key(decoded):
+            return True
+        if not valid and _is_sensitive_key(candidate.group("key").replace("\\", "")):
+            return True
+    for candidate in MULTILINE_ASSIGNMENT_RE.finditer(value):
+        key = candidate.group("key")
+        assigned = candidate.group("value")
+        if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned) or (
+            _is_sensitive_key(key) and _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(assigned)
+        ):
+            return True
+    return any(
+        _json_value_has_sensitive_assignment(item)
+        for item in _decoded_json_documents(value)
+    )
+
+
+def _has_high_entropy_token(value: str) -> bool:
+    for match in HIGH_ENTROPY_TOKEN_RE.finditer(value):
+        token = match.group(0)
+        if len(token) > 256:
+            return True
+        groups = sum(
+            bool(re.search(pattern, token))
+            for pattern in (r"[a-z]", r"[A-Z]", r"[0-9]", r"[+/_=-]")
+        )
+        counts = Counter(token)
+        entropy = -sum(
+            (count / len(token)) * log2(count / len(token)) for count in counts.values()
+        )
+        if groups >= 3 and entropy >= 4.0:
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def _reject_sensitive(value: str, name: str, forbidden: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    if any(secret and secret in value for secret in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} contains runtime credential material")
+    if CREDENTIAL_SCHEME_RE.search(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if _has_structured_sensitive_assignment(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    for candidate in ASSIGNMENT_RE.finditer(value):
+        key = candidate.group("key")
+        assigned = candidate.group("value")
+        if _is_structural_credential_assignment(key, assigned) or (
+            _is_sensitive_key(key) and _looks_sensitive_assignment_value(assigned)
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+    if _has_high_entropy_token(value):
+        raise PolicyError(f"pull-request {name} resembles credential material")
+
+
+def _validate_body(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
+    body = _validate_text(value, "body", 16384, MAX_BODY_UTF8_BYTES, required=False)
+    _reject_sensitive(body, "body", forbidden)
+    return body
+
+
+def _draft_title(value: object, *, forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> str:
+    """Return a bounded, secret-screened Gitea draft title."""
+    title = _validate_text(
+        value, "title", 251, MAX_TITLE_UTF8_BYTES, required=True
+    ).strip()
+    _reject_sensitive(title, "title", forbidden)
+    for prefix in ("WIP:", "[WIP]"):
+        if title.upper().startswith(prefix):
+            title = title[len(prefix) :].lstrip()
+            break
+    if not title:
+        raise PolicyError("title must contain text after the draft prefix")
+    return DRAFT_TITLE_PREFIX + title
+
+
+def _validate_query(target: urllib.parse.SplitResult, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
+    """Accept only short canonical ASCII query strings with bounded pagination."""
+    raw = target.query
+    if (
+        len(raw) > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH
+        or not raw.isascii()
+        or not CANONICAL_QUERY_RE.fullmatch(raw)
+        or "%" in raw
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API query must use short canonical ASCII form")
+    try:
+        pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(raw, keep_blank_values=True, strict_parsing=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("invalid API query") from exc
+    if len(pairs) > MAX_QUERY_ITEMS:
+        raise PolicyError("too many API query parameters")
+    if len({key for key, _ in pairs}) != len(pairs):
+        raise PolicyError("duplicate API query parameters are not allowed")
+    if any(
+        not key
+        or len(key) > MAX_QUERY_KEY_LENGTH
+        or len(value) > MAX_QUERY_VALUE_LENGTH
+        for key, value in pairs
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("API query key or value exceeds its safe limit")
+    if any(key not in allowed for key, _ in pairs):
+        raise PolicyError("API query parameter is outside the read allowlist")
+    values = dict(pairs)
+    for name in ("page", "limit"):
+        if name not in values:
+            continue
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", values[name]):
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use ASCII decimal digits")
+        number = int(values[name])
+        if values[name] != str(number):
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} must use canonical ASCII decimal form")
+        ceiling = MAX_PAGE if name == "page" else MAX_LIMIT
+        if not 1 <= number <= ceiling:
+            raise PolicyError(f"{name} is outside its allowed range")
+    if "state" in values and values["state"] not in {"open", "closed", "all"}:
+        raise PolicyError("pull-request state is invalid")

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/receive_pack_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Validate Git receive-pack requests and scan pushed object content.
+
+Ref commands may only create new namespaced feature branches.  Every pushed
+object is then inflated in quarantine and its decompressed payload scanned,
+so credentials cannot ride through the broker inside compressed pack data.
+The screening is a fail-closed accident barrier for credential-shaped
+content: exact runtime-token forms, private keys, SSH key material, and
+known provider token formats.  Entropy heuristics are deliberately excluded
+so SOPS ciphertext, pinned digests, and lock files remain pushable; a short
+secret disguised as prose is not reliably detectable and must never be
+supplied by callers.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import re
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+import git_pack_objects
+from gitea_api_policy import (
+    STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS,
+    PolicyError,
+    _validate_ref,
+)
+
+ZERO_SHA = b"0" * 40
+MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS = 16
+SCAN_CHUNK = 256 * 1024
+SCAN_CARRY = 8 * 1024
+FEATURE_REF_RE = re.compile(
+    r"refs/heads/(?:(?:feature|fix|hermes|handoff)/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,190})\Z"
+)
+PKT_HEADER_RE = re.compile(rb"[0-9a-f]{4}\Z")
+CONTENT_SECRET_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(pattern.pattern.encode("ascii"), re.IGNORECASE)
+    for pattern in STANDALONE_SECRET_PATTERNS
+) + (
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AGE-SECRET-KEY-1[A-Z0-9]{20,}"),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)PuTTY-User-Key-File"),
+    re.compile(
+        rb"(?im)^[ \t]*authorization[ \t]*:[ \t]*(?:basic|bearer|token)[ \t]+"
+        rb"(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]*[0-9+/=.-])[A-Za-z0-9+/_=.:-]{8,}"
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def _read_pkt_line(stream: BinaryIO) -> bytes | None:
+    """Read one pkt-line; None marks the flush packet before the pack."""
+    header = stream.read(4)
+    if not header:
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack request omitted its command terminator")
+    if not PKT_HEADER_RE.fullmatch(header):
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+    size = int(header, 16)
+    if size == 0:
+        return None
+    if size < 4:
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+    value = stream.read(size - 4)
+    if len(value) != size - 4:
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack command framing is invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _validate_command(line: bytes, token: str, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> None:
+    """Permit only creation of one new, namespaced feature branch."""
+    if any(form in line for form in forbidden):
+        raise PolicyError("Git request contains runtime credential material")
+    command = line.rstrip(b"\n").split(b"\x00", 1)[0]
+    fields = command.split(b" ")
+    if len(fields) != 3 or not all(
+        re.fullmatch(rb"[0-9a-f]{40}", item) for item in fields[:2]
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack ref command is invalid")
+    old_sha, new_sha, raw_ref = fields
+    if old_sha != ZERO_SHA or new_sha == ZERO_SHA:
+        raise PolicyError("Git broker permits only new feature-branch creation")
+    try:
+        ref = raw_ref.decode("ascii")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise PolicyError("Git ref must be canonical ASCII") from exc
+    if not FEATURE_REF_RE.fullmatch(ref):
+        raise PolicyError("Git push is limited to namespaced feature branches")
+    _validate_ref(ref.removeprefix("refs/heads/"), "head", forbidden=(token,))
+
+
+def _scan_payload(payload: BinaryIO, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> None:
+    """Scan one decompressed object payload across chunk boundaries."""
+    carry = b""
+    while True:
+        chunk = payload.read(SCAN_CHUNK)
+        if not chunk:
+            return
+        window = carry + chunk
+        if any(form in window for form in forbidden):
+            raise PolicyError("Git push contains runtime credential material")
+        if any(pattern.search(window) for pattern in CONTENT_SECRET_PATTERNS):
+            raise PolicyError("Git push contains credential-shaped content")
+        carry = window[-SCAN_CARRY:]
+
+
+def _scan_pack(stream: BinaryIO, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> None:
+    objects = git_pack_objects.unpack_objects(stream)
+    try:
+        if stream.read(1):
+            raise PolicyError("Git request has bytes after its pack")
+        for _type_code, payload in objects:
+            _scan_payload(payload, forbidden)
+    finally:
+        for _type_code, payload in objects:
+            payload.close()
+
+
+def validate_receive_pack(
+    body: bytes | BinaryIO, token: str, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]
+) -> None:
+    """Validate one whole receive-pack request: commands, pack, and content."""
+    stream = io.BytesIO(body) if isinstance(body, bytes) else body
+    stream.seek(0)
+    try:
+        commands = 0
+        while True:
+            line = _read_pkt_line(stream)
+            if line is None:
+                break
+            _validate_command(line, token, forbidden)
+            commands += 1
+            if commands > MAX_PUSH_COMMANDS:
+                raise PolicyError("Git push contains too many ref commands")
+        if commands == 0:
+            raise PolicyError("Git receive-pack request has no ref command")
+        _scan_pack(stream, forbidden)
+    finally:
+        stream.seek(0)
+
+
+def scan_loose_object(value: bytes, forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...]) -> int:
+    """Scan one quarantined loose object and return its parsed type code."""
+    type_code, payload = git_pack_objects.parse_loose_object(value)
+    _scan_payload(io.BytesIO(payload), forbidden)
+    return type_code

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Serve the credential-isolated Atlas API and Git smart-HTTP boundary."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import json
+import re
+import socket
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+import deadline_http
+from gitea_api import (
+    CANONICAL_BASE_URL,
+    PolicyError,
+    create_draft,
+    read,
+    read_token,
+)
+from gitea_api_policy import _reject_forbidden, _validate_repo
+from receive_pack_scan import validate_receive_pack
+from scm_broker_io import RejectRedirect, response_status as _status, spool_response
+from scm_broker_server import AbsoluteHeaderDeadlineMixin, BoundedThreadingHTTPServer
+
+BROKER_PORT = 9081
+GIT_USER = "hermes-automation"
+MAX_CONTROL_BODY = 64 * 1024
+MAX_GIT_REQUEST = 128 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_GIT_RESPONSE = 128 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_HEADERS = 32
+MAX_HEADER_BYTES = 16 * 1024
+SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT = 1024 * 1024
+STREAM_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
+INBOUND_HEADER_TIMEOUT = 10.0
+INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT = 120.0
+UPSTREAM_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 300.0
+GIT_PATH_RE = re.compile(
+    r"/git/atlas/(?P<repo>[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99})\.git/"
+    r"(?P<operation>info/refs|git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack)\Z"
+)
+
+
+def _read_bounded(
+    stream,
+    maximum: int,
+    length: int | None = None,
+    *,
+    deadline: float | None = None,
+    set_timeout=None,
+) -> bytes:
+    if length is not None and not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    wanted = maximum + 1 if length is None else length
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    total = 0
+    while total < wanted:
+        if deadline is not None:
+            remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request body deadline exceeded")
+            if set_timeout is not None:
+                set_timeout(remaining)
+        chunk = stream.read(min(STREAM_CHUNK, wanted - total))
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        chunks.append(chunk)
+        total += len(chunk)
+    value = b"".join(chunks)
+    if len(value) > maximum or (length is not None and len(value) != length):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    return value
+
+
+def _spool_bounded(
+    stream,
+    maximum: int,
+    length: int,
+    *,
+    token: str,
+    context: str,
+    deadline: float,
+    set_timeout=None,
+) -> tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    """Copy a fixed-length exchange through a bounded-memory disk spool."""
+    if not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - caller owns returned spool
+        max_size=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT, dir="/tmp"
+    )
+    remaining = length
+    forms = _credential_forms(token)
+    carry = b""
+    try:
+        while remaining:
+            remaining_time = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining_time <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request body deadline exceeded")
+            if set_timeout is not None:
+                set_timeout(remaining_time)
+            chunk = stream.read(min(STREAM_CHUNK, remaining))
+            if not chunk:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request body ended early")
+            candidate = carry + chunk
+            if any(form in candidate for form in forms):
+                raise PolicyError(f"{context} contains runtime credential material")
+            width = max(len(form) for form in forms) - 1
+            carry = candidate[-width:] if width else b""
+            spool.write(chunk)
+            remaining -= len(chunk)
+        spool.seek(0)
+        return spool, length
+    except Exception:
+        spool.close()
+        raise
+
+
+def _spool_response(
+    response, maximum: int, token: str, deadline_seconds: float
+) -> tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    return spool_response(
+        response,
+        maximum,
+        _credential_forms(token),
+        memory_limit=SPOOL_MEMORY_LIMIT,
+        chunk_size=STREAM_CHUNK,
+        deadline_seconds=deadline_seconds,
+    )
+
+
+def _load_json(handler: BaseHTTPRequestHandler) -> dict[str, object]:
+    if handler.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding"):
+        raise PolicyError("chunked broker control requests are not allowed")
+    if handler.headers.get_content_type() != "application/json":
+        raise PolicyError("broker control request must be JSON")
+    length = _content_length(handler.headers, MAX_CONTROL_BODY)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT
+    value = json.loads(
+        _read_bounded(
+            handler.rfile,
+            MAX_CONTROL_BODY,
+            length,
+            deadline=deadline,
+            set_timeout=handler.connection.settimeout,
+        )
+    )
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise PolicyError("broker control request must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def _git_target(raw: str) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
+    if (
+        not raw.isascii()
+        or any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in raw)
+        or "%" in raw
+        or "\\" in raw
+        or len(raw) > 512
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is not canonical ASCII")
+    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(raw)
+    canonical = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(("", "", target.path, target.query, ""))
+    if canonical != raw:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is not in exact canonical form")
+    if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target must be relative")
+    match = GIT_PATH_RE.fullmatch(target.path)
+    if not match:
+        raise PolicyError("Git target is outside the Atlas allowlist")
+    repo = _validate_repo(match.group("repo"))
+    operation = match.group("operation")
+    query = target.query
+    if operation == "info/refs":
+        if query not in {"service=git-upload-pack", "service=git-receive-pack"}:
+            raise PolicyError("Git discovery service is outside the allowlist")
+        service = query.removeprefix("service=")
+    elif query:
+        raise PolicyError("Git RPC query parameters are not allowed")
+    else:
+        service = operation
+    return repo, operation, service
+
+
+def _content_length(headers: object, maximum: int) -> int:
+    """Parse one short canonical bounded Content-Length header."""
+    raw = headers.get("Content-Length", "")  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw, str)
+        or not raw.isascii()
+        or len(raw) > 10
+        or not raw.isdigit()
+    ):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request length is invalid")
+    length = int(raw)
+    if raw != str(length) or not 0 <= length <= maximum:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM request length is invalid")
+    return length
+
+
+def _credential_forms(token: str) -> tuple[bytes, ...]:
+    basic = base64.b64encode(f"{GIT_USER}:{token}".encode())
+    return token.encode("utf-8"), basic, b"Basic " + basic
+
+
+def _validate_receive_pack(body: bytes | BinaryIO, token: str) -> None:
+    """Permit only vetted new-feature-branch pushes with scanned contents."""
+    validate_receive_pack(body, token, _credential_forms(token))
+
+
+def _guarded_opener(guard: deadline_http.StreamDeadline):
+    """Build an opener whose connection obeys one absolute stream deadline."""
+    return urllib.request.build_opener(RejectRedirect(), *guard.handlers()).open
+
+
+def _upstream_git_request(
+    target: str,
+    *,
+    method: str,
+    body: bytes | BinaryIO | None,
+    content_type: str | None,
+    expected_type: str,
+    token: str,
+    body_length: int | None = None,
+    stream_result: bool = False,
+    opener=None,
+) -> bytes | tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    credentials = base64.b64encode(f"{GIT_USER}:{token}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+    headers = {"Accept": expected_type, "Authorization": f"Basic {credentials}"}
+    if content_type:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = content_type
+    if body is not None:
+        if body_length is None:
+            if not isinstance(body, bytes):
+                raise PolicyError("Git upstream request length is missing")
+            body_length = len(body)
+        headers["Content-Length"] = str(body_length)
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        CANONICAL_BASE_URL + target,
+        data=body,
+        method=method,
+        headers=headers,
+    )
+    # One wall-clock budget covers connect, send, headers, and body read; the
+    # watchdog closes the upstream socket if any phase overstays it.
+    guard = deadline_http.StreamDeadline(UPSTREAM_DEADLINE_SECONDS)
+    try:
+        open_upstream = opener if opener is not None else _guarded_opener(guard)
+        with open_upstream(request, timeout=guard.remaining()) as response:
+            if _status(response) != 200:
+                raise PolicyError("Git upstream returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+            if response.headers.get_content_type() != expected_type:
+                raise PolicyError("Git upstream returned an unexpected response type")
+            result, result_length = _spool_response(
+                response, MAX_GIT_RESPONSE, token, guard.remaining()
+            )
+    finally:
+        guard.cancel()
+    if stream_result:
+        return result, result_length
+    try:
+        return result.read()
+    finally:
+        result.close()
+
+
+class BrokerHandler(AbsoluteHeaderDeadlineMixin, BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Expose only bounded metadata, draft creation, and smart-HTTP Git."""
+
+    server_version = "HermesSCMBroker/1"
+    sys_version = ""
+    header_deadline_seconds = INBOUND_HEADER_TIMEOUT
+
+    def _validate_headers(self) -> None:
+        items = list(self.headers.items())
+        if len(items) > MAX_HEADERS:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM request has too many headers")
+        total = 0
+        for name, value in items:
+            if not name.isascii() or not value.isascii():
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request headers must be ASCII")
+            total += len(name) + len(value) + 4
+            if any(ord(character) < 32 and character != "\t" for character in value):
+                raise PolicyError("SCM request header contains controls")
+        if total > MAX_HEADER_BYTES:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM request headers exceed the safe limit")
+        if len(self.headers.get_all("Content-Length", [])) > 1:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM request has duplicate Content-Length")
+
+    def _stream(
+        self, status: int, content_type: str, body: BinaryIO, length: int
+    ) -> None:
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", content_type)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(length))
+        self.end_headers()
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT
+        while True:
+            chunk = body.read(STREAM_CHUNK)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM response write deadline exceeded")
+            self.connection.settimeout(remaining)
+            self.wfile.write(chunk)
+
+    def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: object) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, status: int, body: bytes) -> None:
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def _reject(self, status: int = 400) -> None:
+        self._json(status, b'{"error":"request rejected"}')
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._validate_headers()
+            if self.path == "/healthz":
+                self._json(200, b'{"status":"ok"}')
+                return
+            repo, operation, service = _git_target(self.path)
+            if operation != "info/refs":
+                raise PolicyError("Git RPC requires POST")
+            token = read_token()
+            _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+            expected = f"application/x-{service}-advertisement"
+            streamed = _upstream_git_request(
+                f"/atlas/{repo}.git/info/refs?service={service}",
+                method="GET",
+                body=None,
+                content_type=None,
+                expected_type=expected,
+                token=token,
+                stream_result=True,
+            )
+            body, length = streamed
+            try:
+                self._stream(200, expected, body, length)
+            finally:
+                body.close()
+        except (
+            OSError,
+            PolicyError,
+            socket.timeout,
+            urllib.error.URLError,
+            ValueError,
+        ):
+            self._reject()
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._validate_headers()
+            self.connection.settimeout(INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT)
+            if self.path in {"/v1/metadata", "/v1/drafts"}:
+                self._control()
+            else:
+                self._git_rpc()
+        except (
+            OSError,
+            PolicyError,
+            socket.timeout,
+            urllib.error.URLError,
+            ValueError,
+            json.JSONDecodeError,
+        ):
+            self._reject()
+
+    def _control(self) -> None:
+        data = _load_json(self)
+        token = read_token()
+        if self.path == "/v1/metadata":
+            if set(data) != {"path"} or not isinstance(data["path"], str):
+                raise PolicyError("metadata request fields are invalid")
+            result = read(data["path"], token=token)
+        else:
+            expected = {"base", "body", "head", "head_sha", "repo", "title"}
+            if set(data) != expected or not all(
+                isinstance(data[key], str) for key in expected
+            ):
+                raise PolicyError("draft request fields are invalid")
+            result = create_draft(token=token, **data)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        if token.encode("utf-8") in result:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM upstream reflected credential material")
+        self._json(200, result)
+
+    def _git_rpc(self) -> None:
+        repo, operation, service = _git_target(self.path)
+        if (
+            operation not in {"git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"}
+            or service != operation
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError("Git RPC operation is outside the allowlist")
+        expected_request = f"application/x-{service}-request"
+        if self.headers.get_content_type() != expected_request or self.headers.get(
+            "Transfer-Encoding"
+        ):
+            raise PolicyError("Git RPC request type is invalid")
+        length = _content_length(self.headers, MAX_GIT_REQUEST)
+        token = read_token()
+        _reject_forbidden(repo, "repository", (token,))
+        body, body_length = _spool_bounded(
+            self.rfile,
+            MAX_GIT_REQUEST,
+            length,
+            token=token,
+            context="Git request",
+            deadline=time.monotonic() + INBOUND_BODY_TIMEOUT,
+            set_timeout=self.connection.settimeout,
+        )
+        try:
+            if service == "git-receive-pack":
+                _validate_receive_pack(body, token)
+            expected = f"application/x-{service}-result"
+            streamed = _upstream_git_request(
+                f"/atlas/{repo}.git/{service}",
+                method="POST",
+                body=body,
+                body_length=body_length,
+                content_type=expected_request,
+                expected_type=expected,
+                token=token,
+                stream_result=True,
+            )
+            result, result_length = streamed
+            try:
+                self._stream(200, expected, result, result_length)
+            finally:
+                result.close()
+        finally:
+            body.close()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--listen", default="0.0.0.0")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=BROKER_PORT)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    BoundedThreadingHTTPServer((args.listen, args.port), BrokerHandler).serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Call the credential-isolated Hermes SCM broker over its fixed cluster origin."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import urllib.request
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+import deadline_http
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+BROKER_ORIGIN = "http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081"
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+
+def _open(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int):
+    """Open one broker exchange under a killable absolute deadline.
+
+    The helper process keeps every request on its fixed in-cluster origin by
+    rejecting redirects before they are followed.
+    """
+    return deadline_http.open_bounded(
+        request, maximum=MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, timeout=timeout
+    )
+
+
+def request(
+    endpoint: str,
+    payload: dict[str, object],
+    *,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _open,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Send one bounded broker operation without any repository credential."""
+    if endpoint not in {"/v1/metadata", "/v1/drafts"}:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker operation is outside the client allowlist")
+    body = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    if len(body) > 64 * 1024:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker request exceeds the safe size limit")
+    outgoing = urllib.request.Request(
+        BROKER_ORIGIN + endpoint,
+        data=body,
+        method="POST",
+        headers={
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": "hermes-scm-broker-client/1",
+        },
+    )
+    with opener(outgoing, timeout=30) as response:  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        status = getattr(response, "status", None)
+        if status is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+            status = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if status != 200:
+            raise PolicyError("SCM broker returned an unexpected HTTP status")
+        content_type = response.headers.get_content_type()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise PolicyError("SCM broker returned an unexpected response type")
+        result = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    if len(result) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+        raise PolicyError("SCM broker response exceeds the safe size limit")
+    json.loads(result)
+    return result
+
+
+def read(path: str, *, opener: Callable[..., object] = _open) -> bytes:
+    """Read explicitly allowed Atlas metadata through the broker."""
+    return request("/v1/metadata", {"path": path}, opener=opener)
+
+
+def create_draft(
+    repo: str,
+    *,
+    base: str,
+    head: str,
+    head_sha: str,
+    title: str,
+    body: str,
+    opener: Callable[..., object] = _open,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Create one verified draft through the broker for human review."""
+    return request(
+        "/v1/drafts",
+        {
+            "base": base,
+            "body": body,
+            "head": head,
+            "head_sha": head_sha,
+            "repo": repo,
+            "title": title,
+        },
+        opener=opener,
+    )

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_io.py

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Bounded-memory stream helpers for the Hermes SCM broker."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.request
+from typing import BinaryIO
+
+from gitea_api_policy import PolicyError
+
+
+class RejectRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Reject every upstream redirect before credentials can be forwarded."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        raise PolicyError("SCM upstream redirects are not allowed")
+
+
+def response_status(response: object) -> int | None:
+    """Read an HTTP status from either urllib response interface."""
+    value = getattr(response, "status", None)
+    if value is None and hasattr(response, "getcode"):
+        value = response.getcode()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    return value
+
+
+def spool_response(
+    response,
+    maximum: int,
+    forbidden: tuple[bytes, ...],
+    *,
+    memory_limit: int,
+    chunk_size: int,
+    deadline_seconds: float,
+) -> tuple[BinaryIO, int]:
+    """Spool an upstream response to disk while scanning chunk boundaries."""
+    spool = tempfile.SpooledTemporaryFile(  # noqa: SIM115 - caller owns returned spool
+        max_size=memory_limit, dir="/tmp"
+    )
+    carry = b""
+    total = 0
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + deadline_seconds
+    try:
+        while True:
+            remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM upstream response deadline exceeded")
+            raw = getattr(getattr(response, "fp", None), "raw", None)
+            sock = getattr(raw, "_sock", raw)
+            if hasattr(sock, "settimeout"):
+                sock.settimeout(remaining)
+            chunk = response.read(chunk_size)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            total += len(chunk)
+            if total > maximum:
+                raise PolicyError("SCM upstream response exceeds the safe size limit")
+            candidate = carry + chunk
+            if any(value in candidate for value in forbidden):
+                raise PolicyError(
+                    "Git upstream response contains runtime credential material"
+                )
+            width = max(len(value) for value in forbidden) - 1
+            carry = candidate[-width:] if width else b""
+            spool.write(chunk)
+        spool.seek(0)
+        return spool, total
+    except Exception:
+        spool.close()
+        raise

services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Concurrency-bounded threaded HTTP server for the Hermes SCM broker."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+import time
+from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS = 3
+
+
+class _AbsoluteDeadlineReader:
+    """Read header lines against one wall-clock deadline, not idle timeouts."""
+
+    def __init__(self, stream, connection):
+        self._stream = stream
+        self._connection = connection
+        self._deadline: float | None = None
+
+    def begin(self, timeout: float) -> None:
+        self._deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+
+    def end(self) -> None:
+        self._deadline = None
+
+    def readline(self, limit: int = -1) -> bytes:
+        if self._deadline is None:
+            return self._stream.readline(limit)
+        value = bytearray()
+        while limit < 0 or len(value) < limit:
+            remaining = self._deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                raise TimeoutError("absolute SCM header deadline exceeded")
+            self._connection.settimeout(remaining)
+            character = self._stream.read(1)
+            if not character:
+                break
+            value.extend(character)
+            if character == b"\n":
+                break
+        return bytes(value)
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name: str):
+        return getattr(self._stream, name)
+
+
+class AbsoluteHeaderDeadlineMixin:
+    """Apply an absolute request-line plus header deadline to HTTP handlers."""
+
+    header_deadline_seconds = 10.0
+
+    def setup(self) -> None:
+        super().setup()
+        self._header_reader = _AbsoluteDeadlineReader(self.rfile, self.connection)
+        self.rfile = self._header_reader
+
+    def handle_one_request(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._header_reader.begin(self.header_deadline_seconds)
+            try:
+                self.raw_requestline = self.rfile.readline(65537)
+                if len(self.raw_requestline) > 65536:
+                    self.requestline = ""
+                    self.request_version = ""
+                    self.command = ""
+                    self.send_error(414)
+                    return
+                if not self.raw_requestline:
+                    self.close_connection = True
+                    return
+                if not self.parse_request():
+                    return
+            finally:
+                self._header_reader.end()
+            method_name = "do_" + self.command
+            if not hasattr(self, method_name):
+                self.send_error(501, "Unsupported method")
+                return
+            getattr(self, method_name)()
+            self.wfile.flush()
+        except TimeoutError:
+            self.close_connection = True
+
+
+class BoundedThreadingHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    """Cap active handlers so large Git exchanges cannot exhaust memory."""
+
+    daemon_threads = True
+    block_on_close = True
+    request_queue_size = 16
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        self._slots = threading.BoundedSemaphore(MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def process_request(self, request, client_address) -> None:
+        if not self._slots.acquire(blocking=False):
+            try:
+                request.sendall(
+                    b"HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\n"
+                    b"Connection: close\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n"
+                )
+            finally:
+                self.shutdown_request(request)
+            return
+        try:
+            super().process_request(request, client_address)
+        except Exception:
+            self._slots.release()
+            self.shutdown_request(request)
+            raise
+
+    def process_request_thread(self, request, client_address) -> None:
+        try:
+            super().process_request_thread(request, client_address)
+        finally:
+            self._slots.release()

services/hermes/scripts/gitea_api.py

@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Call the private Atlas Gitea API through a runtime-only token boundary."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://scm.bstein.dev"
-DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
-ALLOWED_METHODS = ("GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE")
-
-
-def read_token(path: Path = DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE) -> str:
-    """Read and validate the token from its in-memory Vault projection."""
-    token = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-    if not token:
-        raise ValueError(f"runtime credential is empty: {path}")
-    return token
-
-
-def api_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
-    """Return a same-origin Gitea API URL for a validated API path."""
-    base = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url.rstrip("/"))
-    target = urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)
-    if base.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not base.netloc:
-        raise ValueError("GITEA_BASE_URL must be an absolute HTTP(S) URL")
-    if target.scheme or target.netloc or target.fragment:
-        raise ValueError("API path must be relative to the configured Gitea origin")
-    if not target.path.startswith("/api/v1/"):
-        raise ValueError("API path must start with /api/v1/")
-    return urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
-        (base.scheme, base.netloc, target.path, target.query, "")
-    )
-
-
-def build_request(
-    method: str,
-    path: str,
-    *,
-    base_url: str,
-    token: str,
-    data: object | None = None,
-) -> urllib.request.Request:
-    """Build one authenticated request without placing the token in its URL."""
-    payload = None
-    if data is not None:
-        payload = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    return urllib.request.Request(
-        api_url(base_url, path),
-        data=payload,
-        method=method,
-        headers={
-            "Accept": "application/json",
-            "Authorization": f"token {token}",
-            "Content-Type": "application/json",
-            "User-Agent": "hermes-atlas-operator/1",
-        },
-    )
-
-
-def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
-    """Parse a bounded method, API path, and optional JSON request body."""
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
-        description="Call the Atlas Gitea API using the runtime Vault token."
-    )
-    parser.add_argument("method", choices=ALLOWED_METHODS)
-    parser.add_argument("path", help="Gitea path beginning with /api/v1/")
-    data_group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
-    data_group.add_argument("--data-json", help="JSON object/array request body")
-    data_group.add_argument(
-        "--data-file", type=Path, help="path to a JSON request body"
-    )
-    data_group.add_argument(
-        "--field",
-        action="append",
-        metavar="KEY=VALUE",
-        help=(
-            "repeatable JSON field; bare text remains a string while true, false, "
-            "null, numbers, objects, and arrays are decoded as JSON"
-        ),
-    )
-    return parser.parse_args(argv)
-
-
-def parse_fields(values: list[str]) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Build a JSON object from shell-safe, repeatable key/value arguments."""
-    result: dict[str, object] = {}
-    for value in values:
-        key, separator, raw = value.partition("=")
-        if not separator or not key or any(char.isspace() for char in key):
-            raise ValueError("each --field must be KEY=VALUE with a non-space key")
-        try:
-            result[key] = json.loads(raw)
-        except json.JSONDecodeError:
-            result[key] = raw
-    return result
-
-
-def load_data(args: argparse.Namespace) -> object | None:
-    """Decode the optional JSON body without involving a shell expansion."""
-    if args.data_json is not None:
-        return json.loads(args.data_json)
-    if args.data_file is not None:
-        return json.loads(args.data_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if args.field is not None:
-        return parse_fields(args.field)
-    return None
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    """Execute the request, print only its response body, and return HTTP status."""
-    args = parse_args(argv)
-    try:
-        request = build_request(
-            args.method,
-            args.path,
-            base_url=os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL", DEFAULT_BASE_URL),
-            token=read_token(),
-            data=load_data(args),
-        )
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
-            body = response.read()
-            if body:
-                sys.stdout.buffer.write(body)
-                if not body.endswith(b"\n"):
-                    sys.stdout.buffer.write(b"\n")
-        return 0
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        body = exc.read(65536)
-        print(f"Gitea API returned HTTP {exc.code}", file=sys.stderr)
-        if body:
-            sys.stderr.buffer.write(body)
-            if not body.endswith(b"\n"):
-                sys.stderr.buffer.write(b"\n")
-        return 1
-    except (OSError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        print(f"Gitea API request failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
-        return 1
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scripts/gitea_askpass.sh

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env sh
-set -eu
-
-case "${1:-}" in
-  *Username*)
-    if [ -s /runtime-access/gitea-username ]; then
-      tr -d '\r\n' </runtime-access/gitea-username
-    else
-      printf '%s' hermes-automation
-    fi
-    printf '\n'
-    ;;
-  *Password*)
-    test -s /runtime-access/gitea-token
-    tr -d '\r\n' </runtime-access/gitea-token
-    printf '\n'
-    ;;
-  *) exit 1 ;;
-esac

services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py

@@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ from hermes_model_routing import (
 
 
 CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH = Path("/opt/data/workspace/projects/cassandra")
-CASSANDRA_REMOTE = "https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/cassandra.git"
-DEFAULT_GITEA_TOKEN_PATH = Path("/runtime-access/gitea-token")
+CASSANDRA_REMOTE = (
+    "http://hermes-scm-broker.hermes-scm.svc.cluster.local:9081/"
+    "git/atlas/cassandra.git"
+)
 
 
 def cassandra_workspace() -> Path:
@@ -139,24 +141,8 @@ def bootstrap_cassandra_state(root: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
     return {"state": "ready"}
 
 
-def _gitea_token_path() -> Path:
-    """Return the runtime-only Gitea credential path without reading it."""
-    configured = os.environ.get("HERMES_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", "").strip()
-    return Path(configured) if configured else DEFAULT_GITEA_TOKEN_PATH
-
-
-def _gitea_token_available() -> bool:
-    """Check credential readiness without loading it into process memory."""
-    try:
-        path = _gitea_token_path()
-        return path.is_file() and path.stat().st_size > 0
-    except OSError:
-        return False
-
-
 def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
-    """Clone or fetch Cassandra through the runtime-only askpass credential."""
-    token_available = _gitea_token_available()
+    """Clone or fetch Cassandra through the credential-isolated SCM broker."""
     if shutil.which("git") is None:
         return "git-unavailable"
     child_env = os.environ.copy()
@@ -173,9 +159,7 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
             }
         }
     )
-    child_env["GIT_ASKPASS"] = env_values.get(
-        "GIT_ASKPASS", "/opt/coordinator/gitea_askpass.sh"
-    )
+    child_env.pop("GIT_ASKPASS", None)
     child_env["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"] = "0"
     if (CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH / ".git").exists():
         try:
@@ -232,8 +216,6 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
                     return f"remote-repair-failed-{repaired.returncode}"
         except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
             return "remote-repair-failed"
-        if not token_available:
-            return "ready; fetch skipped until Gitea token is configured"
         command = [
             "git",
             "-C",
@@ -247,8 +229,6 @@ def sync_cassandra_repo(env_values: dict[str, str]) -> str:
         CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         if any(CASSANDRA_BASE_PATH.iterdir()):
             return "unmanaged-nonempty-directory"
-        if not token_available:
-            return "awaiting-gitea-token"
         command = [
             "git",
             "clone",

services/hermes/scripts/jenkins_image_build_trigger.py

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Trigger only the reviewed-main Hermes agent image release job."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import re
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+JENKINS_ORIGIN = "https://ci.bstein.dev"
+JENKINS_BUILD_URL = f"{JENKINS_ORIGIN}/buildByToken/buildWithParameters"
+JOB_NAME = "hermes-agent-image"
+TOKEN_FILE = Path("/runtime-access/jenkins-image-build-token")
+REVISION_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+QUEUE_PATH_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^/queue/item/[0-9]+/?$")
+
+
+class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Keep a queued-build redirect from becoming an unauthorized job read."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, _request, _file, _code, _message, _headers, _url):
+        return None
+
+
+def _open_without_redirect(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int):
+    """Return the Build Token Root response, including its expected HTTP 303."""
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirect())
+    try:
+        return opener.open(request, timeout=timeout)
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        if exc.code == 303:
+            return exc
+        raise
+
+
+def trigger_build(
+    revision: str,
+    *,
+    token_file: Path = TOKEN_FILE,
+    opener=_open_without_redirect,
+) -> dict[str, str | int]:
+    """Post the fixed job parameters using its job-scoped build token."""
+    revision = revision.strip()
+    if not REVISION_PATTERN.fullmatch(revision):
+        raise ValueError("revision must be a lowercase full 40-character commit")
+    token = token_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if not token:
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins image-build token is empty")
+    payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(
+        {
+            "job": JOB_NAME,
+            "token": token,
+            "PUBLISH_IMAGE": "true",
+            "EXPECTED_SOURCE_REVISION": revision,
+            "CONFIRM_PUBLISH": "PUBLISH HERMES AGENT",
+        }
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        JENKINS_BUILD_URL,
+        data=payload,
+        headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
+        method="POST",
+    )
+    with opener(request, timeout=20) as response:
+        status = int(response.status)
+        location = response.headers.get("Location", "")
+    if status not in {201, 303}:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Jenkins trigger returned HTTP {status}")
+    if not location:
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins trigger omitted the queue Location")
+    queue_url = urllib.parse.urljoin(f"{JENKINS_ORIGIN}/", location)
+    parsed_queue = urllib.parse.urlsplit(queue_url)
+    expected_origin = urllib.parse.urlsplit(JENKINS_ORIGIN)
+    if (
+        parsed_queue.scheme != expected_origin.scheme
+        or parsed_queue.netloc != expected_origin.netloc
+        or parsed_queue.query
+        or parsed_queue.fragment
+        or not QUEUE_PATH_PATTERN.fullmatch(parsed_queue.path)
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("Jenkins returned an invalid queue Location")
+    # Never return the submitted URL: its form body contains the job token.
+    queue_path = parsed_queue.path
+    return {
+        "job": JOB_NAME,
+        "queue_path": queue_path,
+        "source_revision": revision,
+        "status": status,
+    }
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    """Validate one revision, trigger the bounded job, and print safe metadata."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("revision", help="reviewed full commit currently on main")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        result = trigger_build(args.revision)
+    except (OSError, ValueError, RuntimeError, urllib.error.URLError) as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"error": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 1
+    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - exercised through main()
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed supplementary-group and host privilege-policy audits."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import stat
+import struct
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from node_account_io import HardeningError, read_regular
+from node_polkit_audit import audit_polkit_policy
+
+
+def _members(field: str, context: str) -> set[str]:
+    if not field:
+        return set()
+    values = field.split(",")
+    if any(not value or value.strip() != value for value in values):
+        raise HardeningError(f"{context} has a malformed member list")
+    if len(values) != len(set(values)):
+        raise HardeningError(f"{context} has duplicate members")
+    return set(values)
+
+
+def audit_membership(
+    account: str, groups: list[list[str]], gshadow: list[list[str]]
+) -> None:
+    """Reject the dedicated account in any supplementary group/admin list."""
+    for record in groups:
+        if account in _members(record[3], f"group {record[0]}"):
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has supplementary group access")
+    for record in gshadow:
+        principals = _members(record[2], f"gshadow {record[0]} admins")
+        principals |= _members(record[3], f"gshadow {record[0]} members")
+        if account in principals:
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has gshadow group access")
+
+
+def _policy_files(host_etc: Path, polkit_share: Path, root_uid: int) -> list[Path]:
+    files: list[Path] = []
+    sudoers = host_etc / "sudoers"
+    if sudoers.exists():
+        files.append(sudoers)
+    roots = (
+        host_etc / "sudoers.d",
+        host_etc / "polkit-1/rules.d",
+        host_etc / "polkit-1/localauthority",
+        polkit_share / "rules.d",
+        polkit_share / "localauthority",
+    )
+    for root in roots:
+        if not root.exists():
+            continue
+        metadata = root.lstat()
+        if (
+            not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode)
+            or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode)
+            or metadata.st_uid != root_uid
+            or stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) & 0o022
+        ):
+            raise HardeningError("unsafe sudo/polkit policy directory")
+        files.extend(path for path in root.rglob("*") if path.is_file())
+    if len(files) > 256:
+        raise HardeningError("too many sudo/polkit policy files")
+    return sorted(files)
+
+
+def _audit_policy_metadata(snapshot, root_uid: int, account_uid: int) -> None:
+    if snapshot.uid != root_uid or snapshot.mode & 0o022:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy metadata permits unsafe mutation")
+    acl = dict(snapshot.xattrs).get("system.posix_acl_access", b"")
+    if not acl:
+        return
+    header = struct.Struct("<I")
+    entry = struct.Struct("<HHI")
+    if len(acl) < header.size or (len(acl) - header.size) % entry.size:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy ACL is malformed")
+    for offset in range(header.size, len(acl), entry.size):
+        tag, permissions, identifier = entry.unpack_from(acl, offset)
+        if tag == 0x02 and identifier == account_uid and permissions & 0o2:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy ACL grants Hermes write access")
+
+
+def _active_sudo_policy(text: str) -> str:
+    """Remove comments without discarding sudoers' numeric-UID principals."""
+    active: list[str] = []
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        stripped = line.lstrip()
+        if not stripped:
+            continue
+        # Detect any include spelling before the comment rule below.  sudo
+        # honours both #include and @include; a quoted or space-bearing path
+        # must never fall through the "#" comment branch and leave a second
+        # authority file unaudited.  Only the exact bare includedir into the
+        # audited /etc/sudoers.d passes; everything else fails closed.
+        if re.match(r"(?i)[#@]include(?:dir)?(?=\s|$)", stripped):
+            include = re.fullmatch(
+                r"(?i)([#@]include(?:dir)?)\s+([^\s\"'\\]+)", stripped
+            )
+            if include:
+                directive, target = include.groups()
+                if (
+                    directive.lower().endswith("includedir")
+                    and target == "/etc/sudoers.d"
+                ):
+                    continue
+            raise HardeningError("sudo policy includes an unaudited authority source")
+        if stripped.startswith("#") and not re.match(r"#\d+(?:\s|$)", stripped):
+            continue
+        active.append(line)
+    return "\n".join(active)
+
+
+def _mentions_dedicated_identity(text: str, account: str, account_uid: int) -> bool:
+    account_pattern = rf"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])%?{re.escape(account)}(?![A-Za-z0-9_.-])"
+    numeric_pattern = rf"(?<![0-9])#?{account_uid}(?![0-9])"
+    return bool(re.search(account_pattern, text) or re.search(numeric_pattern, text))
+
+
+SUDO_ALIAS_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*\Z")
+
+
+def _joined_sudo_lines(active: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Merge sudoers backslash continuations into whole logical lines."""
+    lines: list[str] = []
+    pending = ""
+    for line in active.splitlines():
+        if line.endswith("\\"):
+            pending += line[:-1] + " "
+            continue
+        lines.append(pending + line)
+        pending = ""
+    if pending:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo policy ends inside a line continuation")
+    return lines
+
+
+def _sudo_user_aliases(lines: list[str]) -> dict[str, list[str]]:
+    """Collect User_Alias definitions so grant principals can be expanded."""
+    aliases: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+    for line in lines:
+        stripped = line.strip()
+        if not stripped.startswith("User_Alias"):
+            continue
+        for definition in stripped.removeprefix("User_Alias").split(":"):
+            name, separator, members = definition.partition("=")
+            name = name.strip()
+            values = [item.strip() for item in members.split(",")]
+            if (
+                not separator
+                or not SUDO_ALIAS_NAME_RE.fullmatch(name)
+                or name in aliases
+                or not all(values)
+            ):
+                raise HardeningError("sudo alias definition is not auditable")
+            aliases[name] = values
+    return aliases
+
+
+def _expand_sudo_principal(
+    principal: str, aliases: dict[str, list[str]], seen: frozenset[str]
+) -> None:
+    """Reject grant principals that reach Hermes through aliases or wildcards."""
+    value = principal.strip()
+    while value.startswith("!"):
+        value = value[1:].strip()
+    value = value.strip('"')
+    if not value:
+        raise HardeningError("sudo grant principal is malformed")
+    if value in aliases:
+        if value in seen:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo alias expansion is cyclic")
+        for member in aliases[value]:
+            _expand_sudo_principal(member, aliases, seen | {value})
+        return
+    if value in {"ALL", "%ALL"}:
+        raise HardeningError("broad sudo authority includes Hermes")
+    if value.startswith("+") or value.startswith("%:"):
+        raise HardeningError("sudo netgroup authority cannot be audited")
+    if SUDO_ALIAS_NAME_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise HardeningError("sudo alias is undefined")
+
+
+def _audit_sudo_grants(active: str) -> None:
+    """Expand every grant's user list; only literal non-Hermes principals pass."""
+    lines = _joined_sudo_lines(active)
+    aliases = _sudo_user_aliases(lines)
+    skip = ("Defaults", "User_Alias", "Runas_Alias", "Host_Alias", "Cmnd_Alias")
+    for line in lines:
+        stripped = line.strip()
+        if not stripped or stripped.startswith(skip):
+            continue
+        head, separator, _rest = stripped.partition("=")
+        fields = head.split()
+        if not separator or len(fields) < 2:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo grant line is not auditable")
+        for principal in " ".join(fields[:-1]).split(","):
+            _expand_sudo_principal(principal, aliases, frozenset())
+
+
+def audit_privilege_policies(
+    account: str,
+    account_uid: int,
+    root_uid: int,
+    host_etc: Path,
+    polkit_share: Path,
+) -> None:
+    """Reject direct, group, wildcard sudo, or root-equivalent polkit grants."""
+    dangerous_polkit = (
+        "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec",
+        "org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-unit",
+        "org.freedesktop.udisks2.modify-device",
+        "org.freedesktop.packagekit",
+    )
+    nsswitch = host_etc / "nsswitch.conf"
+    if nsswitch.exists():
+        try:
+            nss_snapshot = read_regular(nsswitch, 64 * 1024)
+            _audit_policy_metadata(nss_snapshot, root_uid, account_uid)
+            text = nss_snapshot.value.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise HardeningError("nsswitch policy is not UTF-8") from exc
+        for line in text.splitlines():
+            name, separator, sources = line.partition(":")
+            if name.strip() in {
+                "passwd",
+                "group",
+                "initgroups",
+                "shadow",
+                "sudoers",
+            } and separator:
+                active_sources = [item for item in sources.split() if not item.startswith("[")]
+                if not active_sources or any(
+                    item not in {"files", "systemd"} for item in active_sources
+                ):
+                    raise HardeningError("external group/account/sudo authority source is unsafe")
+    total = 0
+    for path in _policy_files(host_etc, polkit_share, root_uid):
+        snapshot = read_regular(path, 256 * 1024)
+        _audit_policy_metadata(snapshot, root_uid, account_uid)
+        value = snapshot.value
+        total += len(value)
+        if total > 2 * 1024 * 1024:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy input exceeds safe limit")
+        try:
+            text = value.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise HardeningError("sudo/polkit policy is not UTF-8") from exc
+        if path.name == "sudoers" or "sudoers.d" in path.parts:
+            active = _active_sudo_policy(text)
+            if _mentions_dedicated_identity(active, account, account_uid):
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has sudo authority")
+            _audit_sudo_grants(active)
+            continue
+        active = "\n".join(
+            line for line in text.splitlines() if not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
+        )
+        grants = "polkit.Result.YES" in active or re.search(
+            r"(?im)^\s*Result(?:Any|Inactive|Active)\s*=\s*yes\s*$", active
+        )
+        if grants and _mentions_dedicated_identity(active, account, account_uid):
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account has polkit authority")
+        broad = "unix-user:*" in active or "Identity=unix-user:*" in active
+        if broad and grants and any(item in active for item in dangerous_polkit):
+            raise HardeningError("root-equivalent broad polkit authority includes Hermes")
+        audit_polkit_policy(path, text)

services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,496 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Reconcile a dedicated unprivileged Hermes SSH account on one Atlas node."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import errno
+import os
+import re
+import shlex
+import stat
+import struct
+from contextlib import suppress
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from node_account_audit import audit_membership, audit_privilege_policies
+from node_account_io import (
+    FileSnapshot,
+    HardeningError,
+    account_lock,
+    assert_unchanged,
+    atomic_write,
+    backup_once,
+    read_regular,
+)
+
+HOST_ETC = Path("/host-etc")
+HOST_HOME = Path("/host-home")
+HOST_K3S = Path("/host-k3s")
+HOST_KUBELET = Path("/host-kubelet")
+HOST_RUN_K3S = Path("/host-run-k3s")
+HOST_RUN_CONTAINERD = Path("/host-run-containerd")
+HOST_POLKIT_SHARE = Path("/host-polkit-share")
+ACCOUNT = "hermes-agent"
+ACCOUNT_UID = 1200
+ACCOUNT_GID = 1200
+ACCOUNT_HOME = "/home/hermes-agent"
+ACCOUNT_SHELL = "/bin/bash"
+HOST_ROOT_UID = 0
+HOST_ROOT_GID = 0
+LEGACY_ACCOUNTS = ("atlas", "oceanus")
+MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS = 1024 * 1024
+ACL_VERSION = 2
+ACL_UNDEFINED_ID = 0xFFFFFFFF
+ACL_USER_OBJ = 0x01
+ACL_USER = 0x02
+ACL_GROUP_OBJ = 0x04
+ACL_GROUP = 0x08
+ACL_MASK = 0x10
+ACL_OTHER = 0x20
+ACL_HEADER = struct.Struct("<I")
+ACL_ENTRY = struct.Struct("<HHI")
+ACL_XATTR = "system.posix_acl_access"
+
+
+def _read_regular(
+    path: Path, maximum: int = MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE
+) -> tuple[bytes, os.stat_result]:
+    snapshot = read_regular(path, maximum)
+    return snapshot.value, path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+
+
+def _records(value: bytes, fields: int, name: str) -> list[list[str]]:
+    try:
+        text = value.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise HardeningError(f"{name} is not UTF-8") from exc
+    if not text.endswith("\n"):
+        raise HardeningError(f"{name} is missing its final newline")
+    records = []
+    names = set()
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        parts = line.split(":")
+        if len(parts) != fields or not parts[0] or parts[0] in names:
+            raise HardeningError(f"{name} has an invalid record")
+        names.add(parts[0])
+        records.append(parts)
+    return records
+
+
+def _encode(records: list[list[str]]) -> bytes:
+    return ("\n".join(":".join(record) for record in records) + "\n").encode()
+
+
+def _expected_records() -> dict[str, list[str]]:
+    return {
+        "passwd": [
+            ACCOUNT,
+            "x",
+            str(ACCOUNT_UID),
+            str(ACCOUNT_GID),
+            "Hermes Agent",
+            ACCOUNT_HOME,
+            ACCOUNT_SHELL,
+        ],
+        "group": [ACCOUNT, "x", str(ACCOUNT_GID), ""],
+        "shadow": [ACCOUNT, "!", "1", "0", "99999", "7", "", "", ""],
+        "gshadow": [ACCOUNT, "!", "", ""],
+    }
+
+
+def _reconcile_record(
+    records: list[list[str]], expected: list[str], *, identity_index: int
+) -> list[list[str]]:
+    for record in records:
+        same_name = record[0] == expected[0]
+        same_identity = record[identity_index] == expected[identity_index]
+        if same_name or same_identity:
+            if record != expected:
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account identity conflicts")
+            return records
+    return [*records, expected]
+
+
+def _reconcile_databases() -> None:
+    expected = _expected_records()
+    definitions = (
+        ("passwd", 7, 2),
+        ("group", 4, 2),
+        ("shadow", 9, 0),
+        ("gshadow", 4, 0),
+    )
+    planned: list[tuple[Path, FileSnapshot, bytes]] = []
+    account_present = False
+    parsed: dict[str, list[list[str]]] = {}
+    for name, fields, identity_index in definitions:
+        path = HOST_ETC / name
+        snapshot = read_regular(path, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+        records = _records(snapshot.value, fields, name)
+        parsed[name] = records
+        updated = _reconcile_record(
+            records, expected[name], identity_index=identity_index
+        )
+        if name == "passwd":
+            account_present = expected[name] in records
+        planned.append((path, snapshot, _encode(updated)))
+    audit_membership(ACCOUNT, parsed["group"], parsed["gshadow"])
+    audit_privilege_policies(
+        ACCOUNT, ACCOUNT_UID, HOST_ROOT_UID, HOST_ETC, HOST_POLKIT_SHARE
+    )
+    try:
+        (HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT).lstat()
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        if not account_present:
+            raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account home already exists")
+    for path, snapshot, _updated in planned:
+        assert_unchanged(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+    for path, snapshot, _updated in planned:
+        backup_once(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+    for path, snapshot, _updated in planned:
+        assert_unchanged(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+    written: list[tuple[Path, FileSnapshot, bytes]] = []
+    try:
+        for path, snapshot, updated in planned:
+            assert_unchanged(path, snapshot, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+            atomic_write(path, updated, snapshot)
+            written.append((path, snapshot, updated))
+        for path, _snapshot, _updated in planned:
+            name = path.name
+            fields = next(item[1] for item in definitions if item[0] == name)
+            records = _records(_read_regular(path)[0], fields, name)
+            if expected[name] not in records:
+                raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes account validation failed")
+    except Exception as error:
+        for path, snapshot, updated in reversed(written):
+            current = read_regular(path, MAX_ACCOUNT_FILE)
+            if (
+                current.value != updated
+                or current.mode != snapshot.mode
+                or current.uid != snapshot.uid
+                or current.gid != snapshot.gid
+                or current.xattrs != snapshot.xattrs
+            ):
+                raise HardeningError(
+                    f"concurrent host account change prevents rollback: {path.name}"
+                ) from error
+            atomic_write(path, snapshot.value, snapshot)
+        raise
+
+
+SUPPORTED_KEY_TYPES = {"ssh-ed25519", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ssh-rsa"}
+KEY_TYPE_RE = re.compile(r"(?:sk-)?(?:ssh|ecdsa)-[A-Za-z0-9@._+-]+\Z")
+
+
+def _key_identity(line: bytes) -> tuple[str, bytes] | None:
+    """Return OpenSSH key type/blob, ignoring options and comments."""
+    stripped = line.strip(b"\r\n")
+    if not stripped or stripped.lstrip().startswith(b"#"):
+        return None
+    try:
+        fields = shlex.split(stripped.decode("ascii"), posix=True)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key line is malformed") from exc
+    indexes = [
+        index for index, field in enumerate(fields) if KEY_TYPE_RE.fullmatch(field)
+    ]
+    if len(indexes) != 1 or indexes[0] + 1 >= len(fields):
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key line has ambiguous key material")
+    key_type = fields[indexes[0]]
+    try:
+        blob = base64.b64decode(fields[indexes[0] + 1], validate=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key payload is invalid") from exc
+    encoded_type = key_type.encode("ascii")
+    if len(blob) < 4 or int.from_bytes(blob[:4], "big") != len(encoded_type):
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key blob is malformed")
+    if blob[4 : 4 + len(encoded_type)] != encoded_type:
+        raise HardeningError("authorized key type does not match its blob")
+    return key_type, blob
+
+
+def _validated_public_key(path: Path) -> tuple[bytes, tuple[str, bytes]]:
+    value, _ = _read_regular(path, 16 * 1024)
+    line = value.strip()
+    if b"\n" in line or b"\r" in line:
+        raise HardeningError("Hermes public key must contain one line")
+    identity = _key_identity(line)
+    fields = line.split()
+    if (
+        identity is None
+        or identity[0] not in SUPPORTED_KEY_TYPES
+        or len(fields) not in {2, 3}
+        or fields[0].decode("ascii") != identity[0]
+    ):
+        raise HardeningError("Hermes public key format is unsupported")
+    return line, identity
+
+
+def _directory(path: Path, *, mode: int, uid: int, gid: int) -> None:
+    with suppress(FileExistsError):
+        path.mkdir(mode=mode)
+    metadata = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise HardeningError(f"unsafe account directory: {path.name}")
+    if metadata.st_uid not in {0, uid} or metadata.st_gid not in {0, gid}:
+        raise HardeningError(f"account directory ownership conflicts: {path.name}")
+    os.chown(path, uid, gid)
+    path.chmod(mode)
+
+
+def _without_key(value: bytes, identity: tuple[str, bytes]) -> bytes:
+    kept = []
+    for line in value.splitlines(keepends=True):
+        if _key_identity(line) != identity:
+            kept.append(line)
+    return b"".join(kept)
+
+
+def _move_key(public_key: Path) -> None:
+    key, identity = _validated_public_key(public_key)
+    target = HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT / ".ssh" / "authorized_keys"
+    legacy_plan: list[tuple[Path, FileSnapshot, bytes]] = []
+    for legacy in LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        authorized = HOST_HOME / legacy / ".ssh" / "authorized_keys"
+        try:
+            snapshot = read_regular(authorized, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            continue
+        updated = _without_key(snapshot.value, identity)
+        if updated != snapshot.value:
+            legacy_plan.append((authorized, snapshot, updated))
+    if legacy_plan and target.exists():
+        target_snapshot = read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        target_without_key = _without_key(target_snapshot.value, identity)
+        if target_without_key != target_snapshot.value:
+            backup_once(target, target_snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+            assert_unchanged(target, target_snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+            atomic_write(target, target_without_key, target_snapshot)
+            verified_target = read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS).value
+            if _without_key(verified_target, identity) != verified_target:
+                raise HardeningError("preexisting Hermes authorization removal failed")
+    for authorized, snapshot, _updated in legacy_plan:
+        assert_unchanged(authorized, snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        backup_once(authorized, snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+    for authorized, snapshot, updated in legacy_plan:
+        assert_unchanged(authorized, snapshot, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        atomic_write(authorized, updated, snapshot)
+    for legacy in LEGACY_ACCOUNTS:
+        authorized = HOST_HOME / legacy / ".ssh" / "authorized_keys"
+        try:
+            value = read_regular(authorized, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS).value
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            continue
+        if _without_key(value, identity) != value:
+            raise HardeningError("legacy Hermes authorization key removal failed")
+
+    # Installation happens only after every legacy authorization is absent. A
+    # crash can therefore remove access temporarily, but can never duplicate
+    # the machine credential across privileged and unprivileged accounts.
+    home = HOST_HOME / ACCOUNT
+    ssh = home / ".ssh"
+    _directory(home, mode=0o700, uid=ACCOUNT_UID, gid=ACCOUNT_GID)
+    _directory(ssh, mode=0o700, uid=ACCOUNT_UID, gid=ACCOUNT_GID)
+    target = ssh / "authorized_keys"
+    if target.exists():
+        current = read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+        if current.value != key + b"\n":
+            backup_once(target, current, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)
+    else:
+        current = FileSnapshot(
+            value=b"",
+            device=0,
+            inode=0,
+            mode=0o600,
+            uid=ACCOUNT_UID,
+            gid=ACCOUNT_GID,
+            size=0,
+            mtime_ns=0,
+            ctime_ns=0,
+            xattrs=(),
+        )
+    atomic_write(target, key + b"\n", current)
+    if _read_regular(target, MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEYS)[0] != key + b"\n":
+        raise HardeningError("dedicated Hermes authorized key validation failed")
+
+
+def _decode_acl(value: bytes, mode: int) -> list[tuple[int, int, int]]:
+    """Decode a bounded POSIX ACL or derive one from ordinary mode bits."""
+    if not value:
+        group = (mode >> 3) & 0o7
+        return [
+            (ACL_USER_OBJ, (mode >> 6) & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_GROUP_OBJ, group, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_MASK, group, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+            (ACL_OTHER, mode & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID),
+        ]
+    if len(value) < ACL_HEADER.size or (len(value) - ACL_HEADER.size) % ACL_ENTRY.size:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL is malformed")
+    if ACL_HEADER.unpack_from(value)[0] != ACL_VERSION:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL version is unsupported")
+    entries = [
+        ACL_ENTRY.unpack_from(value, offset)
+        for offset in range(ACL_HEADER.size, len(value), ACL_ENTRY.size)
+    ]
+    if any(permission > 0o7 for _tag, permission, _identifier in entries):
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL permission is malformed")
+    required = {ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, ACL_OTHER}
+    if not required <= {tag for tag, _permission, _identifier in entries}:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL is incomplete")
+    return entries
+
+
+def _encode_acl(entries: list[tuple[int, int, int]]) -> bytes:
+    return ACL_HEADER.pack(ACL_VERSION) + b"".join(
+        ACL_ENTRY.pack(*entry) for entry in entries
+    )
+
+
+def _acl_with_deny(value: bytes, mode: int) -> bytes:
+    entries = _decode_acl(value, mode)
+    entries = [
+        entry
+        for entry in entries
+        if not (entry[0] == ACL_USER and entry[2] == ACCOUNT_UID)
+    ]
+    entries.append((ACL_USER, 0, ACCOUNT_UID))
+    if not any(tag == ACL_MASK for tag, _permission, _identifier in entries):
+        entries.append((ACL_MASK, (mode >> 3) & 0o7, ACL_UNDEFINED_ID))
+    order = {
+        ACL_USER_OBJ: 0,
+        ACL_USER: 1,
+        ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 2,
+        ACL_GROUP: 3,
+        ACL_MASK: 4,
+        ACL_OTHER: 5,
+    }
+    entries.sort(key=lambda entry: (order.get(entry[0], 99), entry[2]))
+    return _encode_acl(entries)
+
+
+def _read_acl(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return os.getxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, follow_symlinks=False)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno in {errno.ENODATA, getattr(errno, "ENOATTR", errno.ENODATA)}:
+            return b""
+        raise
+
+
+def _validate_acl_backup(value: bytes) -> None:
+    if value[:1] not in {b"A", b"N"}:
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+    if value[:1] == b"A":
+        if len(value) == 1:
+            raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+        _decode_acl(value[1:], 0)
+    elif value != b"N":
+        raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL backup is malformed")
+
+
+def _acl_backup_once(path: Path, value: bytes, backup_name: str | None = None) -> None:
+    """Persist the original ACL as a private, durable host recovery file."""
+    root = HOST_ETC / "hermes-node-boundary"
+    _directory(root, mode=0o700, uid=HOST_ROOT_UID, gid=HOST_ROOT_GID)
+    backup = root / f"{backup_name or path.name}.acl"
+    encoded = b"A" + value if value else b"N"
+    try:
+        existing, _metadata = _read_regular(backup, 64 * 1024)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        _validate_acl_backup(existing)
+        return
+
+    temporary = root / f".{path.name}.acl.hermes-{os.getpid()}"
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(temporary, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, encoded) != len(encoded):
+            raise HardeningError("short sensitive directory ACL backup write")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, HOST_ROOT_UID, HOST_ROOT_GID)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    try:
+        os.link(temporary, backup, follow_symlinks=False)
+    except FileExistsError:
+        # Another reconciler won the race; never overwrite the first backup.
+        pass
+    finally:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    stored, _metadata = _read_regular(backup, 64 * 1024)
+    _validate_acl_backup(stored)
+    directory = os.open(root, os.O_RDONLY)
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+
+
+def _deny_sensitive_root(path: Path, backup_name: str | None = None) -> None:
+    metadata = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise HardeningError(f"unsafe sensitive directory: {path.name}")
+    if metadata.st_uid != HOST_ROOT_UID:
+        raise HardeningError(f"sensitive directory is not root-owned: {path.name}")
+    current = _read_acl(path)
+    _acl_backup_once(path, current, backup_name)
+    updated = _acl_with_deny(current, stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode))
+    try:
+        os.setxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, updated, follow_symlinks=False)
+        verified = _decode_acl(_read_acl(path), stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode))
+        if (ACL_USER, 0, ACCOUNT_UID) not in verified:
+            raise HardeningError("sensitive directory ACL validation failed")
+    except Exception:
+        if current:
+            os.setxattr(path, ACL_XATTR, current, follow_symlinks=False)
+        else:
+            try:
+                os.removexattr(path, ACL_XATTR, follow_symlinks=False)
+            except OSError as exc:
+                if exc.errno not in {
+                    errno.ENODATA,
+                    getattr(errno, "ENOATTR", errno.ENODATA),
+                }:
+                    raise
+        raise
+
+
+def _deny_sensitive_roots() -> None:
+    for path, backup_name in (
+        (HOST_K3S, "var-lib-rancher-k3s"),
+        (HOST_KUBELET, "var-lib-kubelet"),
+        (HOST_RUN_K3S, "run-k3s"),
+        (HOST_RUN_CONTAINERD, "run-containerd"),
+    ):
+        _deny_sensitive_root(path, backup_name)
+
+
+def reconcile(public_key: Path) -> None:
+    """Create the locked account and move only the Hermes authorization key."""
+    with account_lock(HOST_ETC, expected_uid=HOST_ROOT_UID):
+        _reconcile_databases()
+        _deny_sensitive_roots()
+        _move_key(public_key)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--public-key-file", type=Path, required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    reconcile(args.public_key_file)
+    print("Dedicated Hermes node account reconciled.", flush=True)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Crash-safe, metadata-preserving host account database I/O."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import os
+import stat
+import time
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Iterator
+
+MAX_XATTRS = 64
+MAX_XATTR_NAME = 255
+MAX_XATTR_VALUE = 256 * 1024
+MAX_XATTR_TOTAL = 1024 * 1024
+LOCK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15.0
+
+
+class HardeningError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised before an unsafe or ambiguous host-account change."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FileSnapshot:
+    """Bounded file contents and all security-relevant inode metadata."""
+
+    value: bytes
+    device: int
+    inode: int
+    mode: int
+    uid: int
+    gid: int
+    size: int
+    mtime_ns: int
+    ctime_ns: int
+    xattrs: tuple[tuple[str, bytes], ...]
+
+
+def _stat_identity(item: os.stat_result) -> tuple[int, ...]:
+    return (
+        item.st_dev,
+        item.st_ino,
+        item.st_mode,
+        item.st_uid,
+        item.st_gid,
+        item.st_size,
+        item.st_mtime_ns,
+        item.st_ctime_ns,
+    )
+
+
+def _xattrs(path_or_fd: Path | int) -> tuple[tuple[str, bytes], ...]:
+    try:
+        names = sorted(os.listxattr(path_or_fd, follow_symlinks=False))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        names = sorted(os.listxattr(path_or_fd))
+    if len(names) > MAX_XATTRS:
+        raise HardeningError("host account file has too many extended attributes")
+    values: list[tuple[str, bytes]] = []
+    total = 0
+    for name in names:
+        if len(name.encode("utf-8")) > MAX_XATTR_NAME:
+            raise HardeningError("host account file xattr name is too long")
+        try:
+            value = os.getxattr(path_or_fd, name, follow_symlinks=False)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            value = os.getxattr(path_or_fd, name)
+        total += len(value)
+        if len(value) > MAX_XATTR_VALUE or total > MAX_XATTR_TOTAL:
+            raise HardeningError("host account file xattrs exceed the safe limit")
+        values.append((name, value))
+    return tuple(values)
+
+
+def _restore_xattrs(descriptor: int, expected: tuple[tuple[str, bytes], ...]) -> None:
+    expected_names = {name for name, _value in expected}
+    for name, _value in _xattrs(descriptor):
+        if name not in expected_names:
+            os.removexattr(descriptor, name)
+    for name, value in expected:
+        os.setxattr(descriptor, name, value)
+
+
+def read_regular(path: Path, maximum: int) -> FileSnapshot:
+    """Read one bounded, non-symlink regular file and capture its metadata."""
+    flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags)
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) or metadata.st_size > maximum:
+            raise HardeningError(f"unsafe regular file: {path.name}")
+        value = os.read(descriptor, maximum + 1)
+        attrs = _xattrs(descriptor)
+        after = os.fstat(descriptor)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    if len(value) != metadata.st_size or _stat_identity(metadata) != _stat_identity(after):
+        raise HardeningError(f"short file read: {path.name}")
+    return FileSnapshot(
+        value=value,
+        device=metadata.st_dev,
+        inode=metadata.st_ino,
+        mode=stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode),
+        uid=metadata.st_uid,
+        gid=metadata.st_gid,
+        size=metadata.st_size,
+        mtime_ns=metadata.st_mtime_ns,
+        ctime_ns=metadata.st_ctime_ns,
+        xattrs=attrs,
+    )
+
+
+def assert_unchanged(path: Path, expected: FileSnapshot, maximum: int) -> None:
+    """Fail if an account file changed since planning began."""
+    current = read_regular(path, maximum)
+    if current != expected:
+        raise HardeningError(f"concurrent host account change detected: {path.name}")
+
+
+def atomic_write(path: Path, value: bytes, metadata: FileSnapshot) -> None:
+    """Atomically replace a file while retaining ACLs, labels, and xattrs."""
+    temporary = path.with_name(f".{path.name}.hermes-{os.getpid()}")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(temporary, flags, metadata.mode)
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, value) != len(value):
+            raise HardeningError(f"short atomic write: {path.name}")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, metadata.mode)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, metadata.uid, metadata.gid)
+        _restore_xattrs(descriptor, metadata.xattrs)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+    directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+
+
+def backup_once(path: Path, snapshot: FileSnapshot, maximum: int) -> Path:
+    """Create the first durable recovery copy without replacing an older one."""
+    backup = path.with_name(path.name + ".hermes-boundary-backup")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    try:
+        descriptor = os.open(backup, flags, snapshot.mode)
+    except FileExistsError:
+        read_regular(backup, maximum)
+        return backup
+    try:
+        if os.write(descriptor, snapshot.value) != len(snapshot.value):
+            raise HardeningError(f"short backup write: {path.name}")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, snapshot.mode)
+        os.fchown(descriptor, snapshot.uid, snapshot.gid)
+        _restore_xattrs(descriptor, snapshot.xattrs)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    except Exception:
+        backup.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory)
+    return backup
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def account_lock(host_etc: Path, *, expected_uid: int = 0) -> Iterator[None]:
+    """Hold the standard shadow-utils account lock for the full transaction."""
+    path = host_etc / ".pwd.lock"
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0) | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if (
+            not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode)
+            or metadata.st_uid != expected_uid
+            or stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) != 0o600
+        ):
+            raise HardeningError("unsafe standard account lock")
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + LOCK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+        while True:
+            try:
+                fcntl.lockf(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+                break
+            except BlockingIOError as exc:
+                if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
+                    raise HardeningError("standard account lock is busy") from exc
+                time.sleep(0.05)
+        yield
+    finally:
+        try:
+            fcntl.lockf(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+        finally:
+            os.close(descriptor)

services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Literal-identity proof for polkit policies on hardened Atlas nodes.
+
+Polkit rules are JavaScript, so a grant can name its subject indirectly:
+concatenated strings, escape sequences, bracket lookups, or arithmetic can
+compute an identity that plain text matching never sees.  Rather than model
+the language, every grant must scope itself through exact literal identity
+comparisons.  Anything the audit cannot prove literal fails closed.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from node_account_io import HardeningError
+
+_ALLOWED_ESCAPES = {'"', "'", "\\", "/", "n", "r", "t"}
+_STRING_MARK = r"\x00[0-9]+\x00"
+_GRANT_RE = re.compile(r"\bResult\s*\.\s*YES\b")
+_PKLA_GRANT_RE = re.compile(r"(?im)^\s*Result(?:Any|Inactive|Active)\s*=\s*yes\s*$")
+_PKLA_IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"unix-(?:user|group):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z")
+_IDENTITY_USE_RE = re.compile(r"subject\s*(\[|\.\s*(?:user|uid|isInGroup)\b)")
+_COMPUTED_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
+    r"\b(?:eval|Function|arguments|fromCharCode|fromCodePoint|atob|btoa|unescape"
+    r"|escape|decodeURI[A-Za-z]*|encodeURI[A-Za-z]*|charCodeAt|codePointAt"
+    r"|normalize|constructor|prototype|globalThis|Reflect|Proxy)\b"
+)
+# Logical && and || stay legal; every value-building operator next to a
+# string or number literal is rejected so comparisons stay whole literals.
+_OPERATOR_ADJACENT_RE = re.compile(
+    rf"(?:{_STRING_MARK}|[0-9])\s*[+\-*/%<>^~](?![&|=])"
+    rf"|(?<![&|=!<>])[+\-*/%<>^~]\s*(?:{_STRING_MARK}|[0-9])"
+)
+_USER_BEFORE_RE = re.compile(rf"{_STRING_MARK}\s*[=!]==?\s*\Z")
+_USER_AFTER_RE = re.compile(rf"\s*[=!]==?\s*{_STRING_MARK}")
+_UID_BEFORE_RE = re.compile(r"(?<![0-9A-Za-z_.$])[0-9]{1,10}\s*[=!]==?\s*\Z")
+_UID_AFTER_RE = re.compile(r"\s*[=!]==?\s*[0-9]{1,10}(?![0-9A-Za-z_.$])")
+_GROUP_AFTER_RE = re.compile(rf"\s*\(\s*{_STRING_MARK}\s*\)")
+_BARE_SUBJECT_RE = re.compile(r"\bsubject\b(?!\s*[.\[])")
+_PARAMETER_BEFORE_RE = re.compile(r"function\s*\(\s*[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*\s*,\s*\Z")
+_RESULT_USE_RE = re.compile(r"\bResult\b(?!\s*\.\s*[A-Z_]{2,32}\b)")
+
+
+def _split_strings(text: str) -> tuple[str, list[str]]:
+    """Replace string literals with markers and drop JavaScript comments."""
+    code: list[str] = []
+    strings: list[str] = []
+    index = 0
+    length = len(text)
+    while index < length:
+        character = text[index]
+        if character == "`":
+            raise HardeningError("polkit rule uses computed template strings")
+        if character in {'"', "'"}:
+            quote = character
+            index += 1
+            value: list[str] = []
+            while True:
+                if index >= length or text[index] in "\r\n":
+                    raise HardeningError("polkit rule string is unterminated")
+                character = text[index]
+                if character == "\\":
+                    if index + 1 >= length or text[index + 1] not in _ALLOWED_ESCAPES:
+                        raise HardeningError("polkit rule string uses computed escapes")
+                    escaped = text[index + 1]
+                    value.append({"n": "\n", "r": "\r", "t": "\t"}.get(escaped, escaped))
+                    index += 2
+                    continue
+                index += 1
+                if character == quote:
+                    break
+                value.append(character)
+            strings.append("".join(value))
+            code.append(f"\x00{len(strings) - 1}\x00")
+            continue
+        if text.startswith("//", index):
+            newline = text.find("\n", index)
+            index = length if newline < 0 else newline
+            continue
+        if text.startswith("/*", index):
+            closing = text.find("*/", index + 2)
+            if closing < 0:
+                raise HardeningError("polkit rule comment is unterminated")
+            code.append(" ")
+            index = closing + 2
+            continue
+        if character == "/":
+            # Any remaining slash is a regex literal or a division operator.
+            # A regex literal may embed a quote character, which would desync
+            # the string scanner and swallow an unconditional grant.  Neither
+            # regex nor division has a place in an identity-scoped grant, so
+            # both fail closed before they can hide a Result.YES.
+            raise HardeningError("polkit rule uses a regex or division operator")
+        code.append(character)
+        index += 1
+    return "".join(code), strings
+
+
+def _require_literal_identity_use(code: str, match: re.Match[str]) -> None:
+    """Reject one identity reference unless it is an exact literal comparison."""
+    form = match.group(1)
+    if form.startswith("["):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule reads identity through a computed lookup")
+    member = form.removeprefix(".").strip()
+    before = code[max(match.start() - 48, 0) : match.start()]
+    after = code[match.end() : match.end() + 48]
+    if member == "user":
+        literal = _USER_BEFORE_RE.search(before) or _USER_AFTER_RE.match(after)
+    elif member == "uid":
+        literal = _UID_BEFORE_RE.search(before) or _UID_AFTER_RE.match(after)
+    else:
+        literal = _GROUP_AFTER_RE.match(after)
+    if not literal:
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule identity test is not an exact literal")
+
+
+def _audit_rules_javascript(text: str) -> None:
+    """Require granting rules to gate on exact literal subject identities.
+
+    With computed tokens, bracket lookups, and subject aliasing rejected in
+    every rule file, a YES decision can only be written as the literal grant
+    token, so the grant test below cannot be evaded by construction.
+    """
+    code, _strings = _split_strings(text)
+    if _COMPUTED_TOKEN_RE.search(code):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule computes values the audit cannot prove")
+    if _RESULT_USE_RE.search(code):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit rule reads results through a computed lookup")
+    for bare in _BARE_SUBJECT_RE.finditer(code):
+        if not _PARAMETER_BEFORE_RE.search(code[: bare.start()]):
+            raise HardeningError("polkit rule passes the subject to computed code")
+    if not _GRANT_RE.search(code):
+        return
+    if _OPERATOR_ADJACENT_RE.search(code):
+        raise HardeningError("polkit grant builds values with operators")
+    uses = 0
+    for match in _IDENTITY_USE_RE.finditer(code):
+        uses += 1
+        _require_literal_identity_use(code, match)
+    if not uses:
+        raise HardeningError("polkit grant is not scoped to an explicit identity")
+
+
+def _audit_pkla(text: str) -> None:
+    """Require granting localauthority entries to name exact literal identities."""
+    if not _PKLA_GRANT_RE.search(text):
+        return
+    identities: list[str] = []
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        name, separator, value = line.strip().partition("=")
+        if name.strip() != "Identity" or not separator:
+            continue
+        entries = [entry.strip() for entry in value.split(";") if entry.strip()]
+        identities.extend(entries)
+    if not identities:
+        raise HardeningError("polkit authority grant lacks an identity scope")
+    for entry in identities:
+        if not _PKLA_IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(entry):
+            raise HardeningError("polkit authority identity is not an exact literal")
+
+
+def audit_polkit_policy(path: Path, text: str) -> None:
+    """Prove one polkit policy file cannot grant through a computed identity."""
+    if "localauthority" in path.parts or path.suffix == ".pkla":
+        _audit_pkla(text)
+    else:
+        _audit_rules_javascript(text)

services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py

@@ -86,6 +86,21 @@ def _write_empty_auth_store() -> None:
     os.chown(path, OWNER_UID, OWNER_GID)
 
 
+def _stage_node_ssh_config() -> None:
+    """Force every Atlas node alias onto the dedicated Hermes OS account."""
+    destination = RUNTIME_ROOT / "node-ssh-config"
+    source = _copy_secret("node-ssh-config", destination)
+    if "\x00" in source:
+        destination.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise RuntimeError("node SSH config contains invalid control data")
+    destination.write_text(
+        "Host titan-*\n  User hermes-agent\n" + source.rstrip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    destination.chmod(0o600)
+    os.chown(destination, OWNER_UID, OWNER_GID)
+
+
 def stage_agent() -> None:
     """Stage the owner agent's complete runtime access set."""
     for path in (RUNTIME_ROOT, RUNTIME_ROOT / "claude", RUNTIME_ROOT / "codex"):
@@ -93,13 +108,12 @@ def stage_agent() -> None:
     for name in (
         "agent-api-key",
         "chat-relay-key",
-        "gitea-token",
-        "gitea-username",
+        "jenkins-image-build-token",
         "node-ssh-private-key",
-        "node-ssh-config",
         "node-ssh-known-hosts",
     ):
         _copy_secret(name, RUNTIME_ROOT / name)
+    _stage_node_ssh_config()
     _validated_json(
         "claude-credentials",
         RUNTIME_ROOT / "claude" / ".credentials.json",

services/hermes/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+name: manage-atlas-pull-requests
+description: Read bounded private Atlas repository and pull-request metadata or create a verified draft pull request after a tested branch is pushed through Hermes' least-authority Forgejo client. Use for PR handoff in scm.bstein.dev/atlas repositories. Never use it to update, merge, approve, close, delete, or force-push.
+---
+
+# Manage Atlas pull requests
+
+Use `/opt/scm/gitea_api.py` for Forgejo API access. The agent pod has no
+repository credential. The client calls a separate least-authority broker;
+never bypass it with `curl` or direct Gitea HTTP.
+
+Use the configured broker Git remote for clone, fetch, and creation of a new
+namespaced feature branch. Existing-ref updates, protected refs, deletion,
+and force-push are rejected by the broker. Never replace that remote with a
+credential-bearing URL.
+
+## Read repository or PR state
+
+Pass one allowed Atlas metadata API path to the read operation:
+
+```sh
+/opt/scm/gitea_api.py read /api/v1/repos/atlas/REPO/pulls/NUMBER
+```
+
+The client exposes only repository metadata, PRs and PR evidence, branches,
+commits, and commit status. Hooks, Actions secrets/variables, collaborators,
+protections, reviews, merge endpoints, releases, and administration are
+rejected even as reads. Responses are size-bounded. Treat returned state as
+evidence, not authorization to change it.
+
+## Create a review handoff
+
+Before opening a PR, verify the remote, branch, clean worktree, diff, tests, and
+exact pushed commit. Never force-push. Pass that full 40-character pushed head
+SHA explicitly. Keep the short body free of credentials and credential-like
+text. The client screens structured assignments, known token formats, and long
+high-entropy values as an accidental-disclosure barrier. It cannot prove text
+is secret-free: short or multiword secrets under innocuous names may resemble
+ordinary prose, so never place credential material in either field. Structured
+inspection is deliberately bounded; large, deeply nested, or unusual config
+blobs do not belong in these fields and may be rejected. Validate without
+reading a credential or using the network:
+
+```sh
+/opt/scm/gitea_api.py --dry-run create-draft REPO \
+  --base main --head hermes/TASK --head-sha FULL_PUSHED_SHA \
+  --title "Focused change" --body "Tests and review evidence"
+```
+
+Run the same command without `--dry-run` only when the branch is review-ready.
+The client accepts success only when Forgejo returns the exact requested
+repository, base/head refs, head SHA, title/body, canonical URLs, positive PR
+number, and open/unmerged/draft state. Report its URL and exact head commit to
+Brad. Leave it unmerged for human review. PR updates are intentionally absent;
+publish a corrected tested commit and ask Brad how to proceed if metadata must
+change.
+
+## Stop at the authority boundary
+
+Update, merge, approve, close, delete, branch mutation, comments, releases,
+repository administration, and force-push are intentionally unavailable. Do
+not bypass the client with a raw HTTP request. If one of those actions is
+needed, present the tested commit and evidence to Brad and stop for human
+review.

services/hermes/skills/manage-atlas-pull-requests/agents/openai.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+interface:
+  display_name: "Manage Atlas Pull Requests"
+  short_description: "Create safe draft PR handoffs for human review"
+  default_prompt: "Use $manage-atlas-pull-requests to inspect the requested Atlas repository or prepare a tested branch as an unmerged draft pull request. Preserve the human review boundary."

services/hermes/switchyard-deployment.yaml

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ spec:
         prometheus.io/port: "9005"
         prometheus.io/path: /metrics
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject: "true"
-        vault.hashicorp.com/role: hermes-agent
+        vault.hashicorp.com/role: hermes-switchyard
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-relay-key: kv/data/atlas/hermes/chat-telegram
         vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-relay-key: |
           {{- with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/chat-telegram" -}}

services/jenkins/configmap-jcasc.yaml

@@ -652,6 +652,25 @@ data:
               }
             }
           }
+          pipelineJob('hermes-agent-image') {
+            disabled(false)
+            description('Human-gated, daemonless Kaniko build for the reviewed atlas/titan-iac main revision. Publishes a content-addressed Hermes agent image and archives a Flux digest patch; it never mutates Git or deploys.')
+            authenticationToken(System.getenv('HERMES_AGENT_IMAGE_BUILD_TOKEN'))
+            definition {
+              cpsScm {
+                scm {
+                  git {
+                    remote {
+                      url('https://scm.bstein.dev/atlas/titan-iac.git')
+                      credentials('gitea-pat')
+                    }
+                    branches('*/main')
+                  }
+                }
+                scriptPath('ci/Jenkinsfile.hermes-agent-image')
+              }
+            }
+          }
           multibranchPipelineJob('titan-iac-quality-gate') {
             branchSources {
               branchSource {

services/jenkins/configmap-plugins.yaml

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ data:
     gitea:268.v75e47974c01d
     gitea-checks:603.621.vc708da_fb_371d
     multibranch-scan-webhook-trigger:1.0.11
+    build-token-root:365.v717f8685a_09e
     # Structured test evidence. Without junit the `junit` step throws
     # NoSuchMethodError, jenkins.failed_tests is always empty, and triage
     # has only raw console text to work from. Pinned to the newest release

services/jenkins/deployment.yaml

@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ spec:
           ARIADNE_JENKINS_API_USER={{ .Data.data.username }}
           ARIADNE_JENKINS_API_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
           {{ end }}
+          {{ with secret "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins" }}
+          HERMES_AGENT_IMAGE_BUILD_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.build_token }}
+          {{ end }}
         bstein.dev/restarted-at: "2026-05-20T09:40:31Z"
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: jenkins

services/jenkins/hermes-image-builder-serviceaccount.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# services/jenkins/hermes-image-builder-serviceaccount.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-image-builder
+  namespace: jenkins
+automountServiceAccountToken: false

services/jenkins/kustomization.yaml

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ namespace: jenkins
 resources:
   - namespace.yaml
   - serviceaccount.yaml
+  - hermes-image-builder-serviceaccount.yaml
   - vault-serviceaccount.yaml
   - pvc.yaml
   - cache-pvc.yaml

services/jenkins/secretproviderclass.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ spec:
   provider: vault
   parameters:
     vaultAddress: "http://vault.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200"
-    roleName: "jenkins"
+    roleName: "jenkins-vault-sync"
     objects: |
       - objectName: "harbor-pull__dockerconfigjson"
         secretPath: "kv/data/atlas/shared/harbor-pull"

services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync.py

@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ def main():
     conn.close()
 
 
-if __name__ == "__main__":
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - exercised through main()
     try:
         main()
     except Exception as exc:

services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync_listener.py

@@ -100,6 +100,6 @@ class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         return
 
 
-if __name__ == "__main__":
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - server loop
     server = http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer(("", 8080), Handler)
     server.serve_forever()

services/maintenance/apps/metis-configmap.yaml

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ data:
   METIS_MAX_DEVICE_BYTES: "1000000000000"
   METIS_NAMESPACE: maintenance
   METIS_REMOTE_POD_TIMEOUT_SEC: "14400"
-  METIS_RUNNER_IMAGE_AMD64: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis:0.1.0-296-amd64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-amd64"}
-  METIS_RUNNER_IMAGE_ARM64: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis:0.1.0-295-arm64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-arm64"}
+  METIS_RUNNER_IMAGE_AMD64: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis:0.1.0-298-amd64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-amd64"}
+  METIS_RUNNER_IMAGE_ARM64: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis:0.1.0-298-arm64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-arm64"}
   METIS_HARBOR_REGISTRY: registry.bstein.dev
   METIS_HARBOR_PROJECT: metis
   METIS_HARBOR_API_BASE: https://registry.bstein.dev/api/v2.0

services/maintenance/kustomization.yaml

@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ images:
   - name: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/ariadne
     newTag: 0.1.0-461 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:ariadne:tag"}
   - name: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis
-    newTag: 0.1.0-295-arm64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-arm64:tag"}
+    newTag: 0.1.0-298-arm64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-arm64:tag"}
   - name: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/soteria
     newTag: 0.1.0-120 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:soteria:tag"}

services/maintenance/node-ops/metis-sentinel-amd64-daemonset.yaml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
         kubernetes.io/arch: amd64
       containers:
         - name: metis-sentinel
-          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis-sentinel:0.1.0-296-amd64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-sentinel-amd64"}
+          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis-sentinel:0.1.0-298-amd64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-sentinel-amd64"}
           imagePullPolicy: Always
           envFrom:
             - configMapRef:

services/maintenance/node-ops/metis-sentinel-arm64-daemonset.yaml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
         kubernetes.io/arch: arm64
       containers:
         - name: metis-sentinel
-          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis-sentinel:0.1.0-295-arm64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-sentinel-arm64"}
+          image: registry.bstein.dev/bstein/metis-sentinel:0.1.0-298-arm64 # {"$imagepolicy": "maintenance:metis-sentinel-arm64"}
           imagePullPolicy: Always
           envFrom:
             - configMapRef:

services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/job.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/job.yaml
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: vault-hermes-jenkins-build-token-seed-2
+  namespace: vault
+spec:
+  backoffLimit: 2
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: hermes-jenkins-token-seed
+      enableServiceLinks: false
+      restartPolicy: Never
+      nodeSelector:
+        hardware: rpi5
+        kubernetes.io/arch: arm64
+        node-role.kubernetes.io/worker: "true"
+      affinity:
+        nodeAffinity:
+          requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            nodeSelectorTerms:
+              - matchExpressions:
+                  - key: kubernetes.io/hostname
+                    operator: NotIn
+                    values: [titan-04, titan-14, titan-18, titan-19, titan-24]
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 1000
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: seed
+          image: docker.io/hashicorp/vault@sha256:4e33b126a59c0c333b76fb4e894722462659a6bec7c48c9ee8cea56fccfd2569
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command: [sh, /scripts/vault_hermes_jenkins_build_token_ensure.sh]
+          env:
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /tmp
+            - name: VAULT_ADDR
+              value: http://vault.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200
+            - name: VAULT_K8S_ROLE
+              value: hermes-jenkins-token-seed
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsGroup: 1000
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 100
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: scripts
+              mountPath: /scripts
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+          resources:
+            requests: {cpu: 25m, memory: 32Mi}
+            limits: {cpu: 250m, memory: 128Mi}
+      volumes:
+        - name: scripts
+          configMap:
+            name: vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed-script
+            defaultMode: 0555
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir: {}

services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: vault
+resources:
+  - serviceaccount.yaml
+  - job.yaml
+generatorOptions:
+  disableNameSuffixHash: true
+configMapGenerator:
+  - name: vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed-script
+    files:
+      - vault_hermes_jenkins_build_token_ensure.sh=scripts/vault_hermes_jenkins_build_token_ensure.sh

services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/scripts/vault_hermes_jenkins_build_token_ensure.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+secret_path="kv/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins"
+secret_api_path="kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins"
+jwt_file="${VAULT_K8S_JWT_FILE:-/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token}"
+vault_role="${VAULT_K8S_ROLE:-hermes-jenkins-token-seed}"
+payload_file="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/hermes-jenkins-token.json"
+
+log() { printf '[hermes-jenkins-token] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
+cleanup() { rm -f "${payload_file}"; }
+trap cleanup EXIT HUP INT TERM
+
+retry_command() {
+  attempt=1
+  while [ "${attempt}" -le 5 ]; do
+    set +e
+    command_output="$("$@" 2>&1)"
+    command_status=$?
+    set -e
+    if [ "${command_status}" -eq 0 ]; then
+      printf '%s' "${command_output}"
+      return 0
+    fi
+    if [ "${attempt}" -lt 5 ]; then
+      sleep "${attempt}"
+    fi
+    attempt=$((attempt + 1))
+  done
+  return "${command_status}"
+}
+
+ensure_token() {
+  if [ -n "${VAULT_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
+    return
+  fi
+  jwt="$(cat "${jwt_file}")"
+  VAULT_TOKEN="$(retry_command vault write -field=token \
+    auth/kubernetes/login role="${vault_role}" jwt="${jwt}")" || {
+      log "Vault Kubernetes login failed after retries"
+      exit 1
+    }
+  unset jwt
+  if [ -z "${VAULT_TOKEN}" ]; then
+    log "Vault Kubernetes login returned an empty token"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  export VAULT_TOKEN
+}
+
+# Return 0 for the complete field, 10 when absent, 11 when present but
+# incomplete, and 12 for a persistent authorization/transport failure.
+read_build_token() {
+  attempt=1
+  while [ "${attempt}" -le 5 ]; do
+    set +e
+    secret_json="$(vault read -format=json "${secret_api_path}" 2>&1)"
+    secret_status=$?
+    set -e
+    if [ "${secret_status}" -eq 0 ]; then
+      unset secret_json
+      set +e
+      build_token="$(vault kv get -field=build_token "${secret_path}" 2>&1)"
+      field_status=$?
+      set -e
+      if [ "${field_status}" -eq 0 ]; then
+        case "${build_token}" in
+          ''|*[!0-9a-f]*) unset build_token; return 11 ;;
+        esac
+        if [ "${#build_token}" -eq 64 ]; then
+          unset build_token
+          return 0
+        fi
+        unset build_token
+        return 11
+      fi
+      if printf '%s' "${build_token}" | grep -q 'No value found'; then
+        unset build_token
+        return 11
+      fi
+      unset build_token
+    elif printf '%s' "${secret_json}" | grep -Eq 'Code: 404|No value found at'; then
+      unset secret_json
+      return 10
+    fi
+    if [ "${attempt}" -lt 5 ]; then
+      sleep "${attempt}"
+    fi
+    attempt=$((attempt + 1))
+  done
+  unset secret_json
+  return 12
+}
+
+ensure_token
+
+if read_build_token; then
+  read_status=0
+else
+  read_status=$?
+fi
+case "${read_status}" in
+  0)
+    log "job-scoped token already present; no write performed"
+    exit 0
+    ;;
+  11)
+    log "secret exists without a valid build_token; refusing to overwrite existing fields"
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+  12)
+    log "secret read failed after retries; refusing to seed"
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+  10) ;;
+  *)
+    log "unexpected secret read state ${read_status}"
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+esac
+
+new_token="$(retry_command vault write -field=random_bytes \
+  sys/tools/random/32 format=hex)" || {
+    log "Vault random token generation failed after retries"
+    exit 1
+  }
+case "${new_token}" in
+  ''|*[!0-9a-f]*)
+    unset new_token
+    log "Vault returned an invalid random token"
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+esac
+if [ "${#new_token}" -ne 64 ]; then
+  unset new_token
+  log "Vault returned an invalid random token"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+umask 077
+printf '{"options":{"cas":0},"data":{"build_token":"%s"}}\n' \
+  "${new_token}" > "${payload_file}"
+unset new_token
+
+set +e
+create_error="$(vault write "${secret_api_path}" @"${payload_file}" 2>&1 >/dev/null)"
+create_status=$?
+set -e
+cleanup
+if [ "${create_status}" -eq 0 ]; then
+  log "job-scoped token created with KV-v2 CAS create-only semantics"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+if printf '%s' "${create_error}" | grep -qi 'check-and-set'; then
+  unset create_error
+  if read_build_token; then
+    log "another seeder won CAS; existing token preserved"
+    exit 0
+  fi
+  log "CAS race did not produce a readable build_token; refusing to continue"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+unset create_error
+log "KV-v2 CAS create failed; refusing to retry a write"
+exit 1

services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/serviceaccount.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# services/vault-hermes-jenkins-token-seed/serviceaccount.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: hermes-jenkins-token-seed
+  namespace: vault
+automountServiceAccountToken: true

services/vault/hermes-auth-role-bootstrap-job.yaml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 apiVersion: batch/v1
 kind: Job
 metadata:
-  name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-8
+  name: vault-k8s-auth-hermes-10
   namespace: vault
 spec:
   backoffLimit: 2
@@ -15,16 +15,26 @@ spec:
         hardware: rpi5
         kubernetes.io/arch: arm64
         node-role.kubernetes.io/worker: "true"
+      affinity:
+        nodeAffinity:
+          requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            nodeSelectorTerms:
+              - matchExpressions:
+                  - key: kubernetes.io/hostname
+                    operator: NotIn
+                    values: [titan-04, titan-14, titan-18, titan-19, titan-24]
       containers:
         - name: configure-k8s-auth
-          image: hashicorp/vault:1.21.4
+          image: docker.io/hashicorp/vault@sha256:4e33b126a59c0c333b76fb4e894722462659a6bec7c48c9ee8cea56fccfd2569
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           command:
             - sh
             - /scripts/vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh
           env:
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /tmp
             - name: VAULT_ADDR
-              value: http://10.43.57.249:8200
+              value: http://vault.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200
             - name: VAULT_K8S_ROLE
               value: vault-admin
             - name: VAULT_K8S_TOKEN_REVIEWER_JWT_FILE
@@ -38,6 +48,18 @@ spec:
             - name: token-reviewer
               mountPath: /var/run/secrets/vault-token-reviewer
               readOnly: true
+            - name: tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsGroup: 1000
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 100
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 25m
@@ -53,3 +75,5 @@ spec:
         - name: token-reviewer
           secret:
             secretName: vault-admin-token-reviewer
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir: {}

services/vault/scripts/vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh

@@ -235,12 +235,26 @@ write_policy_and_role "mailu-mailserver" "mailu-mailserver" "mailu-vault-sync" \
   "mailu/* shared/postmark-relay shared/harbor-pull" ""
 write_policy_and_role "harbor" "harbor" "harbor-vault-sync" \
   "harbor/* shared/harbor-pull" "hermes/developer-harbor"
+harbor_policy_bootstrap_policy='
+path "kv/data/atlas/harbor/harbor-core" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+'
+write_raw_policy "harbor-policy-bootstrap" "${harbor_policy_bootstrap_policy}"
+log "writing role harbor-policy-bootstrap"
+vault_cmd write "auth/kubernetes/role/harbor-policy-bootstrap" \
+  bound_service_account_names="harbor-policy-bootstrap" \
+  bound_service_account_namespaces="harbor" \
+  policies="harbor-policy-bootstrap" \
+  ttl="${role_ttl}"
 write_policy_and_role "nextcloud" "nextcloud" "nextcloud-vault" \
   "nextcloud/* shared/keycloak-admin shared/postmark-relay" ""
 write_policy_and_role "comms" "comms" "comms-vault,atlasbot" \
   "comms/* shared/chat-ai-keys-runtime shared/harbor-pull" ""
-write_policy_and_role "jenkins" "jenkins" "jenkins,jenkins-vault-sync" \
-  "jenkins/* shared/harbor-pull quality/sonarqube-oidc" "hermes/developer-jenkins"
+write_policy_and_role "jenkins" "jenkins" "jenkins" \
+  "jenkins/* shared/harbor-pull quality/sonarqube-oidc hermes/developer-jenkins" ""
+write_policy_and_role "jenkins-vault-sync" "jenkins" "jenkins-vault-sync" \
+  "shared/harbor-pull" ""
 write_policy_and_role "monitoring" "monitoring" "monitoring-vault-sync" \
   "monitoring/* shared/postmark-relay shared/harbor-pull" ""
 write_policy_and_role "logging" "logging" "logging-vault-sync" \
@@ -255,8 +269,30 @@ write_policy_and_role "game-stream" "game-stream" "game-stream-vault" \
   "game-stream/*" ""
 write_policy_and_role "hermes" "hermes" "hermes-vault,hermes-triage" \
   "hermes/triage-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/triage-api" ""
-write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent" "hermes" "hermes-agent,hermes-switchyard" \
-  "hermes/agent-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/chat-telegram hermes/developer-keycloak hermes/developer-gitea hermes/developer-harbor hermes/developer-jenkins hermes/developer-ssh" ""
+# The agent keeps its own credentials but no longer holds developer-gitea:
+# the least-authority hermes-scm-broker role (below) carries the Gitea token
+# so a compromised agent cannot reach the SCM write path directly.
+write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent" "hermes" "hermes-agent" \
+  "hermes/agent-oidc hermes/agent-tokens hermes/chat-telegram hermes/developer-keycloak hermes/developer-harbor hermes/developer-jenkins hermes/developer-ssh" ""
+write_policy_and_role "hermes-switchyard" "hermes" "hermes-switchyard" \
+  "hermes/chat-telegram" ""
+hermes_jenkins_token_seed_policy='
+path "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-jenkins" {
+  capabilities = ["create", "read"]
+}
+path "sys/tools/random/32" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}
+'
+write_raw_policy "hermes-jenkins-token-seed" "${hermes_jenkins_token_seed_policy}"
+log "writing role hermes-jenkins-token-seed"
+vault_cmd write "auth/kubernetes/role/hermes-jenkins-token-seed" \
+  bound_service_account_names="hermes-jenkins-token-seed" \
+  bound_service_account_namespaces="vault" \
+  policies="hermes-jenkins-token-seed" \
+  ttl="${role_ttl}"
+write_policy_and_role "hermes-scm-broker" "hermes-scm" "hermes-scm-broker" \
+  "hermes/developer-gitea" ""
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-credential-sync" "hermes" "hermes-agent" \
   "" "hermes/agent-tokens"
 write_policy_and_role "hermes-node-ssh" "hermes" "hermes-node-ssh-access" \

testing/quality_contract.json

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
     }
   ],
   "managed_modules": [
+    "ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py",
+    "dockerfiles/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py",
+    "services/harbor/scripts/harbor_hermes_agent_immutability_ensure.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/jenkins_image_build_trigger.py",
     "ci/scripts/publish_test_metrics.py",
     "ci/scripts/publish_test_metrics_quality.py",
     "ci/scripts/semgrep_report.py",
@@ -53,9 +57,29 @@
     "testing/tests/test_supply_chain_report.py",
     "testing/tests/test_semgrep_report.py",
     "testing/tests/test_quality_contract.py",
-    "testing/tests/test_quality_gate.py"
+    "testing/tests/test_quality_gate.py",
+    "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_client.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_io.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_server.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/deadline_http.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/git_pack_objects.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/receive_pack_scan.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
   ],
   "lint_paths": [
+    "ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py",
+    "dockerfiles/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py",
+    "services/harbor/scripts/harbor_hermes_agent_immutability_ensure.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/jenkins_image_build_trigger.py",
     "ci/scripts/publish_test_metrics.py",
     "ci/scripts/publish_test_metrics_quality.py",
     "ci/scripts/semgrep_report.py",
@@ -86,7 +110,15 @@
     "services/hermes/scripts/cli_lane_routing.py",
     "services/hermes/scripts/cli_lane_runner.py",
     "testing/tests",
-    "testing"
+    "testing",
+    "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+    "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+    "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
   ],
   "pytest_suites": {
     "unit": {
@@ -99,10 +131,14 @@
       "junit": "build/junit-unit.xml",
       "coverage_sources": [
         "ci/scripts",
+        "dockerfiles",
         "scripts.render.dashboards_render_atlas",
+        "services/harbor/scripts",
         "services/hermes/scripts",
         "services/mailu/scripts",
-        "testing"
+        "testing",
+        "services/gitea/scripts",
+        "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts"
       ],
       "coverage_xml": "build/coverage-unit.xml"
     },
@@ -169,7 +205,15 @@
       "services/*/scripts/tests/**/*.py",
       "services/hermes/scripts/cli_lane_*.py",
       "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync.py",
-      "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync_listener.py"
+      "services/mailu/scripts/mailu_sync_listener.py",
+      "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/*.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
     ],
     "naming_rules": [
       {
@@ -212,6 +256,10 @@
   "coverage": {
     "minimum_percent": 95.0,
     "tracked_files": [
+      "ci/scripts/hermes_image_release.py",
+      "dockerfiles/hermes-kaniko-heredoc-runner.py",
+      "services/harbor/scripts/harbor_hermes_agent_immutability_ensure.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/jenkins_image_build_trigger.py",
       "ci/scripts/publish_test_metrics.py",
       "ci/scripts/publish_test_metrics_quality.py",
       "ci/scripts/semgrep_report.py",
@@ -243,7 +291,23 @@
       "testing/quality_docs.py",
       "testing/quality_hygiene.py",
       "testing/quality_coverage.py",
-      "testing/quality_gate.py"
+      "testing/quality_gate.py",
+      "services/gitea/scripts/gitea_branch_protection_check.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/gitea_api_policy.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_client.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_io.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/scm_broker_server.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/hermes_coordinator.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_audit.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_hardening.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_account_io.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/stage_runtime_access.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/deadline_http.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/git_pack_objects.py",
+      "services/hermes/scm-common/scripts/receive_pack_scan.py",
+      "services/hermes/scripts/node_polkit_audit.py"
     ]
   }
 }

testing/quality_coverage.py

@@ -3,42 +3,24 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
-import math
-from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
 
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CoverageRates:
-    """Validated line and branch percentages for one source file."""
-
-    line: float
-    branch: float
-
-
-def _percentage(class_node: ET.Element, attribute: str) -> float:
-    """Parse one finite Cobertura rate and fail closed outside its domain."""
-    raw = class_node.attrib.get(attribute)
-    if raw is None:
-        raise ValueError(f"coverage class missing {attribute}")
-    value = float(raw)
-    if not math.isfinite(value) or value < 0.0 or value > 1.0:
-        raise ValueError(f"coverage class has invalid {attribute}: {raw}")
-    return value * 100.0
-
-
-def _load_rates(xml_path: Path, root: Path) -> dict[str, CoverageRates]:
-    """Load validated per-file line and branch rates from Cobertura XML."""
+def _load_rates(xml_path: Path, root: Path) -> dict[str, dict[str, float | None]]:
+    """Load per-file line and branch percentages from a Cobertura XML report."""
     tree = ET.parse(xml_path)
     xml_root = tree.getroot()
     source_roots = [
-        Path(node.text) for node in xml_root.findall("./sources/source") if node.text
+        Path(node.text)
+        for node in xml_root.findall("./sources/source")
+        if node.text
     ]
-    rates: dict[str, CoverageRates] = {}
+    rates: dict[str, dict[str, float | None]] = {}
     for class_node in xml_root.findall(".//class"):
         filename = class_node.attrib.get("filename")
-        if not filename:
+        line_rate = class_node.attrib.get("line-rate")
+        if not filename or line_rate is None:
             continue
         normalized = filename.replace("\\", "/")
         if normalized.startswith("/"):
@@ -50,50 +32,44 @@ def _load_rates(xml_path: Path, root: Path) -> dict[str, CoverageRates]:
                 if candidate.exists():
                     key = candidate.relative_to(root).as_posix()
                     break
-        rates[key] = CoverageRates(
-            line=_percentage(class_node, "line-rate"),
-            branch=_percentage(class_node, "branch-rate"),
-        )
+        branch_rate = class_node.attrib.get("branch-rate")
+        rates[key] = {
+            "line": float(line_rate) * 100.0,
+            "branch": None if branch_rate is None else float(branch_rate) * 100.0,
+        }
     return rates
 
 
-def _load_percentages(xml_path: Path, root: Path) -> dict[str, float]:
-    """Load per-file line percentages for backward-compatible callers."""
-    return {path: rates.line for path, rates in _load_rates(xml_path, root).items()}
-
-
 def run_check(contract: dict[str, Any], root: Path, xml_path: Path) -> list[str]:
     """Return human-readable issues for tracked files below the coverage floor.
 
-    The report is intentionally per-file so a single weak module cannot hide
-    behind aggregate suite coverage.
+    Line and branch rates are both enforced per file so a single weak module
+    cannot hide behind aggregate suite coverage or line-only reporting.
     """
     if not xml_path.exists():
         return [f"coverage xml missing: {xml_path.relative_to(root)}"]
 
-    try:
-        rates_by_path = _load_rates(xml_path, root)
-    except (ET.ParseError, OSError, UnicodeError, ValueError) as error:
-        return [f"coverage xml invalid: {error}"]
+    rates = _load_rates(xml_path, root)
     minimum = float(contract.get("coverage", {}).get("minimum_percent", 95.0))
     issues: list[str] = []
 
     for relative_path in contract.get("coverage", {}).get("tracked_files", []):
         normalized = relative_path.replace("\\", "/")
-        rates = rates_by_path.get(normalized)
-        if rates is None:
+        file_rates = rates.get(normalized)
+        if file_rates is None:
             issues.append(f"coverage missing for tracked file: {relative_path}")
             continue
-        if rates.line + 1e-9 < minimum:
-            issues.append(
-                f"line coverage below {minimum:.1f}%: {relative_path} "
-                f"({rates.line:.1f}%)"
-            )
-        if rates.branch + 1e-9 < minimum:
-            issues.append(
-                f"branch coverage below {minimum:.1f}%: {relative_path} "
-                f"({rates.branch:.1f}%)"
-            )
+        for metric in ("line", "branch"):
+            percent = file_rates[metric]
+            if percent is None:
+                issues.append(
+                    f"{metric} coverage missing for tracked file: {relative_path}"
+                )
+            elif percent + 1e-9 < minimum:
+                issues.append(
+                    f"{metric} coverage below {minimum:.1f}%: "
+                    f"{relative_path} ({percent:.1f}%)"
+                )
 
     return issues
 
@@ -108,16 +84,13 @@ def compute_workspace_line_coverage(
     if not xml_path.exists():
         return 0.0
 
-    try:
-        percentages = _load_percentages(xml_path, root)
-    except (ET.ParseError, OSError, UnicodeError, ValueError):
-        return 0.0
+    rates = _load_rates(xml_path, root)
     samples: list[float] = []
     for relative_path in contract.get("coverage", {}).get("tracked_files", []):
         normalized = relative_path.replace("\\", "/")
-        percent = percentages.get(normalized)
-        if percent is not None:
-            samples.append(percent)
+        file_rates = rates.get(normalized)
+        if file_rates is not None:
+            samples.append(file_rates["line"])
     if not samples:
         return 0.0
     return round(sum(samples) / len(samples), 3)

testing/quality_gate.py

@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ def run_profile(
             results.append(
                 _result(
                     "coverage",
-                    "Per-file 95% coverage floor for tracked quality-managed modules.",
+                    "Per-file 95% line and branch coverage floor for tracked quality-managed modules.",
                     _status_from_issues(issues),
                     issues=issues,
                     coverage_xml=str(coverage_xml.relative_to(root)),

testing/tests/test_hermes_agent_access.py

@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-"""Owner and Switchyard access-boundary contracts."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from testing.tests.test_hermes_cli_support import (
-    HERMES,
-    SCRIPTS,
-    _agent_deployment,
-    yaml,
-)
-
-
-def test_owner_agent_has_pinned_dedicated_node_ssh_access():
-    deployment = _agent_deployment()
-    annotations = deployment["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"]
-    assert annotations[
-        "vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-private-key"
-    ] == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"
-    assert annotations[
-        "vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-config"
-    ] == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"
-    assert annotations[
-        "vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-node-ssh-known-hosts"
-    ] == "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"
-
-    init = next(
-        item
-        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["initContainers"]
-        if item["name"] == "init-config"
-    )
-    command = init["command"][2]
-    assert "ln -s /runtime-access/node-ssh-config /opt/data/home/.ssh/config" in command
-    assert (
-        "ln -s /runtime-access/node-ssh-known-hosts /opt/data/home/.ssh/known_hosts"
-        in command
-    )
-    assert "ln -s home/.ssh /opt/data/.ssh" in command
-    assert "chmod 0700 /opt/data/home/.ssh" in command
-    assert (
-        "ln -s /runtime-access/node-ssh-private-key "
-        "/opt/data/home/.ssh/id_ed25519_atlas_nodes"
-    ) in command
-
-    config = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml").read_text())["data"]
-    assert "ssh_config" not in config
-    assert "ssh_known_hosts" not in config
-    assert "ssh-ed25519" not in (HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml").read_text()
-
-    resources = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "kustomization.yaml").read_text())[
-        "resources"
-    ]
-    assert "node-ssh-access.yaml" in resources
-    access = [
-        item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "node-ssh-access.yaml").read_text())
-        if item
-    ]
-    service_account = next(item for item in access if item["kind"] == "ServiceAccount")
-    assert service_account["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access"
-    provider = next(item for item in access if item["kind"] == "SecretProviderClass")
-    assert provider["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access"
-    assert provider["spec"]["provider"] == "vault"
-    parameters = provider["spec"]["parameters"]
-    assert parameters["roleName"] == "hermes-node-ssh"
-    assert 'secretPath: "kv/data/atlas/hermes/developer-ssh"' in parameters["objects"]
-    assert 'secretKey: "public_key"' in parameters["objects"]
-    daemonset = next(item for item in access if item["kind"] == "DaemonSet")
-    pod = daemonset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
-    assert pod["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-node-ssh-access"
-    assert pod["automountServiceAccountToken"] is True
-    host_home = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "host-home")
-    assert host_home["hostPath"] == {"path": "/home", "type": "Directory"}
-    vault_secrets = next(
-        item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "vault-secrets"
-    )
-    assert vault_secrets["csi"]["driver"] == "secrets-store.csi.k8s.io"
-    assert vault_secrets["csi"]["volumeAttributes"] == {
-        "secretProviderClass": "hermes-node-ssh-access"
-    }
-    reconciler = pod["containers"][0]["args"][0]
-    assert "cat /vault/secrets/node-ssh-public-key" in reconciler
-    assert "grep -qxF" in reconciler
-    assert "for user in atlas oceanus" in reconciler
-    assert "/host-etc/passwd" in reconciler
-    assert "chown \"${uid}:${gid}\"" in reconciler
-    host_passwd = next(
-        item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "host-passwd"
-    )
-    assert host_passwd["hostPath"] == {"path": "/etc/passwd", "type": "File"}
-
-
-def test_owner_agent_tracks_no_ssh_identity_or_host_key_material():
-    """Vault references may be tracked; SSH identities and trust data may not."""
-    forbidden = (
-        "BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY",
-        "ssh-ed25519 AAAA",
-        "ssh-rsa AAAA",
-        "IdentityFile ",
-        "UserKnownHostsFile ",
-        "StrictHostKeyChecking ",
-        "ssh_config:",
-        "ssh_known_hosts:",
-    )
-    text_suffixes = {
-        ".conf",
-        ".json",
-        ".md",
-        ".py",
-        ".sh",
-        ".toml",
-        ".yaml",
-        ".yml",
-    }
-    tracked = "\n".join(
-        path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        for path in HERMES.rglob("*")
-        if path.is_file() and path.suffix in text_suffixes
-    )
-    for marker in forbidden:
-        assert marker not in tracked
-
-
-def test_switchyard_has_a_dedicated_non_owner_identity_and_read_only_catalog():
-    """Routing must not inherit the owner agent's cluster-admin capability."""
-    service_accounts = [
-        item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all(
-            (HERMES / "vault-serviceaccount.yaml").read_text()
-        )
-        if item
-    ]
-    assert any(
-        item["kind"] == "ServiceAccount"
-        and item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-switchyard"
-        for item in service_accounts
-    )
-
-    switchyard = yaml.safe_load(
-        (HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml").read_text()
-    )
-    switchyard_pod = switchyard["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
-    assert switchyard_pod["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-switchyard"
-    agent_pod = _agent_deployment()["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
-    for pod, container_name in (
-        (switchyard_pod, "worker-route-broker"),
-        (agent_pod, "claude-broker"),
-    ):
-        container = next(item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == container_name)
-        catalog = next(
-            item
-            for item in container["volumeMounts"]
-            if item["mountPath"] == "/routing-catalog"
-        )
-        assert catalog["readOnly"] is True
-
-    rbac = [
-        item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "agent-rbac.yaml").read_text())
-        if item
-    ]
-    binding = next(item for item in rbac if item["kind"] == "ClusterRoleBinding")
-    assert binding["subjects"] == [
-        {"kind": "ServiceAccount", "name": "hermes-agent", "namespace": "hermes"}
-    ]
-
-
-def test_switchyard_active_state_uses_a_relocatable_rwx_claim():
-    """A stale node attachment must not strand the routing authority."""
-    claims = [
-        item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "switchyard-pvc.yaml").read_text())
-        if item
-    ]
-    active_claim = next(
-        item
-        for item in claims
-        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-switchyard-state-rwx"
-    )
-    assert active_claim["spec"]["accessModes"] == ["ReadWriteMany"]
-
-    deployment = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml").read_text())
-    strategy = deployment["spec"]["strategy"]
-    assert strategy == {
-        "type": "RollingUpdate",
-        "rollingUpdate": {"maxSurge": 1, "maxUnavailable": 0},
-    }
-    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
-    state = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "state")
-    assert state["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == active_claim["metadata"][
-        "name"
-    ]
-
-
-def test_worker_route_broker_accepts_pod_network_health_checks():
-    """Kubelet probes the pod IP, so the broker cannot bind to loopback only."""
-    script = (SCRIPTS / "worker_route_broker.py").read_text()
-    assert 'ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", PORT), Handler)' in script
-
-
-def test_switchyard_network_boundary_allows_vault_bootstrap():
-    """The pre-populate init container must reach Vault before routing starts."""
-    documents = [
-        item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml").read_text())
-        if item
-    ]
-    isolation = next(
-        item
-        for item in documents
-        if item.get("metadata", {}).get("name") == "hermes-switchyard-isolation"
-    )
-    assert any(
-        rule.get("to")
-        == [
-            {
-                "namespaceSelector": {
-                    "matchLabels": {"kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "vault"}
-                },
-                "podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "vault"}},
-            }
-        ]
-        and rule.get("ports") == [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 8200}]
-        for rule in isolation["spec"]["egress"]
-    )
-
-
-def test_switchyard_network_boundary_allows_metrics_scraping():
-    """VictoriaMetrics may scrape Switchyard without widening its API boundary."""
-    documents = [
-        item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml").read_text())
-        if item
-    ]
-    isolation = next(
-        item
-        for item in documents
-        if item.get("metadata", {}).get("name") == "hermes-switchyard-isolation"
-    )
-    assert any(
-        rule.get("from")
-        == [
-            {
-                "namespaceSelector": {
-                    "matchLabels": {
-                        "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "monitoring"
-                    }
-                },
-                "podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "server"}},
-            }
-        ]
-        and rule.get("ports") == [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9005}]
-        for rule in isolation["spec"]["ingress"]
-    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_agent_layout.py

@@ -285,6 +285,19 @@ def test_broker_services_survive_sibling_container_readiness_loss():
     ):
         assert services[name]["spec"]["publishNotReadyAddresses"] is True
 
+    # The agent web endpoints route through this Service to the same pod the
+    # cli-lane-runner readiness probe gates; a deferred lane image must not
+    # take down the dashboard or terminal.
+    agent_auth = next(
+        item
+        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "oauth2-proxy.yaml").read_text())
+        if item
+        and item["kind"] == "Service"
+        and item["metadata"]["name"] == "oauth2-proxy-hermes-agent"
+    )
+    assert agent_auth["spec"]["selector"] == {"app": "hermes-agent"}
+    assert agent_auth["spec"]["publishNotReadyAddresses"] is True
+
 
 def test_cli_lane_domain_modules_are_all_mounted_with_the_runner():
     manifest = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "kustomization.yaml").read_text())
@@ -354,8 +367,8 @@ def test_cli_lane_config_refresh_does_not_restart_active_work():
         },
         "initialDelaySeconds": 2,
         "periodSeconds": 5,
-        "timeoutSeconds": 2,
-        "failureThreshold": 1,
+        "timeoutSeconds": 5,
+        "failureThreshold": 3,
     }
     environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in lane["env"]}
     assert environment["HERMES_CLI_HEALTH_MAX_AGE_SECONDS"] == "60"
@@ -374,3 +387,33 @@ def test_agent_dashboard_reconnects_all_transient_websockets():
     assert ".then(() => gw.connect())" in dockerfile
     assert 'api.getSessions(1, 0, profile ?? "")' in dockerfile
     assert "dashboard token rotated by a server restart" in dockerfile
+
+
+def test_agent_image_runs_execution_safety_patch_and_regressions():
+    dockerfiles = HERMES.parents[1] / "dockerfiles"
+    dockerfile = (dockerfiles / "Dockerfile.hermes-agent").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    dockerignore = (dockerfiles / "Dockerfile.hermes-agent.dockerignore").read_text(
+        encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+
+    for name in (
+        "patch-hermes-execution-safety.py",
+        "hermes-execution-safety-regression.py",
+        "hermes_execution_patch_support.py",
+        "patch_hermes_run_safety.py",
+        "patch_hermes_decomposition_safety.py",
+        "hermes_execution_regression_support.py",
+        "hermes_run_safety_regression.py",
+        "hermes_decomposition_safety_regression.py",
+    ):
+        assert f"COPY dockerfiles/{name}" in dockerfile
+        assert f"!dockerfiles/{name}" in dockerignore
+    assert "/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python /tmp/patch-hermes-execution-safety.py" in (
+        dockerfile
+    )
+    assert "/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python /tmp/hermes-execution-safety-regression.py" in (
+        dockerfile
+    )
+    assert "COPY services/hermes/scripts/cli_lane_*.py" in dockerfile
+    assert "!services/hermes/scripts/cli_lane_*.py" in dockerignore
+    assert "HERMES_CLI_LANE_SOURCE=/tmp/hermes-lane-regression" in dockerfile

testing/tests/test_hermes_agent_security.py

@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
-"""Agent authentication, networking, and Flux health contracts."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from testing.tests.test_hermes_cli_support import (
-    FLUX_HERMES,
-    HERMES,
-    KEYCLOAK,
-    _agent_deployment,
-    yaml,
-)
-
-
-def test_agent_image_runs_execution_safety_patch_and_regressions():
-    dockerfiles = HERMES.parents[1] / "dockerfiles"
-    dockerfile = (dockerfiles / "Dockerfile.hermes-agent").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    dockerignore = (dockerfiles / "Dockerfile.hermes-agent.dockerignore").read_text(
-        encoding="utf-8"
-    )
-
-    for name in (
-        "patch-hermes-execution-safety.py",
-        "hermes-execution-safety-regression.py",
-        "hermes_execution_patch_support.py",
-        "patch_hermes_run_safety.py",
-        "patch_hermes_decomposition_safety.py",
-        "hermes_execution_regression_support.py",
-        "hermes_run_safety_regression.py",
-        "hermes_decomposition_safety_regression.py",
-    ):
-        assert f"COPY dockerfiles/{name}" in dockerfile
-        assert f"!dockerfiles/{name}" in dockerignore
-    assert "/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python /tmp/patch-hermes-execution-safety.py" in (
-        dockerfile
-    )
-    assert "/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python /tmp/hermes-execution-safety-regression.py" in (
-        dockerfile
-    )
-    assert "COPY services/hermes/scripts/cli_lane_*.py" in dockerfile
-    assert "!services/hermes/scripts/cli_lane_*.py" in dockerignore
-    assert "HERMES_CLI_LANE_SOURCE=/tmp/hermes-lane-regression" in dockerfile
-
-
-def test_agent_refreshes_routes_after_restoring_cli_logins():
-    deployment = _agent_deployment()
-    init_containers = {
-        item["name"]: item
-        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["initContainers"]
-    }
-    configure = init_containers["configure-agent-clients"]
-    command = configure["command"][-1]
-    assert "configure_agent_clients.py" in command
-    assert command.index("configure_agent_clients.py") < command.index(
-        "hermes_coordinator.py --once"
-    )
-    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in configure["env"]}
-    assert env["HERMES_AUTH_FILE"] == "/runtime-access/hermes-auth.json"
-    assert env["PYTHONPATH"] == "/opt/hermes"
-    for name in ("bootstrap-coordinator", "configure-agent-clients"):
-        route_env = {
-            item["name"]: item["value"]
-            for item in init_containers[name]["env"]
-        }
-        assert route_env["CODEX_HOME"] == "/runtime-access/codex"
-        assert route_env["CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR"] == "/runtime-access/claude"
-        assert "/opt/data/tools/bin" in route_env["PATH"]
-
-    assert "patch-web-session-activity" in init_containers
-    web_patch = init_containers["patch-web-session-activity"]
-    assert "/opt/coordinator/patch_web_session_activity.py" in web_patch["command"]
-
-    containers = {
-        item["name"]: item
-        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
-    }
-    steward_env = {
-        item["name"]: item["value"]
-        for item in containers["model-steward"]["env"]
-    }
-    assert steward_env["CODEX_HOME"] == "/runtime-access/codex"
-    assert steward_env["CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR"] == "/runtime-access/claude"
-    assert "/opt/data/tools/bin" in steward_env["PATH"]
-    hermes_mounts = {
-        (item["name"], item["mountPath"], item.get("subPath"))
-        for item in containers["hermes"]["volumeMounts"]
-    }
-    assert (
-        "web-server-patch",
-        "/opt/hermes/hermes_cli/web_server.py",
-        "web_server.py",
-    ) in hermes_mounts
-
-
-def test_flux_health_checks_follow_the_owner_oauth_sidecar():
-    flux = yaml.safe_load(FLUX_HERMES.read_text())
-    checks = {
-        (item["kind"], item["name"])
-        for item in flux["spec"]["healthChecks"]
-    }
-    assert ("Deployment", "hermes-agent") in checks
-    assert ("DaemonSet", "hermes-node-ssh-access") in checks
-    assert ("Deployment", "oauth2-proxy-hermes-agent") not in checks
-
-
-def test_agent_auth_is_bstein_group_and_email_bounded():
-    deployment = _agent_deployment()
-    oauth = next(
-        item for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
-        if item["name"] == "oauth2-proxy"
-    )
-    args = oauth["args"]
-    assert "--user-id-claim=sub" in args
-    assert "--oidc-groups-claim=groups" in args
-    assert "--allowed-group=/hermes-owner" in args
-    assert "--authenticated-emails-file=/etc/oauth2-proxy/allowed-emails" in args
-    script = (KEYCLOAK / "scripts/hermes_access_oidc_ensure.sh").read_text()
-    assert 'group_name="hermes-owner"' in script
-    assert "username=bstein&exact=true" in script
-    assert '"full.path":"true"' in script
-
-
-def test_agent_network_boundary_allows_only_authenticated_and_metrics_surfaces():
-    documents = [
-        item
-        for item in yaml.safe_load_all((HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml").read_text())
-        if item
-    ]
-    isolation = next(item for item in documents if item.get("metadata", {}).get("name") == "hermes-agent-isolation")
-    assert isolation["spec"]["ingress"] == [
-        {
-            "from": [
-                {
-                    "namespaceSelector": {
-                        "matchLabels": {
-                            "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "traefik"
-                        }
-                    },
-                    "podSelector": {
-                        "matchLabels": {"app.kubernetes.io/name": "traefik"}
-                    },
-                }
-            ],
-            "ports": [{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 4180}],
-        },
-        {
-            "from": [
-                {
-                    "podSelector": {
-                        "matchLabels": {"app": "hermes-chat-tenant"}
-                    }
-                }
-            ],
-            "ports": [
-                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9002},
-                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9003},
-            ],
-        },
-        {
-            "from": [
-                {
-                    "podSelector": {
-                        "matchLabels": {"app": "hermes-switchyard"}
-                    }
-                }
-            ],
-            "ports": [
-                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9003},
-                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9006},
-            ],
-        },
-        {
-            "from": [
-                {
-                    "namespaceSelector": {
-                        "matchLabels": {
-                            "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "monitoring"
-                        }
-                    },
-                    "podSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app": "server"}},
-                }
-            ],
-            "ports": [
-                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9010},
-                {"protocol": "TCP", "port": 9011},
-            ],
-        },
-    ]
-    assert isolation["spec"]["egress"] == [{}]
-
-
-def test_owner_agent_has_cluster_admin_kubernetes_context():
-    config = yaml.safe_load((HERMES / "agent-kubeconfig.yaml").read_text())
-    assert config["current-context"] == "atlas-owner"
-    assert config["contexts"][0]["context"]["namespace"] == "default"
-    rbac_path = HERMES / "agent-rbac.yaml"
-    documents = [item for item in yaml.safe_load_all(rbac_path.read_text()) if item]
-    binding = next(item for item in documents if item["kind"] == "ClusterRoleBinding")
-    assert binding["roleRef"] == {
-        "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
-        "kind": "ClusterRole",
-        "name": "cluster-admin",
-    }
-    assert binding["subjects"] == [
-        {"kind": "ServiceAccount", "name": "hermes-agent", "namespace": "hermes"}
-    ]

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_codex_broker.py

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-"""Hermes chat codex broker contracts."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from test_hermes_chat_support import (
-    ModuleType,
-    Path,
-    _load_broker_module,
-    base64,
-    json,
-    sys,
-    time,
-)
-
-
-def test_codex_broker_refreshes_and_persists_first_party_oauth(
-    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
-):
-    """Expired ChatGPT OAuth refreshes in the canonical Codex CLI store."""
-    module = _load_broker_module(
-        "hermes_codex_refresh_broker", "codex_broker.py", monkeypatch
-    )
-    auth_dir = tmp_path / ".codex"
-    auth_dir.mkdir()
-
-    def jwt(expires_at: float) -> str:
-        payload = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
-            json.dumps({"exp": expires_at}).encode()
-        ).decode().rstrip("=")
-        return f"header.{payload}.signature"
-
-    expired = jwt(time.time() - 60)
-    live = jwt(time.time() + 3600)
-    auth_path = auth_dir / "auth.json"
-    auth_path.write_text(
-        json.dumps(
-            {
-                "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
-                "tokens": {
-                    "access_token": expired,
-                    "refresh_token": "refresh-old",
-                },
-            }
-        )
-    )
-    calls = []
-    auth_module = ModuleType("hermes_cli.auth")
-
-    def refresh(access_token, refresh_token, *, timeout_seconds):
-        calls.append((access_token, refresh_token, timeout_seconds))
-        return {
-            "access_token": live,
-            "refresh_token": "refresh-new",
-            "last_refresh": "2026-08-12T20:00:00Z",
-        }
-
-    auth_module.refresh_codex_oauth_pure = refresh
-    package = ModuleType("hermes_cli")
-    package.auth = auth_module
-    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", package)
-    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli.auth", auth_module)
-    monkeypatch.setenv("CODEX_HOME", str(auth_dir))
-
-    assert module._access_token() == live
-    persisted = json.loads(auth_path.read_text())
-    assert persisted["tokens"]["access_token"] == live
-    assert persisted["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "refresh-new"
-    assert persisted["last_refresh"] == "2026-08-12T20:00:00Z"
-    assert calls == [(expired, "refresh-old", 30.0)]
-    assert auth_path.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
-
-    # A healthy token is reused, so repeated routed turns do not spend a
-    # refresh token or create a second billing/authentication path.
-    assert module._access_token() == live
-    assert len(calls) == 1

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_images.py

@@ -1,19 +1,119 @@
-"""Hermes chat images contracts."""
+"""Image generation and sandbox-boundary contracts for Hermes chat."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from test_hermes_chat_support import (
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+import time
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
     HERMES,
-    Path,
-    SimpleNamespace,
+    VAULT,
     _documents,
-    importlib,
-    sys,
-    time,
-    yaml,
 )
 
 
+def test_chat_image_generation_uses_private_owner_broker():
+    """Family pods get image bytes without receiving the owner's OAuth file."""
+    configmap = _documents(HERMES / "chat-configmap.yaml")[0]
+    assert "shared desktop/Wolf lane" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "local FLUX waits" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "Use `image_generate_local`" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "Use `image_generate_hosted`" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "ComfyUI endpoint" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "`MEDIA:` path" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert "`image_edit_latest`" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    assert (
+        "Preserve the most recently selected image lane" in configmap["data"]["SOUL.md"]
+    )
+    config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["config.yaml"])
+    assert config["image_gen"] == {
+        "provider": "atlas-broker",
+        "model": "atlas-image-auto-high",
+    }
+    assert config["plugins"]["enabled"] == ["atlas-broker", "auto-router"]
+
+    statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
+    pod = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    hermes = next(item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == "hermes")
+    mounts = {item["name"]: item for item in hermes["volumeMounts"]}
+    assert mounts["image-plugin"]["mountPath"] == (
+        "/opt/hermes/plugins/image_gen/atlas-broker"
+    )
+    assert mounts["runtime-access"]["mountPath"] == "/runtime-access"
+    assert "provider-auth" not in mounts
+    assert not any(
+        mount["name"] == "home" and "agent" in str(mount)
+        for mount in hermes["volumeMounts"]
+    )
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in hermes["env"]}
+    assert env["HERMES_IMAGE_BROKER_URL"].startswith("http://hermes-image-broker.")
+
+    plugin = (HERMES / "plugins" / "image-gen-broker" / "__init__.py").read_text()
+    assert '"local": "flux-2-klein-4b-local"' in plugin
+    assert '"hosted": "gpt-image-2-high"' in plugin
+    assert 'name="image_generate_local"' in plugin
+    assert 'name="image_generate_hosted"' in plugin
+    assert '"name": "image_edit_latest"' in plugin
+    assert '"name": "image_edit_latest_local"' in plugin
+    assert '"name": "image_edit_latest_hosted"' in plugin
+    assert "def _latest_generated_image" in plugin
+    assert "newest MEDIA: path from the conversation" in plugin
+    assert 'candidate.upper().startswith("MEDIA:")' in plugin
+    assert "override=True" not in plugin
+
+    agent = _documents(HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    containers = agent["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    broker = next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == "image-broker")
+    assert broker["ports"] == [
+        {"name": "image-broker", "containerPort": 9002, "protocol": "TCP"}
+    ]
+    assert broker["securityContext"]["readOnlyRootFilesystem"] is True
+    assert broker["securityContext"]["runAsNonRoot"] is True
+
+    services = _documents(HERMES / "service.yaml")
+    service = next(
+        item for item in services if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-image-broker"
+    )
+    assert service["spec"]["selector"] == {"app": "hermes-agent"}
+
+    oauth_store = _documents(HERMES / "oauth-session-store.yaml")
+    redis = next(item for item in oauth_store if item["kind"] == "Deployment")
+    assert redis["spec"]["strategy"]["type"] == "Recreate"
+    assert "--appendonly" in redis["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"][0]["args"]
+
+    policies = _documents(HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml")
+    agent_policy = next(
+        item
+        for item in policies
+        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-agent-isolation"
+    )
+    broker_ingress = next(
+        rule
+        for rule in agent_policy["spec"]["ingress"]
+        if {port["port"] for port in rule["ports"]} == {9002, 9003}
+    )
+    assert broker_ingress["from"][0]["podSelector"]["matchLabels"] == {
+        "app": "hermes-chat-tenant"
+    }
+    vault_policy = (VAULT / "scripts" / "vault_k8s_auth_configure.sh").read_text()
+    agent_role = vault_policy[
+        vault_policy.index('write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent"') : vault_policy.index(
+            "write_policy_and_role",
+            vault_policy.index('write_policy_and_role "hermes-agent"') + 1,
+        )
+    ]
+    assert "hermes/developer-gitea" not in agent_role
+    assert 'write_policy_and_role "hermes-scm-broker" "hermes-scm"' in vault_policy
+    assert (
+        'write_policy_and_role "hermes-node-ssh" "hermes" '
+        '"hermes-node-ssh-access"' in vault_policy
+    )
+
+
 def test_compact_image_edit_resolves_latest_tenant_artifact(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
     """Follow-up edits resolve the source server-side and keep tool JSON small."""
     provider_module = SimpleNamespace(
@@ -63,6 +163,7 @@ def test_compact_image_edit_resolves_latest_tenant_artifact(tmp_path, monkeypatc
         )
     ]
 
+
 def test_chat_reasoning_uses_switchyard_without_owner_credentials():
     """Family pods use AUTO/manual routes without mounting owner credentials."""
     configmap = _documents(HERMES / "chat-configmap.yaml")[0]
@@ -126,30 +227,31 @@ def test_chat_reasoning_uses_switchyard_without_owner_credentials():
     ]
 
     statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
-    assert statefulset["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"][
-        "ai.bstein.dev/config-rev"
-    ] == "20260816-telegram-topics"
+    assert (
+        statefulset["spec"]["template"]["metadata"]["annotations"][
+            "ai.bstein.dev/config-rev"
+        ]
+        == "20260816-telegram-topics"
+    )
     pod_spec = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
     patch_init = next(
-        item for item in pod_spec["initContainers"]
+        item
+        for item in pod_spec["initContainers"]
         if item["name"] == "patch-stream-recovery"
     )
     assert patch_init["command"][-2:] == [
         "/opt/hermes/agent/conversation_loop.py",
         "/patched/conversation_loop.py",
     ]
-    hermes = next(
-        item
-        for item in pod_spec["containers"]
-        if item["name"] == "hermes"
-    )
+    hermes = next(item for item in pod_spec["containers"] if item["name"] == "hermes")
     assert {
         "name": "stream-recovery-patch",
         "mountPath": "/opt/hermes/agent/conversation_loop.py",
         "subPath": "conversation_loop.py",
     } in hermes["volumeMounts"]
     api_session_init = next(
-        item for item in pod_spec["initContainers"]
+        item
+        for item in pod_spec["initContainers"]
         if item["name"] == "patch-api-server-sessions"
     )
     assert "patch_api_server_sessions.py" in api_session_init["args"][0]
@@ -159,17 +261,16 @@ def test_chat_reasoning_uses_switchyard_without_owner_credentials():
         "mountPath": "/opt/hermes/gateway/platforms/api_server.py",
         "subPath": "api_server.py",
     } in hermes["volumeMounts"]
-    assert any(
-        volume["name"] == "api-server-patch" for volume in pod_spec["volumes"]
-    )
+    assert any(volume["name"] == "api-server-patch" for volume in pod_spec["volumes"])
     assert not any(
-        mount["mountPath"].endswith("/.codex")
-        for mount in hermes["volumeMounts"]
+        mount["mountPath"].endswith("/.codex") for mount in hermes["volumeMounts"]
     )
 
     policies = _documents(HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml")
     agent_policy = next(
-        item for item in policies if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-agent-isolation"
+        item
+        for item in policies
+        if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-agent-isolation"
     )
     broker_ingress = next(
         rule
@@ -179,106 +280,3 @@ def test_chat_reasoning_uses_switchyard_without_owner_credentials():
     assert broker_ingress["from"][0]["podSelector"]["matchLabels"] == {
         "app": "hermes-chat-tenant"
     }
-
-def test_image_broker_returns_bytes_and_removes_owner_cache(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
-    """The broker must not retain a family user's generated image."""
-    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_broker", broker_path)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    generated = tmp_path / "generated.png"
-    generated.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nprivate-image")
-
-    class Provider:
-        def generate(self, prompt, aspect, **kwargs):
-            assert prompt == "paint a blue sphere"
-            assert aspect == "square"
-            return {
-                "success": True,
-                "image": str(generated),
-                "model": "gpt-image-2-high",
-                "quality": "high",
-            }
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_PROVIDER", Provider())
-    result = module._generate(
-        {
-            "prompt": "paint a blue sphere",
-            "aspect_ratio": "square",
-            "model": "gpt-image-2-high",
-        }
-    )
-
-    assert result["success"] is True
-    assert result["image_b64"]
-    assert "image" not in result
-    assert not generated.exists()
-
-def test_image_broker_auto_falls_back_to_local_and_honors_explicit_routes(
-    monkeypatch,
-):
-    """AUTO is hosted-first while explicit local never calls the hosted lane."""
-    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_router", broker_path)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    calls = []
-
-    def hosted(payload, model, prompt, aspect):
-        calls.append(("hosted", model, prompt, aspect))
-        return {"success": False, "error": "hosted refusal"}
-
-    def local(payload, timeout=1800.0):
-        calls.append(("local", payload["model"], timeout))
-        return {
-            "success": True,
-            "image_b64": "aW1hZ2U=",
-            "model": "flux-2-klein-4b-local",
-            "route": "local",
-        }
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_generate_hosted", hosted)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_local_request", local)
-    auto = module._generate(
-        {
-            "prompt": "colorize this family photograph",
-            "aspect_ratio": "portrait",
-            "model": "atlas-image-auto-high",
-        }
-    )
-    assert auto["success"] is True
-    assert auto["route"] == "local"
-    assert auto["hosted_fallback_reason"] == "hosted refusal"
-    assert [call[0] for call in calls] == ["hosted", "local"]
-
-    calls.clear()
-    explicit = module._generate(
-        {
-            "prompt": "make a local landscape",
-            "aspect_ratio": "landscape",
-            "model": "flux-2-klein-4b-local",
-        }
-    )
-    assert explicit["route"] == "local"
-    assert [call[0] for call in calls] == ["local"]
-
-def test_image_broker_policy_is_narrow_and_operator_extensible(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
-    """Family-photo restoration stays allowed while the hard boundary remains."""
-    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_policy", broker_path)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    policy = tmp_path / "policy.json"
-    policy.write_text('{"additional_blocked_phrases":["site-specific block"]}')
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "POLICY_PATH", policy)
-
-    assert module._policy_error(
-        "Colorize my baby photograph with a lighter natural skin tone"
-    ) is None
-    assert "minors" in module._policy_error("Create a sexual image of a child")
-    assert module._policy_error("A site-specific block request") == (
-        "request is blocked by the operator image policy"
-    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_local_compute.py

@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
-"""Hermes chat local compute contracts."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from test_hermes_chat_support import (
-    HERMES,
-    Path,
-    ROOT,
-    SimpleNamespace,
-    _documents,
-    importlib,
-    json,
-    tomllib,
-)
-
-
-def test_local_flux_runtime_and_gpu_handoff_are_flux_managed():
-    """FLUX and Wolf share titan-24 while text stays on titan-20."""
-    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "local-image-deployment.yaml")[0]
-    assert deployment["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-local-image"
-    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
-    assert pod["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-gpu-runtime"
-    local = next(item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == "local-image")
-    assert len(pod["containers"]) == 1
-    assert local["resources"]["requests"]["nvidia.com/gpu.shared"] == 1
-    assert local["ports"] == [{"name": "local-image", "containerPort": 9004}]
-    assert any(mount["mountPath"] == "/models" for mount in local["volumeMounts"])
-    model_env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in local["env"]}
-    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_LISTEN_PORT"] == "9004"
-    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_REVISION"] == (
-        "e7b7dc27f91deacad38e78976d1f2b499d76a294"
-    )
-    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVITY_NODE"] == "titan-24"
-    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVE_SM_PERCENT"] == "80"
-    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_MAX_EXTERNAL_MEMORY_BYTES"] == (
-        "3221225472"
-    )
-    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_OFFLOAD_MODE"] == "sequential"
-    assert "nvidia-process-exporter-local.monitoring.svc.cluster.local" in model_env[
-        "HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVITY_URL"
-    ]
-    models_volume = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "models")
-    assert models_volume["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == (
-        "hermes-image-models"
-    )
-
-    services = _documents(HERMES / "service.yaml")
-    image_service = next(
-        item for item in services if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-local-image"
-    )
-    assert image_service["spec"]["selector"] == {"app": "hermes-local-image"}
-
-    handoff_services = _documents(HERMES / "model-gate-deployment.yaml")
-    handoff = next(
-        item
-        for item in handoff_services
-        if item["kind"] == "Service"
-        and item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-gpu-handoff"
-    )
-    assert handoff["spec"]["ports"][0]["targetPort"] == "handoff"
-
-    ariadne = _documents(
-        Path(__file__).parents[2]
-        / "services/maintenance/apps/ariadne-deployment.yaml"
-    )[0]
-    env = {
-        item["name"]: item["value"]
-        for item in ariadne["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"][0]["env"]
-        if "value" in item
-    }
-    assert env["GAME_MODE_OLLAMA_URL"] == (
-        "http://hermes-gpu-handoff.hermes.svc.cluster.local:11434"
-    )
-    assert env["GAME_MODE_OLLAMA_MODEL"] == "flux-2-klein-4b-local"
-
-    for config_name in ("configmap.yaml", "agent-configmap.yaml", "chat-configmap.yaml"):
-        config = _documents(HERMES / config_name)[0]["data"]["config.yaml"]
-        assert "gpt-oss:20b" not in config
-        assert "atlas-switchyard" in config
-    switchyard = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"][
-        "routes.toml"
-    ]
-    assert 'id = "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0"' in switchyard
-    assert "qwen2.5:3b-instruct-q4_0" not in switchyard
-    assert "route/local/qwen2.5-14b/medium" in switchyard
-    assert "Anthropic and Claude name the same provider" in switchyard
-    assert "OpenAI and Codex name the same provider" in switchyard
-    assert "Choose across every configured Codex and Claude family" in switchyard
-    assert "Claude Fable" in switchyard
-    assert switchyard.count('Treat "think hard"') == 4
-    assert switchyard.count("Never choose below the") >= 5
-    switchyard_config = tomllib.loads(switchyard)
-    routes = switchyard_config["routes"]
-    configured_targets = switchyard_config["targets"]
-    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced", "auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
-        leading_targets = set(routes[route_name]["targets"][:2])
-        assert leading_targets == {"codex_sol_xhigh", "claude_opus_xhigh"}
-        assert "max_output_tokens" not in routes[route_name]
-    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced", "auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
-        targets = routes[route_name]["targets"]
-        selector_targets = routes[route_name]["response_schema"]
-        assert not any(target.startswith("local_") for target in targets)
-        assert any("fable" in target for target in targets)
-        assert "local_qwen" not in selector_targets
-        assert "not eligible for foreground" in routes[route_name]["prompt"]
-    for route_name in ("auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
-        targets = routes[route_name]["targets"]
-        selector_targets = routes[route_name]["response_schema"]
-        assert not any(target.endswith("_low") for target in targets)
-        assert "_low" not in selector_targets
-    maximum_targets = routes["auto_maximum"]["targets"]
-    maximum_selector_targets = routes["auto_maximum"]["response_schema"]
-    assert not any(target.endswith("_medium") for target in maximum_targets)
-    assert "_medium" not in maximum_selector_targets
-    assert "absolute high effort floor" in routes["auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
-    assert "quality mark was missed" in routes["auto_balanced"]["prompt"]
-    assert "raises the next boundary to xhigh" in routes["auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
-    assert "Repeated quality misses require xhigh" in routes[
-        "worker_auto_maximum"
-    ]["prompt"]
-    assert any(
-        target.startswith("local_")
-        for target in routes["manual_local_qwen"]["targets"]
-    )
-    for route_name in (
-        "manual_codex_luna",
-        "manual_codex_terra",
-        "manual_codex_sol",
-        "manual_claude_haiku",
-        "manual_claude_fable",
-        "manual_claude_sonnet",
-        "manual_claude_opus",
-    ):
-        assert not any(
-            target.startswith("local_") for target in routes[route_name]["targets"]
-        )
-    for provider, families in {
-        "codex": ("luna", "terra", "sol"),
-        "claude": ("haiku", "fable", "sonnet", "opus"),
-    }.items():
-        for family in families:
-            for effort in ("low", "medium", "high", "xhigh"):
-                route = routes[f"manual_{provider}_{family}_{effort}"]
-                assert route["id"] == f"atlas/manual/{provider}/{family}/{effort}"
-                assert route["targets"][0] == f"{provider}_{family}_{effort}"
-                worker_target = f"worker_{provider}_{family}_{effort}"
-                assert worker_target in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]["targets"]
-                assert configured_targets[worker_target]["id"] == (
-                    f"worker/{provider}/{family}/{effort}"
-                )
-    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced"):
-        prompt = routes[route_name]["prompt"]
-        assert "image tool—not the conversational model" in prompt
-        assert "Do not select a" in prompt
-        assert "local Qwen or Claude target" in prompt
-    assert "max_output_tokens" not in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]
-    model_gate = _documents(HERMES / "model-gate-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"][
-        "model_gate.py"
-    ]
-    assert "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0" in model_gate
-
-def test_titan20_serializes_classifier_and_local_chat_model_residency():
-    """Classifier and local chat share one serialized resident Qwen weight."""
-    deployment = _documents(
-        Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/ai-llm/deployment.yaml"
-    )[0]
-    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
-    required = pod["affinity"]["nodeAffinity"][
-        "requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution"
-    ]["nodeSelectorTerms"][0]["matchExpressions"][0]
-    assert required["values"] == ["titan-20"]
-    container = pod["containers"][0]
-    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
-    assert env["OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS"] == "1"
-    assert env["OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL"] == "1"
-    assert env["OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE"] == "-1"
-    assert env["OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH"] == "8192"
-    warm_command = " ".join(container["command"])
-    assert "--keepalive=-1" not in warm_command
-    models = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "models")
-    assert models["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == (
-        "ollama-models-titan20"
-    )
-
-def test_local_image_gpu_guard_distinguishes_background_and_saturated_gpu(monkeypatch):
-    """Lease-idle desktop spikes may coexist, but saturation still blocks FLUX."""
-    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_local_image_server", source)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_ACTIVITY_NODE", "titan-24")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_ACTIVE_SM_PERCENT", 80.0)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_MAX_EXTERNAL_MEMORY_BYTES", 3 << 30)
-
-    idle = module._parse_gpu_activity(
-        '\n'.join(
-            [
-                'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="Xorg"} 0',
-                'nvidia_process_gpu_memory_used_bytes{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="Xorg"} 1900000000',
-                'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="game-stream",process="wolf"} 3',
-                'nvidia_process_gpu_memory_used_bytes{node="titan-24",namespace="hermes",process="python"} 9000000000',
-            ]
-        )
-    )
-    assert idle["interactive_active"] is False
-    assert idle["external_gpu_memory_bytes"] == 1900000000
-    assert idle["external_gpu_sm_percent"] == 3
-
-    background_spike = module._parse_gpu_activity(
-        'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="sway"} 41\n'
-    )
-    assert background_spike["interactive_active"] is False
-
-    active = module._parse_gpu_activity(
-        'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="steam"} 91\n'
-    )
-    assert active["interactive_active"] is True
-    assert "91%" in active["gpu_guard_reason"]
-
-def test_local_flux_renderer_uses_a_disposable_cuda_worker(monkeypatch):
-    """A completed render must not leave its CUDA context in the API process."""
-    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_local_image_worker", source)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    calls = []
-
-    def run(command, **kwargs):
-        calls.append((command, kwargs))
-        return SimpleNamespace(
-            returncode=0,
-            stdout=b'{"success":true,"route":"local","image_b64":"cG5n"}',
-            stderr=b"",
-        )
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module.subprocess, "run", run)
-    result = module._render({"prompt": "black cat", "aspect_ratio": "square"})
-
-    assert result["route"] == "local"
-    command, options = calls[0]
-    assert command[-1] == "--render-worker"
-    assert json.loads(options["input"]) == {
-        "prompt": "black cat",
-        "aspect_ratio": "square",
-    }
-    assert options["timeout"] == module.RENDER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
-    assert options["check"] is False
-
-def test_local_flux_uses_low_vram_offload_without_reducing_resolution():
-    """The shared 3080 lane must trade time, not image size, for headroom."""
-    source = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py").read_text()
-    assert 'OFFLOAD_MODE = os.environ.get(' in source
-    assert '"HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_OFFLOAD_MODE", "sequential"' in source
-    assert "pipe.enable_sequential_cpu_offload()" in source
-    assert '"square": (1024, 1024)' in source
-
-def test_chat_auth_and_relay_are_pod_lifetime_only():
-    statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
-    pod = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
-    containers = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
-
-    for name in ("hermes", "webui"):
-        container = next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == name)
-        env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
-        assert env["HERMES_AUTH_FILE"] == "/runtime-access/hermes-auth.json"
-        mount = next(
-            item for item in container["volumeMounts"] if item["name"] == "runtime-access"
-        )
-        assert mount["mountPath"] == "/runtime-access"
-        assert "subPath" not in mount
-
-    hermes_env = {
-        item["name"]: item["value"]
-        for item in next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == "hermes")["env"]
-    }
-    runtime = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "runtime-access")
-    assert runtime["emptyDir"] == {"medium": "Memory", "sizeLimit": "2Mi"}
-    assert not any(item["name"] == "provider-auth" for item in pod["volumes"])
-    init_command = next(
-        item for item in pod["initContainers"] if item["name"] == "init-config"
-    )["command"][2]
-    for key in (
-        "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
-        "API_SERVER_KEY",
-        "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
-        "GITEA_TOKEN",
-        "HERMES_IMAGE_BROKER_KEY",
-        "OPENAI_API_KEY",
-    ):
-        assert key in init_command
-    assert "printf 'API_SERVER_KEY=%s" not in init_command
-    assert hermes_env["AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH"].endswith("/chrome-linux/headless_shell")
-    assert "--no-sandbox" in hermes_env["AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS"]

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_local_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+"""Local inference and sandbox execution contracts for Hermes chat."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
+    HERMES,
+    ROOT,
+    _documents,
+)
+
+
+def test_titan20_serializes_classifier_and_local_chat_model_residency():
+    """Classifier and local chat share one serialized resident Qwen weight."""
+    deployment = _documents(
+        Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/ai-llm/deployment.yaml"
+    )[0]
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    required = pod["affinity"]["nodeAffinity"][
+        "requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution"
+    ]["nodeSelectorTerms"][0]["matchExpressions"][0]
+    assert required["values"] == ["titan-20"]
+    container = pod["containers"][0]
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
+    assert env["OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS"] == "1"
+    assert env["OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL"] == "1"
+    assert env["OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE"] == "-1"
+    assert env["OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH"] == "8192"
+    warm_command = " ".join(container["command"])
+    assert "--keepalive=-1" not in warm_command
+    models = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "models")
+    assert models["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == ("ollama-models-titan20")
+
+
+def test_local_image_gpu_guard_distinguishes_background_and_saturated_gpu(monkeypatch):
+    """Lease-idle desktop spikes may coexist, but saturation still blocks FLUX."""
+    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_local_image_server", source)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_ACTIVITY_NODE", "titan-24")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_ACTIVE_SM_PERCENT", 80.0)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "GPU_MAX_EXTERNAL_MEMORY_BYTES", 3 << 30)
+
+    idle = module._parse_gpu_activity(
+        "\n".join(
+            [
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="Xorg"} 0',
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_memory_used_bytes{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="Xorg"} 1900000000',
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="game-stream",process="wolf"} 3',
+                'nvidia_process_gpu_memory_used_bytes{node="titan-24",namespace="hermes",process="python"} 9000000000',
+            ]
+        )
+    )
+    assert idle["interactive_active"] is False
+    assert idle["external_gpu_memory_bytes"] == 1900000000
+    assert idle["external_gpu_sm_percent"] == 3
+
+    background_spike = module._parse_gpu_activity(
+        'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="sway"} 41\n'
+    )
+    assert background_spike["interactive_active"] is False
+
+    active = module._parse_gpu_activity(
+        'nvidia_process_gpu_sm_util_percent{node="titan-24",namespace="host",process="steam"} 91\n'
+    )
+    assert active["interactive_active"] is True
+    assert "91%" in active["gpu_guard_reason"]
+
+
+def test_local_flux_renderer_uses_a_disposable_cuda_worker(monkeypatch):
+    """A completed render must not leave its CUDA context in the API process."""
+    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_local_image_worker", source)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    calls = []
+
+    def run(command, **kwargs):
+        calls.append((command, kwargs))
+        return SimpleNamespace(
+            returncode=0,
+            stdout=b'{"success":true,"route":"local","image_b64":"cG5n"}',
+            stderr=b"",
+        )
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module.subprocess, "run", run)
+    result = module._render({"prompt": "black cat", "aspect_ratio": "square"})
+
+    assert result["route"] == "local"
+    command, options = calls[0]
+    assert command[-1] == "--render-worker"
+    assert json.loads(options["input"]) == {
+        "prompt": "black cat",
+        "aspect_ratio": "square",
+    }
+    assert options["timeout"] == module.RENDER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+    assert options["check"] is False
+
+
+def test_local_flux_uses_low_vram_offload_without_reducing_resolution():
+    """The shared 3080 lane must trade time, not image size, for headroom."""
+    source = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-local-image-server.py").read_text()
+    assert "OFFLOAD_MODE = os.environ.get(" in source
+    assert '"HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_OFFLOAD_MODE", "sequential"' in source
+    assert "pipe.enable_sequential_cpu_offload()" in source
+    assert '"square": (1024, 1024)' in source
+
+
+def test_chat_auth_and_relay_are_pod_lifetime_only():
+    statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
+    pod = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    containers = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+
+    for name in ("hermes", "webui"):
+        container = next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == name)
+        env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
+        assert env["HERMES_AUTH_FILE"] == "/runtime-access/hermes-auth.json"
+        mount = next(
+            item
+            for item in container["volumeMounts"]
+            if item["name"] == "runtime-access"
+        )
+        assert mount["mountPath"] == "/runtime-access"
+        assert "subPath" not in mount
+
+    hermes_env = {
+        item["name"]: item["value"]
+        for item in next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == "hermes")["env"]
+    }
+    runtime = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "runtime-access")
+    assert runtime["emptyDir"] == {"medium": "Memory", "sizeLimit": "2Mi"}
+    assert not any(item["name"] == "provider-auth" for item in pod["volumes"])
+    init_command = next(
+        item for item in pod["initContainers"] if item["name"] == "init-config"
+    )["command"][2]
+    for key in (
+        "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+        "API_SERVER_KEY",
+        "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
+        "GITEA_TOKEN",
+        "HERMES_IMAGE_BROKER_KEY",
+        "OPENAI_API_KEY",
+    ):
+        assert key in init_command
+    assert "printf 'API_SERVER_KEY=%s" not in init_command
+    assert hermes_env["AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH"].endswith(
+        "/chrome-linux/headless_shell"
+    )
+    assert "--no-sandbox" in hermes_env["AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS"]
+
+
+def test_sandbox_executes_python_with_bounded_output(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-chat-sandbox-server.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_chat_sandbox_server", source)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "WORKSPACE", tmp_path)
+
+    result = module._execute("import math\nprint(math.comb(10, 3))")
+
+    assert result["success"] is True
+    assert result["stdout"] == "120\n"
+    assert result["stderr"] == ""

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_provider_auth.py

@@ -1,18 +1,458 @@
-"""Hermes chat provider auth contracts."""
+"""Provider subscription and OAuth contracts for Hermes chat."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from test_hermes_chat_support import (
-    HERMES,
-    Path,
-    ROOT,
-    _documents,
+import base64
+import json
+import sys
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import ModuleType
+
+import pytest
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
     _load_broker_module,
-    importlib,
-    json,
 )
 
 
+def test_codex_broker_auth_and_request_contract(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
+    """The relay is bounded, stateless, and rejects unapproved models."""
+    module = _load_broker_module("hermes_codex_broker", "codex_broker.py", monkeypatch)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "TOKEN", "relay-secret")
+
+    assert module._authorized("Bearer relay-secret") is True
+    assert module._authorized("Bearer wrong") is False
+    assert module._real_model("route/codex/gpt-5.6-sol/xhigh") == "gpt-5.6-sol"
+    payload = module._validate_payload(
+        {
+            "model": "gpt-5.6-terra",
+            "input": "route this chat turn",
+            "store": True,
+            "stream": False,
+            "max_output_tokens": 96,
+            "max_completion_tokens": 96,
+            "max_tokens": 96,
+            "temperature": 0.7,
+            "top_p": 0.9,
+        }
+    )
+    assert payload["store"] is False
+    assert payload["stream"] is True
+    assert "max_output_tokens" not in payload
+    assert "max_completion_tokens" not in payload
+    assert "max_tokens" not in payload
+    assert "temperature" not in payload
+    assert "top_p" not in payload
+    assert payload["input"] == [
+        {
+            "type": "message",
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "route this chat turn"}],
+        }
+    ]
+    response_item = {
+        "type": "message",
+        "role": "user",
+        "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "keep this item"}],
+    }
+    assert module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": response_item})[
+        "input"
+    ] == [response_item]
+    response_items = [response_item]
+    assert (
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": response_items})[
+            "input"
+        ]
+        is response_items
+    )
+    image_items = [
+        {
+            "type": "message",
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {"type": "input_text", "text": "What color is this?"},
+                {
+                    "type": "image_url",
+                    "image_url": {
+                        "url": "",
+                        "detail": "high",
+                    },
+                },
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    assert module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": image_items})[
+        "input"
+    ][0]["content"][1] == {
+        "type": "input_image",
+        "image_url": "",
+        "detail": "high",
+    }
+    switchyard_image_items = [
+        {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {"type": "input_text", "text": "What color is this?"},
+                {
+                    "type": "image_url",
+                    "image_url": {
+                        "url": "",
+                        "detail": "auto",
+                    },
+                },
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    assert module._validate_payload(
+        {"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": switchyard_image_items}
+    )["input"][0]["content"][1] == {
+        "type": "input_image",
+        "image_url": "",
+        "detail": "auto",
+    }
+    switchyard_base64_items = [
+        {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {"type": "input_text", "text": "What color is this?"},
+                {
+                    "type": "image",
+                    "source": {
+                        "type": "base64",
+                        "media_type": "image/png",
+                        "data": "cHJpdmF0ZQ==",
+                    },
+                },
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    normalized_base64 = module._validate_payload(
+        {"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": switchyard_base64_items}
+    )["input"][0]["content"][1]
+    assert normalized_base64 == {
+        "type": "input_image",
+        "image_url": "",
+    }
+    switchyard_enum_items = [
+        {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": [
+                {
+                    "type": "input_image",
+                    "image_url": {
+                        "type": "url",
+                        "data": {
+                            "url": "",
+                            "detail": "high",
+                        },
+                    },
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+    ]
+    nested_image = module._validate_payload(
+        {"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": switchyard_enum_items}
+    )["input"][0]["content"][0]
+    assert nested_image["image_url"] == ""
+    assert nested_image["detail"] == "high"
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=r"non-empty Responses image URL.*str\[4\]"):
+        module._validate_payload(
+            {
+                "model": "gpt-5.6-terra",
+                "input": [
+                    {
+                        "type": "message",
+                        "role": "user",
+                        "content": [
+                            {
+                                "type": "input_image",
+                                "image_url": {"detail": "high"},
+                            }
+                        ],
+                    }
+                ],
+            }
+        )
+    routed = module._validate_payload(
+        {
+            "model": "route/codex/gpt-5.6-luna/low",
+            "input": "use the low route",
+            "stream": False,
+        }
+    )
+    assert routed["model"] == "gpt-5.6-luna"
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported Codex model"):
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "unapproved-model", "input": "hello"})
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-empty Responses input"):
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": ""})
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-empty Responses input list"):
+        module._validate_payload({"model": "gpt-5.6-terra", "input": []})
+
+    completed = {
+        "id": "resp_test",
+        "object": "response",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "output": [],
+    }
+    completed_item = {
+        "type": "message",
+        "role": "assistant",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "content": [{"type": "output_text", "text": "done"}],
+    }
+    assert module._completed_response(
+        [
+            "event: response.created",
+            'data: {"type":"response.created","response":{}}',
+            "event: response.output_item.done",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps(
+                {
+                    "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                    "output_index": 0,
+                    "item": completed_item,
+                }
+            ),
+            "event: response.completed",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+            "data: [DONE]",
+        ]
+    )["output"] == [completed_item]
+    raw_stream = (
+        "event: response.output_item.done\n"
+        "data: "
+        + json.dumps(
+            {
+                "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                "output_index": 0,
+                "item": completed_item,
+            }
+        )
+        + "\n\nevent: response.completed\ndata: "
+        + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed})
+        + "\n\n"
+    ).encode()
+    normalized = module._normalized_stream(
+        raw_stream, {**completed, "output": [completed_item]}
+    ).decode()
+    terminal_data = next(
+        line for line in normalized.splitlines() if '"response.completed"' in line
+    )
+    assert json.loads(terminal_data.removeprefix("data: "))["response"]["output"] == [
+        completed_item
+    ]
+    assert normalized.endswith("\n\n")
+    streamed_function_item = {
+        "type": "function_call",
+        "name": "read_file",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "arguments": '{"path":"/tmp"}',
+    }
+    streamed_function_body = (
+        "event: response.function_call_arguments.delta\n"
+        'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.delta",'
+        '"item_id":"call_1","delta":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\"}"}\n\n'
+        "event: response.function_call_arguments.done\n"
+        'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.done",'
+        '"item_id":"call_1","arguments":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\"}"}\n\n'
+        "event: response.output_item.done\n"
+        'data: {"type":"response.output_item.done","output_index":0,'
+        '"item":{"type":"function_call","name":"read_file",'
+        '"arguments":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\"}"}}\n\n'
+        "event: response.completed\n"
+        "data: "
+        + json.dumps(
+            {
+                "type": "response.completed",
+                "response": {**completed, "output": [streamed_function_item]},
+            }
+        )
+        + "\n\n"
+    ).encode()
+    normalized_function_stream = module._normalized_stream(
+        streamed_function_body, {**completed, "output": [streamed_function_item]}
+    ).decode()
+    assert "response.function_call_arguments.delta" in normalized_function_stream
+    assert "response.function_call_arguments.done" not in normalized_function_stream
+    assert "response.output_item.done" not in normalized_function_stream
+    normalized_terminal = next(
+        line
+        for line in normalized_function_stream.splitlines()
+        if '"response.completed"' in line
+    )
+    assert (
+        json.loads(normalized_terminal.removeprefix("data: "))["response"]["output"]
+        == []
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="retryable incomplete response"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: response.incomplete",
+                'data: {"type":"response.incomplete","response":'
+                '{"status":"incomplete","incomplete_details":'
+                '{"reason":"max_output_tokens"}}}',
+            ]
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="provider unavailable"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: error",
+                'data: {"type":"error","error":{"message":"provider unavailable"}}',
+            ]
+        )
+    malformed_tool_item = {
+        "type": "function_call",
+        "name": "search_files",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "arguments": '{"path":"","offset":',
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="malformed function arguments"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: response.output_item.done",
+                "data: "
+                + json.dumps(
+                    {
+                        "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                        "output_index": 0,
+                        "item": malformed_tool_item,
+                    }
+                ),
+                "event: response.completed",
+                "data: "
+                + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+            ]
+        )
+    valid_tool_item = {
+        **malformed_tool_item,
+        "arguments": '{"path":"","offset":0}',
+    }
+    assert module._completed_response(
+        [
+            "event: response.output_item.done",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps(
+                {
+                    "type": "response.output_item.done",
+                    "output_index": 0,
+                    "item": valid_tool_item,
+                }
+            ),
+            "event: response.completed",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+        ]
+    )["output"] == [valid_tool_item]
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="malformed function arguments"):
+        module._completed_response(
+            [
+                "event: response.function_call_arguments.delta",
+                'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.delta",'
+                '"item_id":"call_1","output_index":0,'
+                '"delta":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\",\\"offset\\":"}',
+                "event: response.completed",
+                "data: "
+                + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+            ]
+        )
+    streamed_tool = module._completed_response(
+        [
+            "event: response.function_call_arguments.delta",
+            'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.delta",'
+            '"item_id":"call_2","output_index":0,'
+            '"delta":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\",\\"offset\\":"}',
+            "event: response.function_call_arguments.done",
+            'data: {"type":"response.function_call_arguments.done",'
+            '"item_id":"call_2","output_index":0,'
+            '"arguments":"{\\"path\\":\\"/tmp\\",\\"offset\\":0}"}',
+            "event: response.completed",
+            "data: "
+            + json.dumps({"type": "response.completed", "response": completed}),
+        ]
+    )
+    assert streamed_tool["status"] == "completed"
+
+    auth_dir = tmp_path / ".codex"
+    auth_dir.mkdir()
+    # The token payload need only prove the broker reads CODEX_HOME directly.
+    encoded = (
+        base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp": time.time() + 3600}).encode())
+        .decode()
+        .rstrip("=")
+    )
+    (auth_dir / "auth.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps({"tokens": {"access_token": f"header.{encoded}.signature"}})
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CODEX_HOME", str(auth_dir))
+    assert module._access_token().startswith("header.")
+
+
+def test_codex_broker_refreshes_and_persists_first_party_oauth(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Expired ChatGPT OAuth refreshes in the canonical Codex CLI store."""
+    module = _load_broker_module(
+        "hermes_codex_refresh_broker", "codex_broker.py", monkeypatch
+    )
+    auth_dir = tmp_path / ".codex"
+    auth_dir.mkdir()
+
+    def jwt(expires_at: float) -> str:
+        payload = (
+            base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp": expires_at}).encode())
+            .decode()
+            .rstrip("=")
+        )
+        return f"header.{payload}.signature"
+
+    expired = jwt(time.time() - 60)
+    live = jwt(time.time() + 3600)
+    auth_path = auth_dir / "auth.json"
+    auth_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+                "tokens": {
+                    "access_token": expired,
+                    "refresh_token": "refresh-old",
+                },
+            }
+        )
+    )
+    calls = []
+    auth_module = ModuleType("hermes_cli.auth")
+
+    def refresh(access_token, refresh_token, *, timeout_seconds):
+        calls.append((access_token, refresh_token, timeout_seconds))
+        return {
+            "access_token": live,
+            "refresh_token": "refresh-new",
+            "last_refresh": "2026-08-12T20:00:00Z",
+        }
+
+    auth_module.refresh_codex_oauth_pure = refresh
+    package = ModuleType("hermes_cli")
+    package.auth = auth_module
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli", package)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "hermes_cli.auth", auth_module)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CODEX_HOME", str(auth_dir))
+
+    assert module._access_token() == live
+    persisted = json.loads(auth_path.read_text())
+    assert persisted["tokens"]["access_token"] == live
+    assert persisted["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "refresh-new"
+    assert persisted["last_refresh"] == "2026-08-12T20:00:00Z"
+    assert calls == [(expired, "refresh-old", 30.0)]
+    assert auth_path.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
+
+    # A healthy token is reused, so repeated routed turns do not spend a
+    # refresh token or create a second billing/authentication path.
+    assert module._access_token() == live
+    assert len(calls) == 1
+
+
 def test_claude_broker_uses_native_subscription_without_api_billing(monkeypatch):
     """Claude traffic must use the native first-party CLI subscription lane."""
     module = _load_broker_module(
@@ -34,159 +474,3 @@ def test_claude_broker_uses_native_subscription_without_api_billing(monkeypatch)
     assert "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" not in module._claude_environment()
     assert "CLAUDE_API_KEY" not in module._claude_environment()
     assert module.CAPACITY_PATTERN.search("weekly usage limit exhausted")
-
-def test_codex_native_health_overrides_historical_router_errors(
-    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
-):
-    """Fresh first-party health is authoritative over old Switchyard probes."""
-    plugin_path = HERMES / "plugins" / "auto-router" / "provider_status.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_provider_status", plugin_path)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    health_path = tmp_path / "codex.json"
-    health_path.write_text(
-        json.dumps(
-            {
-                "state": "available",
-                "authenticated": True,
-                "transport": "codex-chatgpt-subscription",
-            }
-        )
-    )
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "CODEX_HEALTH_PATH", health_path)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "CLAUDE_HEALTH_PATH", tmp_path / "missing.json")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(
-        module,
-        "_get_json",
-        lambda url: {"status": "ok"}
-        if url.endswith("/health")
-        else {
-            "models": {
-                "route/codex/terra/medium": {
-                    "calls": 1,
-                    "errors": 99,
-                    "total_tokens": 12,
-                }
-            }
-        },
-    )
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_codex_account", lambda: {})
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_claude_account", lambda: {})
-
-    codex = module.provider_status_payload()["providers"]["codex"]
-
-    assert codex["errors"] == 99
-    assert codex["state"] == "available"
-    assert codex["native_health"]["transport"] == "codex-chatgpt-subscription"
-
-def test_api_session_patch_accepts_parent_lineage(tmp_path: Path):
-    """API-created workers must persist the originating Hermes session."""
-    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "patch_api_server_sessions.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("patch_api_sessions", module_path)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    source = tmp_path / "api_server.py"
-    destination = tmp_path / "patched.py"
-    source.write_text(
-        "prefix\n"
-        + module.BEFORE
-        + "middle\n"
-        + module.RUNS_BEFORE
-        + "run body\n"
-        + module.RUN_CLOSE_BEFORE
-        + module.RESPONSES_SESSION_BEFORE
-        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_SIGNATURE_BEFORE
-        + "callback docstring and push helper\n"
-        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_BODY_BEFORE
-        + "tool start body\n"
-        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_END_BEFORE
-        + module.EVENT_CALLBACK_CALL_BEFORE
-        + module.RUN_SWEEP_BEFORE
-        + "suffix\n",
-        encoding="utf-8",
-    )
-
-    module.patch(source, destination)
-    patched = destination.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-
-    assert "X-Hermes-Parent-Session-Id" in patched
-    assert "parent_session_id=parent_session_id" in patched
-    assert "Parent session not found" in patched
-    assert "HERMES_API_DEFAULT_PARENT_MATCH_PREFIXES" in patched
-    assert "user_message.startswith(default_prefixes)" in patched
-    assert "session_parent_conflict" in patched
-    assert "X-Hermes-Conversation-Platform" in patched
-    assert "X-Hermes-Conversation-Title" in patched
-    assert 'conversation_platform != "telegram"' in patched
-    assert "db.record_gateway_session_peer(" in patched
-    assert 'display_name="Telegram"' in patched
-    assert "db.reopen_session(session_id)" in patched
-    assert 'db.end_session(session_id, f"api_run_{terminal_status}")' in patched
-    assert "def _record_run_activity(" in patched
-    assert '"_thinking": "Hermes is reasoning"' in patched
-    assert '"run.started": "Worker started"' in patched
-    assert '"run.completed": "Worker completed"' in patched
-    assert '"reasoning.available": "Hermes finished a reasoning step"' in patched
-    assert '"subagent.progress": "Nested worker progress"' in patched
-    assert "redact_sensitive_text" in patched
-    assert 'getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)' in patched
-    assert "os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)" in patched
-    assert "session_id=session_id" in patched
-    assert 'self._record_run_activity(session_id, "run.started")' in patched
-    assert 'detail = tool_name if event_type in {' in patched
-    assert 'if event_type == "subagent.tool"' in patched
-    assert "_RUN_ACTIVITY_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = 15.0" in patched
-    assert 'heartbeats.get(session_id, 0.0)' in patched
-    assert '"subagent.thinking",' in patched
-    assert "Stream retention and run lifetime are separate" in patched
-    assert 'terminal_status in {"completed", "failed", "cancelled"}' in patched
-    assert patched.index("terminal_status = self._run_statuses") < patched.index(
-        "self._active_run_tasks.pop(run_id, None)"
-    )
-
-def test_switchyard_brokers_and_native_claude_lane_use_the_right_images():
-    """Thin brokers stay small while native Claude runs beside owner auth."""
-    dockerfile = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-switchyard-brokers").read_text()
-    assert "httpx==0.28.1" in dockerfile
-    assert "worker_route_broker.py" in dockerfile
-    assert "routing_catalog.py" in dockerfile
-
-    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml")[0]
-    containers = {
-        container["name"]: container
-        for container in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
-    }
-    expected = (
-        "registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-switchyard-brokers@"
-        "sha256:ee7e95e060ef8083da505162d7e9030daba15fdd828cc047bbcbe6aa409d2083"
-    )
-    assert containers["worker-route-broker"]["image"] == expected
-    assert containers["classifier-broker"]["image"] == expected
-    assert "claude-oauth-broker" not in containers
-
-    agent = _documents(HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml")[0]
-    agent_containers = {
-        container["name"]: container
-        for container in agent["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
-    }
-    for container_name in ("hermes", "terminal"):
-        container = agent_containers[container_name]
-        environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
-        mounts = {item["name"]: item for item in container["volumeMounts"]}
-        assert environment["HERMES_ROUTING_CATALOG_PATH"] == "/routing-catalog/catalog.json"
-        assert environment["HERMES_CODEX_HEALTH_PATH"] == "/opt/data/provider-health/codex.json"
-        assert environment["HERMES_CLAUDE_HEALTH_PATH"] == "/opt/data/provider-health/claude.json"
-        assert mounts["routing-catalog"]["mountPath"] == "/routing-catalog"
-        assert mounts["routing-catalog"]["readOnly"] is True
-    codex = agent_containers["codex-broker"]
-    codex_environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in codex["env"]}
-    assert codex_environment["HERMES_CODEX_HEALTH_PATH"] == "/opt/data/provider-health/codex.json"
-    claude = agent_containers["claude-broker"]
-    assert claude["image"].startswith("registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent@")
-    assert "unset ANTHROPIC_API_KEY CLAUDE_API_KEY" in claude["args"][0]
-    assert any(
-        mount["name"] == "home" and mount["mountPath"] == "/opt/data"
-        for mount in claude["volumeMounts"]
-    )

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_quality.py

@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-"""Hermes chat config contracts."""
+"""Core configuration and workload contracts for Hermes chat."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from test_hermes_chat_support import (
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import yaml
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
     HERMES,
     ROOT,
     _documents,
-    yaml,
 )
 
-
 def test_chat_config_enables_real_research_compute_and_delegation():
     configmap = _documents(HERMES / "chat-configmap.yaml")[0]
     config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["config.yaml"])
@@ -37,6 +41,7 @@ def test_chat_config_enables_real_research_compute_and_delegation():
         assert "terminal" not in toolsets
         assert "code_execution" not in toolsets
 
+
 def test_agent_config_keeps_delegated_reviewers_from_owning_task_lifecycle():
     configmap = _documents(HERMES / "agent-configmap.yaml")[0]
     instructions = configmap["data"]["AGENTS.md"]
@@ -56,22 +61,30 @@ def test_agent_config_keeps_delegated_reviewers_from_owning_task_lifecycle():
     assert "Atlas organization has private visibility" in instructions
     assert "may be public or private" in instructions
     assert "do not infer a\nrepository's visibility" in instructions
-    assert "already supplied through `GIT_ASKPASS`" in instructions
+    assert "brokered Git for clone, fetch" in instructions
+    assert "client carries no repository credential" in instructions
     assert "Never call `kanban_show` without a known, non-empty task ID" in instructions
     assert "bounded ad-hoc inspection and acceptance checks may" in instructions
     assert "load implementation or TDD skills" in instructions
     assert "Never call `kanban_show` without\na known, non-empty task ID" in soul
     assert "must load a skill only when its workflow\nmaterially applies" in soul
-    assert "runtime-only `GIT_ASKPASS`" in soul
-    assert "`scm.bstein.dev` is Gitea, not GitHub" in instructions
-    assert "Never load or follow a GitHub/`gh`" in instructions
-    assert "/opt/coordinator/gitea_api.py METHOD /api/v1/..." in instructions
+    assert "no repository token is present in this pod" in soul
+    assert "`scm.bstein.dev` is Forgejo/Gitea, not GitHub" in instructions
+    assert "GitHub/`gh` skill for an Atlas remote" in instructions
+    assert "load\n`$manage-atlas-pull-requests`" in instructions
+    assert "Updates, merge,\napprove, close, delete, comments" in instructions
+    assert "Leave every PR\nunmerged for Brad's review" in instructions
+    assert "Use the Gitea pull-request merge endpoint" not in instructions
+    assert "reconcile the open PR" not in instructions
+    assert "use Flux reconciliation after" not in instructions
+    assert "PR publication ends at the verified open draft" in instructions
     assert "JENKINS_BASE_URL" in instructions
     assert "Do not\nuse `git reset --hard`" in instructions
     rendered = (HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml").read_text()
     assert 'git config --global user.name "Hermes Agent"' in rendered
     assert 'git config --global user.email "hermes@bstein.dev"' in rendered
 
+
 def test_agent_image_completes_parked_kanban_tasks_atomically():
     dockerfile = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-agent").read_text()
 
@@ -87,6 +100,7 @@ def test_agent_image_completes_parked_kanban_tasks_atomically():
     assert "payload.get(\"status\") == \"blocked\"" in dockerfile
     assert "hermes-kanban-blocked-regression.py" in dockerfile
 
+
 def test_sandbox_shares_only_the_tenant_workspace_without_credentials():
     sandbox_docs = _documents(HERMES / "chat-sandbox.yaml")
     deployments = [doc for doc in sandbox_docs if doc["kind"] == "Deployment"]
@@ -150,6 +164,7 @@ def test_sandbox_shares_only_the_tenant_workspace_without_credentials():
             f"hermes-chat-tenant-{ordinal}"
         )
 
+
 def test_gateway_image_honors_ui_model_and_caps_reasoning():
     dockerfile = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-agent").read_text()
     assert (
@@ -208,6 +223,7 @@ def test_gateway_image_honors_ui_model_and_caps_reasoning():
     assert 'params.has("resume")' in dockerfile
     assert "Open Telegram setup" in dockerfile
 
+
 def test_telegram_router_local_build_defaults_to_cluster_architecture():
     dockerfile = (
         ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-chat-router"
@@ -217,6 +233,7 @@ def test_telegram_router_local_build_defaults_to_cluster_architecture():
     assert "ARG TARGETARCH=arm64" in dockerfile
     assert "GOOS=${TARGETOS} GOARCH=${TARGETARCH}" in dockerfile
 
+
 def test_chat_oauth_allows_stale_service_worker_retirement():
     documents = _documents(HERMES / "oauth2-proxy.yaml")
     deployment = next(
@@ -271,3 +288,169 @@ def test_chat_oauth_allows_stale_service_worker_retirement():
     assert agent_template_volume["configMap"]["name"] == (
         "hermes-chat-oauth-templates"
     )
+
+
+def test_webui_recovers_auth_and_labels_session_scoped_controls():
+    dockerfile = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-webui").read_text()
+
+    assert "res.status===401||res.status===403" in dockerfile
+    assert "window.location.assign('/oauth2/start?rd='" in dockerfile
+    assert "childrenExpanded?'▾ ':'▸ '" in dockerfile
+    assert "'atlas/auto/maximum': 'Automatic · Maximum'" in dockerfile
+    assert "hermes-webui-telegram-project-patch.py" in dockerfile
+    telegram_project_patch = (
+        ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-webui-telegram-project-patch.py"
+    ).read_text()
+    assert "TELEGRAM_PROJECT_NAME = 'Telegram'" in telegram_project_patch
+    assert "session_key.startswith('telegram-topic-')" in telegram_project_patch
+
+    router = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-webui-router.js").read_text()
+    assert "'atlas/auto/fast':'AUTO · Fast'" in router
+    assert "'atlas/manual/codex/sol':'Codex · SOL'" in router
+    assert "'atlas/manual/claude/opus':'Claude · Opus'" in router
+    assert "watchModelOptions('modelSelect')" in router
+    assert "watchModelOptions('settingsModel')" in router
+
+
+def test_chat_voice_uses_private_jetson_services_and_shared_auto_route():
+    statefulset = _documents(HERMES / "chat-statefulset.yaml")[0]
+    containers = statefulset["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    webui = next(item for item in containers if item["name"] == "webui")
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in webui["env"]}
+
+    assert env["HERMES_STT_URL"] == (
+        "http://hermes-stt.hermes.svc.cluster.local:9000/v1/audio/transcriptions"
+    )
+    assert env["HERMES_WEBUI_ATLAS_TTS_URL"] == (
+        "http://hermes-tts.hermes.svc.cluster.local:9001/v1/audio/speech"
+    )
+    assert "hermes_stt_client.py" in env["HERMES_LOCAL_STT_COMMAND"]
+
+    configmap = _documents(HERMES / "chat-configmap.yaml")[0]
+    config = yaml.safe_load(configmap["data"]["config.yaml"])
+    assert config["stt"] == {
+        "enabled": True,
+        "provider": "local_command",
+        "local": {"model": "small", "language": "auto"},
+    }
+
+    dockerfile = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-webui").read_text()
+    assert "hermes-webui-atlas-patch.py" in dockerfile
+    assert "hermes-webui-atlas-voice.js" in dockerfile
+    voice_script = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-webui-atlas-voice.js").read_text()
+    assert "/api/transcribe/capability" in voice_script
+    assert "/api/transcribe" in voice_script
+    assert "/api/tts" in voice_script
+    assert "speakResponse(generation)" in voice_script
+    assert "window._splitForTTS(text,280)" in voice_script
+    assert "pending=fetchSpeech(chunks[index+1])" in voice_script
+    assert "restartSoon(token,450)" in voice_script
+    assert "constraints.voiceIsolation=true" in voice_script
+    assert "highpass.frequency.value=140" in voice_script
+    assert "Math.max(0.04,noiseFloor*2.4+0.006)" in voice_script
+    assert "while(preRoll.length>3) preRoll.shift()" in voice_script
+
+    stt_server = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-jetson-stt-server.py").read_text()
+    assert "def _repetitive_token" in stt_server
+    assert "compression_ratio_threshold=2.0" in stt_server
+    assert "no_speech_threshold=0.5" in stt_server
+
+
+def test_voice_transcript_filter_removes_fan_hallucinations(monkeypatch):
+    server_path = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-jetson-stt-server.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_jetson_stt_server", server_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "cgi", SimpleNamespace())
+    monkeypatch.setitem(
+        sys.modules,
+        "torch",
+        SimpleNamespace(cuda=SimpleNamespace(is_available=lambda: False)),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "whisper", SimpleNamespace())
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+
+    result = {
+        "segments": [
+            {
+                "text": " ththththththththth Testing.",
+                "no_speech_prob": 0.12,
+                "avg_logprob": -0.2,
+            },
+            {
+                "text": " background hum",
+                "no_speech_prob": 0.82,
+                "avg_logprob": -0.9,
+            },
+        ]
+    }
+
+    assert module._clean_transcript(result) == "Testing."
+
+
+def test_voice_models_are_baked_and_runtime_has_no_public_egress():
+    stt_dockerfile = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-jetson-stt").read_text()
+    tts_dockerfile = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-jetson-tts").read_text()
+    assert "ADD --checksum=sha256:aff26ae4" in stt_dockerfile
+    assert "ADD --checksum=sha256:9ecf7799" in stt_dockerfile
+    assert "--chmod=0444" in stt_dockerfile
+    assert "chmod 0555 /opt/models /opt/models/whisper" in stt_dockerfile
+    assert "HERMES_STT_CACHE=/opt/models/whisper" in stt_dockerfile
+    assert "ADD --checksum=sha256:4cabf7c3" in tts_dockerfile
+    assert "ADD --checksum=sha256:db42b97d" in tts_dockerfile
+    assert tts_dockerfile.count("--chmod=0444") == 6
+    assert "chmod 0555 /opt/models /opt/models/piper" in tts_dockerfile
+    assert "HERMES_TTS_CACHE=/opt/models/piper" in tts_dockerfile
+    tts_server = (ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-jetson-tts-server.py").read_text()
+    assert "download_voice" not in tts_server
+    assert "baked Piper voice is missing" in tts_server
+    assert "session_options.intra_op_num_threads = ONNX_THREADS" in tts_server
+
+    policies = _documents(HERMES / "networkpolicy.yaml")
+    voice_policy = next(
+        item for item in policies if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-private-voice"
+    )
+    assert voice_policy["spec"]["policyTypes"] == ["Ingress", "Egress"]
+    assert not any(
+        "ipBlock" in destination
+        for rule in voice_policy["spec"]["egress"]
+        for destination in rule.get("to", [])
+    )
+
+
+def test_voice_workloads_have_deliberate_xavier_placement():
+    documents = _documents(HERMES / "voice-deployment.yaml")
+    deployments = {
+        item["metadata"]["name"]: item
+        for item in documents
+        if item["kind"] == "Deployment"
+    }
+    stt = deployments["hermes-stt"]["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    tts = deployments["hermes-tts"]["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+
+    assert "@sha256:" in stt["containers"][0]["image"]
+    assert "@sha256:" in tts["containers"][0]["image"]
+    assert stt["nodeSelector"] == {"kubernetes.io/hostname": "titan-21"}
+    assert tts["nodeSelector"] == {"kubernetes.io/hostname": "titan-21"}
+    assert stt["automountServiceAccountToken"] is False
+    assert tts["automountServiceAccountToken"] is False
+    assert stt["enableServiceLinks"] is False
+    assert tts["enableServiceLinks"] is False
+    assert stt["runtimeClassName"] == "nvidia"
+    assert stt["securityContext"]["supplementalGroups"] == [44]
+    stt_resources = stt["containers"][0]["resources"]
+    stt_env = {
+        item["name"]: item["value"] for item in stt["containers"][0]["env"]
+    }
+    assert stt_env["NVIDIA_DRIVER_CAPABILITIES"] == "compute,utility"
+    assert stt_resources["requests"]["nvidia.com/gpu.shared"] == 1
+    assert stt_resources["limits"]["nvidia.com/gpu.shared"] == 1
+    assert "nvidia.com/gpu.shared" not in tts["containers"][0]["resources"]["requests"]
+    tts_env = {
+        item["name"]: item["value"] for item in tts["containers"][0]["env"]
+    }
+    assert tts_env["HERMES_TTS_VOICE"] == "en_US-lessac-medium"
+    assert tts_env["HERMES_TTS_ONNX_THREADS"] == "2"
+    assert tts["containers"][0]["resources"]["limits"]["cpu"] == "4"
+    assert all("hostPath" not in volume for volume in stt["volumes"])
+    assert all("hostPath" not in volume for volume in tts["volumes"])

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_routing_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+"""Routing and runtime workload contracts for Hermes chat."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tomllib
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+
+from testing.tests.test_hermes_chat_support import (
+    HERMES,
+    ROOT,
+    _documents,
+)
+
+
+def test_stale_parent_linked_api_workers_close_on_startup(tmp_path: Path):
+    """A previous gateway lifetime cannot leave phantom active workers."""
+    module_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "migrate_api_session_lineage.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "close_stale_api_workers", module_path
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    database = tmp_path / "state.db"
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE sessions (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, source TEXT, "
+            "parent_session_id TEXT, title TEXT, started_at REAL, ended_at REAL, "
+            "end_reason TEXT, archived INTEGER DEFAULT 0)"
+        )
+        connection.executemany(
+            "INSERT INTO sessions "
+            "(id, source, parent_session_id, started_at, ended_at, end_reason) "
+            "VALUES (?, ?, ?, 1, ?, ?)",
+            (
+                ("stale", "api_server", "parent", None, None),
+                ("root", "api_server", None, None, None),
+                ("finished", "api_server", "parent", 2.0, "api_run_completed"),
+                ("interactive", "tui", "parent", None, None),
+            ),
+        )
+
+    assert module.migrate(database) == 1
+    assert module.migrate(database) == 0
+    with sqlite3.connect(database) as connection:
+        rows = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT id, ended_at, end_reason FROM sessions ORDER BY id"
+        ).fetchall()
+    by_id = {row[0]: row[1:] for row in rows}
+    assert by_id["stale"][0] is not None
+    assert by_id["stale"][1] == "api_run_recovered_stale"
+    assert by_id["root"] == (None, None)
+    assert by_id["finished"] == (2.0, "api_run_completed")
+    assert by_id["interactive"] == (None, None)
+
+
+def test_switchyard_brokers_and_native_claude_lane_use_the_right_images():
+    """Thin brokers stay small while native Claude runs beside owner auth."""
+    dockerfile = (
+        ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "Dockerfile.hermes-switchyard-brokers"
+    ).read_text()
+    assert "httpx==0.28.1" in dockerfile
+    assert "worker_route_broker.py" in dockerfile
+    assert "routing_catalog.py" in dockerfile
+
+    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    containers = {
+        container["name"]: container
+        for container in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    expected = (
+        "registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-switchyard-brokers@"
+        "sha256:ee7e95e060ef8083da505162d7e9030daba15fdd828cc047bbcbe6aa409d2083"
+    )
+    assert containers["worker-route-broker"]["image"] == expected
+    assert containers["classifier-broker"]["image"] == expected
+    assert "claude-oauth-broker" not in containers
+
+    agent = _documents(HERMES / "agent-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    agent_containers = {
+        container["name"]: container
+        for container in agent["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    for container_name in ("hermes", "terminal"):
+        container = agent_containers[container_name]
+        environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in container["env"]}
+        mounts = {item["name"]: item for item in container["volumeMounts"]}
+        assert (
+            environment["HERMES_ROUTING_CATALOG_PATH"]
+            == "/routing-catalog/catalog.json"
+        )
+        assert (
+            environment["HERMES_CODEX_HEALTH_PATH"]
+            == "/opt/data/provider-health/codex.json"
+        )
+        assert (
+            environment["HERMES_CLAUDE_HEALTH_PATH"]
+            == "/opt/data/provider-health/claude.json"
+        )
+        assert mounts["routing-catalog"]["mountPath"] == "/routing-catalog"
+        assert mounts["routing-catalog"]["readOnly"] is True
+    codex = agent_containers["codex-broker"]
+    codex_environment = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in codex["env"]}
+    assert (
+        codex_environment["HERMES_CODEX_HEALTH_PATH"]
+        == "/opt/data/provider-health/codex.json"
+    )
+    claude = agent_containers["claude-broker"]
+    assert claude["image"].startswith("registry.bstein.dev/bstein/hermes-agent@")
+    assert "unset ANTHROPIC_API_KEY CLAUDE_API_KEY" in claude["args"][0]
+    assert any(
+        mount["name"] == "home" and mount["mountPath"] == "/opt/data"
+        for mount in claude["volumeMounts"]
+    )
+
+
+def test_classifier_broker_bounds_history_without_losing_routing_intent(monkeypatch):
+    """AUTO classification must fit the Jetson context without losing intent."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "classifier_broker.py"
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "httpx", SimpleNamespace())
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "hermes_classifier_broker", broker_path
+    )
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+
+    payload = {
+        "model": "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0",
+        "messages": [
+            {
+                "role": "system",
+                "content": "routing contract\n" + ("candidate policy " * 1000),
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "user",
+                "content": "Build and verify the Cassandra release safely.",
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": None,
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "call_large",
+                        "type": "function",
+                        "function": {
+                            "name": "large_tool",
+                            "arguments": '{"command":"' + ("x" * 5000) + '"}',
+                        },
+                    }
+                ],
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "tool",
+                "content": "unbounded test output " * 10000,
+                "tool_call_id": "call_large",
+            },
+            {
+                "role": "user",
+                "content": [
+                    {
+                        "type": "image_url",
+                        "image_url": {"url": ""},
+                    },
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "Turn this cat into a cute clown."},
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        "tools": [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "large_tool"}}],
+        "tool_choice": "auto",
+        "parallel_tool_calls": True,
+        "response_format": {"type": "json_object"},
+    }
+
+    compacted = module.compact_payload(payload)
+    encoded = json.dumps(compacted)
+
+    assert compacted["model"] == payload["model"]
+    assert compacted["response_format"] == payload["response_format"]
+    assert "tools" not in compacted
+    assert "tool_choice" not in compacted
+    assert "parallel_tool_calls" not in compacted
+    assert all(message.get("role") != "tool" for message in compacted["messages"])
+    assert all("tool_call_id" not in message for message in compacted["messages"])
+    assert all("tool_calls" not in message for message in compacted["messages"])
+    assert "[tool evidence]" in encoded
+    assert "[assistant requested an external tool]" in encoded
+    assert "Build and verify the Cassandra release safely." in encoded
+    assert "Turn this cat into a cute clown." in encoded
+    assert "image attachment available to the selected worker" in encoded
+    assert "data:image/png;base64" not in encoded
+    assert "unbounded test output " * 100 not in encoded
+    assert len(encoded) < 18_000
+
+
+def test_switchyard_classifier_is_bounded_and_fails_open_once():
+    """A sick local judge must not hold chat through repeated long retries."""
+    config = tomllib.loads(
+        _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"]["routes.toml"]
+    )
+    classifier = config["llm_clients"]["classifier"]
+    assert classifier["base_url"] == "http://127.0.0.1:9008/v1"
+    assert classifier["max_retries"] == 0
+    for route in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced"):
+        assert config["routes"][route]["recent_turn_window"] == 4
+    for route in ("auto_deep", "auto_maximum", "worker_auto_maximum"):
+        assert config["routes"][route]["recent_turn_window"] == 6
+
+    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    containers = {
+        item["name"]: item
+        for item in deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+    }
+    classifier_container = containers["classifier-broker"]
+    env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in classifier_container["env"]}
+    assert env["HERMES_CLASSIFIER_BROKER_READ_TIMEOUT"] == "60"
+    assert classifier_container["readinessProbe"]["httpGet"]["port"] == "classifier"
+
+
+def test_image_broker_returns_bytes_and_removes_owner_cache(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """The broker must not retain a family user's generated image."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_broker", broker_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    generated = tmp_path / "generated.png"
+    generated.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nprivate-image")
+
+    class Provider:
+        def generate(self, prompt, aspect, **kwargs):
+            assert prompt == "paint a blue sphere"
+            assert aspect == "square"
+            return {
+                "success": True,
+                "image": str(generated),
+                "model": "gpt-image-2-high",
+                "quality": "high",
+            }
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_PROVIDER", Provider())
+    result = module._generate(
+        {
+            "prompt": "paint a blue sphere",
+            "aspect_ratio": "square",
+            "model": "gpt-image-2-high",
+        }
+    )
+
+    assert result["success"] is True
+    assert result["image_b64"]
+    assert "image" not in result
+    assert not generated.exists()
+
+
+def test_image_broker_auto_falls_back_to_local_and_honors_explicit_routes(
+    monkeypatch,
+):
+    """AUTO is hosted-first while explicit local never calls the hosted lane."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_router", broker_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    calls = []
+
+    def hosted(payload, model, prompt, aspect):
+        calls.append(("hosted", model, prompt, aspect))
+        return {"success": False, "error": "hosted refusal"}
+
+    def local(payload, timeout=1800.0):
+        calls.append(("local", payload["model"], timeout))
+        return {
+            "success": True,
+            "image_b64": "aW1hZ2U=",
+            "model": "flux-2-klein-4b-local",
+            "route": "local",
+        }
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_generate_hosted", hosted)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_local_request", local)
+    auto = module._generate(
+        {
+            "prompt": "colorize this family photograph",
+            "aspect_ratio": "portrait",
+            "model": "atlas-image-auto-high",
+        }
+    )
+    assert auto["success"] is True
+    assert auto["route"] == "local"
+    assert auto["hosted_fallback_reason"] == "hosted refusal"
+    assert [call[0] for call in calls] == ["hosted", "local"]
+
+    calls.clear()
+    explicit = module._generate(
+        {
+            "prompt": "make a local landscape",
+            "aspect_ratio": "landscape",
+            "model": "flux-2-klein-4b-local",
+        }
+    )
+    assert explicit["route"] == "local"
+    assert [call[0] for call in calls] == ["local"]
+
+
+def test_image_broker_policy_is_narrow_and_operator_extensible(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Family-photo restoration stays allowed while the hard boundary remains."""
+    broker_path = HERMES / "scripts" / "image_broker.py"
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_image_policy", broker_path)
+    assert spec and spec.loader
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    policy = tmp_path / "policy.json"
+    policy.write_text('{"additional_blocked_phrases":["site-specific block"]}')
+    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "POLICY_PATH", policy)
+
+    assert (
+        module._policy_error(
+            "Colorize my baby photograph with a lighter natural skin tone"
+        )
+        is None
+    )
+    assert "minors" in module._policy_error("Create a sexual image of a child")
+    assert module._policy_error("A site-specific block request") == (
+        "request is blocked by the operator image policy"
+    )
+
+
+def test_local_flux_runtime_and_gpu_handoff_are_flux_managed():
+    """FLUX and Wolf share titan-24 while text stays on titan-20."""
+    deployment = _documents(HERMES / "local-image-deployment.yaml")[0]
+    assert deployment["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-local-image"
+    pod = deployment["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    assert pod["serviceAccountName"] == "hermes-gpu-runtime"
+    local = next(item for item in pod["containers"] if item["name"] == "local-image")
+    assert len(pod["containers"]) == 1
+    assert local["resources"]["requests"]["nvidia.com/gpu.shared"] == 1
+    assert local["ports"] == [{"name": "local-image", "containerPort": 9004}]
+    assert any(mount["mountPath"] == "/models" for mount in local["volumeMounts"])
+    model_env = {item["name"]: item["value"] for item in local["env"]}
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_LISTEN_PORT"] == "9004"
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_REVISION"] == (
+        "e7b7dc27f91deacad38e78976d1f2b499d76a294"
+    )
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVITY_NODE"] == "titan-24"
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVE_SM_PERCENT"] == "80"
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_MAX_EXTERNAL_MEMORY_BYTES"] == (
+        "3221225472"
+    )
+    assert model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_OFFLOAD_MODE"] == "sequential"
+    assert (
+        "nvidia-process-exporter-local.monitoring.svc.cluster.local"
+        in model_env["HERMES_LOCAL_IMAGE_GPU_ACTIVITY_URL"]
+    )
+    models_volume = next(item for item in pod["volumes"] if item["name"] == "models")
+    assert models_volume["persistentVolumeClaim"]["claimName"] == (
+        "hermes-image-models"
+    )
+
+    services = _documents(HERMES / "service.yaml")
+    image_service = next(
+        item for item in services if item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-local-image"
+    )
+    assert image_service["spec"]["selector"] == {"app": "hermes-local-image"}
+
+    handoff_services = _documents(HERMES / "model-gate-deployment.yaml")
+    handoff = next(
+        item
+        for item in handoff_services
+        if item["kind"] == "Service"
+        and item["metadata"]["name"] == "hermes-gpu-handoff"
+    )
+    assert handoff["spec"]["ports"][0]["targetPort"] == "handoff"
+
+    ariadne = _documents(
+        Path(__file__).parents[2] / "services/maintenance/apps/ariadne-deployment.yaml"
+    )[0]
+    env = {
+        item["name"]: item["value"]
+        for item in ariadne["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"][0]["env"]
+        if "value" in item
+    }
+    assert env["GAME_MODE_OLLAMA_URL"] == (
+        "http://hermes-gpu-handoff.hermes.svc.cluster.local:11434"
+    )
+    assert env["GAME_MODE_OLLAMA_MODEL"] == "flux-2-klein-4b-local"
+
+    for config_name in (
+        "configmap.yaml",
+        "agent-configmap.yaml",
+        "chat-configmap.yaml",
+    ):
+        config = _documents(HERMES / config_name)[0]["data"]["config.yaml"]
+        assert "gpt-oss:20b" not in config
+        assert "atlas-switchyard" in config
+    switchyard = _documents(HERMES / "switchyard-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"][
+        "routes.toml"
+    ]
+    assert 'id = "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0"' in switchyard
+    assert "qwen2.5:3b-instruct-q4_0" not in switchyard
+    assert "route/local/qwen2.5-14b/medium" in switchyard
+    assert "Anthropic and Claude name the same provider" in switchyard
+    assert "OpenAI and Codex name the same provider" in switchyard
+    assert "Choose across every configured Codex and Claude family" in switchyard
+    assert "Claude Fable" in switchyard
+    assert switchyard.count('Treat "think hard"') == 4
+    assert switchyard.count("Never choose below the") >= 5
+    switchyard_config = tomllib.loads(switchyard)
+    routes = switchyard_config["routes"]
+    configured_targets = switchyard_config["targets"]
+    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced", "auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
+        leading_targets = set(routes[route_name]["targets"][:2])
+        assert leading_targets == {"codex_sol_xhigh", "claude_opus_xhigh"}
+        assert "max_output_tokens" not in routes[route_name]
+    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced", "auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
+        targets = routes[route_name]["targets"]
+        selector_targets = routes[route_name]["response_schema"]
+        assert not any(target.startswith("local_") for target in targets)
+        assert any("fable" in target for target in targets)
+        assert "local_qwen" not in selector_targets
+        assert "not eligible for foreground" in routes[route_name]["prompt"]
+    for route_name in ("auto_deep", "auto_maximum"):
+        targets = routes[route_name]["targets"]
+        selector_targets = routes[route_name]["response_schema"]
+        assert not any(target.endswith("_low") for target in targets)
+        assert "_low" not in selector_targets
+    maximum_targets = routes["auto_maximum"]["targets"]
+    maximum_selector_targets = routes["auto_maximum"]["response_schema"]
+    assert not any(target.endswith("_medium") for target in maximum_targets)
+    assert "_medium" not in maximum_selector_targets
+    assert "absolute high effort floor" in routes["auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
+    assert "quality mark was missed" in routes["auto_balanced"]["prompt"]
+    assert "raises the next boundary to xhigh" in routes["auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
+    assert (
+        "Repeated quality misses require xhigh"
+        in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]["prompt"]
+    )
+    assert any(
+        target.startswith("local_") for target in routes["manual_local_qwen"]["targets"]
+    )
+    for route_name in (
+        "manual_codex_luna",
+        "manual_codex_terra",
+        "manual_codex_sol",
+        "manual_claude_haiku",
+        "manual_claude_fable",
+        "manual_claude_sonnet",
+        "manual_claude_opus",
+    ):
+        assert not any(
+            target.startswith("local_") for target in routes[route_name]["targets"]
+        )
+    for provider, families in {
+        "codex": ("luna", "terra", "sol"),
+        "claude": ("haiku", "fable", "sonnet", "opus"),
+    }.items():
+        for family in families:
+            for effort in ("low", "medium", "high", "xhigh"):
+                route = routes[f"manual_{provider}_{family}_{effort}"]
+                assert route["id"] == f"atlas/manual/{provider}/{family}/{effort}"
+                assert route["targets"][0] == f"{provider}_{family}_{effort}"
+                worker_target = f"worker_{provider}_{family}_{effort}"
+                assert worker_target in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]["targets"]
+                assert configured_targets[worker_target]["id"] == (
+                    f"worker/{provider}/{family}/{effort}"
+                )
+    for route_name in ("auto_fast", "auto_balanced"):
+        prompt = routes[route_name]["prompt"]
+        assert "image tool—not the conversational model" in prompt
+        assert "Do not select a" in prompt
+        assert "local Qwen or Claude target" in prompt
+    assert "max_output_tokens" not in routes["worker_auto_maximum"]
+    model_gate = _documents(HERMES / "model-gate-configmap.yaml")[0]["data"][
+        "model_gate.py"
+    ]
+    assert "qwen2.5:14b-instruct-q4_0" in model_gate

testing/tests/test_hermes_chat_sandbox.py

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-"""Hermes chat sandbox contracts."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from test_hermes_chat_support import (
-    Path,
-    ROOT,
-    importlib,
-)
-
-
-def test_sandbox_executes_python_with_bounded_output(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
-    source = ROOT / "dockerfiles" / "hermes-chat-sandbox-server.py"
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hermes_chat_sandbox_server", source)
-    assert spec and spec.loader
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    monkeypatch.setattr(module, "WORKSPACE", tmp_path)
-
-    result = module._execute("import math\nprint(math.comb(10, 3))")
-
-    assert result["success"] is True
-    assert result["stdout"] == "120\n"
-    assert result["stderr"] == ""